1 Dr Tan Wu Meng asked the Minister for Health (a) how many and what proportion of workers at healthcare institutions are currently outsourced; (b) what proportion of outsourced workers perform roles which in the pre-outsourcing era would have been in frontline or patient care areas or involving handling patient samples; and (c) whether human resource practices for outsourced workers are harmonised with direct hires, including recognition for COVID-19 related work and frontline exposure risk.
\tThe Senior Minister of State for Health (Dr Koh Poh Koon) (for the Minister for Health): Sir, as a doctor and a unionist, I want to thank all our frontline healthcare workers for their sacrifices and hard work during this COVID-19 crisis. About 10,000 staff, or about 13%, working in public healthcare institutions are hired by third party contractors. Some examples of outsourced workers include housekeeping staff, security guards, and staff doing landscaping, pest control and kitchen or food services. Of these outsourced staff, almost 70% of them are in roles which require them to be at the frontline or patient care areas, but less than 5% are involved in handling patient samples.
In general, the third party contractors have been engaged by the public healthcare institutions under a contract for service arrangement for specific projects or services. They are engaged for a fee and take on the responsibility of hiring the staff required to meet the needs of these projects or services. Hence, the compensation and benefits of staff that they hire is determined and paid by these contract companies.
Nevertheless, to ensure that the welfare of outsourced staff is taken care of during the COVID-19 outbreak, the public healthcare institutions have extended various initiatives to them. Outsourced staff who work in high-risk areas are trained in infection control measures and provided with full PPE, or Personal Protective Equipment, when discharging their duties. They are also included in the COVID-19 vaccination exercises for our healthcare workers.
The public healthcare institutions appreciate the contribution of these outsourced workers in our battle against COVID-19 and many of these institutions have extended goodwill donations and care packs to their outsourced staff. The Ministry certainly encourages the public healthcare institutions to continue looking into ways to show appreciation for the hard work of outsourced staff in many different ways.
\t
\tMr Speaker: Dr Ta Wu Meng.
Dr Tan Wu Meng (Jurong): Mr Speaker, I thank the Senior Minister of State for his answer. I have two supplementary questions I would like to put to MOH. As preamble, I just want to make reference to the Budget 2020 Round-up Speech delivered last year by the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Finance, and I quote from paragraph B24(a), \"The Government will award public officers on the frontline who are directly battling with the COVID-19 disease up to one additional month of special bonus. This will include many healthcare officers in MOH and the restructured hospitals.\"
Sir, in the context of this, I can share that my Clementi residents tell me, and my brothers and sisters in the Labour Movement tell me, that there are cleaners serving in our hospitals, cleaners who are cleaning COVID-19 patient rooms, cleaners who are cleaning COVID-19 patient room toilets, who unfortunately, at the moment, do not qualify for this bonus because they are outsourced. So, can I ask the Senior Minister of State will the Ministry consider extending this bonus to outsourced cleaners and rank and file workers who are embedded deep in the COVID-19 frontline? I ask this again, Mr Speaker, because in the pre-outsourcing era, these workers would have been in-sourced, would have been direct hires and in the pre-outsourcing era, they would have qualified for similar bonuses and support. And it would also be in harmonisation with the existing measures the Senior Minister of State has mentioned – provisions of vaccination support and PPE support. So, I raise this for the Ministry's consideration, please.
\tDr Koh Poh Koon: Sir, I agree with the Member that outsourced workers who share the same risks in very high-risk areas, for example, the COVID-19 ICUs or the COVID-19 wards, need to be appropriately recognised. And I am sure the healthcare institutions will look at ways to honour their hard work and sacrifices, and the risks that they take as well. We will give the healthcare institutions the latitude and the time to plan for appreciation in the various ways that they can to show solidarity with these workers who have also taken risks, just like any of our other healthcare workers in the frontline sector.
\tMr Pritam Singh (Aljunied): Mr Speaker, I thank the Senior Minister of State. I have one question. Does the Ministry make it a requirement for service providers to extend work injury compensation to outsourced healthcare workers?
\tDr Koh Poh Koon: Sir, can I just clarify if the Member is asking about compensation by the hospitals or work injury compensation in general?
\tMr Pritam Singh: It would be specific to the service providers, because these are outsourced workers. There are situations – not exactly in the healthcare setting but sometimes, other settings – where the worker is on a contract for service arrangement and no Work Injury Compensation Act or WICA benefits accrue to such workers. So, I am wondering whether healthcare institutions make it a requirement for companies that provide such outsourced services to healthcare institutions, whether it is a requirement by the healthcare institutions themselves for these workers to have WICA coverage.
\tDr Koh Poh Koon: Sir, I do not have specific details on this pertaining to the institutions but I would imagine that the generic provisions for workplace injuries and compensation would apply in this setting as well.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"POFMA Office's Actions In Regard To Misinformation about COVID-19 and COVID-19 Vaccination","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"OA","content":"The following question stood in the name of Ms He Ting Ru –
2 To ask the Minister for Communications and Information (a) whether the POFMA Office is taking any measures to deal with misinformation over COVID-19 and COVID-19 vaccines; and (b) if so, what are the measures being taken, bearing in mind the need to ensure that there will not be a chilling effect on legitimate concerns being raised.
\tAssoc Prof Jamus Jerome Lim (Sengkang): Question No 2, please.
\tThe Minister for Communications and Information (Mr S Iswaran): Mr Speaker, Sir, misinformation is a serious challenge in our fight against the COVID-19 pandemic. In the past year, we have responded to over 60 instances of speculation, rumours, scams and outright falsehoods pertaining to COVID-19, using a range of responses – from public communications to legislative levers, including the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act or POFMA.
A key focus of the Ministerial Taskforce and our Government agencies has been to provide accurate updates from trusted sources in a timely and transparent manner, to help ensure our citizens are well-informed and to calm anxieties caused by such misinformation. For instance, we regularly convey information and clarifications through the media, on Government websites, social media and the Gov.sg channel on WhatsApp and Telegram.
Public education is key to our vaccination programme. We want to strengthen our resilience against vaccine misinformation by enhancing the understanding of COVID-19 vaccines and debunking falsehoods, so that Singaporeans can make informed decisions for the safety and health of themselves, their loved ones and the community.
We use multiple platforms and languages to communicate essential information about the COVID-19 vaccines to all segments of our society. Over the past few weeks, vaccination information has been conveyed through print and broadcast interviews, as well as social media, direct messaging platforms and Gov.sg. The local media has also published articles and FAQ columns to address concerns and questions about vaccines. We have also worked with major tech companies to ensure that authoritative sources, including MOH’s website, are prominently included on their platforms.
As we commence the vaccination programme for seniors, community volunteers from the People’s Association, as well as Silver Generation Ambassadors, will be conducting house visits to speak to our seniors and address their queries about the COVID-19 vaccine and the vaccination programme.
We are also actively monitoring for vaccine-related misinformation. Where there is cause for action, we will not hesitate to use the full force of the law.
All of us have a role in stemming the spread of misinformation. We should check that the information we receive comes from reliable sources, make the effort to verify before sharing and not share unverified information. It is vital, especially in this time of crisis, that every one of us does the right thing.
\tAssoc Prof Jamus Jerome Lim (Sengkang): I thank the Minister for that response. I am just wondering as a supplementary question if some degree of benefit of doubt may be afforded to those who may unwittingly be sharing disinformation. I have in mind Grandma who may run the risk of falling foul of POFMA because she shares reservations in a WhatsApp message she received about mRNA vaccines. She is exercising just individual skepticism.
\tMr S Iswaran: Mr Speaker, I thank the Member for his question. In our response to misinformation as I have described, we have a range of possibilities – from public education, to a targeted effort to clarify a particular point on Government websites and other channels, as well as working with the specific parties concerned. We do not need to always resort to the extreme use of the legislative levers, unless it is warranted by the circumstances. Therefore, in the kind of example that the Member cites, very often, we have found that engagement with the relevant parties has sufficed to clarify the matter and correct the misinformation.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Impact of SolarWinds Breach on Singapore and Cybersecurity of Critical Systems","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"OA","content":"3 Mr Alex Yam asked the Minister for Communications and Information (a) what is the impact of the SolarWinds breach on Singapore and the cybersecurity of our critical systems; and (b) what steps is the Ministry taking to mitigate the cyber threats to Singapore arising from this and other global cybersecurity incidents.
4 Mr Desmond Choo asked the Minister for Communications and Information in light of the SolarWinds cybersecurity incident (a) how many companies and Government agencies are affected or vulnerable to such attacks; and (b) how can companies providing essential services and Government agencies have better oversight over cybersecurity arrangements with third party providers.
\tThe Minister for Communications and Information (Mr S Iswaran): Mr Speaker, the SolarWinds cybersecurity breach compromised a network management software that is widely used by major companies worldwide. The attacker used the software’s regular updates to implant a backdoor and gain a foothold in the networks of organisations that downloaded and installed the malicious update. This is a very sophisticated attack that evaded detection for many months.
As reported by the media, SolarWinds’ clients include US government agencies and Fortune 500 companies – including Microsoft, CISCO Systems and VMWare. It affected about 18,000 customers, although a much smaller number were compromised by follow-on activity on their systems. This breach is especially noteworthy because the SolarWinds software is part of the network control and management infrastructure. Hence, it was trusted and had privileged access to internal networks. The situation is still evolving and the affected firms are continuing with their investigations.
When first alerted of the breach, the Cyber Security Agency, or CSA, immediately raised the National Cyber Threat Alert Level and worked with our Critical Information Infrastructure, or CII, sectors to check and monitor our critical systems. There is no indication thus far that Singapore’s CII and Government systems have been adversely affected by the SolarWinds breach. The Government is nonetheless adopting a cautious approach and CSA has issued public advisories on steps that enterprises and organisations should take to safeguard their systems against this threat. These include having full visibility of their networks and detecting unusual activity in a timely manner.
\t In the longer term, dealing with these sophisticated cyber threats requires a fundamental shift in mindset towards a \"zero-trust\" cybersecurity posture. At its core, this \"zero-trust\" cybersecurity posture has the notion that we should protect our networks by observing two key principles. First, we should not trust any activity without first verifying it; and second, ensure constant monitoring and vigilance for suspicious activities. This includes compartmentalising and restricting access to different segments of the network, validating transactions across segments, reconciling any escalation of user privileges, and actively and regularly hunting for threats. Organisations should also put in place robust plans for cyber incident response in the event they fall victim to a cyber-attack.
CSA will strengthen engagements with CII sectors, enterprises and organisations to adopt and sustain these measures.
Mr Speaker, the SolarWinds incident underscores the global and transborder nature of cyber threats. Given the nature of the digital domain, such cyber incidents will happen from time to time. Malicious actors only need to exploit one vulnerability, while the defenders must ensure that there are no vulnerabilities in all the systems and networks that they are protecting, all the time. Though difficult to completely prevent, we need deliberate, targeted and consistent efforts to strengthen our cyber defences against sophisticated threats like the SolarWinds breach, which exploit the supply chain of trusted software and vendors. Our CIIs, enterprises and citizens must also maintain their vigilance against cyber threats, as we mitigate the risks while leveraging the opportunities of digitalisation.
Mr Speaker, may I also have your permission to say that this is also in response to Question No 4.
\tMr Speaker: Please do. Mr Desmond Choo.
\tMr Desmond Choo (Tampines): I would like to thank the Minister for his clarification. I have two points of clarifications for the Minister. The first, is before the SolarWinds incident, FireEye was also a victim of hacks. According to media reports, 30% of companies have actually not used SolarWinds nor FireEye software. This means that the vulnerability could be a lot more extensive than we believe. How would the Government go ahead in the future to make sure that we close up our weakest link?
The second point of clarification is on the roles of CSA and GovTech, in helping our companies providing essential services to toughen up their defences. Not all companies are equally well-resourced, some will need more support than others, we are probably only as good as our weakest link. So, I hope the Minister can point us the way forward.
\tMr S Iswaran: Mr Speaker, I thank the Member for his question. I think his two questions are in some ways inter-related. Because the first is, how we can ensure that we are not vulnerable and the second is how we can help companies fortify themselves against such threats.
I think underlying this is the key point first, what I stated earlier in my main response, which is that, the nature of cyber threats is such that they are global, they are transborder and they can occur or affect us through a multiplicity of chance; not least, as the SolarWinds incident illustrates, through trusted network systems and vendors.
And therefore, the first and perhaps most important point is the \"zero-trust\" posture that we must adopt. In other words, always be vigilant, constantly evaluate our systems and conduct regular monitoring and threat hunting exercises. I think this is a fundamental; it is a posture that we need to adopt across not just our critical information infrastructure, but indeed across all organisations, especially as our digital footprint grows as we adopt new digital solutions.
Secondly, on the part of CSA and the Government, CSA works with our CII sectors in particular, to share information regularly on evolving threats and also on solutions that are available for adoption. In particular, CSA is in regular contact with its counterparts around the world and that is an important source of this information and intelligence that is necessary to strengthen our own system.
CSA also has, as I mentioned, an alert system, so that when it is warranted, the alert levels are raised so that our CII owners are aware that the threat landscape has shifted and they need to step up some of their activities in response to that.
Finally, CSA works with several private sector partners and others to ensure various forms of cybersecurity solutions are available for adoption and use by not just the large enterprises and our CIIs but also SMEs.
This is an important part of our work going forward, raising awareness of cybersecurity and also putting in place solutions or making available solutions which businesses can use, and at the same time also working with individuals.
So, there is a range of measures we are undertaking and that we continue to undertake. I think the fact of the matter is, we can never be foolproof in this effort, but we can make sure that we take every effort to strengthen our system and learn from incidents like SolarWinds to further fortify ourselves.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Complaints of Smoking in Prohibited Locations","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"OA","content":"5 Ms Yeo Wan Ling asked the Minister for Sustainability and the Environment (a) how regularly are complaints about smoking in prohibited locations lodged; (b) how many of them turn out to be in areas that are not prohibited; and (c) whether there have been considerations to redefine prohibited smoking areas based on different parameters such as human traffic volume and width of walking area.
\tThe Senior Minister of State for Sustainability and the Environment (Dr Amy Khor Lean Suan) (for the Minister for \tSustainability and the Environment): Feedback on smoking received by NEA is categorised as either smoking in prohibited or non-prohibited areas. NEA does not track the number of feedback received on smoking in prohibited locations that turn out to be in areas that are not prohibited. In 2020, NEA received an average of about 2,900 feedback a month on smoking in prohibited areas and 210 feedback a month on smoking in non-prohibited areas.
To reduce the public's exposure to the harmful effects of second-hand tobacco smoke, NEA has been progressively extending the smoking prohibition to more places where the public are likely to be exposed to second-hand tobacco smoke. Human traffic volume is already one of the considerations when determining smoking prohibited places, alongside other factors such as whether the places are enclosed, and frequency of visits by families and vulnerable groups.
Besides the Government's efforts on smoking prohibition, I urge smokers to exercise social responsibility and refrain from lighting up where the tobacco smoke can affect those around them. Families and friends of smokers, as well as the general public, can help to reinforce positive social norms.
\tMr Speaker: Ms Yeo.
\tMs Yeo Wan Ling (Pasir Ris-Punggol): Mr Speaker, I thank the Senior Minister of State for her response. I have two supplementary questions. The open areas outside of many common public hotspots such as MRT, LRT stations, pathways leading up to shopping malls, which may house polyclinics as well as dialysis centres are often open air and unsheltered. However, these pathways are frequented by families with young children as well as patients with compromised immunities and vulnerables such as seniors.
In such high human traffic thoroughfares, often, the smoking community would also find it convenient to take a break and smoke, especially if there are litter bins around for the disposal of the cigarettes. In such areas as well as in places where there are high incidence of complaints which turn out to be areas which are not prohibited, would the Minister consider to locate such litter bins to areas where there is less human traffic but still convenient and safe for our smokers to take a break?
The second supplementary question is, would the Minister also consider to place advisories or send emissaries to the areas for the community to be considerate of each other's needs?
\tDr Amy Khor Lean Suan: I thank the Member for her supplementary questions. I assume that for areas where there is high human traffic, litter bins are placed there in order to provide convenience for people to bin their rubbish. But I do understand the Member's questions and concerns. Indeed, we do have such similar feedback on these thoroughfares. NEA has responded to the feedback by working with the relevant agencies and premises owners to relocate these bins – particularly the ones with the ashtrays – to places where there is less footfall, away from the main thoroughfare or high human traffic volume, to prevent the areas near where the thoroughfare is to become smoking congregation areas.
With regard to advisories, indeed, NEA actually worked closely with the Town Councils as well as with various Government agencies and grassroots to distribute advisories or flyers in residential estates as well as to put up visual reminders to remind smokers to be considerate when lighting up and to not smoke in smoking prohibited areas. And of course, we will continue to actively monitor and enforce against smoking in prohibited areas.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Effectiveness of Anti-littering Enforcement Actions and Possibility of Scaling Up","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"OA","content":"6 Mr Liang Eng Hwa asked the Minister for Sustainability and the Environment (a) whether the high-rise anti-littering measures taken so far have been effective; (b) whether the surveillance devices being deployed can be scaled up; and (c) whether the agencies will look to new technologies and devices to enhance enforcement capabilities.
\tThe Senior Minister of State for Sustainability and the Environment (Dr Amy Khor Lean Suan) (for the Minister for Sustainability and the Environment): NEA adopts a multi-pronged approach comprising enforcement, public education and community partnerships to deter high-rise litterbugs.
In 2020, NEA has stepped up enforcement against high-rise littering by increasing the number of surveillance camera deployments by over 50% as compared to 2019. NEA also partnered closely with Town Councils to enable more timely information-sharing to facilitate the investigation of high-rise littering offences. These measures enabled NEA to take more than 1,000 enforcement actions against high-rise litterbugs in 2020. NEA will continue to enhance its enforcement capabilities by keeping pace with developments in camera technology for high-rise littering surveillance.
Even as NEA steps up enforcement against high-rise littering, we must continue to cultivate social graciousness, good habits and a sense of collective responsibility to keep Singapore clean and safe. For this reason, NEA adopts complementary strategies such as strengthening community partnerships to raise awareness on the negative impacts of high-rise littering. In 2020, NEA trialled informative standees at public areas with persistent littering feedback and enforcement, to deter people from committing high-rise littering offences. NEA is also partnering Town Councils to install posters at HDB blocks, highlighting the environmental and social consequences of high-rise littering.
Through the collective efforts of all, we can uphold high standards of public cleanliness.
Mr Speaker: Mr Liang Eng Hwa.
\tMr Liang Eng Hwa (Bukit Panjang): Thank you, Sir. While I appreciate the efforts by NEA over the years, there are obviously no visible improvements in the estate that we can see and have been monitoring. Items continue to be thrown out of windows, such as cigarette butts, and it is frequently still happening. Many Members have raised this in this House for many years. So, I would like to ask the Senior Minister of State whether this is a case where the deterrent effect is not working and the litterbugs think they can get away with it. If that is the case, then are surveillance and enforcement working to achieve that?
Secondly, I would like to ask whether NEA is seeing this littering problem as a steady state problem or is NEA committed to improving the situation to move the needle and using and harnessing technologies and a community effort to reduce high-rise littering?
\tDr Amy Khor Lean Suan: Again, let me thank the Member for his questions and, in fact, comments.
First, with regard to the question about the deterrent effect of our enforcements, let me say that due to the nature of the offence – high-rise littering act – as well as the fact that our estates especially are very heavily built up, very dense, I think you would appreciate that it is not easy to identify and apprehend high-rise litterbugs. Despite this, a high-rise littering offence is a very serious offence. It affects our public health and, in fact, safety, too, and we take this seriously and we take firm enforcement action as far as is possible and practicable.
Over the years, we have stepped up our enforcement and surveillance capabilities. In fact, we leveraged technology and data analytics in order to apprehend high-rise litterbugs. And as I have noted, since last year, 2020, we have actually increased our camera deployments by more than 50%. We have also worked more closely with the Town Councils to enable more timely sharing of information in order to facilitate our investigations. In fact, we have worked to improve our work processes through data analytics so that we can actually shorten the waiting time for camera deployments for surveillance and that is the reason why we are able to increase the number of deployments of the cameras.
We have also worked to streamline our investigation procedures to shorten the investigation period as far as possible. In addition to that, of course, we will continue to look at using better camera technology in terms of better image resolution as well as detection capabilities and so on to be more effective. Let me also say that, in fact, we have, over the years, been increasing the penalties for high-rise litterbugs. So, for high-rise littering, the first offence is already a Court conviction, with a maximum of $2,000 fine and/or CWO. The third and subsequent offences are a maximum of $10,000 fine and/or CWO. What we are doing now is also to deter future high-rise litterbugs. For instance, when we have a camera capture of a high-rise littering act, we are working with Town Councils to put up standees in that affected block to inform residents that high-rise littering offences have been committed and have been captured by camera deployments.
Let me also add that when we look at the statistics, basically, the repeat offenders for high-rise littering acts actually are lower than for the general littering offences. So, although the number of offences per offender may be higher for high-rise littering because the camera will capture multiple acts of high-rise littering, but, for repeat offenders, actually, the percentage is lower. So, it does show that what we are doing does have a deterrent effect if we are able to identify and apprehend them.
So, steady state? No. As I have said earlier, at the end of the day, even as we step up enforcement and continue to actively monitor and try and apprehend with technology and so on, ultimately, what is important is we need the community, we need Singaporeans to cooperate. We need Singaporeans to cultivate social graciousness, good habits and collective responsibility and not to litter, in order to be able to keep Singapore clean and green.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Facilitating Singaporeans Entering Malaysia to Take Care of Essential Personal Matters","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"OA","content":"7 Ms Sylvia Lim asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs whether the Government is working with the Malaysian authorities to facilitate Singaporeans entering Malaysia for essential personal matters such as family bereavements.
\tThe Minister for Foreign Affairs (Dr Vivian Balakrishnan): Mr Speaker, many of us have family or close friends across the Causeway. So, in the last one year, the enforced separation by the border closures has had a profound emotional impact on many families in Singapore, especially when confronted by family bereavement. I have lost count of the number of emails I have received from people who were deprived of that opportunity to be with a family member at the end of life. So, we particularly sympathise and understand the feelings of Singaporeans and, indeed, Malaysians who are caught in such circumstances.
Having said that, we also fully understand the need for public health precautions, of which border closures are part. And we also recognise that it is the responsibility of each government to do whatever it takes in order to protect public health.
Throughout this epidemic, we have been in close contact with the Malaysian authorities and we have worked with them to facilitate travel for Singaporeans with essential or compassionate reasons for travel. Since March 2020, we have helped to facilitate travel for more than 250 appeal cases from Singapore Citizens or PRs who wanted to enter Malaysia. We have also facilitated the repatriation of more than 350 Singaporeans who were stranded in Malaysia, and these were usually the elderly or very young, or people with disability and mobility issues, and we have had to run special services across the Causeway to bring our people back home.
We have reached with the Malaysian authorities an in-principle agreement to have protocols for travel in such circumstances, including family bereavements. The exact details are still being worked out. As Members of the House are aware, the COVID-19 situation keeps evolving very rapidly. Even our previously agreed Reciprocal Green Lanes and travel bubbles have had to be opened and shut, sometimes quite quickly. So, I hope all Members understand that this is a dynamic and difficult situation. We are doing our best but, from time to time, we will sometimes have to take tough decisions.
\tMr Speaker: Ms Sylvia Lim.
\tMs Sylvia Lim (Aljunied): Thank you, Speaker. I have two supplementary questions for the Minister for Foreign Affairs.
First, in his earlier reply, he mentioned that the Ministry has facilitated successfully about 250 appeals for travel by Singaporeans and PRs across the Causeway. I have some residents who were obviously not successful in their attempts to get across and this was despite MFA Consular officers coming in to try to assist, but there was just no response from the Malaysian side. So, I would like to ask how can the Ministry take this forward to ensure that there is a broader baseline or more objectivity to facilitate such travel, such that it is not just hit-and-miss where some appeals are allowed and some are not, and I do not know the circumstances of the 250 successful appeals.
The second question, perhaps more broadly, is that we are all aware of the dynamic political situation in Malaysia and also the state of emergency currently. So, I wonder if the Minister could share with us his observations about how functional currently are the diplomatic channels to resolve bilateral issues.
\tDr Vivian Balakrishnan: I thank Ms Sylvia Lim for the two supplementary questions. I said just now we had facilitated more than 250 cases. The Member is quite right. In fact, the majority of cases did not get through. For each case that MFA is aware of, we would first inform the Singaporean or PR concerned that they need to get approval – specific approval from the Director-General of Immigration of Malaysia. We always ask them to keep us informed so that we can also reach out informally to the Malaysian High Commission to try our best to persuade. But the legal and diplomatic position is that the ultimate discretion and the final decision rest with the Director-General of Immigration of Malaysia. So, I am not in a position to say on what basis he agreed to some of our requests and disagreed with many of the other requests.
I would also say that I have also come across many cases, when the Singaporean is made aware of how difficult the hurdles are in place, they have sometimes decided that because of the lack of time, that it would be pointless to try to get across the Causeway and to delay the funeral. So, all in all, it has been a very tough, a very heart-wrenching time for these families. And what I can assure is that MFA takes seriously each and every single case. We will do our best.
On Ms Sylvia Lim's second point about what she described as the dynamic political situation in Malaysia, the state of emergency and the rest of it, what I would say from an MFA perspective is that throughout this entire crisis – and Members must remember, in the case of Malaysia, they have even gone through a change of government in the past one year – nevertheless, throughout this crisis, we have been able to maintain good functional communications and relations between the Prime Ministers, between the Ministers, certainly between myself and the Foreign Minister of Malaysia Dato' Sri Hishammuddin Hussein, and as well as at the public service, civil service level.
So, all those ties, those communications, both formal and informal, including WhatsApp messages, are flowing. I can tell you that there have been occasions where I have even had to call him up personally because a Singaporean got stuck in a particularly delicate situation and he has obliged. So, the point is, on both sides of the Causeway, we are dealing with a very difficult situation. My objective is to keep relations open, keep communications honest, constructive, helpful. Not to make things worse, not to put undue pressure which would actually cause damage to the long-term challenge of both countries having to deal with this pandemic.
\tSo, all in all I would say that our relations remain in a very good state. I am sorry that we have not been able to persuade the authorities in Malaysia to agree to every request that has come from Singaporeans, but we will do our best.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Eligibility for Community Care Apartments","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"OA","content":"8 Ms Ng Ling Ling asked the Minister for National Development (a) how many Singaporeans are currently eligible for community care apartments; and (b) whether HDB will consider rolling out such apartments earlier to more townships should demand far exceed the pilot supply.
\tThe Minister for National Development (Mr Desmond Lee): Mr Speaker, jointly developed by MND, MOH and HDB, the Community Care Apartments integrate senior-friendly housing with care services that can be scaled according to individual care needs, with the aim of better supporting our seniors to age in place. The first pilot at Bukit Batok will be launched for sale in February 2021 – which is this month – in our HDB Build-To-Order exercise.
The number of Singaporeans who may be eligible for the Community Care Apartments will depend on their age, the income levels and in the case of this pilot, we give priority to those with need for assistance with their activities of daily living. The demand for the Community Care Apartments will also depend on seniors' budget, preferences and care needs.
We have plans for the Community Care Apartments to be piloted at additional sites if the take-up rate and public response for the first pilot at Bukit Batok is good. As this is a new housing concept, we will evaluate the initial pilots before developing longer term plans.
\tMr Speaker: Ms Ng Ling Ling.
Ms Ng Ling Ling (Ang Mo Kio): Thank you, Speaker, and I thank the Minister for the reply. I am very encouraged by MND, MOH and HDB for their collaboration to bring about such a meaningful pilot housing model and to expand the housing options for our seniors with a complimentary suite of care services – almost able to be customised to their needs. I have several of my residents' families who have expressed their needs for a smaller, affordable apartments like this, with care support nearer to home.
My two supplementary questions are: one, will MND also consider granting exceptions for eligibility of such flats if one of the applicants is a care-giver below 65 years old, but is looking after a senior. Case in point is a resident of mine who is the only child of an aged parent requiring such care that has been described in the pilot model.
My second question is, will MND consider granting exceptions for eligibility to such flats if one of the applicants is a person with disabilities who can benefit also from such care support, but is below 65 years old? A lot of the criteria spelt out would also be actually very suitable for people with disabilities. So, these are my two supplementary questions.
\tMr Desmond Lee: Mr Speaker, this is the very first pilot. We have scoped it. We want to see what the demand is and how people respond to a care continuum option like this. But nevertheless, if appeals come in, we will consider making exceptions to the two cases that the Member had mentioned. But I think we want to make sure that we can first, evaluate the pilot, at least the first site, for the target group that this was intended for. Nevertheless, in the steady state, we will certainly look at the exceptional cases like this.
In the first case, if one is below 65 years old but a care-giver, I think we can look at the situation and exercise discretion. On the second, I have asked my team, beyond the pilot for Community Care Apartments for seniors, to look at the model for persons with disability and independent living in the community.
\t
\tMs Denise Phua Lay Peng (Jalan Besar): I have actually gone to the exhibition at HDB and studied the Community Care Apartment model. I am very impressed and very excited as well. My supplementary question is related to Member Ng Ling Ling's question. I think it is such an excellent model and it should be scaled.
I am asking if the Minister would consider working with the disability organisations to pilot this model. Because the current options for residential living for persons with disability is not a continuum – you either stay at home with your own parents who are also ageing themselves, or you go to a residential home which is a very costly model. There is also merit to develop a continuum of living models so that folks can afford and benefit from different tiers of service packages. I think it just make sense for persons with disability who are younger than 65 years to be given that option; so that the principle of more self reliance and joint responsibility can be manifested in the new options.
I hope that the Minister will not wait until the pilot is over, but to try this model with persons with disability who will be able to live more independently – do a pilot of the pilot.
\tMr Desmond Lee: Yes, we are already studying and actively looking at how and what options may be available for persons with disability who may want to live independently in the community.
For the Community Care Apartments, apart from the age criterion, a person with physical disability may benefit from the Care Apartment model. If a younger person with disability, and it is a physical disability, would like facilities such as these, we are certainly studying that. But, of course, there other forms of disability that we may need to look at, and the availability of community based services in a model such as this. But we are actively looking at it.
\tMr Speaker: Mr Xie Yao Quan.
\tMr Xie Yao Quan (Jurong): Thank you, Mr Speaker. I thank the Minister for his reply. I have one supplementary question. The Minister has mentioned that the Community Care Apartment is a novel housing scheme and I think the key differentiator is that this scheme integrates – it is not just about housing but it integrates care, health and social services. And the Minister, in his reply, has also emphasised the importance of evaluating this new housing scheme.
So, my question is apart from public response and market demand, what other factors and outcome measures might the Ministry take into consideration as it reviews its plans for the roll-out and evaluate the pilot scheme.
\tMr Desmond Lee: I think the Member is right. In evaluating this pilot, we look beyond just the market response to a housing option like this because this is not just housing; it is housing plus social support and care options integrated together.
And therefore, in evaluating this pilot, we look at a number of things. For example, getting feedback from the seniors as well as their care-givers and family members on the layout of the Community Care Apartments, on the communal spaces that we are providing, on the programming that we are offering, on the care services, both the basic as well as the optional care services that we are providing to them.
We are also looking at whether the Community Care Apartments and the programming we are providing as well as the support that comes with it, whether it adds and supports and promotes the overall well-being of our seniors in a holistic way – both the physical well-being, emotional well-being and relational well-being.
Thirdly, for a new housing concept like this, we also want to evaluate the new models such as joint balloting. For this particular scheme, we allow seniors who are family members or friends to jointly ballot and if they ballot successfully, then both can select the apartments; and ideally on the same floor next to each other.
So, new models that seek to try to enable the kind of relationships that seniors would like to continue with, despite moving to a new home.
And ultimately, looking at it from macro-perspective as the Community Care Apartments seek to close a gap in the overall continuum of housing options for our seniors in their golden years – whether indeed it plays the part of enabling a senior to right-size to a smaller home that they can manage better in terms of housekeeping, as compared to a larger home that they owned in their earlier days when their children lived with them; as they move to a new environment, there is that social communal kind of relationships that are forged with their neighbours in the apartments; whether they are kept involved and engaged in the community and interested in the community and in active pursuits of activities.
And ultimately, it is the ability to make a more gradual support framework that escalates based on their needs; and as some seniors increasingly become frailer and have more care requirements, having priority access to a nursing home nearby.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"External Wall Seepages and Ceiling Leakages in HDB Flats","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"OA","content":"9 Mr Liang Eng Hwa asked the Minister for National Development (a) what is HDB’s approach to assist flat dwellers who experience persistent external wall seepages and ceiling leakages; and (b) whether HDB invests in new capabilities and technologies to tackle long-standing and recurring cases where the HDB maintenance contractors are unable or incapable of rectifying.
10 Mr Muhamad Faisal Bin Abdul Manap asked the Minister for National Development whether HDB will consider rolling out a national programme of facade repair for ageing HDB blocks in view of the recent spates of external wall seepage.
\tThe Minister of State for National Development (Assoc Prof Dr Muhammad Faishal Ibrahim) (for the Minister for National Development): Mr Speaker, may I have your permission to take Question Nos 9 and 10 together.
\tMr Speaker: Yes, please.
\tAssoc Prof Dr Muhammad Faishal Ibrahim: Mr Liang Eng Hwa and Mr Muhamad Faisal Abdul Manap have raised questions about external water seepages and ceiling leakages. I will address the Members' questions together. Mr Desmond Choo also had a question about how MND can support Town Councils with water seepages and wear and tear problems at common areas, which my colleague, Senior Minister of State Sim Ann will address separately.
The external walls of HDB blocks are common property under the Town Councils' management and maintenance. As they are subject to wear and tear over time, Town Councils are advised to keep them in good condition by carrying out regular maintenance and repairs where needed. Residents who encounter water seepage through their walls typically report such cases to their Town Council. As such, HDB does not have information on the total number of external wall seepage cases.
There are currently no plans to roll out a programme for façade repairs to address external wall seepage specifically, as such issues can be prevented today through regular maintenance by Town Councils. HDB provides assistance to Town Councils by co-sharing 50% of the costs of façade repairs, under the Façade Repairs Co-payment scheme.
From the second half of this year, BCA will require a Periodic Façade Inspection (PFI) to be carried out for all buildings above 20 years old and above 13 metres in height. The objective is to improve public safety, by facilitating the early detection of potential issues and the timely repair of façades.
Ceiling leaks that occur in HDB flats are generally a result of wear and tear over time. In such cases, the responsibility for repairs is shared jointly between the upper and lower floor flat owners. Both upper and lower floor flat owners would need to jointly investigate and carry out the repairs. In most cases, leakages can be amicably resolved when flat owners exercise mutual understanding and cooperate with one another.
HDB also offers assistance to help upper and lower floor owners resolve ceiling leak issues. In cases where the leak is caused by wear and tear, HDB may offer assistance with repairs and co-share the cost of repairs under the Goodwill Repair Assistance (GRA) scheme. Under this scheme, HDB will pay 50% of the ceiling leak repair cost. The remaining 50% is then shared equally between the upper and lower floor flat owners. However, if the cause of the leak at the lower floor flat is due to renovations carried out at the upper floor flat, the upper floor flat owner would be fully responsible for rectifying the leak and bearing the full repair cost.
HDB has been exploring new technologies to improve on current repair methods for ceiling leaks and has identified two new repair methods. Firstly, nanotechnology waterproofing system and secondly, overlaying waterproofing membrane system. These technologies provide alternative repair options for residents who do not wish to hack their toilet tiles or who prefer to keep the existing finishes in their toilets. For complex and recurring issues which contractors are unable to rectify, HDB will also assist in the investigation and provide advice where possible.
Lastly, ceiling leaks can also occur for units that are on the top floor, as water seeps into the flat through the roof. As the roof is part of common property, the Town Council is responsible for addressing the leak. Where necessary, HDB can provide technical advice to the Town Council on the root cause of the leak and on the appropriate repair methods.
\tMr Speaker: Mr Liang Eng Hwa.
\tMr Liang Eng Hwa (Bukit Panjang): Thank you, Sir. Sir, the Minister of State mentioned about not having data other than from HDB sources. Just to let him know that I have received more than hundred feedback over the last two, three months. And some very serious cases where water flows out like a tap from the wall. So, here is the frustrating situation. The Town Council contractors will always be called upon to do the repair and they will use a trial-and-error method because they cannot really identify where the source of the seepage is. And it may not be fixed in one day, they will come another day; and sometimes, it takes multiple sessions to get it done. It causes a lot of frustrations to residents and also the resources of the contractors as well.
Can I ask and appeal to MND and HDB to intervene in this situation because this is really a basic liveability issue, especially first thing for those that are perennial cases, where HDB should step in? Because some of these are due to certain batches of HDB flats that were built using a particular technique, prefabrication techniques and so on. Therefore, the water seepage has been there for many years.
I hope the HDB can come in for those cases to help identify the root cause of the problem, use technology like the Minister of State mentioned, use the research that HDB has. It does help to assist the contractors to tackle the problem as well. This is actually for the good of construction productivity because the contractors will then know how to tackle this problem as well. I hope that HDB sees some ownership in this problem as well.
Secondly, can I also request when the flats go through the Home Improvement Programme, can HDB also incorporate the repair of the seepages and rectifications as part of the suite of offering? Because these 30-year-old flats are going to be around for another 30 years, the next 30-year life cycle. We need to help fix those problems so that they do not face this problem the next 30 years.
\tAssoc Prof Dr Muhammad Faishal Ibrahim: Sir, I thank the Member for the supplementary questions. Certainly, we will look at how we can improve rectifying; and also help other organisations, even the contractors. We are looking at the building industry, how we can use research and technology to repair and to produce materials and products which are long-lasting and able to rectify such seepages and other kind of defects. So, this is something that we will take note of.
As the cases that the Member has raised may be specific to certain types of construction method, I will take it back and see how we can address the situation together.
Mr Speaker: Faisal Manap.
\tMr Muhamad Faisal Bin Abdul Manap (Aljunied): Thank you, Sir. I thank the Minister of State for his reply. Sir, there are national programmes such as Neighbourhood Renewal Programme (NRP) and Home Improvement Programme (HIP) to repair and revitalise ageing HDB neighbourhoods and flats' interior respectively.
Basically, my proposal is to have a similar national programme for facade repair. One, so as to reap the economies of scale benefit; hence, resulting in the saving of public funds. Secondly, I feel that by having a national programme, it will give a more thorough repair work, which will result in better outcome as compared to patchwork, which is what we are doing currently.
As the Minister of State mentioned earlier, it is co-sharing between Town Council and HDB. But I believe that more thorough work to be done for the facade repairs under a national programme would be more beneficial in the long run.
\tAssoc Prof Dr Muhammad Faishal Ibrahim: Mr Speaker, I thank the Member for the suggestion. As I shared earlier, we feel that it is important to make sure the buildings or structures that we have are maintained and, at the same time, we look at it in terms of the long term how we can ensure the maintainability and the use of such facilities including the facade. That is why we have a periodic facade inspection regime which will ensure that there is regular and timely inspection. During the inspection, if we see there are things that need to be rectified, we can do so. At the same time, the Facade Repair Co-Payment Scheme will help to take care of such a situation.
So, essentially, we want to see how, as a whole, in Singapore, we can try to inspect and maintain over time. As such, this is something that we are committed to doing with the Town Council. We hope, as a whole, in the whole building industry and construction industry, we want to see how we can enhance, not only the maintainability of the building but, in particular, also the facade.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Water Seepages and Wear and Tear Problems at Common Areas of HDB Estates","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"OA","content":"11 Mr Desmond Choo asked the Minister for National Development how can the Ministry support Town Councils to help residents with water seepages and wear and tear problems at common areas of HDB estates.
\tThe Senior Minister of State for National Development (Ms Sim Ann) (for the Minister for National Development): Mr Speaker, the external walls of HDB flats are common property under the Town Councils’ management and maintenance. Town Councils are responsible for keeping common property, including external walls, in good condition by carrying out regular and cyclical maintenance.
Residents who encounter water seepage from external walls in their flat typically report it to the Town Council managing their estate. For difficult cases, HDB will work with the Town Councils to resolve the seepage issue. For example, there may be cases where Town Councils have carried out repairs but the water seepage issue persists despite the Town Councils' efforts. In such cases, HDB can assist the Town Council by carrying out joint inspections and providing technical advice to the Town Council on appropriate repair methods.
In addition, to support Town Councils in carrying out their maintenance work, HDB has been providing training to Town Council maintenance staff on the repairs of water seepage from external walls. There are also regular dialogues between HDB and Town Councils to discuss and resolve issues relating to estate maintenance.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Child And Elder Care as Reasons for Not Participating in Workforce","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"OA","content":"12 Ms Carrie Tan asked the Minister for Manpower (a) for each year from 2015 to 2019, how many persons, disaggregated by age and gender, who are outside of the labour force, cite care for their own children as the main reason for being outside of the labour force; and (b) how many months on average these persons remain outside of the labour force.
13 Ms Carrie Tan asked the Minister for Manpower (a) for each year from 2015 to 2019, how many persons, disaggregated by age and gender, who are outside of the labour force, cite care for their elderly parents as the main reason for being outside of the labour force; and (b) how many months on average these persons remain outside of the labour force.
\tThe Minister of State for Manpower (Ms Gan Siow Huang) (for the Minister for Manpower): Mr Speaker, may I take Parliamentary Question Nos 12 and 13 together?
\tMr Speaker: Yes, please.
\tMs Gan Siow Huang: Ms Carrie Tan asked about individuals outside the labour force who cite care for their own children or care for elderly parents as the main reason for doing so.
Data from the annual Comprehensive Labour Force Survey shows that in 2018, 144,100 or 4.3% of the resident population cited broader care-giving responsibilities as the main reason. Among these, 55,300 were providing care for own children. There was a slight reduction in 2019, to 133,500 and 52,900 respectively. Around nine in 10 residents who cited care-giving as their main reason were females, and about nine in 10 were in their 30s or over. Data collected prior to 2018 was not directly comparable due to different survey questions being asked.
For those who cited care-giving for own children in 2018 and 2019, the median number of years since their last job was about four to five years. For those who cited care-giving for family members or relatives, the median number of years was eight.
Overall, the resident female employment rate in Singapore is high and is rising. In 2019, the overall resident employment rate for females aged between 25 and 64 was at 73.3%, which is above the OECD average of 66.3%. This has improved from 70.5% in 2014.
Support for care-givers has also been enhanced over the years. For families with young children, we have increased accessibility and affordability of pre-school services. Since 2012, we have doubled full-day pre-school capacity to more than 180,000 places today. We also recently enhanced means-tested pre-school subsidies so that more families pay less for pre-school.
Separately, through the Caregiver Support Action Plan that was announced by MOH in 2019, we have strengthened support for care-givers of seniors. There is also a range of home and community care options to help support the care and social needs of the elderly, to support individuals with care-giving responsibilities while they are at work.
\tMr Speaker: Ms Carrie Tan.
\tMs Carrie Tan (Nee Soon): Speaker, I thank the Minister of State for providing the data. Great to know that there are extensive efforts by the relevant Ministries to look into pre-school and also care-givers support, to help women who are disproportionately more impacted by care-giving responsibilities on their employment.
Given that in Singapore, our retirement adequacy is tied almost entirely to employment, and given that we have an ageing population, we can expect that more people, especially women, could be displaced from the workforce due to the rising needs for eldercare. So, would the Minister of State agree that it is important to value the work of care by some measures, so that we can avoid compromising care-givers' retirement adequacy?
My second supplementary question is, perhaps, it is not so fair to just direct this question at MOM, given it already has got a lot under its portfolio. But is there any multi-Ministry attention or cross-Ministry efforts now, in addition to the Caregiver Support Action Plan, to consider identifying long-term care care-givers who are displaced from the workforce to provide them with some form of basic income, either in cash or in the form of CPF top-ups to avoid retirement inadequacy?
\tMs Gan Siow Huang: I thank Ms Carrie Tan for the two questions. I think they are somewhat related. They are about recognising the sacrifices that care-givers have to make in order to take care of their loved ones at home.
\tIndeed, we are also very concerned about the retirement preparedness and adequacy of care-givers who out of no choice, are unable to work. Hence, a lot of measures have been put in place to provide support to the care-givers to alleviate their roles at home and with the care-giving duties. At the same time, on the financial side, we have a few schemes to provide financial support.
For example, the Silver Support Scheme has been around since 2016 and has been enhanced recently to provide top-ups, especially for those who do not have enough income through their lifetime, and also, for those who have less means to support themselves.
We have also looked at matching the CPF contributions with the latest scheme so that those who have less CPF balance will be able to have top-ups to make their CPF balance higher than what is the current situation.
CPF members are also able to get additional interest for the first $60,000 of the CPF balances. There is also another one percentage point extra interest for those who are 55 years and above, for the first $30,000 of the combined balances.
\tMs Carrie Tan: I thank the Minister of State. I would really like to reflect some sentiments that residents have surfaced to me. Typically, some of the aunties who have been housewives.
(In Mandarin): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] Some housewives stay at home to look after their loved ones for many years. They ask me, \"Why is it that my friends who work can receive Workfare? I stay at home, not because I do not want to work; it is because I need to look after my family. Why is it that I can’t receive Workfare?\"
(In English): Can we consider a separate scheme that perhaps is some version of Workfare but called \"Carefare Income Supplement\" in the near future or whatever timeline in the future?
\tMs Gan Siow Huang: I thank Ms Carrie Tan for an interesting proposal. I think we will keep an open mind to all the various options available to improve support for care-givers. At the same time, I want to emphasise that we also promote strong family ties. For example, my mother is a full-time housewife and I see it as a responsibility for me to take care of her now that she is old and for me to be able to help to make sure she still lives comfortably, given that she has sacrificed so many years for us, the children.
\tMr Melvin Yong Yik Chye (Radin Mas): Mr Speaker, I thank the Minister of State for her reply. I just have one supplementary question. At NTUC, I regularly receive feedback from our PMETs, in particular, mothers and those with ageing parents, that they often feel that they have been disadvantaged in their careers due to their care-giving needs.
With COVID-19 drastically changing the way that we work and permanent telecommuting arrangements have now become a reality, I would like to ask if the Ministry has any plans to encourage or even incentivise employers to adopt prolonged telecommuting arrangements for employees with care-giving needs, so that they can both work and care for their loved ones, at the same time.
\tMs Gan Siow Huang: I thank the Member for the interesting proposal. Indeed, MOM together with our tripartite partners have been strongly advocating flexible work arrangements, not just for care-givers, but for all adults who may be able to achieve better work-life harmony and balance by having that flexibility of working from home, or having staggered work hours, or working part-time.
Certainly, we want to continue to encourage employers to keep an open mind and seize the opportunity to look at expanding the scope of flexible work arrangements for all their employees, regardless of whether they are care-givers or not.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Measures to Protect Micro SMEs in Landlord-tenant Disputes","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"OA","content":"14 Dr Tan Wu Meng asked the Minister for Law (a) what measures protect sole proprietors of micro SMEs from rogue landlords in the event of landlord-tenant disputes where such disputes are not handled by the Small Claims Tribunal; and (b) what are the avenues by which micro SME sole proprietors of limited means can access legal services at affordable cost especially if they do not qualify for pro bono legal services.
\tThe Second Minister for Law (Mr Edwin Tong Chun Fai) (for the Minister for Law): Mr Speaker, the Small Claims Tribunal’s jurisdiction does not extend to disputes involving non-residential tenancies. In such cases, small and micro SME tenants who wish to enforce their contractual rights may bring an action in Court. Where the claim involves sums of no more than $250,000, this tenant may commence an action in the State Courts.
The Courts have put in place simplified processes and procedures, and schemes also, to help parties, including SME tenants, to navigate the Court process, even without legal representation. For example, for claims brought in the Magistrate’s Court, parties may opt for a simplified process under the Rules of Court to obtain early resolution of the dispute.
In addition, parties can also resolve such disputes efficiently through alternative dispute resolution. If the matter is already before the Court, parties may request, or be referred by a judge, for mediation at the State Courts' Centre for Dispute Resolution. Tenants may also consider mediation before commencing a court action. Mediation is available at a relatively low cost, for example, through the Singapore Mediation Centre’s Small Case Commercial Mediation Scheme.
There are avenues available for micro SMEs to access legal services at an affordable cost, if it transpires that the Court process is what the SME wants to go through. Whilst pro bono legal advice and legal aid are not generally intended for commercial matters, micro SME tenants who are sole proprietorships and cannot afford their own lawyers may also approach the Legal Aid Bureau for assistance, and this can be considered on a case-by-case basis.
Last year, against the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Ministry also stepped in to introduce various relief measures to alleviate potentially unfair outcomes, whilst ensuring fairness to parties, including landlords and tenants: (a) we introduced the Rental Relief Framework in June 2020, to help affected SMEs with their cash flow by mandating the passing on of up to four months of rental waiver for the months of April through to July 2020; (b) in November 2020, we introduced the Re-Align Framework, which will help eligible small and micro businesses severely impacted by COVID-19 to renegotiate certain contracts on fairer terms. These contracts include leases or licences for non-residential property of a duration of up to five years. The Framework has been in operation since 15 January 2021 and will last for six weeks.
It is in the same spirit that the Fair Tenancy Pro Tem Committee was formed in June 2020 under the auspices of the Singapore Business Federation, or SBF, to establish industry norms on tenancy practices and terms on which the tenancies are entered into. Key industry representatives from the landlord and tenant communities have been discussing issues relating to fair conduct on the part of landlords and tenants, as well as enforcement and dispute resolution, should that be necessary. MTI and ESG are closely involved in the process and are working with SBF to help facilitate discussions. The Committee is expected to issue its preliminary report on these findings to the Government shortly.
\tDr Tan Wu Meng (Jurong): I thank the Minister for his comprehensive answer. I have got two supplementary questions. Sir, I want to surface an observation that some residents have broached with me in Clementi. Some of these residents are elderly, sole proprietors of micro SMEs. Some of these elderly residents have had limited formal education. They went to start a small enterprise, a micro SME, got into a situation with a landlord. And because of their background and their lack of knowledge, they are in an unequal bargaining position.
Can I ask the Minister what is the policy rationale for scoping the Small Claims Tribunal, or SCT, jurisdiction in its present form regarding tenancy disputes? I ask this because in some of these cases, had the dispute involved a contract in a private, non-commercial capacity, the same asymmetry of bargaining power would have existed, the same quantum might have been in contention, but it would have qualified for SCT jurisdiction. So, I was wondering if the Minister can share more about the policy rationale there.
And secondly, how we can further enhance awareness of the available measures for recourse among these elderly micro SMEs sole proprietors?
\tMr Edwin Tong Chun Fai: Sir, when a matter goes before the Small Claims Tribunal, the parties represent themselves. And so, those cases are typically scoped to be less complicated, more straightforward, more personal in nature, as opposed to business or commercial, which itself, attracts the potential for disputes being more complicated.
In addition, there is a cap on the quantum of claims that go before the Small Claims Tribunal. It is for that reason that the scoping of the nature of the disputes is as such for Small Claims Tribunal cases. That is, of course, not to say that such entities' elderly persons or proprietors, as Dr Tan has put it, will not be able to avail themselves of other legal services. I have outlined several. There are several pro bono options, Legal Aid can step where appropriate. And in those cases where it is deemed to be of a particular complication and there needs to be more legal advice given, Dr Tan's resident in Clementi can approach the Legal Aid.
As far as awareness is concerned, there are different schemes that I have outlined earlier, including those that were recently introduced in 2020, pertaining to the COVID-19-related relief measures, those have been put on a variety of different platforms, including social media, advertisements, websites. In addition to that, we have also made available to various communities on the ground, including hawkers associations, merchants associations, people in touch with the persons who are likely to need to avail themselves of these measures, material information.
In addition to that, I would say that my Ministry also mans a hotline which has been quite well used in the last few months. We address those queries in a variety of different languages as well.
If none of these avail the particular instance that Dr Tan was speaking about, please feel free to approach me and I will take that offline, and assist the person separately.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Number and Types of Stay-Home-Notice and Quarantine Order Breaches","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"OA","content":"15 Mr Chua Kheng Wee Louis asked the Minister for Home Affairs (a) what is the total number of Stay-Home-Notice and Quarantine Order breaches to date; (b) what is the range of enforcement actions taken; (c) what is the protocol for the use of the Homer mobile application; and (d) whether its use is compulsory for all Long-Term Visit Pass holders and visitors to Singapore.
\tThe Minister of State for Home Affairs (Assoc Prof Dr Muhammad Faishal Ibrahim) (for the Minister for Home Affairs): Mr Speaker, as at 25 January 2021, a total of 308,442 Stay-Home Notices (SHNs) and 268,385 Quarantine Orders (QOs) have been issued. Of these, there have been 367 breaches of SHN and 130 breaches of QO.
Those who breach the SHN and QO may be prosecuted under the Infectious Diseases Act and be liable to a fine of up to S$10,000, imprisonment of up to six months, or both. For example, on 17 July 2020, a Singaporean was sentenced to three months of imprisonment for evading the service of a Home Quarantine Order (HQO) on four occasions and for refusing to comply with the HQO. Members may also recall the case of a Singaporean who returned to Singapore from Myanmar in March last year and immediately breached his SHN by eating “bak kut teh” at a hawker centre followed by buying groceries at a supermarket. He was sentenced to six weeks’ imprisonment.
Agencies may also take administrative actions against those who breach SHN or QO. For example, in November 2020, MOM revoked the work passes of four work-pass holders who breached their SHN requirements. Last year, a Singapore Permanent Resident (PR) lost his PR status and was barred from re-entering Singapore after he breached SHN requirements.
We have adopted a range of technological solutions to monitor individuals on SHN and QO.
Since August 2020, all individuals who are serving SHN at their place of residence are required to don an electronic monitoring device for the duration of SHN. These devices are issued to the travellers after immigration clearance and will need to be activated once they reach their place of residence. The devices use GPS and 4G/Bluetooth signals to determine if persons on SHN are within the range of their place of residence. During the 14-day SHN period, persons wearing these devices may receive notifications on the devices and need to acknowledge them in a timely manner. Any attempt to leave their place of residence or tamper with the electronic device will result in alerts being sent to the authorities, who will then conduct follow-up investigations, and take further enforcement actions if necessary.
Similarly, Persons Under Quarantine, or PUQs in short, are required to don electronic monitoring devices to ensure that they do not breach their QO.
Electronic monitoring devices are compulsory for all individuals who are on SHN or QO. This includes Singaporeans, PRs, Long-Term Pass Holders and short-term visitors.
The Member mentioned the HOMER App. The HOMER App was introduced on 7 April 2020 and is currently used alongside the electronic monitoring devices deployed to monitor the health and location of PUQs. The HOMER App uses facial recognition and location tracking to verify the PUQs’ identity and location respectively, to ensure that they do not breach their QO requirements.
Mr Speaker: End of Question Time. The Clerk will now proceed to read the Orders of the day.
[Pursuant to Standing Order No 22(3), Written Answers to Question Nos 16-22, 25-35, 37-42 and 44-57 on the Order Paper are reproduced in the Appendix. Question Nos 23-23, 36 and 43 have been postponed to the next available sitting.]
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Mr Speaker: Minister Vivian Balakrishnan.
The Minister for Foreign Affairs (Dr Vivian Balakrishnan): Mr Speaker, on behalf of the Minister for Law, I beg to move that \"The Bill be now read a Second time.\"
Let me begin with a mea culpa. We acknowledge our error in not stating that data from TraceTogether is not exempt from the Criminal Procedure Code. I take full responsibility for this mistake and I deeply regret the consternation, the anxiety that was caused by my mistake.
In Parliament last month, the Minister for Home Affairs and I stated that the use of TraceTogether data in investigations or criminal proceedings would be restricted to serious offences. This Bill before us gives legal force to these statements. The legislation specifies that personal data collected through digital contact tracing systems can only be used by public agencies for the specific purpose of contact tracing, except where there is a need to use that data for investigations or criminal proceedings in respect of serious offences. We have decided that these restrictions will cover personal contact tracing data not only from TraceTogether, but also SafeEntry and a private sector system called BluePass insofar as BluePass is interoperable with TraceTogether.
Mr Speaker, this pandemic is not going to go away for quite a long time more. In fact, I do not know exactly when the pandemic will end.
What I do know is that contact tracing, augmented by digital tools, enables us to quickly break the chains of transmission by identifying and isolating close contacts. This is precisely why we need high participation rates in digital contact tracing.
Contact tracing is traditionally a manual, painstaking and very resource-intensive task. Members of the House may recall that – cast your minds back a year ago – at the start of the pandemic, when the number of cases started to grow. And we had to rapidly expand the pool of contact tracers to keep up with the load. We even had to call in reinforcements from the Singapore Armed Forces. But we all knew that this would not be sustainable if the numbers continued to rise. And the numbers did continue to rise.
So, we realised, very early on, that we needed to make better use of both technology and data, including especially proximity data, generated from Bluetooth technology, in order to help our contact tracers carry out their work more effectively and efficiently.
And I say this with the experience of SARS 17 years ago. SARS had much fewer cases than COVID-19 and it was a manual contact tracing system. We would not have been able to cope with the sheer volume this time if we were still using the methods of 17 years ago.
This was why we conceptualised and introduced TraceTogether – to reduce the time and the resources needed to collect some of these essential data for contact tracing. And, if I may add, these efforts have paid off.
TraceTogether, alongside the other digital contact tracing systems, such as SafeEntry, has shortened the average time required for contact tracing from four days to now less than 1.5 days. This means that people who have been exposed, or potentially exposed, are isolated more swiftly. It reduces the probability of them passing on the virus to their family members, friends and the community at large. And where there is widespread adoption of digital contact tracing, the enhanced effectiveness can be very significant.
Let me cite one recent example. In the recent Royal Caribbean Quantum of the Seas case, the use of TraceTogether data helped MOH to quickly identify more than three-quarters of the close contacts – although thankfully, in this case, it turned out to be a false positive.
TraceTogether has also enabled us to trace contacts more comprehensively and to identify many contacts whom the person may not have recalled meeting or even realised that he had been in close contact with. And this is particularly so, when you are with someone whom you do not already know. The probability of your forgetting that interaction is much higher.
TraceTogether was always designed for contact tracing purposes. And this is obvious, if you consider the safeguards and the features of the system. TraceTogether only collects proximity data, which is necessary in order to identify close contacts. It does not collect GPS data; it does not collect movement data. The token does not even have cellular connectivity. These were conscious design decisions made at conception.
Furthermore, the app and the token only keep a temporary record, in an encrypted form, locally on the device itself. And this data is automatically purged after 25 days. The Government also intends to deactivate TraceTogether, along with the other digital contact tracing programmes, once the pandemic is over.
The GovTech engineers and I took great pains to create an app that was fundamentally privacy protecting at its core – privacy by design. We even open sourced the code. We invited experts to come and tear down the TraceTogether token to prove this. Perhaps, I was so enamoured by what I thought was the ingenuity and brilliance of this that I got blindsided.
Prof Ang Peng Hwa of NTU very elegantly described our ethical dilemma as one in which we are dealing with a choice between \"right\" versus \"right\". A choice between \"right\" and \"wrong\" is very easy to make. But in this case, it is right to protect public health by protecting the data in TraceTogether. But it is also right, and just as important, to protect public safety, especially when it comes to serious crimes – \"right\" versus \"right\".
It would indeed be unconscionable to inhibit the ability of the Police to act, when it comes to a serious offence that affects someone's life or safety. Someone came up to me and said, \"Think about the example of a kidnapped child. And all that was left was a dropped phone or a token. And if that mother brought that token or phone to the Police, would it be right for us to say, 'No, we cannot and would not do anything about it.'?\" In fact, it would be untenable – to adopt a purist ideological stance and to deliberately refuse to check that data and pursue all leads available.
Singapore is one of the safest countries in the world. Our people walk the streets safely, day or night, alone or in groups, with peace of mind, precisely because there is high trust in an effective Police Force that always acts for the public good, that legally pursues all information and leads available to solve and to prevent crimes. We cannot take this safety and security that we value so much for granted even in the midst of this pandemic.
Let me go through the specific legislative amendments that are being proposed.
This Bill sets out what Minister Shanmugam and I said in Parliament last month. It represents a balance between two imperatives. Singaporeans want the protection of TraceTogether. They know it saves lives. Singaporeans also understand and support the Police's continued access to such data for investigations or criminal proceedings in respect of serious offences, to bring perpetrators of crime to justice and to protect public safety and security.
We are moving this Bill on a Certificate of Urgency, so that it may come into effect as soon as possible.
Let me move on to the four key thrusts of this Bill.
Scope of legislation. First, the legislation will cover \"personal contact tracing data\" recorded in any \"digital contact tracing system\". Clause 7 of the Bill introduces section 80 to define \"personal contact tracing data\" to mean \"entry or exit records, proximity information or other data collected using any digital contact tracing tool or combination of digital contact tracing tools, that is part of a digital contact tracing system, and which, by itself or with other information, identifies any individual\". I apologise for that mouthful of words. Basically, it means, the key point is, data that is personally identifiable.
The \"digital contact tracing systems\" covered by the Bill are listed in the Sixth Schedule. This will include TraceTogether, SafeEntry and BluePass insofar as it is interoperable with TraceTogether.
SafeEntry, as Members are aware, is a digital equivalent of the visitor record logs. BluePass is a contact tracing system, developed by the private sector, that is capable of interoperating with TraceTogether in order to support the national programme.
We are concerned with protecting personal contact tracing data in the Government’s national digital contact tracing systems, and we will treat all data in the same way, however it enters the national system. Section 84 specifies that the Minister may add to the list of \"digital contact tracing systems\" if new systems or additional systems are created. However, any removal from the Sixth Schedule will require Parliamentary approval. We will come back here. This means that the Government cannot unilaterally remove any digital contact tracing system from the restrictions imposed by this Bill.
Second, on authorised use and disclosure. The Government's use of the data will be ring-fenced to contact tracing, with the exception for investigations or criminal proceedings in respect of serious offences. Clause 7 of the Bill introduces subsection 82(1), which specifies that the data may only be used to \"carry out or facilitate contact tracing\". Subsection 82(2) states that the Police and other law enforcement agencies \"in the exercise of any power under the Criminal Procedure Code (Chapter 68) or other written law\", may not obtain personal contact tracing data, except for \"an investigation or criminal proceeding in respect of a serious offence\".
There are seven categories of serious offences, set out, quite coincidentally, in the Seventh Schedule. These are offences of a significant severity and/or pose an immediate threat to life or public safety, such as the use of firearms, dangerous weapons, terrorism, murder, drug offences that attract the death penalty, kidnapping and rape. The Government cannot amend this list of offences in the Seventh Schedule without coming back to Parliament for approval.
Third, the Government may not use the data for any purpose other than those mentioned, regardless of any other written law requiring or allowing the disclosure of the data. Just in case \"I don't know what I don't know.\" This is added assurance. This trumps any other written law. This will give added reassurance that there are no further scenarios where public agencies may use the data apart from the purposes stated explicitly in this Bill.
Fourth, on safeguards and data deletion. Clause 7 of the Bill introduces subsection 82(8) which provides for the Minister to specify a date after which a digital contact tracing system is no longer required to prevent or control the spread of COVID-19. The data administrator must then delete any personal contact tracing data which is no longer required.
We have also built other safeguards into our digital contact tracing systems. Today, TraceTogether devices and SafeEntry servers are purged automatically after 25 days, unless that data has been extracted for contact tracing purposes or for the investigations or criminal proceedings in respect of serious offences. This 25-day timeline is set based on the advice of our medical professionals, to account for the incubation period of the virus, which we currently estimate to be 14 days, and the time taken from the onset of symptoms and for the patient to visit a doctor and get tested and, if positive, to notify MOH. This data retention period could change on the advice of medical experts, if the virus continues to evolve and we have a better understanding of the disease, the virus and its incubation period. But the point here is that we will stand guided on the basis of science and medicine.
Before I conclude my speech, I need to remind you that there are two other sections related to the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Law.
Clause 2 of the Bill extends Part 7 of the current Act, for another year, until April 2022. Part 7 provides the legal basis for the Minister for Health to make regulations to prevent or control the spread of COVID-19. These regulations underpin the safe management measures adopted since the circuit breaker last year. As this pandemic will not go away soon, it is imperative that we remain vigilant and continue with safe management measures in our daily lives.
Clause 4 of the Bill amends Part 2A of the Act to set out the Singapore Land Authority's (SLA's) role in the administration of the Rental Relief Framework. The SLA is working to operationalise the Rental Relief Framework.
Mr Speaker, this Bill will give legal force to the statements made by the Minister for Home Affairs and me in this Chamber. You will notice that it has been tightly scoped. It is a specific amendment made in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic – that the Government will limit its use of personal contact tracing data for the purposes of contact tracing, except where there is a need to do so for investigations or criminal proceedings in respect of serious offences.
These are extraordinary times, exceptional circumstances. We are introducing this Bill urgently, to remove any doubt among Singaporeans and to assure everyone that data will be properly safeguarded and used only for the appropriate purposes, so that we may continue to focus our attention towards battling this clear and present threat, the COVID-19 global pandemic.
This is crucial because the virus is a clear, present and, in fact, on a global scale, a growing threat. And it will remain so for some time. So, we cannot afford to be distracted from our fight against COVID-19. We need to rally together, look out for one another, protect public health and safety even as we try carefully to re-open our economy. Mr Speaker, Sir, I beg to move.
[(proc text) Question proposed. (proc text)]
Mr Pritam Singh (Aljunied): Mr Speaker, Sir, my speech is divided into three topics. First, I will talk about the Government's error in not realising that section 20 of the Criminal Procedure Code applies to TraceTogether data. Second, I will speak on the carving out of the seven categories of offences in the Bill that permits the use of TraceTogether data and I will thereafter set out the Workers' Party's position on the Bill. Third, I will look to the longer term and reflect on the balance between the privacy rights of citizens and the growing power of the state and private companies in collecting and using data and personal information.
I believe there is scope to learn important lessons from the fall-out that has ensued from the Government's admission that TraceTogether data could be used for investigatory purposes, a departure from earlier assurances that TraceTogether would only be used for contact tracing.
First, the Government's error. Sir, Singaporeans are willing to take the actions necessary to combat COVID-19 when called upon by the Government if they believe these actions will help our country and all of us who live and work here.
A few Singaporeans have told me that if the Government had stated upfront that TraceTogether data would be used for the seven categories of serious crimes only, they would have been prepared to prioritise the use of TraceTogether because of the imperative of fighting an epidemic, even those who could have had residual privacy concerns could have been assuaged had the Government detailed the processes and accountability regime for using TraceTogether information in investigations.
Why was there disquiet, unhappiness and even cynicism in some quarters at the Government's belated acknowledgement that TraceTogether can be used for criminal investigations as originally explained by Minister of State Desmond Tan in Parliament last month?
It comes down to a question of trust, the perceived lack of empathy over the public's privacy concerns and discomfort with sharing mobile phone data with the authorities without sufficient assurances.
In fact, from a very early stage the Government clearly contemplated that there would be privacy concerns with the use of TraceTogether for contact tracing.
In his broadcast of 21 April 2020, the Prime Minister said that Singapore intended to make full use of IT, including TraceTogether, which would require everyone's cooperation. He added and, I quote, \"There will be some privacy concerns, but we will have to weigh these against the benefits of being able to exit from the circuit breaker and stay open safely.\"
In the months that followed, the public were told that the number of sign-ups to TraceTogether was not satisfactory.
As late as November, the multi-Ministerial Taskforce linked transiting to phase 3 in our fight against COVID-19 with requiring at least 70% of the population signing up for TraceTogether. Since then and along with the issuance of TraceTogether tokens, this minimum 70% threshold was reportedly reached on 21 November 2020, even as it had been hovering around the 50% mark around two weeks earlier.
When Minister Vivian Balakrishnan admitted in Parliament that he did not consider section 20 of the Criminal Procedure Code at the next sitting of Parliament on 5 January this year, there are Singaporeans who opined that this was not fathomable or even believable for a largely efficient Government machinery that has consistently approached COVID-19 as a whole-of-Government endeavour. They further contend that if not Ministers, at least the officials in the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry of Health and GovTech who conceived of TraceTogether would have known of the privacy considerations surrounding TraceTogether.
Some go a step further in suspecting the Government of willful blindness on function creep, or worse, that the information surrounding the use of TraceTogether for criminal investigations may have been suppressed until the threshold of 70% of the population had downloaded the app or collected the TraceTogether token.
A separate group of Singaporeans queried whether there will be consequences for those who made this mistake in promising wrongly that TraceTogether would be used only for contact tracing. They believe the Government did not do its homework. While there was no dishonesty or malice, there was a lack of care or diligence in accurately communicating the potential use of data collected by TraceTogether.
I am sure Members have come across a range of opinions from residents in the course of their house visits or interactions with family and friends over the last few weeks on this matter. Whatever the view, it is apparent that the Government's handling of this matter has eroded trust from some members of the public.
To this end, I would like to ask two questions of the Government and, specifically, the Minister. First, what was the exact date on which Minister-in-charge of Smart Nation knew that section 20 of the Criminal Procedure code would apply to TraceTogether? Secondly and, in connection with this, was Mr Christopher de Souza's Parliamentary Question submitted before or after the Minister became aware of section 20 of the Criminal Procedure Code?
These questions are important for the House to understand at what point the Government determined that its original representations on the use of TraceTogether were misleading and whether it could have corrected the position and updated the public on its own initiative.
Let me now move on to my second topic, the carving out of the seven categories of crimes and the Workers' Party's position on the Bill.
The Workers' Party's starting point on this matter is that Singapore is as close to a wartime scenario as most Singaporeans have seen in our lifetimes.
This pandemic has exceeded in the living memory of older Singaporeans only by the far greater oppression of World War II. In terms of its effects on the national consciousness, COVID-19 is perhaps on par with other upheavals such as the 1964 riots and Singapore's ejection from Malaysia in 1965. Its scale and complexity have surpassed the SARS crisis of 2003.
In such a wartime scenario, the core question for this House is whether the change in the Government's position on TraceTogether data to allow for its use for serious crimes could compromise the fight against COVID-19 and jeopardise contact tracing. I will make two points in this regard.
First, while we know that TraceTogether data is critical for contact tracing, we need to ask whether TraceTogether data is vital for solving these seven categories of crimes.
As it stands, the Police have an abundance of investigative tools. They have other technological tools like CCTVs. They can forensically examine mobile phones and laptops that contain massive amounts of data other than TraceTogether. They also have old-fashioned police work such as finding and interviewing witnesses using confidential informants, scrutinising the crime scene and collecting physical evidence for forensic analysis.
There is a legitimate view that these tools should be more than sufficient in detecting crime and securing convictions. To know whether these other tools are enough, I would like to ask the Minister two questions about the use of TraceTogether data for actual cases:
(a) For the one known case where TraceTogether was used, was the case solved, in that a suspect has been identified or charged, and how critical was TraceTogether data to solving the case?
(b) How many other times has TraceTogether been used for the seven categories of serious crimes so far?
There is little or no doubt that TraceTogether would make things convenient for the Police. But it is my view that convenience for the Police may not be a good enough reason to compromise the trust necessary to win the COVID-19 fight.
There is an equally legitimate view that with the existing tools at their disposal, the Police are likely to have little, if any additional benefit from using TraceTogether data.
I look forward to hearing the Minister's answers to my questions so that we can know for sure. The answers will allow members of the public to appreciate the balance that is being struck between privacy and policing.
On to my second point: would allowing these exceptions compromise the use of TraceTogether in fighting the pandemic?
Against the possible benefits of using TraceTogether for fighting crime, we need to compare the likely cost to our fight against COVID-19.
There was a public outcry after Minister of State Desmond Tan's reply on 4 January 2020 when Singaporeans found out that section 20 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) applied to TraceTogether and that the Government had backtracked on earlier assurances. Some Singaporeans seemed placated when the Government announced a day later that the use of TraceTogether data would be restricted to the seven categories of crime. Others, less so.
However, this House's knowledge of both support as well as resistance of Singaporeans is only anecdotal. In the middle of last week, it was confirmed that the TraceTogether signups had reached 80% from 78% some weeks earlier. However, these numbers too can give a false sense of security insofar as our contact tracing efforts are concerned.
In an Institute of Policy Studies (IPS) report released on 24 May 2020, out of a broadly representative sample size of the Singaporean population, 87% of respondents were agreeable to imposing strict surveillance on those who needed to be quarantined. But when the questioning moved to the employment of CCTVs and cellphones to prevent the spread of COVID-19, only 49% were agreeable to have their cellphone data tracked without their consent.
Separately, more than a few people have anecdotally shared online that they will use the TraceTogether app to gain entry to a place, only to turn off Bluetooth immediately after entering. This clearly shows that a high level of downloads of the TraceTogether app does not necessarily translate to a high degree of continuous usage.
Those who choose to switch off their Bluetooth function could do so for various reasons, a common one being that people do not want to drain their phone battery and not necessarily because of privacy concerns. We do not know for sure either way, but if the IPS report is indicative, privacy is more than likely to matter.
It is therefore open to question whether the efficacy of TraceTogether for contact tracing could be compromised because of the Government's belated explanation on the use of TraceTogether data for investigative purposes.
To that end, I would like to inquire if the Government is able to track the number of users of the TraceTogether app who turn off their Bluetooth function after downloading the app and, separately, who turn it off after gaining entry to a building or premise. The answer to this question will determine whether TraceTogether is working as intended or whether the Government needs to comprehensively review the public buy-in and effectiveness of the TraceTogether app and token.
I now move on to the Workers' Party's position on the Bill. The Workers' Party is of the view that Singapore's number one priority should be to tackle the pandemic's public health and economic effects. Anything that compromises this priority has to give way, unless there are overwhelming good reasons.
Other jurisdictions have taken a cleaner approach on contact tracing apps in line with the Government's original public statements that TraceTogether would be limited to contact tracing, period.
Personally and subject to the Minister's response on the centrality of TraceTogether data for policing, I, personally, would prefer aligning the use of TraceTogether with the Government's original emphatic assurances that TraceTogether would be used for contact tracing only. This is because of some Singaporeans' residual concerns over privacy and the established discomfort about sharing cellphone data.
I am of the view that such an approach would also engender greater confidence given that a public conversation on privacy has hitherto not been ventilated in a significant way in Singapore. I will return to that subject very shortly.
Even so, the Workers' Party is prepared to support the Bill to allow for the use of TraceTogether data for Police investigations in the exceptional cases identified in the Bill. The main reason is because the exceptions constitute a significant reduction of the wide ambit of section 20 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
In other words, a Singaporean's right to privacy is better protected with this Bill than without it. Ms Sylvia Lim will speak further on the seven exceptions.
Sir, let me move on to my last topic, which is about the longer term. The discomfort and distrust in some quarters generated by the belated disclosure on the applicability of section 20 of the Criminal Procedure Code to TraceTogether is somewhat or to some extent unsurprising. A 2016 KPMG report shared that 32% of Singaporeans were extremely concerned about the handling and use of their personal data and that Singaporean consumers felt the most defenceless among Asian respondents over the way organisations handle and use their personal information.
I would contend that across the population, there is a general lack of awareness about not just the Government's powers of data collection, investigation and privacy, but the rapid advance of predictive technologies for public use. As a society, many are relatively uninformed about legal or constitutional rights and responsibilities, to say nothing about the right to privacy.
If we are already talking about a societal COVID-19 reset when this crisis passes, the Government should also review the lessons learnt from the roll-out of TraceTogether and, specifically, whether Singapore should actively appraise the balance between policing and citizen privacy.
The mobile phone application WhatsApp recently found out the hard way what happens when people suddenly become suspicious about technology and privacy. When the company published new terms of service with a short deadline for acceptance, there was a huge backlash against WhatsApp and its corporate owner, Facebook.
WhatsApp's experience shows that Singapore's experience with the TraceTogether issue is not unique. Confidence in technological tools and the institutions that control them can be lost overnight. This loss of trust engenders cynicism and push back from the public, and in an age where information travels instantaneously and fake news spreads at light speed, cynicism has to be taken very seriously and addressed squarely from a governance standpoint.
In the first major debate of this parliamentary term, the Prime Minister addressed the House on Disease X, a possible outbreak even deadlier than COVID-19. In this regard, a new national research programme for epidemic preparedness and response called Prepare was announced in December 2020. The programme is meant to accelerate the production of diagnostic tools, therapies and vaccines once a major disease strikes.
However, medical preparedness is only part of the fight. The other part is the battle for the trust and cooperation of the people. If Disease X strikes and another TraceTogether-type situation occurs, our fight against Disease X may be rendered ineffective and tragically thwarted.
I call on the Government to initiate an immediate conversation on the balance between the state's collection and use of data against the individual's right of privacy because many of the new technologies with public repercussions have already been rolled out. According to the latest Government Financial Statements, or GFS, MHA has invested in PolCam 3.0 and 4.0 whereas only PolCam 1.0 and 2.0 have entered the mainstream media lexicon.
Intrusive technology has already extended to other areas of governance. The Government Financial Statements confirm that the Ministry of Social and Family Development has implemented video analytics, facial recognition and behavioural analytics technology at a voluntary children's home. Let that sink in for a moment – behavioural analytics technology at a children's home.
What impact could befall a child if such data is hacked in a cybersecurity breach many years later? How is the problem of bias, both from a technology perspective and a human interface angle, dealt with? Who checks whether such information is secure or securely wiped? And who has a right to review this information and for how long?
To counter skepticism and its resultant behaviours and to replace it with trust and cooperation, Singaporeans also need to better understand the necessity and ambit of data collection. This is especially so for a new generation who are more likely to be concerned about privacy and individual rights.
The public must also be assured that the data collected and used for investigative purposes have safeguards that are robust enough with independent and external checks and balances, if necessary. And it would be critical for the public to understand that in Singapore at least, regulation is marching in step with the evolution of newer and more intrusive policing and data collection technologies. This is currently not the case in many parts of the world and there is an opportunity for Singapore to be a leader in this regard.
To this end, I would advance that there are important actions that the Government can undertake to better dispel doubts.
First, the Government should be forthcoming, without prompting, in informing the public about what data it collects and how it ensures the robustness and integrity of its processes.
Second, the Government should ensure that our laws reassure Singaporean citizens and residents that investigatory powers and data collection are used for legitimate purposes and are subject to rigorous checks that protect us from the abuse of our personal data.
Moving forward, a review of our existing laws may be required to achieve this. Let me discuss each of these actions in turn.
The first thing the Government could do to counter cynicism and create trust is to be forthcoming about what data it collects and the safeguards to prevent misuse of information in its possession.
The Government regularly asks information of tech giants like Facebook. For example, the Straits Times reported in 2018 that Facebook's semi-annual transparency report revealed that the Singapore Government had made 244 request for information concerning 310 Facebook accounts in the latter half of 2017.
It would reassure the public, in my view, if the Government could tell us what it has asked the tech companies for and for what purposes. This could be done on a regular basis through the Police's annual report, for example.
If the Government is forthcoming with such information, it will engender confidence that the Government has nothing to hide, is performing its role as a state should, and that its requests are for legitimate purposes in the interest of Singaporeans. Singaporeans will also better appreciate the nature of the behind-the-scenes work that is done to keep Singapore safe and secure. And I will make this point again: this awareness and confidence will aid us in our fight against future threats.
The second thing the Government could do is to conduct a broad review of the state's powers to collect data for the purposes of investigations in light of new technologies and consider how privacy concerns could be better balanced or accommodated within the legislation.
Section 39 of the Criminal Procedure Code, for example, gives the Police wide leeway when investigating arrestable offences to access computers and computer data, even for computers outside of Singapore. Section 40 of the CPC allows the public prosecutor to authorise the accessing of decryption information. Statutes like the Broadcasting Act and the Telecommunications Act and others give the Police powers akin to those in the Criminal Procedure Code, although specifically scoped for those Acts.
Even so, like the Criminal Procedure Code, the investigative powers of the relevant authorities are drafted broadly and do not include separate laws on how the exercise of these investigatory powers come with safeguards. Such safeguards would reassure the public that the state is acting legitimately and with sufficient regard for the individual's right to privacy.
To build confidence between the citizen and the state in an era where the call for privacy will only get louder, other verification mechanisms can be considered. I would offer three suggestions in this regard.
One possibility for checking against abuse and engendering confidence can be the appointment of a neutral commissioner or an ombudsman to monitor the use of such powers by the Government and, in particular, law enforcement agencies.
Another possibility is an omnibus legislation like the UK's Investigatory Powers Act. This piece of legislation covers the acquisition and retention of data, including bulk personal datasets, and provides for how such material is dealt with, including oversight arrangements, amongst others.
Thirdly, the Government could include a key performance indicator in the Budget Book for each relevant Ministry that measures the public's confidence in the collection and use of data collected on the one hand, and the public's right to privacy on the other.
To conclude, Mr Speaker, it is important for me to restate that privacy concerns are not the domain of a small segment of Singaporeans. The international conversation has moved significantly over the past few years with recent revelations of how security agencies of democratic countries, such as the US, collect vast amounts of information about their citizens. Arising from such revelations, other democratic jurisdictions have sought to update their laws to focus on and better calibrate the balance between the state's investigatory powers and the individual's right to privacy. At the heart of this discussion is a desire for checks and balances that are fit for purpose for today's day and age.
Understandably, the conversation with electorates in these countries has not been easy. Many people perceive the world to be in an Orwellian age, complete with fake news and the prospect of privacy intrusions by even private corporations. However, the absence of such a conversation in Singapore, combined with an erroneous assumption that continuing down tried and tested routes will suffice, would engender a worse outcome, even presaging a disunited population. We will all lose if that happens. COVID-19 is a crisis like no other. But insofar as finding a better balance between policing and privacy, the lessons that have been taught by this TraceTogether episode inform us that they are lessons the Government would be wise not to dismiss.
To recap, Sir, the Workers' Party is prepared to support the Bill even as we look forward to the Minister's answers on the specific queries with regard to the Police's use of TraceTogether data. But, separately, and arising from this episode, I urge the Government to open a national conversation on privacy forthwith, with a view to not just prevent the weakening of trust between citizens and the state today, but to strengthen it for the Singapore of tomorrow. Thank you.
Mr Speaker: Ms Tin Pei Ling.
Ms Tin Pei Ling (MacPherson): Mr Speaker, Sir, in Mandarin, please.
(In Mandarin): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] Mr Speaker, Sir, today's debate on the COVID-19 (Temporary Measures) (Amendment) Bill is very meaningful. This amendment, essentially, restricts the use of information collected by TraceTogether and SafeEntry to seven serious crimes. In fact, this Bill also aims to enhance public trust and encourage Singaporeans to continue fighting against COVID-19 with peace of mind for the greater good.
Since the outbreak of COVID-19, more than 2.2 million people worldwide have died and over 100 million confirmed cases have been diagnosed. In Singapore, the number of confirmed cases exceeded 59,000 and the death toll is 29.
In the face of this global pandemic, the Singapore Government has given top priority to the safety of our people. All this while, our Ministries have worked together, mobilised national resources and capabilities, investing nearly $100 billion last year to support Singapore companies and workers, and established a relatively comprehensive system of testing and treatment. At present, efforts to control the pandemic have also achieved firm results. As such, Singapore is widely praised for its COVID-19 fight.
Despite that COVID-19 has dealt a severe blow to the global economy and livelihoods around the world, local employment in Singapore has finally returned to pre-COVID-19 levels, even attracting $17.2 billion in fixed investments last year, which is 13% higher than in 2019.
Singaporeans' lives as well as their jobs are now protected. How many people have had to give their all to achieve this?
Outside of Singapore, we can see how COVID-19 is developing around the world. What is worrying is that, even in China where the control is watertight, they have also seen a rebound of cases. This is a reminder of how fluid the situation really is. In Singapore, vaccination is now in full swing. But with the start of the Phase 3, more people can gather in public places and hold large-scale gatherings. We cannot rule out the possibility of another wave and must be vigilant. Recently, there were community cases now and then. But, fortunately, they have been controlled. At the same time, there are news that not only has the virus not been exterminated, it has also mutated into more infectious strains.
Fortunately, we are living in an age of technology. Viruses cannot be touched or seen, but we can use the Internet and big data to track them down and isolate those who are infected. This would be unimaginable in the last century. Because of the advent of technology, our generation is able to better and more effectively deal with major infectious diseases globally. Technology has given us a ray of hope so that the disasters that befell human civilisations, such as smallpox, the Plague and cholera, will not recur.
As we laud the advancements of technology, there is anxiety, too, both worldwide and in Singapore. Among some communities, there are worries that big data will threaten privacy. Today's amendment Bill on TraceTogether is one clear example. TraceTogether is critical in contact tracing within the shortest time possible to limit the spread once an infected person is identified. The success of TraceTogether depends on all our cooperation. It was not easy to get everyone on board initially. Apart from helping the less tech-savvy to use it, we have to consider privacy issues. Making the coding open source and, therefore, verifiable by third parties, helped build trust in TraceTogether among the public.
However, when Singaporeans later discovered that the Police could access the data for serious crime investigations, which was different from the original picture painted, it triggered a debate. I, therefore, appreciate the Minister's clarifications. Such being the case, this amendment is perhaps the most decisive move. The Bill defines the seven serious crimes where TraceTogether data can be used outside of contact tracing purposes. This is very clear. I am confident that this will fortify the public's trust in the system. Nevertheless, I have three clarifications to seek from the Ministers.
First, after this Bill is passed, if there were other type of cases outside of the seven categories, such as a missing person case, the Police will be under immense pressure to solve it, will the Police be able to use the data from TraceTogether?
Second, if this data were collected for a major crime investigation, what is the process involved and what are the controls involved during this process?
Third, as we move towards a digital future, more technologies and our lives will be intertwined, we cannot deny that there will be a possibility that there will be another major crisis that will affect all. How will this Bill affect the large-scale deployment of such future technology solutions that will enhance our collective well-being? Will it also be just limited to the investigation of these seven major crimes?
Around the world, the success or failure of the COVID-19 fight depends not so much on medical resources and technology, but on public awareness. In countries like Europe and the US where there are strong calls for human rights, the situation seems to be more severe. In contrast, Asian cultures that emphasise the need to abide by social rules for the sake of collective interests have made the fight against COVID-19 more effective.
As the pandemic continues to worsen in most countries, entering Phase 3 means that we will enter a long-drawn war against the diseases. The Government's introduction of legislation at this stage to improve contact tracing efficiency is after much consideration. We cannot afford to let our guard down. We have to tread on thin ice and not let the efforts of the Government and society as a whole to be wasted just because of one careless moment.
In the fight against COVID-19, a wrong move may mean a lost war. Singapore is still plagued by the epidemic. Think of the number of hospital wards where healthcare workers have worked overtime and the loneliness and anxiety of isolated patients and their families, the pain of being separated from those you miss. How many students have to take part in graduation ceremonies online? Also, how many have to bear uncertainties in their career as a result of economic changes?
With the situation so fluid, some people may feel uneasy. Perhaps, even after this Bill is passed, some people would still hesitate to use TraceTogether. Yet, every life is precious and we have to use technology to fight this disease.
In Chinese mythology, Goddess Nuwa transformed her body into all that physically make up the world after she mended the sky. Shennong died after trying out hundreds of herbs himself. Da Yu passed by his home three times, but did not enter while managing the flood. All these characters in the stories shared the same spirit and that is the spirit of the greater good.
Sun Yat Sen, a great man of modern history also said that the difference between the individual and society is like the difference between the individual good and greater good.
Master Xing Yun once wrote in a Buddhist textbook that we need to elevate our love for the individual to a great compassion for all people. If we interpret this from another angle, it means that mankind can and should strive to achieve the greater good and greater compassion for the world.
Looking back at our own history, Singapore faced great difficulties in the early days of nation building. The prosperity and progress we have today depend to a large extent on the sacrifices and contributions of our early founders and pioneers. Some of them were political leaders, some representatives of Chinese businessmen, some philanthropists, some artists, some education promoters. Their names are still familiar to us today and praised by future generations. These include Sir Stamford Raffles, founder of Singapore; Mr Lee Kuan Yew, the founding Prime Minister who fought hard for Singapore throughout his life; Mr Yusof Ishak, the first President who contributed greatly to Singapore's racial harmony; Mr Tan Kah Kee, a philanthropist; Dr Tan Tock Seng who gave medical aid to the needy; Mr Lee Kong Chian, a great educator; and also many pioneers whose names cannot be listed here. Since the founding of Singapore, they have given their all and devoted their entire lives and wealth to promoting the political, social and economic and educational progress of Singapore. These great men have one thing in common, which is a spirit of placing the greater good over their individual good – be selfless. Bit by bit, through their convictions, they built this dream home called Singapore.
Today, I am convinced that making contributions should not be the prerogative of any segment of society. In the past year, we have seen that not only have Singaporeans not been defeated by the virus, they have also shown courage and kindness. Every frontline healthcare worker who faces the unknown with courage is also someone else's child or parent. There are also food and beverage operators who are willing to give hearting-warming meals to healthcare workers despite their own financial difficulties, and volunteers who visit foreign worker dormitories despite the risk of infection to themselves. They have shown us what the Singapore spirit is. They give us confidence that no matter how severe the storm is, we can overcome it.
Therefore, we must not give up our fight against COVID-19 at this juncture. We must continue to work together. Everyone is necessary in this fight. Every man is like a drop of water. Only when he is integrated into the sea can he see the vast expanse of the ocean. He is like a sand integrated into the desert to form a vast desert.
Given that the Bill has restricted the use of TraceTogether information, sacrificing a bit of privacy in exchange for public safety and health can be seen as a good deed. I hope that everyone will support this Bill.
When this pandemic is finally over, what will remain? Physically tired we may be, but we will leave behind a strong sense of home and nation. In the face of unpredictable challenges in the future, we, as Singaporeans should consciously integrate our individual good into the greater good and uphold the spirit of \"Singapore for me, me for Singapore\". Together, we will overcome this crisis. I support this Bill.
Mr Speaker: Mr Christopher de Souza.
Mr Christopher de Souza (Holland-Bukit Timah): Mr Speaker, Sir, thank you for allowing me to join this debate. I think the legislation is timely, speaks of transparency and is needed. Following my question to MHA in January, it was announced that data collected through the TraceTogether app could be used for criminal investigations. That was on a Monday. The day after, which was a Tuesday, Dr Vivian Balakrishnan provided a clarification that he had not considered the CPC when he spoke in June 2020 about the ambit of the usage of TraceTogether. I want to say that I listened to every word that he had said and I believe him; and I want to have that stated on Hansard.
I also remember Mr Pritam Singh saying in that debate that he accepts that the CPC was not in the Minister's contemplation at that time and that the remarks were made in good faith. Again, today, presumably consistent with that position of Mr Pritam Singh in January – the consistent position being the consistent position in January – that there is no imputation of dishonesty or malice on the Minister. I think he had quoted several groups that he had spoken to. But, in his view, there is no imputation of malice or dishonesty. And I think that is something very important to clear up because it is consistent with his initial position in January that he accepts the remark was made in good faith.
As a result of my clarification, which is really clarification, which is really an answer to my question from the day earlier – I am talking about the January sitting – we are in double quick time, debating this Bill under a Certificate of Urgency.
What this Bill does is ensure that only under these seven categories of offences can the Police use the TraceTogether data. I support this because in limiting to these seven categories, it allows the raison d'etre continues to be contact tracing. So, the fact is that we only have seven categories out of a vast number of offences in Singapore. And if you can go through the Penal Code, the Prevention of Corruption Act and the Misuse of Drugs Act, you will realise that there are many other offences outside the scope of these seven categories, including offences such as theft, battery and assault, and possession of a controlled drug which TraceTogether data cannot be used for.
Here we are only carving out seven and I think this indicates that it is most certainly geared towards contact tracing.
It is essentially a balancing exercise. We are in the midst of a pandemic and TraceTogether saves lives but we must also balance that with its ability to trace suspects for serious crimes. I have been the Government Parliamentary Committee (GPC) Chairman for Home Affairs and Law all of last term – and I know the threats we face. They are real, especially terrorism, especially drugs. I know how important it is to have the Police be given the tools to fight serious crime and I do know that the Police Force is a professional and judicious one and therefore notwithstanding the sacrifice of privacy the Bill envisions, I think on the grand scale of things, it should be supported so as to achieve the greater aim of containing a pandemic and the ancillary consequence of fighting crime.
I also listened intently to Mr Pritam Singh's position just now saying that, after speaking about privacy, the Workers' Party, notwithstanding, still supports the carve-out of seven offences. So, supporting seven categories, it must follow that the Workers' Party accepts the sacrifice to privacy is justifiable, at least, insofar as this Bill is concerned. Because the sacrifice to privacy is a basic ingredient to the Bill. To support the ancillary purpose of fighting serious crime, it is an ingredient.
Now, what is the basis of that ingredient? Mr Pritam Singh calls it privacy and I would say an element of sacrifice of privacy is needed. And let me make a case for that.
I do want to say something in favour of Home Affairs and MinLaw and AGC and the Police, when they were looking at the seven categories of offences. I do think that they were judiciously exercising self-restraint in not broadening the categories further, that is, they were trying to make the sacrifice of privacy as least painful as possible.
Let me give you a reason why I say this. If you look under the fourth offence, which is the drug-related offence, the TraceTogether data can only be used if the offence attracts a death sentence. Personally, I think this is overly restrictive. I know I am pushing the envelope here, but because of my strong stance against drug trafficking, the heinous nature of the offence and the multi-generational effects it causes on families, if it were up to me, I would not have restricted it to only crimes which attract a death sentence. I would have extended it to all types of drug trafficking, whether or not the offence attracted the death sentence.
And allow me to explain why. The ability to intervene or apprehend a suspect has, in part, to do with pre-arrest intelligence work. CNB may know that a known drug trafficker is going to do another drug delivery but until he is apprehended, they will not know the exact weight of the drug on him. So, it is really only when he has been apprehended with the drugs and the drugs have been weighed and found to have attracted a potential death sentence, for example, an arrest involving more than 15mg of diamorphine, that the CNB can retrospectively use the TraceTogether data of the suspect. This, in my view, restricts CNB far too much.
What I am getting at is that I would have thought that the more efficient method in which the TraceTogether data could be used by CNB would be before the apprehension so that the source of the drug could be ascertained upstream, that is, further up the chain of trafficking.
In effect, the Bill may have the unintended effect of only allowing retrospective tracing and not real time tracing of known drug trafficking whereas, in my view, real time tracing could create more leads thereby making CNB operations more efficient and productive. That is my own view.
My guess is that CNB was consulted in this along with the stakeholders – AGC, MHA, MCI and SNDGO, and the collective decision was to restrict it to only to death sentence for drug-related offences. If my guess is correct, this signals to me a judicious exercise of self-restraint, that is, the lesser the sacrifice to privacy, the better, out of respect to Singaporeans – and I dare say a sacrifice to privacy, to some extent, that the Workers' Party, is willing to accept.
So, I go back to this theme of balance. The overarching raison d’etre of this app is contact tracing; a lesser, ancillary consequence, is the ability to fight serious crime.
And why not allow for that positive ancillary consequence if indeed it can solve crime and alleviate much distress suffered by the victims of crimes, and their families? On balance, I think it is worth it. Why? Because for the reasons I have presented, the Bill still preserves contact tracing as the greater purpose.
Containing a pandemic through contact tracing and solving serious crimes are both – are both – virtuous exercises. The seven categories listed in the Bill strike the right balance. And for these reasons, I support the Bill.
Mr Speaker: Ms Sylvia Lim.
Ms Sylvia Lim (Aljunied): Mr Speaker, I have some queries and concerns on the Bill as regards Part 3 on personal contact tracing data.
First, it seems to me that the furore about the use of TraceTogether data could have been avoided if the Government had been clear from the start that the Police would be using its powers to access the data. Instead, blanket assurances were given by several Ministers that the TraceTogether (TT) data would only be used for contact tracing in COVID-19 cases. These blanket assurances were given from at least the middle of 2020.
Minister Vivian Balakrishnan told the House last month that he had forgotten about the Criminal Procedure Code when he gave his assurances and had sleepless nights thereafter. But the bigger question is: for all these months, why did no one in the Government step forward to correct the misrepresentation that TraceTogether was fully ringfenced for COVID-19 tracing?
Second, on why Police would need TraceTogether data for criminal investigations, I have some scepticism.
First, the TraceTogether data is likely to be incomplete and patchy. As pointed out by the Leader of the Opposition, people can and do turn off the Bluetooth functions on their phones. Those using TraceTogether tokens may also not carry them around all the time. The TraceTogether system's proximity data may also have some technical limitations as to distance and time which may make records incomplete.
Second, it should be pointed out that some countries, like Australia, have chosen not to allow their law enforcement agencies to access information from COVID-19 contact tracing schemes for other investigations. Even speaking as someone who is generally supportive of law enforcement, I believe it is important for the Government to make a convincing case for TraceTogether data use by elaborating on possible scenarios so that we can understand why TraceTogether may be pivotal to solving certain crimes. Earlier in his speech, Minister Vivian Balakrishnan gave one scenario of a child being kidnapped. I wonder if he has other scenarios to share.
Third, the Bill limits Police's use of TraceTogether data to seven categories of serious crimes. When the seven categories were announced last month, it was clear to me, at least, that the Government was making serious efforts to scope down its powers. On the face of offence categories, most can agree that they are grave offences which the public would want the Police to solve.
The seven categories of offences are now listed in the Seventh Schedule of the Bill. The Bill makes clear that the Seventh Schedule cannot be amended by Subsidiary Legislation but only through amending the main Act in Parliament. This will ensure that Members of Parliament and the public can scrutinise any change before it is law.
However, how water-tight are the seven categories? I was expecting to see in the Seventh Schedule a listing of the exact Penal provisions being contemplated such as precisely which sections of which laws are included. However, the Seventh Schedule describes the offence categories in less precise terms. This may lead to some ambiguity and uncertainty in application.
For instance, Category 7 is listed as, and I quote, \"Any offence involving serious sexual assault such as rape or sexual assault by penetration\". The use of the phrase \"such as\" means that rape and sexual assault by penetration are mere examples and not exhaustive of the category of serious sexual assault. Would this category include scenarios where the sexual assault did not involve penetration but involved, say, sexual assault of a mentally disabled victim? Many would regard sexual assault of a mentally disabled victim as serious and, in fact, TraceTogether data might be pivotal in such cases due to the victim's reduced ability to assist in Police investigations.
Another example of potential ambiguity is the offence of rioting. Rioting is defined under the Penal Code as a situation where there is an unlawful assembly of five or more persons and one member uses force or violence to pursue a common object of the assembly. If one looks at Seventh Schedule, Category 3, it seems to me that some cases of rioting may be included but not others, as it all depends on whether the injuries to the victim are of a life-threatening nature or not. Given the importance of proper classification, who will be the gatekeeper to certify whether or not a crime incident falls within the Seventh Schedule? It should not be left to the investigator alone.
My fourth point relates to from whom the Police will extract the TraceTogether data. The Bill makes clear that the Police will order the production of the data, so there is no need to seek consent from the person having the data. Referring to the parliamentary answer given by MHA to Member of Parliament Christopher de Souza on 4 January, Minister of State Desmond Tan had said that TraceTogether data would not be extracted from suspects but only from witnesses. Could the Minister clarify the precise basis for distinguishing the two? As for suspects, Minister of State Tan had said that TraceTogether data would not be extracted from suspects for the purpose of security. What are these security concerns?
Finally, in the light of the revelation that Police will use TraceTogether data, several defence counsel have asked me whether suspects too will be able to access TraceTogether data in any given case as it could be exculpatory, that is, it would delink the suspect from the crime. If the Police will be able to use TraceTogether data to incriminate the suspect, then in all fairness, the TraceTogether data should be available to the defence as well.
To this end, we understand that TraceTogether data on devices is transient as it is encrypted and stored for only 25 days, after which it is automatically deleted. Defence counsel often come onto the case some weeks after the arrest. How does the Government intend to handle this issue of justice and fairness?
Sir, as mentioned by the Leader of the Opposition earlier, the Workers' Party is prepared to support the Bill. However, we need answers to the questions we have posed.
Mr Speaker: Mr Murali Pillai.
Mr Murali Pillai (Bukit Batok): Mr Speaker, Sir, today’s debate is about accountability to Parliament. As leaders, it is important to communicate clearly as well as in a principled manner. If we had stated in this House that TraceTogether data is to be used only for contact tracing, then it should be so. Even if there is great benefit to be gained by using it for other purposes, even if there is fine print that allows us to do so, we should forebear. If we want to take a different approach from what was earlier represented in this House, then we should raise the matter here for debate and convince hon Members in this House that it is necessary to change tack.
This is responsible politics. It is for this reason that I welcome the introduction of this Bill.
The hon Leader of Opposition in his speech mentioned that there are quarters outside this House which ascribe a sinister motive in relation to the point as to whether the hon Minister knew from the outset that the data was to be used for other matters, apart from contact tracing, in particular, in dealing with investigation of offences.
What is noteworthy, as the hon Leader of Opposition mentioned, was that in the hon Prime Minister's speech on the 21 April 2020, he had already stated that in relation to the digital contact tracing efforts, there could be privacy concerns.
I filed a Parliamentary Question for the sitting in June 2020. On 4 June 2020, the Government's answer was that the data from TraceTogether would be used for contact tracing only. So, just looking at two points, April and June, you could already see there is a bit of a disjunct and there was an error that arose arising from the fact that while on one hand, the Prime Minister said there could be some privacy concerns, on the other, the Minister had pointed out that the data would only be used for contact tracing.
I, like the hon Member Mr Christopher de Souza, looked at the chronology of the entire saga and I am convinced that this error, just like the hon Leader of Opposition said, is not an error that was intentionally made. It was an error, in the words of Minister Vivian Balakrishnan, a mea culpa that arose because it was not drawn to his attention that the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) was applicable.
This Bill asks for permission to make TraceTogether and SafeEntry data, which was meant to be used for contact tracing to be available to the Police when there is a clear and pressing need to use that data for criminal investigations into seven categories of serious offences. In this regard, both the hon Leader of Opposition, Mr Pritam Singh, and the hon Member Ms Sylvia Lim, asked questions in relation to exactly when this would arise in practice. One point that was made was that the Police has already an abundance of tools.
But, to me, I find it useful that in this Bill, there is the operative words \"clear and pressing need\", and that, to me, limits the ability to use the data. And in relation to the seven categories – these are serious crimes that we are talking about – anyone looking at it would know that – and I am, in a sense, sharing what I am going to say a bit later – in balancing privacy concerns with really the concern for meting out justice in relation to the commission of serious offences, the Police should be provided access.
The question is a simple one. If these harms fall on your parent, your sibling, your child, and if the data from your TraceTogether token can make a difference between solving the case and leaving it unsolved, or if it means catching the criminal in days rather than in months or even years, would we not say yes?
I do say yes, and this is why I support this Bill. I do so for one main reason – it is in line with the current legislative policy to allow the Police access to any relevant data, no matter how personal, in their investigations.
As it stands, there is no blanket privacy protection that applies across the board. Our private phone logs, our banking records, are all subject to these provisions. The need for privacy must be weighed against the demands of justice, and the need to protect the safety and security of all Singaporeans. We are by no means unique in taking this stance. I made mention last month in this House that there is parity between the positions taken in Singapore and the European Union through its General Data Protection Regulations.
[Deputy Speaker (Mr Christopher de Souza) in the Chair]
An easy way out of this decision, it would be to say that TraceTogether and SafeEntry, taken together, is an aberration – if it had not existed, what would the Police do? The Police have solved crimes before TraceTogether and SafeEntry, and will do so after the programme has been stood down. So, why do we feel it needs this? Why not do without?
It would indeed be the easier route – just keep to the original promise, forget about the data and pretend we never had it.
But the fact remains that this is not a hypothetical armchair philosophy question. We have real crimes, real lives at stake. It is morally indefensible to shut our eyes to the answer when knowing it would make a difference in cracking a serious crime case and bringing the culprit to face justice and, possibly, save other lives from being victims of serious crime. This is not a crude utilitarian trampling of principles for a greater good. It is, in fact, the principle from which all Police powers come – the demand for justice, the right to be protected from evil and harm.
To those people who are troubled because they received this raft of conspiracy messages, saying that, \"Oh, the Police has no system to protect data and they use it for all kinds of issues\"; let me just say it for myself as a criminal lawyer for the past 25 years and a former police officer before that, that I know personally how seriously the Police deals with issues of misuse of data. I know of cases, some of them were cases where I represented the ex-officer, where there was misuse of data, and the Police officers concerned were prosecuted.
[Mr Speaker in the Chair]
So, there is a system and I would want to share my own experience with those who are troubled by these conspiracy messages.
A more difficult question – and that was posed by the hon Member Mr Christopher de Souza – is why then limit this access to serious crimes as defined under the Bill, given the state of law at this point? He spoke about the need to extend it to cover other classes of drug offences. With respect, this question ignores the facts and circumstances that have led us to this point. As hon Members are already familiar with the background, I will desist from recounting it again in my speech.
The crucial point to note is that this Bill represents a compromise to ensure that we do not take the risk of losing the ability to conduct contact tracing quickly and aggressively via TraceTogether and SafeEntry when we are in the midst of a pandemic.
It seems to me that there is broad agreement for data to be used to investigate the seven categories of serious crime proposed under the Bill. I do appreciate the hon Member Ms Sylvia Lim's point about the fact that they are not defined in terms of cross-reference to provisions but there is already description of the serious crimes. To me, that is sufficient. Using the general principles of interpretation, one would get to know what is parliamentary intention.
Extending the categories will require hon Members of this House to take a gamble on whether or not a group of Singaporeans and residents will still be prepared to adopt TraceTogether and SafeEntry – and that is a point that the hon Leader of Opposition made – or, instead, be put off in light of the extended use of the data. This is not a gamble that we should take, given the state of COVID-19 pandemic today. It is far worse than a year ago – the mutating virus has variants which are more infectious and lethal, more than 2 million dead across the world, a reporter in tears on \"live\" TV as she visited hospitals where patients are dying from lack of proper healthcare, students in a university ringfenced by metal fences to regulate visitor movements and keep them safe. This quick escalation can happen in Singapore if we were to lose our cohesion resulting in our healthcare resources being overwhelmed.
Even the vaccine is not a magic bullet. There are no magic bullets. All we have is our very human responses – our responsibility to each other, our own recognition of our vulnerabilities, our hopes and our better selves.
TraceTogether and SafeEntry, collectively, is a tool to help us in this pandemic and we need it in this new and present threat. It is also a tool to help us against the old evils of human depravity, greed and lust. There is no reason why it cannot do both. Even if one contact were traced through which one serious crime is solved or one serious crime is prevented, it would be worthwhile. And we just need one reason to support this Bill.
In closing, I would like to refer to the hon Leader of Opposition's point about the future and how we should regulate data in the future.
I would suggest, especially, in the context of the present crisis and the efforts being expended to contain the threat of COVID-19, we should also be looking at the future when we have to contain another crisis.
In that kind of scenario, what would we want to be as Members in this House? Should we just be ambassadors of our people, just conveying what this group of people have expressed, or that group of people have expressed? Would that be sufficient? Or would it be necessary that we bear the responsibility as leaders to move our people, to say, \"This is a crisis. Yes, errors will be made. But look at the conduct. Look at the outcome.\"
We must have the courage to move our people in one direction to overcome the crisis together. And that to me would be a big lesson for the future. I support this Bill. [Applause.]
Mr Speaker: Mr Gerald Giam. Mr Pritam Singh.
Mr Pritam Singh: I thank the hon Member Mr Murali for his comments. I would just like to pick up on a point the hon Member made about the easy way out being to just proceed as originally assured by the Government. I would suggest, very respectfully, to the hon Member that we have to take a step back and look at what is this easy way out of. And, in my humble view, the bigger issue is to ensure the safety of the population at hand and to ensure that contact tracing is successful.
So, the Government obviously had to weigh the implications of going ahead, proceeding as assured by the Minister and the Government or introducing the exemptions for serious crimes at this point.
In those circumstances, the critical issue in my mind is to determine which way do you go, where do you fall. And I would suggest that it is not a question of armchair philosophy or trying to defend something that is morally indefensible. Because, as a society, we have rules in very different situations. The hon Member is a criminal lawyer of some repute. Outside this Chamber, I think people like me would be going to him for advice on criminal matters.
But a useful example is attorney-client privilege. I could be representing a criminal who could have admitted to me that he committed an offence but my instructions is to plead not guilty for him in Court. And that puts a lot of pressure on criminal lawyers, as the Member would know. There are two options. You do not take up the case; you drop the brief. Or you make sure you follow those instructions to a hilt because if you do not, you have committed some offences vis-a-vis the Legal Profession Act and you have breached client confidentiality.
I am not suggesting an equivalence to TraceTogether. I am not suggesting that. But, effectively, that lawyer is a walking TraceTogether token. He knows something about the matter.
As far as society is concerned, that is a trade-off. What do we want? In this context, Government has put out a position and I would accept, as I have, that serious crimes are something that we have to look at carefully. Hence, the Workers' Party support.
But it is important, I think, for the Government to explain how critical TraceTogether information actually is. Because the public does not know. And insofar as how a conviction or a decision to prosecute turns on TraceTogether data, it is not exactly hypothetical.
The hon Member Mr Christoper de Souza has talked about expanding actually the scope of Misuse of Drugs Act, for example. But if one thinks about it, we have to bring ourselves back down to the purpose of this Bill which is TraceTogether. And the simple answer to that is I do not think drug lords or criminals will be carrying TraceTogether tokens and TraceTogether applications around.
But that is my position. I just wanted to verbalise my views on the points that hon Member Mr Murali made about, suggesting that this is an easy way out. I do not think that is the nub of the issue. I think it is far deeper than that.
Mr Speaker: Mr Gerald Giam. Ms Sylvia Lim.
Ms Sylvia Lim: I think, Sir, I just have one clarification for Member Mr Murali. If I heard him correctly, during his speech, he said he is comforted by the fact that the Bill states that the TraceTogether data would only be accessed when there is clear and pressing need. I would like to ask him whether he means that it is stated explicitly in the provisions or that it is implied by the provisions.
Mr Murali Pillai: Mr Speaker, Sir, so as not to hold up the proceedings, I am checking my notes and I will come back to my learned friend, Ms Sylvia Lim, shortly.
Mr Speaker: Mr Gerald Giam.
Mr Gerald Giam Yean Song (Aljunied): Mr Speaker, when I first read the 4 January Parliamentary Question by the Member for Holland-Bukit Timah Mr Christopher de Souza, I anticipated that the Government would answer it in one of two ways.
One, that TraceTogether or TT data is not and will never be used for anything other than contact tracing, as per their earlier assurances. Or two, that the TT data may be used for criminal investigations in some circumstances.
I thought the second scenario would be less likely. I shared with a colleague ahead of that day's Sitting that I did not think the Government would use TT data for non-contact tracing purposes. It will cause a public outcry as it would inviolate TT's privacy policy and what the Government had been saying about TT's privacy protection so far. More damagingly, it could lead to a lower adoption rate of TT, which would in turn hinder our battle against the COVID-19 pandemic.
As it turned out, option two was closer to reality. Minister of State Desmond Tan said that, \"The Singapore Police Force is empowered under the Criminal Procedure Code or CPC to obtain any data, including TraceTogether or TT data for criminal investigations\", and went on to assure the House that the data was secure and only authorised officers are allowed to access it.
In response to my supplementary question that day, the Minister of State clarified that other than for the purpose of criminal investigations and protecting public safety and security, TT data is to be used only for contact tracing.
The next day, on 5 January, the Minister for Foreign Affairs made a clarification, following a lot of unease expressed by Singaporeans about the previous day's revelations, where he stated that the use of TT data would be restricted to serious crimes.
Three days later, on 8 January, the Smart Nation Digital Government Office announced upcoming legislative provisions for the usage of data from TT and SafeEntry, which are in the Bill we are debating today.
Why did the Government choose the make this revelation only on 4 January, more than nine months after TT was launched? All that time the TT's privacy statement contained a more absolute assurance and, I quote, \"Any data shared with MOH will only be used solely for contact tracing of persons possibly exposed to COVID-19.\"
This privacy statement changed only sometime after 12.25 pm on 4 January, the afternoon that the PQ was answered, with the new clarification that it can also be used for criminal investigations.
On 8 June 2020, the Minister for Foreign Affairs had stated in a press conference that TT data is \"only used for contact tracing\".
While the Minister has since admitted that he had not thought of the CPC at that time – and I appreciate his explanation – why did anyone in Government not come out sooner to correct this statement?
Many Singaporeans downloaded the TT app and collected the TT token in large numbers, in part, because they trusted the Government's assurances of privacy and limitation of use.
This unfortunate sequence of events may make many Singaporeans more wary of taking Government's statements at face value. Some may now adopt Ronald Reagan's adage, \"Trust, but verify\".
We may now have an 80% adoption rate for TT but we should not rest on our laurels and become complacent.
First, the more people use TT, the more effective contact tracing will be. We should always aim for maximum adoption and usage and minimise any obstacles to adoption. For example, privacy fears or poor app performance.
Secondly, just because 80% of residents have downloaded the app or collected the token, does not mean that they are actually using it, a point that the Leader of the Opposition also made earlier.
There are many ways that TT can be disabled. There is even a pause function within the TT app itself. Suffice to say, one does not need to be a rocket scientist to figure out how to legally disable the TT app or token.
With the 4 January revelation, many people who anticipate engaging and even minor misdemeanours may choose to disable TT just to avoid detection. Some might even do so to avoid being called as a witness in a Court case. Others may do so as matter of principle or because of their lack of trust in the Government.
All these might add up to a not-so-insignificant proportion of our population.
We may think that these people are holding out on TT for unjustifiable reasons, especially since the seven serious crimes have already been scoped in. However, we cannot control every action that individuals make with their electronic devices.
Ultimately, TT relies on user consent. Perceptions will drive behaviour. The net result may be a lower than desired usage of TT which will hamper our contact tracing efforts.
The Government does not want to constrain itself by committing to \"never use TT data for crime fighting\". However, is the potential cost of slower containment of the community's spread of COVID-19 worth it? Put another way, if the COVID-19 situation were to take a turn for the worse, overwhelming our healthcare system, will the Police still use TraceTogether data if it inevitably suppresses the adoption rate and hinders contact tracing efforts?
Mr Murali has said that it is worth using contact tracing data even if one serious crime is solved. On the flip side, is it worth it if even one COVID-19 cluster goes undetected because a few people deactivated the TT app out of privacy concerns?
Sir, I will, with some reluctance, be prepared to support this Bill. However, I hope the Government and the Police will now consider this question carefully in deciding how often and to what extent it uses the broad powers conferred on it by section 20 of the CPC and this Bill.
Mr Speaker, I have some further clarifications for the Minister on this Bill.
First, we now know that SafeEntry data is also accessible to the Police. Since its launch, how many times have the Police used SafeEntry data for investigations and how many of these investigations were outside the scope of the seven serious crimes in the Seventh Schedule?
Second, the sunset clause proposed under section 82(8) gives a lot of power to the Minister to determine if we still need digital contact tracing and when the contact tracing data will be deleted.
The pandemic may last another four to five years, as Minister Lawrence Wong has recently alluded to. In an even more pessimistic scenario, COVID-19 may never be fully eradicated but will become endemic in our population.
If this happens, will these digital contact tracing systems ever be stood down? What are the criteria that will be used to determine this?
Third, do the safeguards in section 82 of the Bill cover data that has been uploaded to MOH databases for the purposes of contact tracing? If so, will the Police still be allowed to access this data even after the pandemic is over?
I asked a similar question on 5 January and the Minister answered then, \"I believe that once the pandemic has passed, that data – certainly the specific personalised data – those fields should be eliminated.\" Can I confirm that this remains the intent of this Bill?
Mr Speaker: Mr Murali Pillai.
Mr Murali Pillai: Mr Speaker, Sir, I am grateful for your indulgence. I would like to thank the hon Member Ms Sylvia Lim for her clarification question. In relation to how I got the impression that the powers would only be used when there is a clear and pressing need, I would like to direct her attention to the Government statement issued on 8 January 2021, entitled \"Upcoming Legislative Provisions for Usage of Data from Digital Contact Tracing Solutions\", where in paragraph three, it is stated that the legislation will specify the personal data collected through digital contact tracing solutions which comprise the TraceTogether programme and SafeEntry programme can only be used for the specific purpose of contact tracing except where there is a clear and pressing need to use that data for criminal investigations of serious offences.
So, that is how I formed the impression and I would invite the hon Minister to confirm if my impression is correct, in his response to us.
Mr Speaker: Ms Sylvia Lim.
Ms Sylvia Lim: Thank you, Speaker. I would like to thank Mr Murali also for clarifying in effect that it is not the Bill itself that states so. He said that he obtained the information from a Government statement.
Mr Speaker: Ms Jessica Tan.
Ms Jessica Tan Soon Neo (East Coast): Mr Speaker, thank you for allowing me to speak on this Bill.
Many Singaporeans recognise the importance of contact tracing in our quest to keep Singaporeans and Singapore safe during this COVID-19 pandemic. With the clarification that TraceTogether data can be accessed by the Police under the Criminal Procedure Code, I, like many, have received feedback from residents expressing disappointment and concerns. This change from the earlier assurances given that TraceTogether data would only be used for COVID-19 contact tracing purposes is something that has caused some disquiet. I can understand that many are upset because many had collected the token or downloaded the app on this assurance.
But I do want to make this point about looking at the TraceTogether solution and what the Minister has shared earlier with regards to the design decisions on TraceTogether.
I think that it is clear that TraceTogether is purpose-built with the singular purpose for COVID-19 contact tracing to prevent a situation of the spread of COVID-19 and with privacy protection central to that design. Why do I say that?
First, TraceTogether utilises, as many have said, Bluetooth exchanges to capture proximity of who has been close to you. This token or app does not use GPS capabilities and hence does not capture location information. This data is also captured and stored on the token or the app and not on the server.
The Minister had also shared that there are safeguards and what these safeguards include – that the data is kept on the token and is also deleted after 25 days. The scope of the TraceTogether solution has been very singular in that purpose of design. The fact is that data is deleted after 25 days – based on what the Minister had shared – based on medical advice of the time required for contact tracing data, if required, and that it is deleted after that time.
The Minister in his speech also shared that when the pandemic is over, the TraceTogether solution will be stood down and all personal digital contact tracing data used for COVID-19 contact tracing will be deleted from the systems as soon as practicable.
If you think about it from a design purpose, it is clear. But I think the important question now for all of us, in front of us now, is: do we restrict the use of that contact tracing data?
This Bill seeks to limit the use of personal data collected for COVID-19 through digital contact tracing solutions. If this Bill is passed, it will mean that personal contact data from TraceTogether and SafeEntry as set out in the Sixth Schedule of the Bill can only be used for COVID-19 contact tracing purpose when there is an infection and the only exception will be when the data is needed for criminal investigation proceedings for the serious offences as specified in the Seventh Schedule of the Bill.
Despite the intent of the Bill to limit the use of personal contact tracing data for the specified seven categories of serious crimes, some have asked if we should even allow access – and this discussion has been happening outside of this Chamber as well – and use of data for any other purpose as there was assurance given earlier that the information was for the sole purpose of COVID-19 contact tracing in the event that there is an infection.
Many have also pointed out that there is no need for the data from TraceTogether to be used as there are other sources of more intelligent data and information available from other smarter devices. These include close-circuit TVs installed in buildings, elevators, along our streets, in-vehicle cameras, and GPS devices including smartphones, just to name a few. With data from these devices, is there really a need for the data from TraceTogether?
Given the earlier assurance and the mistake made – I think the Leader of the Opposition and Mr Murali have also pointed this out, and I think we have had a discussion – I actually ask this question of myself: would be be an easier decision not to allow the use of the TraceTogether data for any other purpose? Easier in the sense that because of what people are feeling and the angst that some are feeling.
But then I ask myself again: is it the right decision?
If we take the position not to allow access to TraceTogether data for the purpose of police investigation when a serious crime is committed, what it would mean is that even if the data from the TraceTogether token or app could help in the investigation, even if there is a remote possibility, the Police cannot access the data.
The Minister gave the example of someone being kidnapped. I actually wrote that down for my speech too. In the event that someone was kidnapped – I had this discussion with a resident – if that happened, and if TraceTogether data, in the remotest possibility, was the only available data that could provide a lead in expediting investigations in that situation, what it would mean is that the data cannot be accessed if we did not have this discussion and we did not agree on this Bill.
In situations involving serious crimes – and the list, I think, we have all talked about that, in terms of the seriousness of those crimes – like murder, terrorism or kidnapping, timely access to data could make the difference between life and death. Knowing the implications of this, I ask myself again: would it be the right decision for us to agree that the data cannot be used even if it could save a life?
I come to this point that – I think there is some talk about whether it is convenient or easy for the Police. Are we making it easier for the Police to investigate rather than using other data? I think we all agree this is not about convenience. It is really about aiding and helping in investigations of serious crimes – matters that involve, in some cases, life and death.
As the Bill seeks to allow for personal contact tracing data to be accessed by the Police to assist in the investigation of serious crimes, what will happen if someone loses his/her token and it is used by another person for criminal purposes? I know this is somewhat a practical question but can the Minister share what will be done to prevent such misuse? Now that it could be used for criminal investigations of serious crimes, I think there are some voters who may be worried that their token or their app might be misused by someone else. How do we prevent that?
Mr Speaker, as we continue our fight against COVID-19, contact tracing remains the most important measure in keeping transmissions low together with all the other measures. While we protect data privacy – and I think the reason for this Bill is that we recognise that privacy is important – we must make the right decision to protect and keep Singapore and Singaporeans safe and secure. The measures proposed in this Bill are important as they seek to make clear the use and the limitations of personal contact tracing data for COVID-19 contact tracing purposes and criminal investigations.
The Bill is a compromise. It is a balance between public health and keeping everyone in Singapore safe and secure while respecting personal privacy.
Before I end, I do want to touch on this point because I think there were some discussions about whether this Bill will cause lower take up rates of TraceTogether. I think that is the purpose of why we are having this conversation in Parliament. It is to help Singaporeans understand why this balance needs to be made. I think to some extent I trust that Singaporeans, with the right information and understanding, will move in the right direction and support the use of digital solutions to help with contact tracing.
We have seen that of Singaporeans since COVID-19 started till now. We have seen how Singaporeans have stepped up. There have been so many restrictions made on everybody's lives but everyone has played their part. I think it is important we have this conversation so that Singaporeans can make the right decision to continue to move forward together, to keep everyone safe.
For these reasons, Mr Speaker, and for the implications that I have shared on public safety, I support the Bill.
Mr Speaker: Mr Leong Mun Wai.
Mr Leong Mun Wai (Non-Constituency Member): Mr Speaker, Sir, we all know by now that the merit of this Bill rests on tradeoff between public trust and public health on one side and public safety on the other.
Public trust in the Government is the cornerstone of Singapore's political system. Our people's trust in the Government enabled the first-generation leaders to transform Singapore from a third-world country to a first-world country. This very same trust enabled the Government to combat and curtail the SARS crisis in 2003 and the H1N1 crisis in 2009.
Sir, I would like to state that the Progress Singapore Party, or PSP, fully supports the Government's efforts to combat the COVID-19 pandemic and we were among the first to urge the Government to make mask-wearing mandatory in the early stages of the pandemic.
However, it would be remiss of me not to state that our contact tracing programmes intrude extensively upon our people's privacy.
SafeEntry collects an individual's NRIC, contact number, their location, whenever they enter a building and even how long an individual stays in a location, while TraceTogether collects who that individual was in close proximity to and for how long. The two programmes together allow the Government to easily create a map where an individual goes and who he associates with.
Singaporeans have long accepted some erosion over their civil rights and by extension their privacy, in order to ensure public safety. However, when the Government announced the TraceTogether token in June 2020, there was a public backlash against TraceTogether. Over concerns that TraceTogether will invade their privacy and the collected data will be used for non-contact tracing purposes.
But in the end, our people trusted both Minister Balakrishnan's and Senior Minister Teo's promises that the collected data would only be used for contact tracing, which was why TraceTogether adoption finally surpassed 70% in December 2020. This trust was broken during the January parliamentary session, when not only did the Government admitted that TraceTogether data was accessible to the Singapore Police Force for the purposes of criminal investigations, it was already actually assessed by the Police to investigate a murder.
Sir, trust takes years to build, seconds to break and forever to repair. This broken promise has broken the public's trust in the Government. It is because of this broken trust that we are gathered here today debating a Bill that has to be passed under a Certificate of Urgency, which means that all the three Readings of the Bill would have to be done in this Parliament Sitting and there will be little time to consider its implications carefully.
Actually, to start repairing the broken trust, the Government must first answer questions about the follow-up process around this episode. Like when did the Police first access the TT data? When the TT data was accessed, did the Police consider that they will be breaking the promise that the Government gave to not use the TT data for anything other than for the purposes of fighting the pandemic?
Has the TT data been accessed only once as Minister Balakrishnan has stated in the previous sitting, or more than once? If more than once, how many cases exactly has the Police actually accessed? When was Cabinet first informed that TT data was accessed in a direct breach of the promise they gave? Did Cabinet then gave instructions to the Police not to access TT data in light of their repeated and public promises?
These five questions apply with equal force to the data collector under the SafeEntry programme, which has so far attracted less attention. To proceed with this Bill, without answering these questions will leave serious doubts in the public's mind over whether this Bill is truly to rebuild public trust in a Government or to rubber stamp the Police actions after the fact. It is therefore in the spirit of rebuilding public trust that the Progress Singapore Party rises in opposition to this Bill. Allow me to elaborate.
As the PSP Secretary-General, Dr Tan Cheng Bock has stated, backtracking is not good politics and it erodes the confidence and social compact of our citizens in our political institutions. At this point in the pandemic, the last thing we need is for our citizens to lose faith in the Government and start second-guessing the Government's motives whenever in announces new measures to control the COVID-19 virus, especially when other countries around the world are experiencing new outbreaks.
The Government is compromising public health and public trust for some benefit in public safety by passing this Bill. Public trust in TraceTogether has been eroded by this broken promise. What I found when speaking to residents is that they are now leaving their TraceTogether tokens at home when they go out. And some are now refusing to use TraceTogether altogether.
This will compromise the effectiveness of contact tracing efforts, and this is exceptionally dangerous in light of the uptick in community cases since Singapore's move into Phase Three.
The SPF has already broad powers to assess documents, things, data, computers and even decryption data under the Criminal Procedure Code for the purposes of investigating crimes. How much is the incremental benefit, from a set of data that exists only for 25 days? Besides I find it quite unbelievable that such criminals would carry their TraceTogether tokens when committing such crimes, especially now that the Government has announced the TT data is accessible by the Police.
Sir, the challenge of a democratic Government is to use innovative technology for public safety, but at the same time, not intruding into the privacy of its citizens too much, not in using any technology that is available. The Government's biggest priority now should be to fight the COVID-19 pandemic and persuade as many people as possible to use TraceTogether. This must be the call and primary purpose. Any other purpose that compromises on this primary purpose and cause people to reconsider using TraceTogether must be set aside.
Sir, the PSP is not objecting to this Bill for the sake of objecting. We have thought of supporting it with some changes, but to trade off public trust in public health measures, which must be of utmost priority in a pandemic crisis, for public safety, is too much to give for us, after much consideration.
And the complete ring-fencing of contact tracing data, keeping it solely for public health objective, is not unprecedented. The Australian government has publicly committed that the data collected by the contact tracing application cannot be accessed by the Police and is to be used only for contact tracing purposes, and has already passed legislation to that effect.
We must also keep in mind that the COVID-19 pandemic will neither be the first nor the last pandemic that our country will have to deal with. Any action the Government takes to deal with this pandemic be it to prioritise public health and trust or public safety will significantly impact our people's trust and confidence in the Government's action in future pandemics and other unforeseen calamities.
Therefore, when all the various issues are considered, passing this Bill may actually run against the Government's objective of rallying everybody together to fight the pandemic which should be our top priority at this moment in time.
In conclusion, Sir, this Bill does not go far enough to assure our citizens that the Government will keep its promises and is insufficient to restore public trust in the Government during this pandemic. The Progress Singapore Party therefore stands opposed against this Bill and calls upon the Government to keep to his original promise by fully exempting contact tracing data from the CPC.
Mr Speaker: Leader.
The Minister, Prime Minister's Office and Second Minister for Finance and National Development and Leader of the House (Ms Indranee Rajah): Mr Speaker, I just have a clarification for Mr Leong because I just wanted to understand his position. So, would I be correct then in understanding that, in the example given by Minister Vivian, that if there was a child kidnapped and let us say, there is no other sign of any evidence, the only thing that you have is TraceTogether data, Mr Leong's position would be, \"No, let it be, we will not access that data.\" Is it that the position?
Mr Leong Mun Wai: I thank the Minister for the question. Yes. Our position will be that.
But of course, in any of the decisions we make, there is a trade-off. So, when you take the position of the Bill what you are saying public trust plus the needs of public health – both of these benefits would be less than the benefits that you draw or you expect to draw from public safety. So, we have the weigh the trade-off and after weighing the trade-off, we hold the stand that we are going against this Bill.
Ms Indranee Rajah: I thank the Member for his clarification. He is right. There is a trade-off, but we would not trade a child's life for something like that.
Mr Speaker: Mr Vikram Nair.
Mr Vikram Nair (Sembawang): Mr Speaker, while I understand the context for this Bill, and the reservations many of the earlier Members have mentioned about privacy, I wish to state that I have a somewhat different view. I, too, have my reservations on this Bill, but it largely has to do with the limits its placing on the powers of the Police to obtain information under the CPC. And I think one of the points that we cannot trivialise, is how difficult Police investigations are and how difficult the process of finding the truth can be as well, even if matters were to go to Court.
In Singapore, we have a low crime rate and most Singaporeans go about their daily lives without fear of crime. An important reason for this is that we have effective law enforcement by the Police. Singapore's Police Force is small, relative to the population. We have just under 9,700 regular police officers in Singapore, which is around 170 per 100,000 people. This is one of the smallest in the developed world and even amongst our neighbours. For example, the US has around 238, Hong Kong has 487 and Malaysia has around 320.
Yet, despite the small Police Force, they have been effective at keeping the crime rates low. This is in part because it has strong support from the population. And people make reports whenever they see anything amiss. For Members of Parliament, you know this, almost every other thing ends up in a Police report; whether it is a neighbour dispute, complaint about noise. People share information freely with the Police, trust the Police and expect them to be able to solve crimes. This expectation is reflected in section 20 of the Criminal Procedure Code which allows a Police officer above the rank of sergeant to order a person to \"produce any document or thing\" to assist in investigations.
This power is understandable. When a crime happens, Police have to piece together what happened. The crime scene is not going to the tell the Police the story. If they are lucky, they will have eyewitnesses who can identify the accused, get confessions and close the case. But what if they do not have ready eyewitnesses? What if they have people who were there but who did not see things but who may be able to give information or device? These are all different situations you may find yourself in after a crime has happened.
The Police have a wide variety of investigated methods, that is, old-fashioned style investigations, maybe like Sherlock Holmes – you look for clues, you piece together, you draw inferences. But while those make good stories, they do not help you solve a large number of crimes that take place regularly. So, Police use data, they use technology, they find corroborating evidence from as many sources as possible to try and understand what happened.
Even after Police work is done and the suspect is found, a trial may be necessary if the suspect does not plead guilty and where evidence gathered by the Police and investigators are put to rigorous testing.
As a lawyer, I take part in trials and I can tell you, the truth is not always straightforward. There will be competing versions of narratives and the Judge sitting there has to decide who is telling the truth. The more information and data you have, the better you will be able to piece the story together. And the standard for proving guilt is beyond reasonable doubt. So, it is a very high threshold you have to take before you can establish someone has done something wrong.
The general rules of evidence, certainly in civil proceedings is, you have a duty to disclose all evidence that is not privileged, even if it goes against your client's case. This is because your primary obligation is with the Court, to help the Court find the truth. Even in criminal proceedings, there are obligations on prosecutors to disclose evidence that may go towards showing the person is not guilty. All this is there because we want the Courts to have the best available information to arrive at the truth.
So, generally, the rules and the society that we live in has this presumption that the Court has to have access to all available information. And, of course, for the information to get to the Court, it must first be gathered, in this case, by the Police.
I understand that this limitation is only to the powers of the Police and not to the powers of the Court. But in practical terms, where you only have 25 days to gather this evidence, if the decision is not made upfront to gather this evidence, it is unlikely to be gathered or used in Court.
So, against this backdrop of the manpower crunch, Police have regularly kept up with the latest policing methods, using technology wherever possible. One obvious example is the use of CCTVs, which are now there at the ground floor lift lobbies and staircases to HDB flats. There is obviously a trade-off in privacy, but I think Singaporeans have generally been comfortable with this. They trust the Police; they cooperate with the Police.
I always find more requests for more CCTVs, not less. In fact, with most of my residents, the kinds of things they ask surveillance for usually gets rejected but this includes dealing loanshark harassment, littering, inconsiderate neighbourly behaviours, noise nuisance, speeding, traffic offences and parking offences.
The Police have done a very good job of dealing with serious crime. Minor crime is obviously not prioritised but this is what causes the most nuisance amongst many of our residents. And even in these situations, people are always ready to trade off privacy for a fast resolution to issues.
People understand that Police have limited resources and they are generally supportive unmanned surveillance methods.
Where would TraceTogether and SafeEntry come in? What does TraceTogether do? TraceTogether does not track individual locations. It is not this autonomous pilot scene where everyone goes, what you are doing or is it going to retrace your story. The only information TraceTogether has is who is near you at that point in time. This is obviously very useful in contact tracing because you may not know all the people you are in close contact with over a two-week period.
But for this very reason, it can also be helpful if you are trying to solve \"who done it\", a mystery of what happened here. Let us say, obviously, in a case of murder, it is very clear cut. The victim is there. The victim cannot speak; the victim is dead. The victim has a device. You may be able to infer from that device who was in close proximity at the time of the event.
How about other cases? What about cases where you cannot see the victim. Maybe you are sitting in a coffeeshop. A fight took place behind you. Your token is here but you did not see what happened but you were at the location. By the time the Police come, the people involved in the fight had disappeared. If that fight is not serious, then, that is going to be one of those potential unsolved crimes – people disappeared, not serious enough to investigate. But if they could use TraceTogether data to find out who did it, then that may be another solved crime. Would you want your TraceTogether data to assist in Police investigations with that situation? I would have no objections to it.
Likewise, if someone was hauled up, being interrogated for a crime. And if he were to say, \"Oh, yeah, I was in the coffeeshop and I think the Member of Parliament was there, maybe Member of Parliament so and so\". Then, if he was not close proximity, he maybe blindsided, cannot remember, you can check the TraceTogether data as well.
The key point about TraceTogether is that it is useful to place you together with a stranger and placing a person is an important part of the solving the mystery of the crime – who done it? where was he at the time it happened? I do not see any principled reason why this data should not be relied on by Police.
The second point is SafeEntry. Currently, TraceTogether data can be used for serious crime. But I also have reservations on things that are excluded. For example, if sexual assault is not serious, it cannot be used; violence not amounting to grievous bodily harm non-capital drug offences. These acts are not serious under the current legislation but would you want the Police to use all data available to solve these crimes? My answer would be yes.
If you were a victim, if one of your family members was a victim, would you want Police to use all available data? Pretty sure the answer is yes. If you were wrongly accused, would you want the Police to use this data to show you were somewhere else the time it happened? Probably yes. But that cannot be done now, unless it is a serious crime.
Police are also being prevented from using SafeEntry data now for anything apart from serious matters. SafeEntry would show what time you entered a place and maybe what time you left if you had checked out. I know that at many places, they monitor you checking in but they do not monitor you checking out. Admittedly, again, it is not perfect. It is just one more clue to help put the whole picture together.
If used in conjunction with TraceTogether, it may show when you went and it may show when you left, if you can remember where you went to and the Police can find someone else who was there at that point in time. You could be corroborated by a stranger.
To me, what SafeEntry does, is similar to what visitor logs at condominiums and so on, may have done. Generally, we accept that people who maintain properties can keep entrances of visitors when they come and go. And this is often used in, both in civil cases as well as in criminal cases to find out whether a person was at a particular location, at a particular point in time. To me, SafeEntry is a far more sophisticated visitor log far, more accurate, and the fact that its use is being limited is actually a concern because, again what you are saying is, no, no, you cannot see the whole picture, you just have to work with this limit of information.
To me, in identifying how a crime happened, who was there, these are not straightforward processes. And for those who do trials, there is plenty of uncertainty involved in all these things. The more information you have, the better you can test the truth or falsity of a person's story. And I think this is important.
Ultimately, if we want to keep COVID-19 in control, we need to use TraceTogether. Why? Because TraceTogether makes contact tracing significantly easier. A person does not have to remember where they were the last 14 days. They do not have to remember exactly how much time they spent at each place nor do you have to do individual interviews for each and every person. So, to me, it goes without saying that TraceTogether is necessary for this fight.
Is TraceTogether something to be feared? Is it a huge invasion of your privacy? In my view, it is not. In my view, the fact that TraceTogether can be used to solve crimes, it may help exonerate innocent people. To, me, that is one more reason to use it, rather than to be afraid of using it.
Ultimately, it is our duty as Members of this House to be role models as well. So I think it is important for us not just to reiterate or echo fears that are outside but explain to people whether there is a proper basis for their fears or whether these fears may be overblown and the important considerations, the benefits of using this outweigh, whatever fears we may have. Because ultimately, when we use TraceTogether, the more of us that use it, the better we can solve the community spread of COVID-19. I also hope the better we can solve crime.
But I do acknowledge that there are people who have concerns about privacy and therefore its use in crime fighting is going to be limited. So, yes, I do have my reservations on these restrictions, but as this Bill is a compromise, I support it.
Mr Speaker: Ms Nadia Samdin.
Ms Nadia Ahmad Samdin (Ang Mo Kio): Mr Speaker, Sir, it has been slightly over a year since COVID-19 forced its first city into lockdown. The following months saw governments across the world pushed into doing the same, changing our lives and livelihoods in substantial ways for the safety of our citizens.
In Singapore, the situation is largely under control. Thanks to the sacrifices of our frontline workers, work by our Government and Civil Service, and the civic mindedness of our citizens in complying with regulations. We have put society before self. But the community cases remind us that the COVID-19 curve has only been flattened, and not quashed. With every report of a new case, what swiftly follows are assurances that the close contacts are being identified and quarantined, the capabilities of our contact tracing team on full display.
The positive impact of TraceTogether, or TT for short, in increasing the efficiency of our contact tracing efforts is undeniable but given the developments since we last sat in this House last month, we must also understand the sentiments of some Singaporeans about the expanded use of TT data in connection with the investigation powers under the CPC beyond what was originally promised to be used solely for contact tracing purposes.
This is the first time that a database of Bluetooth data that can tell who we are with, and for approximately how long, is recorded and accessible by the Government under specified conditions. While we note the strict conditions in which the data can be accessed, the very collection and storage of such information does involve an ideological leap in some quarters.
However, many believed in the purpose for which the data would be used and on that basis more than 4.2 million people have enrolled in the programme today. We cannot take their concerns lightly.
My worry is that despite the utility and practicality of TT, the cost of going beyond the initial promise of what the TT data can be used for may drive away those who are skeptical of the assurances which this Bill is actually seeking to provide.
To move forward together, I hope for a focus on building trust and gaining confidence for the programme. And, in this respect I have some clarifications to raise, and assurances I hope to seek. These fall into three broad categories: first, transparency in the technology; second, transparency in the projected life cycle and use; and third, transparency in the process of using TT data in investigations.
When the TT programme first started, the Government gave public access to the technology behind it. The programme's base code, Opentrace, is open source. I received an email from a young resident of mine seeking clarification on the continued commitment in making Opentrace, open source. There were two points in particular.
As of 10 January, the Opentrace Github repository for Android was updated close to 10 months prior. However, the app on Play Store was updated on 7 December. This suggests that the version listed on the Github repository, is not the same version as that which was on the application. There are also no opensource licences listed and the terms of use and distribution should be outlined in the repository itself.
Some suggestions for consideration are: to ensure that the Github repository is updated within a reasonable time when there are application updates that have been rolled out; to update the Opentrace repository with opensource licences; to publish brief transparency reports on perhaps a bi-annual basis that will help the public understand how the data is being used, provided that the release of such data will not disrupt any investigations; and to reaffirm the commitment that TT data will always be stored on the user's device, only shared with the Government when the user takes action to upload the data and can be deleted at the request of the user.
On my second point, there are several stages in the investigation and criminal prosecution process. Generally, when the Police have been informed of a possible offence, an investigation is initiated. Evidence is obtained. The investigation officers or IOs meet with the prosecutors in the Attorney-General's Chambers (AGC). The DPPs will decide on the actual charge to proceed with, subject to their own internal procedures and approval structures, as well as whether sufficient evidence has been collected. The person under investigation or arrest will then appear in Court to be formally charged.
But some investigations do not conclude with the person investigated being charged for a variety of reasons. For cases that proceed to prosecution, at the stage of criminal investigations, our IOs would likely have an idea of the range of offences which could apply. But the final charge may not be set out until much later. Even then, during trial, charges may be amended or dropped.
How will we deal with cases where TT data is used in investigations where the actual charge, in the end, does not fall within the categories of these serious offences? Will the use of TT data during investigations put pressure on prosecutors to proceed with a holding charge for a more serious offence in order to legitimise the use of TT data?
While I note section 82(7), I would also like to seek confirmation whether an individual will be able to meaningfully offer both his TT and SafeEntry data as evidence. In the event one is being investigated for a serious offence but claims innocence, can such individual volunteer and access personal contact tracing data, noting the possible privacy concerns of others, as that individual's personal contact tracing data may involve the data of others who were around the individual at a particular time.
And, finally, for example, in a case of sexual assault, it can be a very traumatic experience for victims. Cases do go unreported and some take a very long time before they come to light. Given that TT data is automatically deleted in 25 days and very little actual information is collected and stored, how useful is this data for investigations? I would appreciate if the Government could please share some of its considerations in this regard.
My third point. Mr Speaker, over the course of my engagements regarding the inclusion of TT data, people have also shared their concerns with me over the likelihood of TraceTogether one day becoming compulsory, along with a slew of other privacy concerns. There is speculation circulating, and the only way to combat this speculation is with clarity.
Specifically, I would like to request for clarity on the life cycle of the programme. People want to have an understanding and assurance on how long the programme will last, that it will continue to remain opt-in, under what conditions that may change and when it would be laid to rest. Of course, it is impossible for us to give a fixed date for when the TT programme can be terminated as it is still unclear how long COVID-19 will last and even more uncertain what its impact may be on society at large.
However, it is possible for us to take a condition-based approach in detailing the life cycle of the TT programme, a way of specifying the conditions that will prompt a significant change in our present use of the TT app and device. This is so Singaporeans are prepared in advance for any changes in the TT programme as the conditions and parameters for this would have already been specified. As an example, one of the \"conditions\" could be, should there be no new infections, both community and imported, for a period of x number of months, the TT programme will then be laid to rest. While we are dealing with unprecedented challenges and we recognise that things change very quickly, such an open approach will help engender trust.
In closing, Mr Speaker, Sir, at the heart of it, I, along with many Singaporeans, believe in the importance of contact tracing and the utility of the TT programme. I have read a number of concerns and confusion over the past month and I do feel bad for the engineers and teams behind the programme because I genuinely believe they were doing the best they can, all the while working in the heat of a crisis under immense pressure. I also appreciate the difficult position that we are debating today and the Minister's candour.
It is evident to me that the various protocols around the TT data, for example, encryption, storage on local device and the automatic destruction after 25 days, were in place solely for contact tracing purposes at the time.
However, as a lawyer, I also understand the potential utility for which the TT data could bring as evidence, in particular, for grave offences, and the potential to charge an accused who committed a wrongdoing, exonerate someone who is innocent, and give peace to victims and their families.
Based on several conversations I have had on the ground, many Singaporeans understand and are willing for TT data to be used in investigations although some do wish that they had been consulted first. I hope that some of the above clarifications can be addressed.
Notwithstanding the above, Mr Speaker, Sir, I believe that the Bill reflects a practical position and compromise, and express my support.
Mr Speaker: Mr Xie Yao Quan.
Mr Xie Yao Quan (Jurong): Mr Speaker, Sir, Singapore may be doing well now, but COVID-19 could be with us for quite a while more. Indeed, many countries around the world are currently dealing with major outbreaks.
In Singapore, we have a multi-layered strategy to keep ourselves safe, for as long as possible. But, crucially, every single layer in this strategy rests on trust between the Government and its people. Safe distancing, wearing of masks, complying with group size limits, keeping at all the Safe Management Measures and resisting fatigue and complacency – we can only do this if there is trust between the Government and its people.
Getting as much of our population vaccinated as possible, allaying concerns, countering misinformation. These too require trust between the Government and its people. And participating voluntarily in a national contact tracing scheme like TraceTogether certainly requires that same trust.
In short, trust is the lynchpin in every layer of our multi-layered strategy to stay safe in a COVID-19 world. And therefore, the Government must do all it can to continue keeping trust with our people in this fight.
This is why personally, I would much prefer – much prefer – that the Government maintains what it had communicated at the start, at the outset, and completely exempts TraceTogether data from Criminal Procedure Code provisions.
In my view, this is the surest way – not the only way but the surest way – to maintain the trust between Government and people that is so crucial in this fight, and the surest way to help Singaporeans understand what Minister Balakrishnan himself had referred to in his clarifications in this House last month, and I quote \"not only the measures that we are implementing, but why we are implementing it, the spirit behind it.\"
A complete exemption of TraceTogether data from Criminal Procedure Code provisions, in line with the Government's original communications on this matter would, in my view, be the surest way to achieve this.
Some have pointed out that other technological applications that are so prevalent in our lives today have far broader terms of use regarding our personal data. But that is really not the point, and in any case, the trust between Government and its people is a completely different matter. It is sacrosanct. It is strategic.
I was, therefore, very concerned about how Singaporeans would take to the Government's clarifications on this matter last month, and to the proposed amendments before us today.
In this respect, I was relieved to observe that, in general, in fact, the level of participation and the desire to participate in TraceTogether had actually remained high. In fact, many of my residents have been anxious to collect their tokens and were asking me when stock at the Community Club would be replenished – happy to know that stock has arrived. Other residents pointed out to me that the amendments actually limit Police access to a much narrower scope than what the Criminal Procedure Code provides for. So, they understand the Government’s thinking on this matter and recognise the Government’s practical and calibrated approach on this matter.
And I note that TraceTogether data, as it was originally designed, will ultimately continue to be automatically purged after 25 days and cease to exist altogether once this pandemic is behind us, the proposed legislation notwithstanding.
So, ultimately, it was really a dilemma for me. On the one hand, the need to jealously safeguard trust in the interest of public health. On the other, having a calibrated way to also enhance public security and safety. I thought long and hard about this matter and, ultimately, after considering the Minister's clarifications, my personal views and by listening to the whole range of views amongst my residents, I am prepared to support this Bill.
Mr Speaker: Order. I propose to take a break now. I suspend the Sitting and will take the Chair at 4.30 pm.
Sitting accordingly suspended
at 4.11 pm until 4.30 pm.
Sitting resumed at 4.30 pm.
[Mdm Deputy Speaker in the Chair]
Mr Alex Yam (Marsiling-Yew Tee): Mdm Deputy Speaker, I think I can speak on behalf of many Singaporeans and all Members of this House will agree when I say that I take pride in our Police Force.
We are proud of the work that they do in keeping all of us safe. They are efficient, reliable and responsible. They are not known to abuse their authority and they have always used their investigative powers diligently. They are the reason they walk our streets safely and our children play freely. I trust them with my life, I trust them to keep us safe, and I trust that they take their responsibility and duty diligently.
I must admit that I was a little surprised at the furore over the revelation that TraceTogether data may be used in Police investigations under the Criminal Procedure Code. After all, public safety and public health are of equal importance. However, I can empathise with the reasons for the unhappiness. The abrupt change in the terms concerning personal data usage is upsetting for many.
In this pandemic, the people have entrusted their personal data for an important purpose. To be then told it will also be used for something beyond the original intention feels like trust has been broken.
This breakdown in communication could have been avoided. If more time was spent engaging various stakeholders and examining the communication strategy for loopholes, we could have avoided the current situation that we are in.
But with the urgency due to the raging pandemic last year, I can fully understand that things developed quickly and this unfortunately led to incomplete and inaccurate information being disseminated to the public.
The communication process could indeed have been better managed. People rightfully expect better from their government.
What the Government must do now is to rectify this mistake, apologise for the miscommunication, acknowledge the concerns that have been raised, understand the reasons for the discontentment, and reassure the public on what will be done to prevent similar occurrences for future policies.
Coming back to the use of TraceTogether for Police investigations, I think it bears repeating that Singapore is ranked top for personal safety. This is according to the most recently available 2019 Safe Cities Index published by the Economist Intelligence Unit.
We have our Police and security agencies to thank for this. But it is easy to get complacent. Just as it is with combating COVID-19, we must not take our safety and security for granted.
Singapore may be safe, but it is not crime-free. Violent crimes do occur, though rarely.
In 2019 alone, 155 serious crimes were recorded, including some violent ones, and in recent months, resurfacing of cold cases, a small number of which were horrific crimes involving suspected murder and rape that remain unsolved till today due to the lack of sufficient evidence.
Indeed, therefore, access to information is key to the resolution of any crime. Police need evidence and the sooner the better, the more complete the better.
To leave no stone unturned is perhaps the unspoken operational motto that guides exemplary police forces around the world. This helps them to protect civilians' safety and security. Therefore, it strikes me as counterintuitive to deliberately place restrictions on the Police on their access to information that could be helpful in the course of the investigation.
It would be akin to walking past a bloody knife and ignoring it completely.
While it may be rare that TraceTogether data could produce conclusive evidence for every single investigation that it is used for, sometimes you just need one small jigsaw piece to complete the puzzle.
As with the hon Member Mr Vikram Nair, I have reservations on this legislation that we are placing a restraint on the Police's investigative powers and limiting the type of crimes that the data can be used for.
There are crimes that might not at the current moment be classified as serious crimes but have the potential to escalate. An example is stalking. We have seen in various cases, not just locally but internationally, that stalking can give rise to more serious crimes such as sexual assault or even murder and kidnapping.
Some have also scoffed at the idea. If you have to commit a crime, do not bring along your TraceTogether token then. Do not turn on your app. But not all crimes are planned. Most are opportunistic: molest, pickpocketing, even assaults are sometimes committed on impulse and are not so much pre-planned. These situations will benefit from the use of TT data in investigations as well.
Many also tend to look at the use of TT data, in the most recent conversations, solely for the Police to establish guilt or to trace where you have been. Let us not forget that in the entire process of investigation – all the way from Police until it makes its way to Court – it is also equally important that evidence is available to prove innocence, not just guilt.
Whatever the gravity of the crime, any miscarriage of justice, whether for a minor crime or a serious crime, weighs equally on the person.
Some may of course argue that it is the Police's responsibility to seek out evidence via other channels that have always been available – a plethora of sources of information – and therefore the Police need not use TraceTogether.
That might be true to a certain extent but if it makes it more efficient, if it solves a crime, it saves a life and it safeguards security in our society, it upholds justice, I fail to comprehend why they should be denied access to any tool that would allow them to do so.
Time is of the essence in any investigation. Over the years, new technology has been consistently introduced and existing ones also enhanced to aid our Police, to improve the quality and speed of investigations. The Police are therefore able to review many cases with conclusive results.
I therefore fear that if we start introducing restrictions to Police investigative prerogatives, this will set a precedence for future technology where then, there is an expectation that applicable scenarios must be spelt out in full. This will then seriously impact the capability of not only the Police but other security agencies and the Government because they would have to overcome a huge amount of red tape just to get evidence.
On a wider scale, it is also imperative that we get our priorities right. Data privacy is important, I think it is universally acknowledged – but so is safety, security, life, preservation of life, both in health as well as in safety.
In other countries, the limitation of capability and access to information seriously impacted the management of many governments on the pandemic itself. Some governments have had to seek approval to declare a state of emergency or to introduce measures just to control COVID-19. Even when powers are accorded, they are inadequate. There have been mention of other jurisdictions where contact tracing have been limited. But why?
It is not because of some noble ideal but because no one is taking it seriously. They do not download it. They do not participate in contact tracing. These measures are not so much a noble ideal in protecting the privacy but to encourage them to protect their lives.
Singaporeans amidst this pandemic have been responsible, cooperative and with a mind on the greater social good. This has helped us tremendously in combating the pandemic.
I note from feedback and conversations with residents who are volunteers and many others that the unhappiness does not stem from the Police access to the data but from a broken trust – from the sense that trust has been broken, that a promise was not kept.
Had all the cards been laid on the table from the very beginning, perhaps we would not even be having this debate today. The problem really lies with the omission of information and a perceived lack of transparency to the public on communication regarding the use of TraceTogether. Certainly, the Government should have been more open, more prepared and more diligent about communicating this aspect to the public.
But I come back to the point I made three times in this speech – that I am uncomfortable with Police access to any information that will be helpful to keep our society safe. Because even if the Police is allowed to use the data, it does not mean that they use it callously. They use it with great responsibility. The hon Member Mr Murali, from his experience, has also indicated that the Police take the use of evidence and personal data very seriously. It is not something that they throw about willy-nilly.
If there is an infraction, there is a misuse of the data, it is punished, action is taken.
We are in the midst of a pandemic. These are extraordinary times and TraceTogether is an extraordinary measure. It is a temporary tool and that bears repeating. It is a temporary tool.
We use to build our resilience against COVID-19. It helps to keep all of us healthy and safe, and it is crucial in reducing community cases.
As the past months have demonstrated, we are far from being immune to COVID-19 resurgence. We have seen that in many other countries. Therefore, the usage of TraceTogether remains crucial.
Any refusal to participate in contract tracing will impede our efforts and turn us back from the gains we have made in the last year. Therefore we must stay rational in this process.
Mdm Deputy Speaker, as the Government has already introduced the amendments before this House and has communicated to the public more than once its intention to do so – to ringfence the data for only the stipulated seven categories of serious crimes – I therefore reluctantly support the intent of this Bill to formalise those assurances about the use of contact tracing data to maintain trust.
But I emphasise again that I am uncomfortable with the limits upon our Police capability to solve crime and to keep us safe and also to prove innocence.
This must therefore not set the precedence for future data access for new technology when it comes to issues of public safety. Stability, safety, security and human lives are at stake, pandemic or otherwise.
Mdm Deputy Speaker: Mr Sharael Taha.
Mr Sharael Taha (Pasir Ris-Punggol): Thank you, Mdm Deputy Speaker. Singapore has dealt with this pandemic decisively. My visit to our recently set up swab centres in Pasir Ris gives me every confidence that we have and will continue to take appropriate measures to respond quickly and effectively to curtail the spread of this virus.
The pandemic has also expedited our use of digital tools such as the contact tracing app. This has enabled us to perform contact tracing more efficiently and reducing the need for laborious manual process. Personally, I have had two meetings that were cancelled because members were placed on SHN based on TT information that they were in contact with a suspected case. And I am glad that this information was made available and has protected me and my family from potential exposure to the virus, especially when I have elderly parents.
It is fantastic to see how, as a community, we have managed to leverage on technology to combat this pandemic. It is not far-fetched to state that every single one of us is responsible for the effectiveness of TraceTogether, and we must continue to do so. With it, we can quickly trace anyone who has been exposed to the virus, and take the necessary steps to quarantine and prevent them from infecting others.
Time is of the essence for contact tracing to be effective. Only through the concerted and responsible use of TT will we be able to do contact tracing quickly, and slow down the spread of virus. In true digital \"gotong-royong\" fashion, all of us helping each other out, serving the greater good of society.
Safety, security and justice are societal values that we all agree are important. Collectively, we work hard to ensure that we are able to uphold these qualities within our society. Many of us would even say that these qualities should never be compromised. The Singapore Police Force plays a fundamental role in ensuring that we continue to enjoy a safe, secure and just Singapore. We must continue to support our Police Force in its efforts to prevent, deter and detect crime. And our men in blue must be suitably equipped to do their duties effectively. We all believe and trust the Police Force to leave no stones unturned when it comes to the safety and security of Singapore. And that they would bring about swift justice to those who have broken our laws.
The Criminal Procedure Code or CPC has allowed our Police Force powers to obtain information as part of their investigations. This is how police investigations have operated over the years and contribute to making our Police Force effective. Now that the Ministry has clarified the reach of CPC, do we treat TT data as another source of information that can be used by our Police Force in the course of their investigations? Or are we trying to say that certain sets of data and sources of information should be excluded from CPC, and hence cannot be used by the Police Force to help them in the course of their investigations? Should we be setting a precedent of precluding certain sets of information to be used by law enforcement agencies in their pursuit of justice?
What this potentially means is that information that may assist in investigations cannot be used by the Police. And conversely, it may mean that an innocent man is not able to use information from TT as an alibi to prove his innocence. From a data use point of view, the preclusion of certain sources of data seems to only make the jobs of our men in blue much more difficult. And yet we fundamentally agree that their work to preserve our safety and security, and facilitate the enactment of justice are important features of our society which we must uphold. The recent case of the 16-year-old radical detained under ISA reiterates the fact that we can never take our safety and security for granted and, hence, should we not allow our Police Force every information to help them achieve their mission?
Moreover, when we start to preclude sets of information from being used by our Police Force, we set a dangerous precedent for future preclusions of access to data. As we undergo further digitalisation of our nation, we will create even more technologies and sets of data or information that we are only beginning to discover its benefits and applications. Are we really ready to say that we will not allow some of these future technological benefits and applications to be used by our law enforcement agencies in our pursuit for a safe, secure and more just Singapore?
It must be reiterated that CPC only allows for such information to be used for criminal investigations. It is not in the public’s interest to deny our law enforcement agencies access to such data if it can be used to serve the public good. Beyond the arguments of protection of personal privacy, should not safety, security and pursuit of justice for our society take precedence and be prioritised? Mdm Deputy Speaker, in Malay, please.
(In Malay): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] When we allow TT data to be used only for these seven categories of criminal offences, we should do so with an awareness of its implications. This essentially means that, after excluding these seven crimes, TT data cannot be easily used as evidence to prosecute or to defend those suspected of crimes that are not included in these seven categories.
For example, when a person is wrongfully accused of molestation, would the individual not be able to use location data to provide an alibi as evidence that he is innocent? Or in the search for a criminal witness, would the victim not be able to ask for help from strangers in the vicinity?
For child molestation cases, from the perspective of parents, like many of us here, TT data may be able to assist investigations in such cases. Is it not our social responsibility towards the victim's families to enable police to use data and any possible resources that can help the victims and families find justice?
In conclusion, after the Ministry has explained the CPC's jurisdiction, the basic question that we need to ask ourselves is whether certain sources of information should be excluded from the jurisdiction. As a society, we still uphold societal values such as security, prosperity and justice which should never be compromised.
In the pursuit of justice, we are confident in that the law enforcement agencies will conduct thorough investigations and our Police Force will remain as a pillar of safety and peace that we have enjoyed all this time.
We have just embarked on a digitalisation journey and there are many more new things that we need to know to ensure that the law enforcement agencies can continue to move ahead.
At the moment, once we have become aware of how TT data can assist police investigations, we cannot deliberately disregard, obstruct or halt the use of TT data in criminal investigations. This is an injustice to the victims and those who are innocent who have placed their trust and confidence in our Police Force and our legal system.
(In English): Mdm Deputy Speaker, while I understand the concerns of personal privacy, the challenge that we are facing is that we have to balance between privacy, public health and safety, security and justice – a point also mentioned by fellow Members Mr de Souza, Mr Murali, Ms Tan and Minister Vivian.
I would like to highlight that this amendment sits in the COVID-19 (Temporary Measures) Bill which is temporary and tabled to be in force till 8 April 2022 or when this pandemic is over. We must also not lose sight of the designed principles of TT and the fact that TraceTogether data is stored only up to 25 days.
These facts surely point to the original intent of TraceTogether, which is a technological/digitalisation measure that was put in place primarily for contact tracing in order to help our community contain the spread of the current pandemic. The law enforcement benefits that may arise from this is only a useful byproduct and the CPC ensures that it will be used judiciously to serve societal needs for safety, security and pursuit of justice.
In this case, the Bill limits the use of such data to these seven categories of serious criminal offences. However, this should not set the precedence and impact our safety and security by tying the hands of our Police as we move into the digital future. Information that may assist in investigation, even if it is remotely helpful, should be made available to the Police. And let this be the only time where we limit access to information for our Police Force in the pursuit of justice. Notwithstanding the arguments above, Mdm Deputy Speaker, I support this Bill.
Mdm Deputy Speaker: Mr Louis Ng.
Mr Louis Ng Kok Kwang (Nee Soon): Madam, the use of TraceTogether data has generated much public debate. One month after this issue first arose in Parliament, we are now debating a piece of legislation introduced on a Certificate of Urgency to put in safeguards on the use of data.
In the past few months, the Bills, which have been fast-tracked all relate to COVID-19 measures.
I thank the Minister for acting just as quickly to address the public’s privacy concerns and data protection concerns. But this is not simply an issue of privacy and data protection, it is also a public health concern.
Restoring the public’s trust in our national contact tracing infrastructure is important especially in these times. We read in the papers news of second and third waves in other countries. We need to be ready on all fronts to suppress any outbreaks as quickly as humanly possible. We cannot now handicap ourselves by weakening the public’s trust in our contract tracing system.
I should also say that I understand the public safety and security needs to access TraceTogether data for certain serious crimes. As a parent, if my daughters’ safety was at risk because of a kidnapping for example, I know I would want access to all data possible to keep them safe.
The question is not whether the data should be used, but what safeguards should be in place. I have two points to raise.
First, can Minister explain what operational protocols are in place to ensure TraceTogether data used for serious crimes do not become used for investigations of less serious crimes? For example, the SPF may access TraceTogether data for a suspect involved in a murder investigation. In the course of investigations, the TraceTogether data links the suspect to a separate petty theft committed. Given that police investigations are fluid, how does the SPF ensure that use of the TraceTogether data is strictly confined to the seven categories of serious crimes?
Second, the debate over the past month may have impacted actual use of the TraceTogether app. We already know from newspaper reports that some people are now choosing to turn off their TraceTogether app when meeting friends or when going out; we must measure the precise effect of such changes. Can the Minister share what specific data points does the TraceTogether team use to measure the impact of the Government's announcement on TraceTogether app’s actual usage?
Let me take an example. If we look at daily active users or weekly active users, we might well notice no change in usage.
But we might find, for example, that more people are actually turning on the TraceTogether application only once a day and turning it off for the rest of the day. We may also find that mobile devices with TraceTogether apps are, on average, pinging with fewer devices than before, suggesting that the app or Bluetooth functionality may have been turned off. Even if we mandate that the app is flashed at point of entry to a location, a user can subsequently turn off the app.
As I have said, I agree with the Government that TraceTogether data should be used for very serious crimes. But we have to deal with the reality that some people may find ways around use of the TraceTogether app, compromising our public health efforts.
For public health reasons, can the Minister share what specific data analysis is used to trace whether actual compliance rate with TraceTogether app requirements does not go down? Madam, notwithstanding my clarifications I stand in support of the Bill.
Mdm Deputy Speaker: Mr Zhulkarnain Abdul Rahim.
Mr Zhulkarnain Abdul Rahim (Chua Chu Kang): Mdm Deputy Speaker, let me begin with two unshakeable truths that we are faced with.
The first truth: it is trite that comprehensive case investigation and contact tracing are crucial to prevent community spread of the COVID-19 pandemic. In addition to vaccine, contact tracing and social distancing are our defences and instruments to fighting contagious diseases.
We are facing a global pandemic and an unprecedented economic crisis, the like of which our nation has never seen before. This is a matter of public health. This is a matter of life and death.
Conventional contact tracing and investigation is a complex and laborious process. There are also significant challenges like language barriers and distrust of unknown callers, coming in the wake of a year when online scams are increasing. Contact tracers are, in fact, in a race against time to prevent the next spread of infection.
In the UK, by mid-July last year, the conventional contact tracing system was inundated and rendered less effective. In London, only 47% of at-risk people were contacted. The UK government had stated that in order for the tracing and curb to be effective, at least 80% of the infected people's contacts must be contacted and told to self-isolate within 48 to 72 hours.
Singapore's TraceTogether, which uses Bluetooth technology, is one of the least invasive of all the contact tracing tools out there. In fact, TraceTogether has been modelled by researchers in Germany who are working on an app which is compliant with the EU's General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR). TraceTogether has assisted our agencies to quickly identify and curb local cluster transmissions in the community, as seen in the recent Police Para-Vet and Kallang industrial clusters. There is no doubt that contact tracing is vital in our fight against this pandemic and with more people using the app, the more effective our contact tracing will be.
The second unshakeable truth is that our law enforcement agencies have been effective in solving and deterring crimes, and as a result, we have built a reputation of being a safe and law-abiding country. We must give credit to the dedication and meticulous hard work of our Police officers over the years, aided by our robust legislation and criminal justice system.
Our law enforcement agencies have been effective in thwarting threats to our public safety and security. Just a week ago, we have been rocked by news of a foiled attempt to attack mosques in Singapore by a 16-year-old. For future threats and serious crimes, it behoves the Police to utilise all the tools at its disposal to detect and prevent such crimes and it is incumbent upon us, as Members of this House to facilitate this.
This Bill specifies that the contact tracing data cannot be accessed by any public officer. The only exception is for Police investigations and this is further restricted to the seven serious offences specified in the Bill.
I am confident that all Members of this House would agree on two things. First, that the offences specified are so egregious in nature and extremely time-sensitive that it is important to allow the Police to have all the tools at its disposal; and second, that there is no reason to doubt that the Police would use those tools judiciously and within the ambits of the law in order to fight such crimes quickly for the public interest. In fact, as part of our criminal law, the Police already has existing powers to compel production of any document or thing, including seizing computers or mobile devices.
The fact that the TraceTogether did not consider the application of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) shows that the contact tracing tool was never designed for criminal investigations purposes in the first place. Why not have a blanket exclusion of such data from criminal investigations? I do not think we should go down this path because these are serious offences – the stakes are just too high. Mdm Deputy Speaker, in Malay, please.
(In Malay): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] The success of TraceTogether is dependent on public trust and confidence. This debate has clarified how Police investigative powers, when using TraceTogether and SafeEntry data, are limited to only serious offences.
For someone who is under investigation for serious offences, the Police would have to firstly seize his or her mobile device, or TraceTogether token, before accessing the data, since the data is stored on his or her device.
It is thus not a hidden attempt or something that is unknown to the individual. Nevertheless, to further protect the rights of privacy of the individual, perhaps the Ministry can consider a dedicated channel within the PDPC to investigate any complaints of TraceTogether data access breaches made by any party.
Another suggestion is in regards to the category of serious offences. While I agree that these seven categories are egregious offences, I would like to ask the Ministry to consider that crimes or offences against children under the age 14 or vulnerable persons, to be considered as offences that are serious enough to be included in this Bill. This includes those who by reason of their mental or physical incapacity, are unable to protect himself or herself.
I have previously spoke about how we should, as a society, stand together to end violence and crimes committed against children and vulnerable groups.
Perhaps we should leave the door slightly open for the Police or the law enforcement agencies to seek a specific Court order to allow the use of data in exceptional cases, especially when it will help to investigate offences committed against children or specific groups.
I also believe that this will act as a deterrent to offenders who take advantage by hiding under the proverbial cloak of data privacy.
Ultimately, this debate is not about fighting crimes. It is about fighting the COVID-19 pandemic together as a nation. However, the two objectives are not mutually exclusive.
I believe that there is still great public confidence in TraceTogether and SafeEntry, because it has helped us to contain the spread of the pandemic in our country effectively.
Let us not let this issue of data privacy distract us from what is at stake here. We still have a long way to go in our fight against this pandemic, with the vaccination program being rolled out.
We have to fight together as one and not allow any seeds of doubt to fester in our communities that will erode trust in our nation’s efforts to combat this pandemic and fight crimes at the same time. As the saying goes, \"united we stand, divided we fall\".
(In English): Mdm Deputy Speaker, this debate will shape how we treat other issues surrounding privacy of data in the future. This legislation, however, is a temporary compromise, at least until the pandemic is over and it makes clear what can or cannot be used by the Police in its investigations.
I am glad that we have that line drawn clearly in the sand, before we cross too far and get lost in the desert. I would not wedge the safety of my daughters or anyone's daughters – you can bet your bottom dollar on that. With that, Mdm Deputy Speaker, I support this Bill.
Mdm Deputy Speaker: Ms Hany Soh.
Ms Hany Soh (Marsiling-Yew Tee): In Mandarin, please, Mdm Deputy Speaker.
(In Mandarin): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] Mdm Deputy Speaker, thank you for the opportunity to speak on this Amendment Bill. I would like to declare that I am a lawyer.
I agree that the Government respects Singaporeans' desire for personal data privacy, and make it clear that unless it is for the investigation of seven categories of serious offenses set out in the Bill, the authorities will not use or share any records in TraceTogether.
The primary purpose of TraceTogether (TT), in the form of either a token or app, is to enhance contact tracing for COVID-19 cases and quickly locate the source of the infection.
However, because it also records when and whom you have been in close contact with, that information might be useful to the Police when investigating certain cases, such as rape, kidnapping and murder, and allow them to apprehend the culprit in the shortest time possible.
Last month, the Straits Times reported a few sensational cases in Singapore in the past; these cases remain unresolved today. Some victims were raped before they were murdered. As technology was not very advanced back then, even though the Police did a thorough investigation, they were still not able to apprehend the murderer.
As one can imagine, this has caused immense grief and anguish to the victims' family. We can imagine that to-date, they are still grieving and continue to hope that the Police can one day apprehend the murderer and bring closure to the case.
As technology becomes more advanced, we often see on Channel 8's Crime Watch how Police use certain technologies, such as CCTV footage and even leads provided on the media and social media platforms to solve crimes.
However, the investigation officers (IOs) in the Serious Crimes Division may also encounter tricky cases, for example, the culprits may have wiped clean their fingerprints in the crime scene and have not left any leads behind. In the crime scene, there were also no CCTV footages, so the Police were not able to locate the murderer. After the victim has died, family members may also turn to social media platforms and give out flyers to seek leads, but without any success.
When investigating such serious crimes, I think that the Police should do everything to fight against the clock, because as long as the murderer remains at large, it may cause others to panic and worry about their own safety.
In order to avoid another unsolved case, I agree that the authorities should reveal to the IOs information recorded by the TT. This may bring a ray of hope in apprehending the culprits.
However, the TT may also have recorded other people’s personal privacy. Therefore, I urge the authorities to be extra cautious and ensure that when using the information, other people’s personal data and privacy will not be leaked.
(In English): In summary, Mdm Deputy Speaker, while I speak in support of using any available digital contact tracing technology, including TraceTogether tokens and SafeEntry records to assist in criminal investigations, I also recognise the fact that its primary intention and objective was to serve the purpose of preventing COVID-19 clusters from manifesting in our community.
I therefore agree that we should reserve the right to use contract tracing data only in the most dire of circumstances, like the seven categories of serious offences as set out in the Bill.
If and when it is necessary to utilise under such circumstances, I urge the relevant authorities, while handling such data, to adhere to a strict and transparent protocol throughout the entire process, from its retrieval for usage to its eventual disposal.
Mdm Deputy Speaker: Mr Yip Hon Weng.
Mr Yip Hon Weng (Yio Chu Kang): Mdm Deputy Speaker, as many Members have mentioned, this willingness to use the TraceTogether data is related to the central issue of people's trust in what the Government has said about the collection, storage and use of the TraceTogether data.
This public trust in the Government is especially important during a crisis. In line with what Prof David Chan explained in his book, \"Combating a Crisis\", public trust is directly affected by previous related events. How agencies coordinate and work together as well as communicate with the public will also affect public trust.
We recall that last year, there were several incidents of data lapses or information leakage by public officers. This pertains to the number of COVID-19 cases and announcement of control measures. We also learnt about leaks involving personal data committed by public officers in violation of the Official Secrets Act in 2019. And this was just months after the largest data breach in Singapore where personal data was stolen from SingHealth in 2018. With these headline grabbing incidents, we can understand why the public may be concerned about their data collected through the TraceTogether platform.
On agencies working together, we should note that the TraceTogether initiative cuts across the portfolios of many Ministries. The gadget is developed as part of the Smart Nation initiative. The data is channelled to MOH for contact tracing. And from the Government's response to a Member's Parliamentary Question last month, the public now knows that MHA, specifically the Police, has access to this data.
Mdm Deputy Speaker, it took six months before this issue of accessibility of the TraceTogether data by the Police was made known to the public. During my engagements with residents, I have encountered many instances where they asked me why it took so long for the Government to reveal this fact. I am glad that the Government has acknowledged that the issue should have been flagged earlier.
Contact tracing is not new. In the West, technologies involving the mobile tracking of infectious diseases have been around for at least a decade. However, issues relating to privacy and civil liberty have contributed to such technologies’ low penetration rate in these countries.
So, it should not be surprising that Singaporeans, too, have concerns about individual’s data privacy even from the onset of the gadget roll-out. I believe we can recall there were glowing news reports of hundreds who have enthusiastically queued at the various centres to collect their gadgets. Everyone then understood that the TraceTogether data would be automatically erased once it is older than 25 days and it would only be used by MOH. You can imagine the let-down when it was disclosed that the Police also have powers to access the data via the Criminal Procedure Code.
Singaporeans understand and support the need to fight crime. It is, therefore, reassuring that we are now moving this Bill to provide a “white-list”, limiting the use of TraceTogether data to seven categories of serious crimes and nothing else. To provide further reassurance, can the Minister elaborate if the Police are still able to access the TraceTogether data after it has been collected for 25 days? In a criminal investigation, the Police may want to trace back a suspect’s movements well longer than 25 days ago. In this instance, would they be able to recover, retrieve and access the data even after deletion? Is the data totally deleted and disappear after 25 days or is it still stored somewhere?
In order for Singapore to ride out this pandemic, we need all residents to be onboard the Government’s various measures. Apart from the ability to do effective contact tracing, we also need to vaccinate our population. This, again, requires the people to trust the various types of information that the Government shares with the public, especially those related to vaccine safety. Only with trust would people step forward and take the vaccination.
Mdm Deputy Speaker, in conclusion, I hope that with the passage of this Bill today we can maintain the public trust in the Government. To do this, we must be clear when explaining or sharing information with the public. If there is any misinformation, we must act at the earliest opportunity to set the record right. Ultimately, it is about the public’s belief that the Government is able to solve problems, be transparent, and says what it means and means what it says. Mdm Deputy Speaker, I support the Bill.
Mdm Deputy Speaker: Mr Don Wee.
Mr Don Wee (Chua Chu Kang): Mdm Deputy Speaker, I will be speaking in Mandarin.
(In Mandarin): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] Mdm Deputy Speaker, it is up to the doer to undo the knot. Indeed, considering how everything started, I am glad to hear the clarification made by the Minister just now and he had also assumed the responsibility. He also acknowledged that because of the seriousness of the situation at that time, it was imperative to gather information to quickly identify, isolate and treat patients. It is expected that he and the departments involved had very limited time to think about any other ramifications. Although we are surprised and disappointed by this oversight, it is somewhat understandable, taking into account the unprecedented situation of the pandemic.
Now that the Minister has clarified it, I think the matter should be rested. The reason is very simple: the Government obtains information through TraceTogether and the Criminal Procedure Code in order to protect its citizens.
The Government is unlike private companies, such as Google and Facebook which collect data to make a profit. We do not seem to be as concerned about Google and Facebook collecting and monitoring our personal data and we often use these platforms. So, why are we so worried about the data the Government collects to protect us? In addition, what the Government collects, in comparison, is very limited and much less. What is more, we are a country governed by the rule of law, and there are rules governing data processing in all Government departments. In the course of implementation, institutional or personal lapses may occur occasionally, but once they are discovered, we acknowledge and rectify them. This is how we improve and strengthen the system. Those who insist that it is too late for the Minister to take back his words, advocating personal privacy, and demand that the Government limit the TraceTogether data to COVID-19 tracing only, are missing the wood for the trees. I would ask, if not for our country bringing the pandemic here under control, and ensuring law and order, would we even be able to discuss privacy issues?
Today, we are gathered here to debate whether legislation should be passed to limit the use of TraceTogether data by police and courts to only the investigation of seven types of serious crimes. Frankly, I am not in favour of this \"special treatment\" for TraceTogether data.
In my view, even if a crime is not under the seven categories of serious crimes, the use of the data should be authorised for police investigations or court proceedings. Solving cases are not easy! With hands and feet tied, how can the police solve cases and arrest suspects?
I believe that all Members here, including those in the opposition, will do their utmost to protect their families, protect their children, pursue all leads in order to identify the pervert, put him in jail and prevent him from endangering other innocent children. We should not become like some western developed countries where certain cases cannot be solved due to privacy protection.
We are an Asian society where the interest of the community is more important than that of the individual. It is this value that has enabled us to fight the pandemic more effectively.
I hope that the Minister will consider my views and suggestions. Thank you.
Mdm Deputy Speaker: Minister of State Desmond Tan.
The Minister of State for Home Affairs (Mr Desmond Tan): Mdm Deputy Speaker, I will take the opportunity to address some of the questions that were raised by Members of the House pertaining to contact tracing data used by Police investigations.
First, Ms Nadia Ahmad Samdin and Mr Louis Ng asked about using contact tracing data for cases where the initial charge for a serious offence is subsequently reduced or amended to a less or non-serious offence, or if the serious offence reveals a separate non-serious offence. The Police and Prosecution will not be able to use the contact tracing data for prosecution of a non-serious offence. This is what we are trying to say in this Bill. There could be a situation where the suspect is investigated for both serious and non-serious offences committed at the same time. In criminal proceedings for such cases, which may be dealt with in a joint trial conference covering both the serious and non-serious offences, it would not be feasible to separate the data used for investigations of these offences. But should the offences be dealt with separately in separate trials, then the prosecution will not be able to use the data in prosecution for the related non-serious offence.
Mr Pritam Singh asked about Police’s use of TraceTogether data and Mr Leong Mun Wai also asked when Police first accessed the TT data. The Police have only requested for TT data once, for a murder that occurred in May 2020, in line with their powers under the CPC. As the TT app was not installed in the suspect’s phone, there was no useful data obtained.
Mr Pritam Singh and Ms Nadia Ahmad Samdin also asked about the usefulness of the contact tracing data for criminal investigations. It is understandable that in any investigation, every piece of information is potentially useful and helpful. Our current framework under the CPC has enabled the Police to do their job efficiently and effectively, and Singapore has thus been kept safe and secure.
Let me give a hypothetical example, where we assume a terrorist attack has occurred and Police are trying to prevent more attacks. In such a situation, contact tracing data could be critical information that we could use to identify any other persons involved in the planned attacks and uncover any terrorist ring as quickly as possible. As you can see, when it comes to investigations, time is of the essence. If Police had intelligence and access to contact tracing data that could help stop attacks from taking place, I believe Members in this House would not say no.
Ms Sylvia Lim asked if we can give more than one example that Minister Vivian Balakrishnan had given in his opening speech. With your permission, Mdm Deputy Speaker, may I ask the Clerks to distribute an Annex that I have prepared, containing examples for each of the seven categories of serious offences. Members can go through these scenarios and examples, and ask ourselves: would we really say that the information should not be used by the Police in such situations?
Mdm Deputy Speaker: Yes, please proceed. [A handout was distributed to hon Members. Please refer to Annex 1.]
Mr Desmond Tan: I will let Members of the House read at your own time.
Ms Tin Pei Ling asked about the safeguards in Police’s access to the data. First, while the Criminal Procedure Code, or CPC, specifies that production orders can only be made by officers with the rank of sergeant and above, we, in fact, intend to require the rank of requesting officer for contact tracing data to be higher. All requests for contact tracing data will have to be made by an officer of Inspector rank and above. This is the same level of approving authority for bank data that we request from financial institutions.
Second, within the Police, all requests for contact tracing data must be approved by the Criminal Investigation Department of the Singapore Police Force (SPF), which is the staff authority for all investigation-related matters within the SPF.
Third, the receiving party will only be required to comply with the order to disclose the data to the Police, if it is in relation to a serious offence. Any public sector officer, including Police, who uses or discloses the data for a non-serious offence would have committed an offence.
Lastly, all extracted data will be encrypted and kept in strict confidence. Only authorised officers will have access to the encrypted data. Mechanisms will be put in place to ensure restricted access and to maintain logs on the officers who have accessed the data. And, of course, if the data is used in Court, it will be seen whether the offence does or does not fall within the seven specified categories.
Ms Jessica Tan cited a situation where an individual’s lost token was used to commit a serious crime. As part of an investigation, Police will holistically assess the leads and evidence, including TT data, in cases where this may be obtained. If a person assisting in investigation claims that he had lost his TT token, this will also be looked into by the Police. My advice is that upon the discovery of the loss of the TT token, one should quickly get a replacement at any Community Club, so as not to compromise contact tracing efforts.
My Sylvia Lim asked about my statement in Parliament last month about accessing suspect’s and witness’ contact tracing data. Under the CPC, Police are entitled to access data from anyone. What was meant was that, operationally, in order not to compromise investigations, Police are more likely to approach witnesses first for data, in order not to tip off suspects. In this Bill, Police are empowered to access data from all persons for investigating the serious crimes that are set out in the Bill.
Ms Sylvia Lim also asked why the exact list of offences is not specified. Describing the categories of scheduled offences, rather than the specified offences themselves, is an approach that we have employed in other Acts. For example, the Extradition Act takes a similar approach. The seven categories of offences relating to serious offences that will be obvious prima facie.
On Ms Sylvia Lim's question regarding what is included under the category of serious sexual crimes, only rape and sexual assault with penetration will be covered. It will not cover other sexual assault involving mentally challenged victims. The Police cannot use contact tracing data that fall outside of the seven categories. Should a Police officer make a request, the Smart Nation and Digital Government Office (SNDGO) and MOH would not be permitted to provide the data.
Various Members asked to expand the Police's use of contact tracing data to other offences that are not covered or not included in the seven categories, such as outrage of modesty or offences against vulnerable persons. Indeed, the data would be useful and would assist the Police to solve these crimes. However, we had to make a judgement call on the balance between the two imperatives of public health and public safety that Minister Vivian Balakrishnan talked about.
Outrage of modesty and offences against vulnerable persons are of grave concern to the Police and public but rank below the seven categories in seriousness. This was a very tough balancing act for MHA. Nonetheless, I would like to assure Members that the Police will continue to investigate all offences even though they are not in the seven categories of serious offences.
Ms Sylvia Lim and others spoke about Australia's model. Every country is different. Singapore had to decide what model and what we value. We score exceptionally well on safety and security because of the approach that we have taken and that we have decided on.
I have a graphic here and I will distribute to Members via email at the end of today to illustrate this point – that we are here today, our security situation and safety is a result of the model and decision we have taken in terms of our law enforcement policy.
I am heartened that many Members expressed their support and trust in the Police. This trust and support is very precious to us, which we will guard zealously. I would like to assure Members that the Police will continue to do whatever they can to ensure public safety and to pursue all leads in our investigations.
Mdm Deputy Speaker: Minister Vivian Balakrishnan.
Dr Vivian Balakrishnan: Mdm Deputy Speaker, Members of this House, let me first express my appreciation for, first, our points of agreement. I believe all of us are agreed – I am looking at the Leader of the Opposition – that we are facing a global life-and-death crisis which requires extraordinary measures. I believe all of us are agreed that contact tracing – effective, rapid contact tracing – is essential as part of our response to dealing with COVID-19.
I also venture that all of us in this Parliament are agreed that TraceTogether and SafeEntry, representing our digital contact tracing tools, have made a real difference to the effectiveness of our COVID-19 response. In particular, I would reiterate that it has enabled us to shorten the period from four days to one and a half days.
Members will know that I am by training and instinct a doctor. I am not a lawyer. I am a doctor. Perhaps one of the defects of being a doctor is that we focus very, very much on the individual – on the health and on the outcomes of the individual. I want to say that so that you understand in context because what I want to do now is to share my personal timeline, through this journey. Let me begin.
We first stated that the Government would use TraceTogether data only for contact tracing simply because this was how and why we designed TraceTogether. I can tell you all categorically, again, as a doctor and perhaps a techno-optimist, that the potential use of the data by the Police did not cross my mind or the mind of my engineers at all. I state that categorically.
In fact, if you think about the features that we built in – encrypted, decentralised data, auto-purging after 25 days, encrypted identities, no GPS, no cellular connectivity – I think any fair-minded person with some appreciation of technology will know that what we had in mind was digital contact tracing. We were not at all trying to create a surveillance tool. I say this so that you understand my state of mind when I said what I said in June.
But what I said in June was wrong because in a sense, my own enthusiasm for the technology blindsided me and I did not read section 20 of the CPC. Because the law of the land, is that the CPC – specifically section 20 – does authorise the Police to access many databases, including contact tracing data.
The next point is – when did I become aware that what I said was wrong? Basically, what happened was at the end of October, I was asked: are you sure that the CPC does not apply, even for a murder case? A member of the public asked me.
When I received that query, I asked my staff – please go and double check. I am not a lawyer but please go and double check what the legal provisions are. At that point, I was informed that the CPC applied and that in fact, the Police had requested TraceTogether data on one previous occasion.
Your next question should be: well, what did you do after that? I will tell you very frankly. In fact, I have shared that in the last month, I had many sleepless nights and I engaged in several rounds of discussion with some of my senior Cabinet colleagues on whether we should carve out and, if we did, how should we carve out the contact tracing data from the application of the CPC.
You will know that my own strongly held view at that point in time was that even if the CPC applied and even if we were going to make data available, we should exercise this with utmost restraint.
I was also aware that I had first made this assurance in this Chamber. I think it was in June in this Chamber. I told my staff regardless of the outcome of this internal review, we will come back here and we will clarify. We did that last month.
Mr Christopher de Souza filed a question. I believe it was in early December – about a month after I commenced this process of internal discussion.
I am sharing this with you so that you understand that there is nothing to hide. The CPC is written law. But I should have been aware and I should have made it clear right from the onset. I have reflected that if in June, I had added four words – subject to prevailing legislation – perhaps we would not be here this afternoon. Nevertheless, it has occurred.
I want to, in the rest of this wrap-up speech, address the different queries, comments and suggestions under three categories: first, trust and participation in digital contact tracing; second, the technical features and safeguards of TraceTogether and SafeEntry; and third, to deal with the specific clarifications of clauses within the Bill.
First, trust and participation. In an ideal world, no mistake would have been made. No question would have arisen. But I am now in a scenario where a mistake has been made and the real question then is how do we maintain trust when a mistake has been made?
I will come back to my instinct as a doctor. The patient-doctor relationship is built on trust. Both the patient and the doctor hope that we will never make a mistake. But mistakes do occur sometimes, usually rarely. The most important ingredient in that trust relationship between a doctor and a patient is complete transparency – that if anything goes wrong, I will tell you and if anything needs to be fixed, I will do so, and I will go all out to remedy the problem if I can humanly do so.
My answer to this question today – how do you maintain trust when a mistake has been made – is actually quite straightforward. Acknowledge the error. Take full responsibility.
It is no different from a complication in surgery. Acknowledge the error. Take full responsibility. And I have done so.
Next, do the right thing rather than choosing the politically expedient option. You know I believe in transparency even if transparency is awkward and politically costly. But it is better to be transparent than to double down on a mistake. You see my point here? Better to be transparent, fix the error rather than to double down on your mistake.
One further principle from my medical practice is beware of false dichotomies. The false dichotomy I have heard today is that you have to choose between saving the life of a child and you have to choose between participation in digital contact tracing.
I believe by being completely open, transparent, answering every question, explaining and letting people see the purpose behind what we are doing and why we are doing it, I believe we can avoid this dichotomy. I believe it is possible for us to continue to have perhaps the world's most successful contact tracing programme; and at the same time, deal with people's expectations that Singapore will remain safe and secure. And that the Police are our guardians, our protectors. And that the Police have acted at all times strictly within the ambit of the law in order to fulfill their higher mission to protect us.
Today, I come before this House, moving legislation on a Certificate of Urgency to give legal force to the statements that the Minister for Home Affairs and I made in Parliament last month.
This Bill ensures that personal digital contact tracing data can only be used for contact tracing, with a narrow exception for investigations and criminal proceedings in respect of seven categories of serious offences.
I know there can be some debate. In fact, there has been some debate how specific are our definitions. Should we enlarge it? Should we constrict it? I think that is legitimate debate. But I believe that this Bill reflects the right balance between restricting the use of personal digital contact tracing data and, at the same time, enabling our Police to fulfil their duty to keep us safe – avoid false dichotomies.
I will just reiterate a few scenarios which you would have, in fact, in the annex in front of you. If the next of kin of a murder victim asks the Police, \"Please decrypt the TraceTogether data on his phone\", would any of you refuse? If the parents of a kidnapped child found the token and desperately asked the Police to unlock it, which one of you would refuse? If a terrorist act is imminent, would you tie the hands of our Police and security forces? I believe I know the answer to these questions, and, certainly, the majority of Singaporeans outside this House.
Singaporeans understand the need for Police to lawfully access information and I believe that public trust in our Police Force remains high, very high. And as Foreign Minister who has had to travel to many parts of the world, this confidence and trust is a huge competitive advantage that Singapore has.
On the question of public trust and public participation, let me, in a rather limited way, share some numbers with you. You know that for TraceTogether, we give people the option of writing in to say, \"Please delete my data\". In the last one month, we have had 350 individuals who have asked us to delete their data – 350. Every one of that 350 who has requested us to delete is a source of regret for me. At least 350 have, for a variety of reasons, decided to forgo the protection that TraceTogether offers them and their loved ones. But on the other hand, in this same period, in this same one month, over 390,000 have come onboard the TraceTogether programme.
I do not want to belabour this but my simple conclusion or inference is that Singaporeans know that I misspoke but they also trust the TraceTogether system is safe, it does what it is supposed to do, it protects public health, and they also trust the Police to always behave lawfully.
Members also had questions on the features and safeguards of TraceTogether and SafeEntry. Let me quickly try to run through as many of these clarifications as possible. Mr Louis Ng, and I think Mr Pritam Singh as well, asked whether it has affected our adoption. I have just given you some figures on people who have signed on in the last one month.
But I will also accept the point that Mr Louis Ng made, and I think Mr Gerald Giam made as well, that there may be individuals who are gaming the programme. You switch it on in order to do your SafeEntry and then you promptly switch it off. I think Mr Louis Ng also asked whether we have more granular data into how people are using the tokens and using the TraceTogether app.
Today, more than 80% of Singapore residents are onboard the programme. Based on broad proxies, and I say proxies, and I will explain why it is only a proxy, but based on broad proxies, we estimate about 58% of users use the app at least once a day. This proportion has remained the same before and after the parliamentary clarification in January.
Mr Ng also asked if we could provide more granular usage statistics, such as whether the mobile devices with the applications were on average pinging fewer devices than before. And, Mr Ng, I have to tell you, actually, the privacy-respecting nature of the system means we actually cannot collect that level of granular data to track active usage. The data is stored locally on your own device. The TraceTogether app only connects to the server periodically, only to download information. Some Members would be familiar – occasionally, when you have checked into the same place as someone else who has turned out to be COVID-19-positive, that message may light up to warn you that there may be a potential overlap in time and space between you and the COVID-19-positive patient.
The point I am making is that, again, it reveals the privacy by design that we focused on in rolling out this programme. I want to remind everyone that TraceTogether is meant to protect us and our loved ones. The effectiveness of TraceTogether depends heavily on the rate of user participation. For those who switch off your Bluetooth or your app or engage in other forms of technical wizardry, I would just ask you why deprive yourself and your loved ones of the protection?
Again, as Foreign Minister, I have looked round the world and one of the reasons why we are better off is that we have not politicised our response to COVID-19. I am grateful to Mr Singh and the Workers' Party that, unlike in other countries where wearing a mask or not wearing a mask is a badge of political identity, we have avoided that kind of political dichotomy.
So, for people who are angry or disappointed at my mistake, you are entitled to do that but do not deprive yourself and your loved ones of the protection from this system.
Ms Nadia Samdin asked a few suggestions regarding OpenTrace, and she asked if we would continue to make OpenTrace open-source such as by introducing open-source licences and regularly updating the GitHub repository. Actually, my engineers will know that I have been leaning on them repeatedly to keep updating the GitHub repository. But, again, those of you who are actual programmers will know it is a very big slog to tidy up your code and prepare it for public open-source perusal. But we believe in open-sourcing OpenTrace, it has served us well, it has been helpful, it has allowed experts to look at both OpenTrace and TraceTogether, and for them to conclude that the app does and continues to do what it is supposed to do, and to do so in a privacy protecting manner.
Other governments have looked at our code base including Australia, Alberta, Poland. We have had discussions at the technical level. They have modified it, used it, changed it; we are completely open about that.
To be clear to Ms Nadia Samdin, there is already an open-source licence. The OpenTrace repository is published under – sorry, to get technical here – a GNU General Public Licence Version 3.0. Those of you in the know will know that this is an open-source licence. The Standard General Public Licence 3.0 terms are also within the repository itself in a licence and markdown file, as is the standard practice, and maybe Ms Nadia Samdin can check on that after this. But I will convey your suggestions to the GovTech team and discuss what our next steps are for open-sourcing.
Ms Nadia Samdin also asked if we would commit that TraceTogether data will always be stored on the user's device and shared with MOH only when the user uploads the data, and to delete the data at the request of the user. By design, TraceTogether data will be stored in the user's device before it is shared with the authorities. Again, for those of you who have ever been in the circumstance where you need to share it, you know that your participation is needed. We send you a PIN, you have to enter the PIN before the data is uploaded.
This Bill limits the Government's use of TraceTogether data to the purposes of contact tracing with the exception, as I said earlier, for investigations and criminal proceedings in respect of serious offences, and it applies regardless of how the data is accessed or shared. The same applies for the suggestion on deleting the data upon request. Users can do so and we have done so, as I shared just now; we have deleted data for 350 persons in the last one month.
But in certain cases, for instance, where the data has already been uploaded because there was a positive COVID-19 case, then MOH will have to retain that data as long as that cluster is active and they need it in order to break the chains of transmission. I am sure Members of this House will understand the need for that.
Mr Gerald Giam asked about the Police's use of SafeEntry data. I believe the Member did ask just now. I am not privy to the operational details but I do understand that SafeEntry data has been used for investigations into offences in a number of instances. I must state for the record that my previous assurances were on TraceTogether in this House and not on SafeEntry. Nevertheless, we have decided in this Bill to envelope SafeEntry and BluePass insofar as it interoperates with TraceTogether within the same protective cocoon that this Bill provides.
It is also worth reminding Members of the House that, actually, SafeEntry is a digital visitor log. It is no different today. If it was not there, the Police would go to the security guard, say, of your condominium and say who has come in at what time, which car numbers were in here, look at your video surveillance. SafeEntry actually, in that sense, is not novel compared to TraceTogether. But it is different in the sense that it is a centralised database. Therefore, we decided we better take pre-emptive action to put the same cocoon of legislative protection around it.
Let me now move on to clarifications on the legislative amendments themselves, and I hope Members will bear with me if some of this is a bit technical.
Ms Nadia Samdin asked if an individual would be able to access their own personal contact tracing data including if one is being charged for a serious offence. The answer is yes. Members of the public can request for their own data for legitimate purposes as is the current practice today. The lawyers looking at the text of the Bill will realise we have been very careful not to circumscribe the rights of the individual to his data.
I believe Ms Sylvia Lim asked if suspects and the Defence Counsel could access the personal contact tracing data for their Court cases and whether the time period of 25 days is sufficient to retain the data for such users. The Bill circumscribes the use of personal contact tracing data by public sector agencies, but I will reiterate, does not prohibit individuals from using or requesting for their own personal contact tracing data provided they have a right to access such data. For serious offences, the individual can share his or her own data with anyone including the Police, the prosecution, the Defence Counsel and offer his or her data to the Court as evidence.
If the Prosecution is in possession of contact tracing data which strengthens the Defence's case or weakens the Prosecution's case, the Prosecution has to disclose such data to the Defence to comply with its common law disclosure obligations laid down by the Court of Appeal. I believe this is known as the \"Kadar disclosure obligations\". Again, the criminal lawyers here will understand what I am talking about. This is in the Bill – specifically, section 82(7) allows for individuals to continue to have access to personal contact tracing data if they have such a right of access under any \"rule of law or otherwise\". Mr Singh, you can confirm that clause.
The right of access under \"any rule of law\" here includes the Kadar disclosure obligations.
Ms Tin Pei Ling asked if TraceTogether data could be used in missing persons cases. A next of kin – father, mother, husband, wife – a next of kin may request the data of a missing person to the extent permissible today. This includes requesting for personal contact tracing data of the next of kin, if they have a right to do so.
Mr Gerald Giam also asked if personal contact tracing data uploaded to MOH servers would be covered by this Bill specifically by section 82. The answer is yes. The Bill restricts the Government's use of personal contact tracing data collected from digital contact tracing systems specified in the Sixth Schedule.
Mr Zhulkarnian Abdul Rahim suggested having a dedicated channel independent of the Police to investigate any complaints of TraceTogether data access breaches made by any party.
If you peruse the Bill in front of you, you will realise that disclosure or misuse of contact tracing data on contravention of the COVID-19 (Temporary Measures) Act will be investigated by authorised persons from the Government Data Office appointed under this Act. These authorised persons would be appointed by Senior Minister Teo Chee Hean as the Minister overseeing this part of the Act. So, there is a clear separation of roles and duties.
The Government Data Office will oversee the public sector data governance policy and requirements, similar to what the PDPC does for the private sector. And I can give this assurance that Police officers will not be appointed for this purpose.
There were also other questions pertaining to data governance for personal contact tracing data. It was Mr Yip who asked whether Police would still be able to request the data beyond the 25-day mark, and if the data will be stored for more than 25 days, should it be required by Police for investigations and proceedings into serious offences. I think it was also Mr Giam who asked if Police will be able to access the data when the pandemic has been declared over.
In general, the Police will not be able to obtain data if the request comes in after the 25th day mark and this is because the data would have been auto deleted, either deleted on your personal token or app or deleted from the main server. There are some exceptional scenarios. Nowadays, I am very careful with all my caveats. There are some exceptional scenarios where the data may be stored for more than 25 days.
One, when the data relates to a COVID-19 patient or an individual who is closely associated with the patient, and the data is used for active contact tracing purposes. And I think that, people will accept this is a legitimate use of data beyond the 25th day.
Two, when the data has been used for investigations or criminal proceedings in respect of serious offences; the data may be retained until the investigation or criminal proceedings are over, including Court proceedings, I must add, and will be deleted when the data is no longer needed.
The same applies to when the pandemic is being declared over. And then we can happily stand down our digital contact tracing programmes.
As I mentioned in my opening speech, subsection 82(8) provides for the Minister to specify a date after which digital contact tracing system is no longer required to prevent or to control the spread of COVID-19. The data administrator must then delete any personal contact tracing data which is no longer required.
Police will not be able to use any personal contact tracing data unless the data had previously been retained and used for investigations of criminal proceedings in respect of serious offences.
Ms Nadia Ahmad Samdin asked if the Government would consider publishing disclosure reports to help the public understand how the data is being used. We will accept Ms Nadia’s suggestion to have a report disclosing the use of the data beyond contact tracing. My team will work out the details on how often and the contents of these reports, but it should broadly encompass the types of data, how the data was used, as well as the number of occasions that the data has been used for purposes other than contact tracing from the day that this Act comes into force.
Ms Nadia Ahmad Samdin and Mr Gerald Giam asked if it was possible for us to specify the conditions for the life cycle of the TraceTogether programme, such as the conditions to decide when it should be deactivated.
Actually, this is a much wider question – what determines the changing points in the pandemic and what determines the end of the pandemic? Our approach has to be guided by science and public health. We will monitor the overall situation closely, consider all relevant factors before adjusting our measures, as we have indeed in the last one year with our three phases of re-opening since the circuit breaker.
In other words, there is no rule book. There is no standard play book that we can rely on. We will have to respond to the situation as it evolves.
And this approach has served us well, and we should continue to abide by this considered approach in determining the end of the pandemic. Even now, we know that the pandemic has been very unpredictable. Many places that previously contained their initial infections, are now dealing with second, third, fourth waves. New variants have emerged, some more transmissible, some even more lethal. Whether and when we can revert to normal will really depend on the global situation, not just the situation within Singapore and this is the nature of infectious disease epidemics.
Lastly, Members expressed a wide variety of views on the types of offences which Police ought to use personal contact tracing data for investigations or criminal proceedings. Some of you suggested expanding the list, some to include additional offences. Mr Vikram Nair, I believe, said that he preferred not to have any carve-outs. He said that this would be tantamount to saying that the Police should not look at all available information in pursuit of their investigations. Mr Sharael Taha, Ms Tin Pei Ling, Mr Alex Yam and Mr Christopher de Souza expressed concerns that the passage of this Bill may set a precedent for how the Government may use data collected by digital solutions in the future, and hamper the Government’s ability to function effectively. Mr Pritam Singh, in his considered speech, also referred to the future and what impact these decisions may have.
I want to say that our decision today to only include serious offences, to tightly scope the use of personal contact tracing data is a result of a delicate balance between the right to public health, the right to public security and respecting the sensitivity of personal data during this extraordinary time.
Mdm Deputy Speaker, this Bill is being tabled and read on a Certificate of Urgency in exceptional circumstances. It is intended to deal with the specific issue of the Government’s use of personal data collected via digital contact tracing systems in the midst of an emergency.
We have taken this exceptional step because we need to focus on encouraging public participation and maintaining confidence in our public health measures. This Bill is about ensuring maximum support from the public in our fight against COVID-19.
I want to stress this Bill is not a precedent. It is not in the public interest to deny the Police access to the data necessary to ensure public safety and the proper conduct of justice.
The nature of the legislation which this House is called upon to consider today is sui generis. It is a piece of legislation introduced during a public health crisis, being moved under a Certificate of Urgency, because of the situation that we are in. We are not trying to set a precedent here today.
Privacy and data governance, especially, in the face of accelerating technological revolution, these are broad and complex issues, which I think Mr Singh also recognises, that need careful contemplation, consultation and open debate. This should not be settled on a Certificate of Urgency in one day. There will be proper occasions in the future to do this.
Mdm Deputy Speaker, our response to COVID-19 has not been perfect, but it has been effective. This current state of affairs did not happen by chance. It is due to our concerted efforts on multiple fronts – our excellent healthcare system, our heroic frontline officers, our extensive testing capacity, our effective contact tracing regime that has enabled us to quickly identify, isolate close contacts, truncate transmission.
Most of all, it is because of our social capital, the sacrosanct trust of our citizens and the collective responsibility that we have for one another. Madam, I beg to move. [Applause.]
Mdm Deputy Speaker: Mr Pritam Singh.
Mr Pritam Singh: Thank you, Mdm Deputy Speaker, just a few follow-up questions for the Minister.
The first being the Minister's revelation that he came to the knowledge that section 20 of the CPC would apply, from end October onwards. I am just reviewing the articles in our newspapers of record, The Straits Times, from end October right through early November. A number of representations made by various Ministers nothing suggested that the Government was going to make the revelation that the Minister shared in early January clear that section 20 of the CPC would apply. That actually came end October, a good two months later.
Can I ask the Minister what was the Cabinet deliberating, if that was an issue with regard to the Cabinet? Or what caused the delay in coming to a landing on the time and by when the Government will make things clear to Singaporeans?
The second question I have pertains to a figure that Minister gave in his speech – 58% – and correct me if I am wrong, Minister, because I may have misheard you and I apologise for that. Fifty-eight percent turned on their TraceTogether at least once a day. I believe that is what Minister said. The question actually that I asked and I think a few other Members asked was whether the Government or the Smart Nation Office or GovTech is able to track when people switched off their TraceTogether application. Because that really is the key because if for some reason people are not confident, then we have got a problem on our hands.
So, how is it that the Government is able to track when people switch on their phones at least once a day, but for some reason is not able to find out when people turn off their phones?
The third point I think is not specific to Minister's speech. It is the Parliamentary system of Government we have here. The Opposition asks questions of the Government. The Government makes its position known. And I know there are individual Singaporeans outside of this House who are concerned about the privacy issues and so forth. I would just like to advise everyone, well, not everyone but those who are not comfortable with the Government's replies – all of us in the WP, as I know, have downloaded TraceTogether.
As of now, they are 31 to 35 TraceTogether devices around me and 4,306 total exchanges today. So, I would like to share with Singaporeans to please download the app and use the token, because it is the safety of the entire community that is at stake, insofar, as COVID-19 is concerned. Whatever concerns that are there that you wish to raise, I am sure your parliamentarians will bring them up in Parliament and certainly the Opposition in Parliament will do so.
Dr Vivian Balakrishnan: I thank the Leader of the Opposition for his vote of confidence and his advertisement of his use of TraceTogether.
Let me deal with the first two questions. At the end of October, when I was asked, basically, what did I spend November doing? As I said, double checking the legislation and then having, among sleepless nights and conversations, asking: \"Do we carve it out? How do we do it? What should we do?\" So, that occupied us in November. Mr Christopher de Souza filed in December and I thought it was right that we should answer it in Parliament.
If I could replay, if I could rewind time, I would not even have made this mistake in June. And I would also say if I could replay, I would also have looked for an earlier occasion to explain all this. But the key point which I am trying to make, is that there was never any doubt in my mind that we would clarify, that we would explain and we would be held accountable and that I would take responsibility. That is the way we operate.
And for myself having been being in this Chamber now for almost 20 years, the older Members will know, I have always operated that way. Mistakes, warts, misunderstandings, misspeak – I have never shied away from clarifying it. So, I am grateful to you. I think it was last month when you said you accept in good faith my explanation. So, never any attempt, to shy away from transparency and from reflecting the mistake.
On the second question about why I said 58% switch it on at least once a day. Again, if you look at your app, and if you see somewhere about the upper third, it will probably say you are okay. What it does in order to tell you whether you are okay or not, is that it has to query a central server as to whether the SafeEntry check-ins that you have done, have overlapped in time and space with someone else. If you have, then some of you may receive a slightly more worrying message to say that this has happened. If you have symptoms, please see a doctor and please get tested.
Now, of course, if we have identified you as a close contact on the basis of Bluetooth proximity data from TraceTogether, you do not need to wait for that message, we will call you, and test you and isolate you, if necessary.
But anyway, to come back to that question of, \"How come you know I am on but I do not know when you are off\". So, I know you are on because you have actually queried the database to check whether your journeys overlapped with someone else who may have been positive. But I do not know when you switch it off or when you, as Mr Gerald Giam has mentioned, put it in a Faraday Cage. I do not know that, precisely because of the privacy respecting design of the system. This also relates, although you have not asked it, to the question about how useful is TraceTogether data for Police investigations.
And again, I would reiterate my explanation that, by its very design, you know I was not designing a surveillance system. So, you can make a reasonable argument that therefore most times, it is not going to be very useful. Because it was never designed for that purpose. But the reason why I am still coming to this House and still asking for this carve-out for the seven categories of serious offences, is really about a value statement – to say that for these types of situations, you do not believe in tying the hands of your Police Force unnecessarily.
And for those of you who have served in the Police Force – Ms Sylvia Lim has, I believe, been a Police officer, Mr Murali has been a Police officer and Deputy Prime Minister Heng has been a Police officer – you will know that when you are investigating any leads, indirect, circumstantial or otherwise, may be relevant. And even if you do not identify the suspect, it may help you identify a witness.
So, what we are saying, in moving this Bill, is that, at least for these seven categories of serious crimes, let us agree not to tie the hands of our Police Force. And I am grateful to you and to the Workers' Party for saying you support this Bill.
Mdm Deputy Speaker: Mr Leong Mun Wai.
Mr Leong Mun Wai: Mdm Deputy Speaker, thank you for the opportunity to make some clarifications and also to explain the position of Progress Singapore Party. Please allow me some time to do that.
Mdm Deputy Speaker: This is for clarification, please.
Mr Leong Mun Wai: Do you mean I am not allowed to —
Mdm Deputy Speaker: You can clarify but please keep it succinct.
Mr Leong Mun Wai: Okay. Since PSP is not going to support the Bill, I think it is our responsibility to explain to this House and to Singaporeans, our position further. We thank the Government —
Mdm Deputy Speaker: Sorry, this is seriously for clarifications for the Minister. Not for you to make another speech.
Mr Leong Mun Wai: Okay, in that case, maybe I would like to ask the Minister that in deciding the trade-off, very often, he brought up the example of one victim of the seven serious crimes; maybe a victim of one of the seven serious crimes. But when we are making a trade-off as leaders of the country, do we not actually think of both sides? It is about one victim versus thousands of possible drop-outs from the TT programme.
Of course, I accept the explanation that he has done with regard to he does not think there is an effect on that. I would like him to clarify, what does he think about that approach to making the trade-off, which is the approach that PSP has taken.
Mdm Deputy Speaker: Minister.
Dr Vivian Balakrishnan: Mdm Deputy Speaker, that is why I referred to false dichotomies. In contrast to you, the Workers' Party – in my view and I hope you let me speak for you – has taken the more responsible position, that so long as you can envisage certain extreme, certain serious offences, for which you need to make an exception, then this Bill, with its current construction, is necessary.
In fact, if you vote against the Bill, then the status quo applies and the status quo is that the CPC has licence over this data as well.
So, I would still appeal to your good sense and your sense of responsibility to the nation to do the right thing. I believe it is possible. And give credit to Singaporeans. Singaporeans care, Singaporeans do look out for one another and Singaporeans will also accept that mistakes are made, but as long as you come clean and you explain why you did something, and you can convince them, and slowly step by step, win confidence, we can avoid these false dichotomies.
That is why I stand here completely confident that we are doing the right thing. It is not the politically expedient thing. It is not the convenient thing for me personally, politically, but it is the right thing.
I thank the Workers' Party for standing with us in doing the right thing in the midst of a crisis. I hope PSP can do likewise, but that is your decision.
Mdm Deputy Speaker: Mr Leong, I think you have made your point already. No more clarifications?
[(proc text) Question put, and agreed to. (proc text)]
[(proc text) Bill accordingly read a Second time and committed to a Committee of the whole House. (proc text)]
[(proc text) The House immediately resolved itself into a Committee on the Bill. – [Dr Vivian Balakrishnan]. (proc text)]
[(proc text) Bill considered in Committee; reported without amendment; read a Third time and passed. (proc text)]
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Adjournment","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"OS","content":"The Leader of the House (Ms Indranee Rajah): Mdm Deputy Speaker, I beg to move that Parliament do now adjourn.
Mdm Deputy Speaker, to be more specific, I beg to move that Parliament do now adjourn to Tuesday, 16 February 2021. The Deputy Prime Minister looking very anxious so I should make sure that it is on 16 February! [Laughter.]
[(proc text) Resolved, \"That Parliament do now adjourn to Tuesday, 16 February 2021.\" – [Ms Indranee Rajah]. (proc text)]
Adjourned accordingly at 6.29 pm.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Prevalence of Cases of Firms Underpaying Foreign Staff","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WANA","content":"16 Mr Muhamad Faisal Bin Abdul Manap asked the Minister for Manpower in each year of the the past five years, how many cases of firms underpaying its foreign staff have been detected.
17 Mr Leong Mun Wai asked the Minister for Manpower with regard to cases of underpayment of foreign employees’ salaries (a) how many of these cases have been discovered since 2010; (b) what are the main methods used to effect such underpayments; and (c) whether employment agencies are involved in any of these violations.
Mrs Josephine Teo: Under the Employment of Foreign Manpower Act, it is an offence for employers to not pay foreign employees their contractual fixed monthly salaries or inflate the salaries of their foreign employees with no intention of paying them the amount declared to MOM.
Between 2010 and 2014, an average of 60 employers per year were taken to task for underpaying their foreign employees’ salaries. MOM stepped up education efforts to encourage foreign employees to report salary irregularities. We also improved detection capabilities. As a result, between 2015 and 2019, about 190 employers per year were taken to task. Most cases did not involve employment agencies. Nonetheless, over the same 10-year period, enforcement action was taken against six licensed employment agencies.
In some cases, underpayment was done simply by paying their foreign employees a lower salary. Some tried to avoid leaving any paper trail by crediting full declared salaries to the foreign employees and requiring the employees to return a portion back to them in the form of electronic transfers or in cash.
There is no excuse for underpayment of any employee, foreign or local. MOM will continue to take strong surveillance and enforcement action against errant employers and any other parties who abetted the offences.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Duration for Deputyship Application Process without a Lasting Power of Attorney","subTitle":"Monetising HDB flat for owner's care needs","sectionType":"WANA","content":"18 Mr Yip Hon Weng asked the Minister for Social and Family Development (a) what is the typical duration for the deputyship application process without a Lasting Power of Attorney (LPA); (b) what happens when the care-giver is unable to make a successful application; and (c) whether the Ministry will consider mandating registration of LPA for HDB flat buyers so that donees can monetise the flat for the owner's care needs when necessary.
Mr Masagos Zulkifli B M M: Most applications for appointment of a deputy are completed within 3 to 4 months of filing in the Family Justice Court. In some cases, the process may take longer if the case is complex, documents submitted are incomplete or if someone objects to the application. The application for deputyship can also be made using the Simplified Track. An urgent application under the Simplified Track for example, for one-time emergency funding below S$5,000 can be processed on an expedited basis, usually within three working days. However, where the documentation is incomplete or there is an objection, the approval would take longer. Prior to filing the Deputyship application in the Family Justice Courts, an applicant has to obtain a medical report to support the application. The time taken to obtain the report ranges from 1 to 3 months.
There are three reasons why a deputyship application may be unsuccessful. The first is that the Court had determined that the care recipient has not lost mental capacity and is able to make decisions on his own without a need for a deputy. The second reason is that the application was contested and the Court decided to appoint someone other than the applicant caregiver. Third, the applicant caregiver was found by the Court to be unsuitable, in which case the caregiver could ask a family member or close friend to apply to be appointed as deputy. If there is no suitable family member or close friend, the caregiver may approach a Professional Deputy registered by the Office of the Public Guardian (OPG). The list of registered Professional Deputies can be found on OPG’s website. Where the care recipient has limited assets and no or little support from the next-of-kin, a pro bono Panel Deputy could also be appointed.
Nevertheless, caregivers who are not appointed as deputies may still perform acts in connection with the care or treatment of a person without mental capacity such as bringing the person for a medical check-up, if the acts are done in the person’s best interests. Regardless of whether there has been a deputy or donee appointed, medical practitioners may decide on any life-sustaining treatment or treatment to prevent serious deterioration of a person.
My Ministry does not plan to mandate the making of an LPA in tandem with significant transactions such as the purchase of a property, as it should be the donor’s choice on whether he wants to make an LPA. However, we are working with other Ministries and Statutory Boards, including the Housing and Development Board, to increase awareness of the importance of an LPA at relevant life milestones. We had also put out a consultation paper from 28 October to 18 November last year on the development of a full online LPA registration process and other improvements. The proposed initiatives are to make it more convenient for Singaporeans to make their LPAs, which we hope will drive uptake.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Responsibility for Paying Temporary Development Levy","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WANA","content":"19 Mr Gerald Giam Yean Song asked the Minister for National Development whether the responsibility for paying the Temporary Development Levy rests with landlords or tenants.
Mr Desmond Lee: The Temporary Development Levy (TDL) is payable when temporary enhancement of land value occurs when Temporary Permission (TP) is granted, for a temporary change-of-use or minor building works.
Under Section 40B of the Planning Act, the TDL shall be paid for by the owner of the premises or the applicant for the TP. URA does not prescribe which party should pay the TDL – it is up to the relevant stakeholders to discuss and make a commercial decision.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Coordination of Construction Projects to Minimise Disruption to Residents","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WANA","content":"20 Mr Yip Hon Weng asked the Minister for National Development (a) whether the Ministry coordinates the schedules of multiple construction projects by different agencies affecting a specific residential area to minimise the duration of which they take place concurrently; (b) what are the criteria that will trigger the Ministry to review its approval process for these works; and (c) how do the different project leaders and relevant public agencies work together to address feedback from residents in a timely manner.
Mr Desmond Lee: Public construction projects comprise the development of land to meet public needs, such as for public housing, transport, and essential utilities. Within our urbanised environment, we recognise the need to minimise and mitigate the disruptions caused by construction projects on surrounding communities.
Large-scale public land development projects are coordinated and planned upfront by development agencies such as HDB and JTC to minimise and mitigate the impact on surrounding communities, nature and businesses. The Municipal Services Office (MSO) under MND has also begun pilot trials to collate schedules of planned infrastructure works across several public agencies, with a view to consolidate and stagger works where possible.
Construction works are also subject to requirements to mitigate their impact on surrounding communities. For example, to alleviate noise disamenities, all contractors, must comply with the noise limits stipulated in the Environmental Protection and Management (Control of Noise at Construction Sites) Regulations. Contractors must also comply with the Environmental Public Health Act and implement dust mitigating measures such as using netting or covers for aggregate and sand storage, and screening construction activities off from public places.
Public agencies are committed to respond quickly and effectively to residents’ feedback on dis-amenities from construction works. Residents can provide feedback on such dis-amenities via MSO’s OneService app, which allows seamless case referral between agencies for expedient follow-up. Together with agencies such as LTA, HDB, PUB and NParks, MSO has also worked out escalation protocols to ensure that complex cases are escalated to the appropriate authorities when needed for prompt action. Collectively, these efforts allow agencies to address residents’ feedback in a timely manner.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Correlation between Quantum of Medical Bills and Medical Insurance Coverage","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WANA","content":"21 Mr Seah Kian Peng asked the Minister for Health whether there is any evidence to show correlation between the quantum of medical/hospitalisation bills and medical insurance coverage.
Mr Gan Kim Yong: Different health insurance products affect healthcare consumption and bills differently. For example, Integrated Shield Plan (IP) full riders which cover the entire co-payment under the IP plan, have contributed to higher medical/hospitalization bill sizes. For private hospital riders, the average bill size for individuals with zero co-payment insurance coverage is around 25% higher than those with some form of co-payment in 2019. While full riders are popular because patients are not required to make any co-payment, they can inadvertently lead to over-consumption, over-servicing and over-charging of healthcare services, and ultimately, rising healthcare costs and higher insurance premiums for all.
This is why the Ministry of Health had worked with insurers to introduce a minimum level of co-payment for new IP riders in 2018. This was an important move to preserve the principle of co-payment in our healthcare financing system. All stakeholders must continue to play their part and exercise responsibility in choosing and delivering appropriate and necessary care.
Ensuring that our insurance scheme design encourages appropriate healthcare consumption becomes increasingly important given our rising healthcare costs. For example, the MediShield Life Council recently observed that the rise in cancer prevalence and emergence of higher cost cancer therapies have led to an increase in chemotherapy claims. The current design of a single claim limit catering to the wide range of chemotherapy treatments may need to be reviewed to strike a better balance between providing access to appropriate treatments and keeping claims growth sustainable. MOH will continue to monitor and review various features of healthcare insurance design as necessary, in order to ensure that healthcare treatments remain affordable and sustainable for Singaporeans.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Higher MediShield Life or MediSave Claim Limits Based on Indication-based Pricing, Therapeutic Value of Drug and Patient Outcomes","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WANA","content":"22 Mr Zhulkarnain Abdul Rahim asked the Minister for Health given the high cost of cancer drugs, whether a tiered approach can be adopted to allow higher MediShield Life or MediSave claim limits based on indication-based pricing or therapeutic value of a drug and patient outcomes.
Mr Gan Kim Yong: The MediShield Life Council is reviewing the MediShield Life coverage for cancer drugs so they can be covered in a more sustainable and affordable manner, in light of the rising cancer prevalence among Singaporeans and emergence of higher cost cancer therapies.
The Council will also study the approaches taken in other countries, such as using health technology assessment to determine the clinical benefits and cost-effectiveness of the drug, and negotiating with pharmaceutical companies on pricing before funding is extended.
The Council will then make its recommendations to MOH on the coverage and funding approach of cancer drugs. As the MediShield Life and MediSave schemes act in tandem to enhance affordability for Singaporeans, MOH will also review the MediSave withdrawal limit thereafter.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"MAS' Role in Appointments of Top Leaders at Financial Institutions","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WANA","content":"25 Mr Leong Mun Wai asked the Prime Minister (a) whether MAS has any supervisory role overseeing the appointments of top leaders of local financial institutions and, if so, what is the extent of this role; and (b) whether MAS will intervene if such a position within a local financial institution has not been held by Singaporean Citizens for an extended period of time.
Mr Tharman Shanmugaratnam (for the Prime Minister): The key senior managers, including the chief executive officer, of a financial institution (FI) are appointed by its board of directors.
The appointments are in turn subject to approval by the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS). In approving the appointments, MAS must be satisfied that the board has carried out a thorough assessment of candidates before arriving at the person they consider the best for the job, and that there are no concerns over the professional integrity of the appointee.
MAS does want to see our local talents developed for senior management positions in the financial sector. As reported in Parliament recently, the number of Singaporeans in senior positions grew from 1,700 to 2,600 between 2014 and 2019, which is an increase of more than 50% in five years.
Our basic approach to achieving this has been to create an enabling environment for our Singaporean talent, not a protectionist environment. We help FIs do well and grow in Singapore, enable them to hire the best talent, and encourage and actively support them to develop our Singaporeans for senior positions in the sector. This is the way to open up opportunities for Singaporeans to hold senior management positions, in both local and foreign FIs.
We will undermine our local FIs if we tell them that they must appoint only a Singaporean CEO, regardless of the merits of the candidates. Our major local FIs, such as our local banks, are no longer competing mainly in the domestic market. They are operating in a fiercely competitive Asian and global market. Imposing a nationality restriction on who their boards appoint as CEOs will put our local FIs at a disadvantage.
It will not be doing any favour to Singaporeans either, including those holding senior management ranks in the local FIs. Their interest, and ours, is in having globally competitive local FIs, that can grow opportunities for Singaporeans and for our whole financial sector. That is indeed what we have been witnessing.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Action against Advertisements of Illegal Remote Gambling or Loan Services on Social Media, SMS and Messaging Apps","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WANA","content":"26 Mr Gerald Giam Yean Song asked the Minister for Home Affairs how are the authorities actively monitoring and taking action in relation to advertisements of illegal remote gambling websites or loan services on social media, SMS and other messaging apps.
Mr K Shanmugam: Police will take the necessary enforcement actions when they receive complaints from members of public on advertisements on illegal remote gambling and unlicensed moneylending services. These include forwarding offending phone numbers to the telecommunication service providers to terminate the phone numbers, or to social media platforms to remove the illegal content. Where it is possible to track the identities of the perpetrators, Police will take them to task.
To prevent criminal syndicates from using prepaid SIM cards to send such advertisements, Police also conduct joint enforcement operations with IMDA against errant retailers known to be selling prepaid cards that have been fraudulently pre-registered. The most recent operation took place on 16 August 2020, with 16 shops raided, 10 arrests made, and the seizure of more than 2,800 fraudulently registered prepaid SIM cards.
The public plays an important part in this effort against advertisements of illegal remote gambling and unlicensed moneylending services. Mobile subscribers should block and report messages advertising illegal remote gambling and unlicensed moneylending services using spam filtering functions on their phones or third-party applications. One such application is ScamShield, a mobile application jointly developed by the National Crime Prevention Council (NCPC) and the Government Technology Agency (GovTech). The app is available for free for all iOS users, and we are currently working on the Android version.
IMDA is also working with the telecommunication service providers to explore technical solutions to reduce the delivery of such advertisements.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Impact of Gang Activities on Crime and Security Situation in Singapore","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WANA","content":"27 Mr Murali Pillai asked the Minister for Home Affairs in relation to the police operation between 21 December 2020 and 3 January 2021 that led to the arrest of 151 persons who are suspected to be members of unlawful societies (a) what are the reasons that led to the commencement of the operation; and (b) what is the Ministry’s assessment of the impact of gang activities on the crime and security situation in Singapore at this point.
28 Mr Melvin Yong Yik Chye asked the Minister for Home Affairs (a) whether there has been a rise in secret society and gang-related activities over the past five years; (b) whether there is a trend of younger individuals joining secret societies and gangs; and (c) what are the Ministry’s plans to deter people, especially our youths, from joining secret societies and gangs.
Mr K Shanmugam: The Police operation between 21 December 2020 and 3 January 2021 that led to the arrest of 151 persons for being suspected members of unlawful societies was mounted as part of Police’s continuous anti-gang suppression and deterrence efforts.
The secret society situation in Singapore is under control. The number of rioting and serious hurt cases with secret society connotations averaged 112 cases per year from 2016 to 2020. As for cases that involve the use of weapons such as parangs or knuckle dusters, the numbers have decreased, from 12 cases in 2016 to one case in 2020.
The secret societies today are largely made up of loosely-organised street gangs, comprising mainly of younger members who flit between different gangs. From 2016 to 2020, the number of youths who were dealt with by Police for committing offences with secret society connotations remained stable at an average of 153 per year.
Nonetheless, youth gangs remain a serious concern for Police. Police invest significant resources to educate and engage youths to deter them from joining secret societies and gangs. For example, Police conduct regular anti-gang talks at secondary schools. They also work with partners such as MSF, MOE and Volunteer Welfare Organisations to target at-risk youths, to try to rehabilitate them before they become entrenched in the gang mindset. One such initiative is the Streetwise Programme (SWP), a six-month long diversionary programme for wayward youths to seek assistance and counselling from social workers and Police officers. It aims to rehabilitate youths who have drifted into gangs and are involved in petty secret society activities.
Due to the COVID-19 restrictions, the Police are looking to enhance their anti-gang outreach efforts online. In 2020, the Police and the National Crime Prevention Council organised the e-Delta League Tournament, which saw more than 100 youths participate in a FIFA 21 tournament online. As part of the tournament, the Police conducted a virtual Youth Workshop to share crime prevention advice, as well as to deliver anti-gang talks to the participants.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Higher Priority for BTO Flats and Added Subsidies for Resale Flats for Singaporeans Staying Near Parents","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WANA","content":"29 Mr Kwek Hian Chuan Henry asked the Minister for National Development whether HDB can consider giving (i) higher priority to BTO flat applications or (ii) added subsidies for HDB resale flats, to Singaporeans whose parents or parents-in-law are staying near the new BTO/resale precinct so that they can stay near their parents and provide mutual support.
Mr Desmond Lee: Couples applying for a new flat within 4km of their parents’ residence, can qualify for the Married Child Priority Scheme (MCPS). Under the MCPS, up to 30% of the flat supply is set aside for eligible first-timer families, while up to 15% of the flat supply is set aside for second-timer families.
In addition, couples who wish to live near their parents may consider the Multi-Generation Priority Scheme (MGPS). This scheme allows a married couple and their parents to make a joint application for two new flats in the same BTO project, and enjoy priority allocation. The parents can book up to a 3-room flat.
Couples who wish to live with their parents can also apply for a 3Gen flat. 3Gen flats are larger than 5-room flats, and come with four bedrooms and two en-suite bathrooms. As these flats are designed for multi-generational living, only multi-generational families are eligible to buy them.
For resale flats, eligible couples that buy a resale flat within 4km of their parents’ residence can qualify for a Proximity Housing Grant (PHG) of $20,000. If they buy a resale flat to live with their parents, they can qualify for a PHG of $30,000.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Allowing Singaporeans to Buy Resale HDB Flats from Proceeds of Selling Local or Overseas Private Property","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WANA","content":"30 Mr Kwek Hian Chuan Henry asked the Minister for National Development whether the Ministry will consider allowing Singaporeans who own local or overseas property to purchase a resale HDB flat if they are downgrading to cash out their local private property for their retirement living, or when the annual value of their total overseas property is less than a certain value or when they satisfy an established time line to divest the overseas property.
Mr Desmond Lee: Singaporeans who own a local or overseas residential property can buy a resale flat if they meet the eligibility conditions for HDB flat purchases and dispose of their private property within six months from the date of the resale flat purchase. This requirement is consistent with the intent for HDB flats to be homes for long-term owner-occupation. It deters speculative purchases of HDB flats, thus helping to keep them affordable, and also prioritises our limited supply of HDB flats for home seekers who do not own other properties.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Building a Certain Type of HDB Flats that Can Be Used as \"Stock Holding\"","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WANA","content":"31 Mr Kwek Hian Chuan Henry asked the Minister for National Development whether the Ministry will consider the building of a certain type of HDB flats that can be used as \"stock holding\" and which can be used by young couples with kids to set up their family home while waiting for their BTO flats to be completed.
Mr Desmond Lee: There are various interim housing options available to young married couples with children who are waiting for their BTO flats to be completed. Most continue to stay with their families, while some choose to rent on the open market. For those who need further assistance, HDB already has in place the Parenthood Provisional Housing Scheme (PPHS) under which such couples can apply to rent a flat. Married couples with children enjoy priority in flat selection under the PPHS.
We encourage flat buyers to take into account the lead time needed for the completion of their new flats, and consider the full range of housing options available to best meet their housing needs. Those who prefer to move in sooner can consider buying a resale flat, and tap on the various housing grants available for the purchase.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Review of India-Singapore Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement Given DBS' Merger with India's Lakshmi Vilas Bank","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WANA","content":"32 Mr Leong Mun Wai asked the Minister for Trade and Industry whether the Ministry intends to negotiate for better terms in the ongoing review of the India-Singapore Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) in light of the DBS group's merger with Lakshmi Vilas Bank.
Mr Chan Chun Sing: The Third Review of the India-Singapore Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) has been ongoing since September 2018. We regularly review our Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) in tandem with changing economic patterns and flows between Singapore and our trade partners. These reviews are not linked to specific commercial transactions.
The amalgamation of Lakshmi Vilas Bank in November 2020 with DBS Bank India Limited is the result of a commercial decision by DBS.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Take-up Rates for Digital Inclusion Programmes","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WANA","content":"33 Mr Saktiandi Supaat asked the Minister for Communications and Information (a) how many households are currently eligible for subsidised digital inclusion schemes like the Home Access and NEU PC Plus Programmes, and what percentage of these households are not enrolled; (b) what is being done to create more awareness about the schemes to eligible households; (c) whether there are plans to place rental households under auto-inclusion for the Home Access Programme; and (d) what are the plans for the next 10 years to ensure that the broadband technology availed to subsidised recipients stay current with the times.
Mr S Iswaran: The Government is committed to equipping all Singaporeans with a baseline of affordable digital access. The Infocomm Media Development Authority (IMDA)’s Home Access and NEU PC Plus programmes subsidise digital connectivity for low-income households. We have also established a streamlined application process for households supported by the Ministry of Social and Family Development (MSF)’s Comcare Long-Term and Short-to-Medium Term Assistance Schemes, and the Ministry of Education (MOE)’s Financial Assistance Scheme, to facilitate the inclusion of such households.
IMDA has been creating awareness about the programmes through the natural touchpoints of likely beneficiaries, such as MOE schools and Social Service Offices. To date, the NEU PC Plus programme has supported a total of about 56,000 households since 2006, and the Home Access programme has benefited some 21,000 households since late 2014. In the coming months, we will be streamlining the application for Public Rental Scheme households to ensure that they can auto-qualify for the assistance, so that there is a more seamless process in meeting their digital connectivity needs.
These efforts have contributed to the increase in Singapore’s household level broadband penetration rate from 87% in 2014 to 98% in 2019. We will continue to work closely with agencies such as MSF and MOE to support low-income households in digital access to ensure that no one is left behind in Singapore’s digitalisation journey.
The Government also regularly reviews our programmes for currency and relevance. The Home Access programme was enhanced in April 2020 to offer faster broadband speeds from 300 Mbps to 500 Mbps and 1 Gbps. These speeds are on par with what is available to Singapore consumers more generally.
Beyond ensuring digital access, my Ministry and our agencies will also work with stakeholders and partners to help all Singaporeans go digital. To make this a success, we aim to empower others to lead efforts in helping Singaporeans embrace technology as a means to improving lives. This will require different segments of society to contribute, and we encourage those with an interest, passion and the skills to join us on this journey.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Help for Employers Caught Out by Indonesia's New Zero Placement Fee Policy for Domestic Helpers","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WANA","content":"34 Mr Melvin Yong Yik Chye asked the Minister for Manpower arising from Indonesia’s new \"zero placement policy\" (a) what measures can the Ministry put in place to support employers who need to hire new foreign domestic workers from Indonesia; and (b) whether the Ministry has any plans to help alleviate the financial burden for such employers who are unable to afford the placement fee.
Mrs Josephine Teo: The Indonesian authorities have informed employment agencies (EAs) in Singapore that it will be introducing a \"zero placement fee policy\". This policy requires employers to bear placement fees and other costs incurred by new Indonesian foreign domestic workers (FDWs) when seeking employment overseas, including the costs of air tickets, work visas, passport replacement, medical examinations, transportation and accommodation. While this policy was supposed to have taken effect on 15 January 2021, the Indonesian authorities have extended the transition period by six months, until 15 July 2021. EAs have indicated that the service fee charged to employers for Indonesian FDWs could increase as a result of this policy.
To avoid these higher fees, employers can consider FDWs other than those from Indonesia. Regardless of the country of origin, employers should ensure they have full information of the cost implications before making their hiring decisions. EAs are required by Singapore law to provide employers with a clear breakdown of the fees charged to them and their FDWs. Depending on employers’ preferences and cost considerations, EAs will advise them on the options that best meet their requirements. EAs will likely make adjustments to bring in FDWs from countries with growing demand by employers.
Alternatively, employers can consider hiring part-time help from domestic services providers under the Household Services Scheme. Those with caregiving needs for the elderly or young children may also approach agencies like the Agency for Integrated Care (AIC) or the Early Childhood Development Agency (ECDA) for assistance on accessing subsidised services.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Number of Foreigners, Permanent Residents and Singaporeans Tested positive for COVID-19","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WANA","content":"35 Mr Ang Wei Neng asked the Minister for Health (a) what is the number of foreigners, Permanent Residents and Singaporeans arriving in Singapore from July 2020 and of these, how many have been tested positive for COVID-19; (b) of the foreigners arriving in Singapore since July 2020, how many are work permit holders and domestic helpers respectively and of these, how many have been tested positive for COVID-19; and (c) whether there are plans for foreigners to submit Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) test results to the Singapore Government at least three calendar days prior to arrival in Singapore.
Mr Gan Kim Yong: From 1 July 2020 to 31 December 2020, 191 Singapore Citizens (SCs) and 214 Permanent Residents (PRs) tested positive for COVID-19 out of about 64,000 and 32,000 arrivals respectively. Out of the 177,000 foreigners who arrived during this period, 1,179 tested positive for COVID-19. This included 440 Foreign Domestic Workers and 147 Work Permit Holders who tested positive, out of about 14,000 and 28,000 arrivals respectively. All arrivals from high-risk countries or regions are subject to Stay Home Notice (SHN), and all detected cases are sent to appropriate care facilities for isolation. This minimises the risk of transmission to the community.
All inbound travellers who are not SCs or PRs, and who are entering from high-risk countries or regions, are required to present a negative COVID-19 Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) test taken within 72 hours before departure to board the plane to Singapore. Given the emergence of new virus variants and the worsening COVID-19 situation around the world, all inbound travellers (including SCs and PRs) arriving from 25 January 2021 are also required to take a COVID-19 PCR test upon arrival in Singapore.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Matched Retirement Savings Scheme's Contributions and Limits","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WANA","content":"37 Ms Carrie Tan asked the Minister for Manpower (a) whether the Government’s matched contributions under the Matched Retirement Savings Scheme apply to top-ups made by non-family members; and (b) whether the tax reliefs provided to those who top up the CPF accounts of their loved ones can be extended to non-related persons who may choose to do so for someone.
Mrs Josephine Teo: The Matched Retirement Savings Scheme (MRSS) was announced in Budget 2020 and launched earlier this year. Under this scheme, the Government will match cash top-ups to eligible recipients’ Retirement Accounts, up to $600 per year. Anyone can provide such top-ups. Singapore citizens and permanent residents who make cash top-ups for their loved ones may be eligible for up to $7,000 of tax relief per year. Employers who make cash top-ups on their employees’ behalf will also enjoy an equivalent amount of tax deduction. Tax reliefs are not available for top-ups from other non-related parties. However, they can contribute to beneficiaries through a charity with Institutions of Public Character (IPCs) status and be eligible for a tax deduction of 250%.
We will continue to review the scheme to ensure that it remains relevant to members.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Database of Adult Persons with Intellectual Disabilities and Special Needs","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WANA","content":"38 Ms Yeo Wan Ling asked the Minister for Social and Family Development (a) whether the Ministry maintains a database of adult persons with intellectual disabilities and special needs (undiagnosed and diagnosed); (b) whether such personal information can be passed on to local volunteer and charity organisations to reach out to these persons who may be living without care-givers, without their explicit consent; and (c) what are the outreach plans for such adults especially if they are living alone, or with elderly care-givers.
Mr Masagos Zulkifli B M M: MSF has data on persons with disabilities, including persons with intellectual disability, who have applied for government-funded disability services. These services range from early intervention services and special education to adult disability services such as day or residential care and employment support services, and include schemes that support access by persons with disabilities to transport or assistive technology.
MSF generally obtains the consent of individuals in need before sharing their personal data with non-government entities, such as charity organisations. Exceptions may be exercised by MSF in line with the Government Instruction Manual on ICT and Smart Systems Management, for example, to provide assistance to address concerns of an individual’s well-being or safety, where consent cannot be obtained in a timely manner. MSF may, for example, need to share information with social workers or healthcare professionals to help in the detection of abuse of vulnerable adults early, to ensure timely intervention. Before doing so, MSF will assess the need for sharing the data and ensure that a good balance is struck between achieving the intended purpose and respecting the privacy of persons in need. We typically work with other Government agencies, Government-appointed agencies and trusted partners on the ground to render support and assistance. The non-government entities in receipt of such personal data are obliged to protect and safeguard the data as required by the Government for the intended purposes, and in line with the Personal Data Protection Act.
We recognise that there may be vulnerable persons with disabilities living on their own, or with senior caregivers, who may require more assistance. Our partners, including grassroots organisations, the Agency for Integrated Care and Social Service Agencies, have been referring such cases that they come across to us for support. During the circuit breaker period, SG Enable also set up a dedicated support team to attend to the heightened needs of caregivers and PwDs. MSF will continue to work closely with our partners to bring those who require help into our social support system. Likewise, we encourage members of the public to refer cases that may require help to MSF.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Children Without Child Development Accounts","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WANA","content":"39 Mr Seah Kian Peng asked the Minister for Social and Family Development how many children who are currently eligible for a Child Development Account (CDA) have not had their CDAs established and what can be done for this particular group of children.
Mr Masagos Zulkifli B M M: Parents can open a Child Development Account (CDA) for an eligible Singapore Citizen child anytime from the child’s birth until the end of the year that he or she turns 12. Based on the 2008 to 2020 birth cohorts, around 450,700 children are eligible for a CDA. As at 7 December 2020, about 1.8% or 8,200 eligible children have not opened their CDA. We expect this number to decrease given the time frame to open a CDA.
Parents can conveniently apply for the Baby Bonus Scheme and open a CDA for their child on the Baby Bonus website or the LifeSG mobile application. Information on how to apply for a CDA is also included in the Baby Bonus kit distributed to new parents at maternity hospitals and ICA’s birth registration counters. Subsequently, MSF regularly sends mail reminders to parents to apply for the Baby Bonus Scheme and open a CDA.
MSF also works with agencies to reach out to those without a CDA. For example, MSF partners KidSTART Agencies under the Early Childhood Development Agency (ECDA) to identify low-income families and help them apply for a CDA.
We encourage all parents to open a CDA as the Government provides the CDA First Step Grant of $3,000, and co-matches parents’ savings up to a cap, depending on the child order. These help families defray the financial costs of child-raising and can be used by the child and his or her siblings for approved educational and healthcare expenses. For more information on the CDA and how to open an account, members of the public can visit MSF’s Baby Bonus website (babybonus.msf.gov.sg), or call the Baby Bonus hotline 1800 253 7707 for assistance.
The Government is committed to building strong and resilient families, and helping all parents invest in their children’s future, including the more vulnerable children. We will continue to work with relevant agencies to help more families benefit from the CDA.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Public Agencies In Charge of Deploying Safe Distancing Ambassadors and Enforcement Officers","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WANA","content":"40 Ms Yeo Wan Ling asked the Minister for Sustainability and the Environment (a) given the approach to enforcements of safe distancing measures, which are the public agencies in charge of deploying safe distancing ambassadors and enforcement officers in community hotspots (including basketball courts and playgrounds) and in residential estates; (b) how frequent and extensive are safe-distancing patrolling efforts within residential areas; and (c) whether the enforcement agencies are cross-sharing reported cases from the community on the flouting of safe distancing rules.
Ms Grace Fu Hai Yien: To curb the transmission of COVID-19 in the community, around 3,000 Safe Distancing Ambassadors (SDAs) and Enforcement Officers (EOs) from more than 15 agencies are deployed daily to enforce Safe Distancing Measures (SDMs) and Safe Management Measures (SMMs) at various premises and public spaces, with more being deployed during peak hours and weekends.
Of these, about half are deployed at residential estates every day by agencies such as Housing & Development Board, National Parks Board, Sport Singapore, National Environment Agency and Singapore Food Agency. Working with limited resources, the agencies consider several factors in their deployment such as crowd levels, types of activities and operational effectiveness.
The agencies meet regularly to coordinate operational plans and ensure consistency in our enforcement approach. They take a \"no wrong door\" approach and will refer cases to the appropriate agency for follow up. Agencies also undertake joint operations, such as with the Police to step up enforcement at popular night spots.
COVID-19 remains a serious threat and we must not become complacent, especially in the run-up to Lunar New Year period and during the festive period, which will see an increase in social interactions. We must be disciplined in observing the tightened measures announced on 22 January 2021 by the Multi-Ministry Taskforce. While our officers are working hard to ensure the safety of our residents, we cannot rely on enforcement alone; our enforcement officers cannot be everywhere, all the time. All of us need to be socially responsible and do our part to prevent a resurgence in community transmission. Otherwise, all the sacrifices we have made will be in vain. Together, we can keep Singapore safe.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Managing Number of SHN Hotels to Balance Cost Considerations and Demand","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WANA","content":"41 Mr Chua Kheng Wee Louis asked the Minister for National Development (a) what is the number of Stay-Home-Notice (SHN) hotels and rooms currently contracted by the Ministry; (b) what is the current physical occupancy rates of the hotels and their average contracted periods remaining; and (c) what is the Ministry’s plan to manage the number of SHN hotels to balance cost considerations and demand for such facilities.
Mr Desmond Lee: There are typically between 30 to 70 hotels operating as Stay-Home Notice (SHN) dedicated facilities (SDFs). MND works with agencies such as MTI, MOM, MOE and ICA to match the supply of SDFs with forecasted demand. We have built flexibility in the system and worked with our hotel partners to put in place arrangements that allow us to be agile in activating and standing down capacity as required. The contracts for facilities will be renewed, so long as they continue to be needed to manage the risk of imported cases.
There are about 15,000 individuals currently in SDFs. This figure changes depending on the external COVID environment, our border control policies, travel demand and other factors. A key consideration in our planning is ensuring sufficient vacant SDF capacity to accommodate returning Singaporeans who are welcome to return home at any point in time.
We will continue to monitor the trends and evolving COVID-19 situation closely and adjust our active SDF capacity accordingly. Protecting the community from imported cases is our priority, and the SDF system that we have in place today is critical to ensure that travellers can be effectively isolated until they are found to be free of COVID-19. In balancing between the cost of SDFs and allowing inflow of travellers to meet our economic and social support needs (e.g. foreign domestic workers), we must ensure that we do not compromise our ability to isolate travellers arriving from higher risk countries. Since, 1 January 2021, all incoming travellers have to pay for their stay at SDF hotels.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Review of Legal Profession Act to Clarify Jurisdiction of The Courts and Routes of Reviews and Appeals","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WANA","content":"42 Ms He Ting Ru asked the Minister for Law whether a review of the Legal Profession Act to clarify the jurisdiction of the courts and routes of review/appeals available to a complainant, solicitor and the Law Society will be conducted.
Mr K Shanmugam: My Ministry has noted the remarks of the Court of Appeal, and will study the issue and consult the relevant stakeholders.
44 Mr Murali Pillai asked the Minister for Manpower (a) what is the ratio of the aggregate number of foreign workers in Singapore against the aggregate number of man-year entitlement (MYE) at this point in time; (b) how does this ratio compare with the ratios in corresponding points in the past two years; and (c) what steps will the Ministry take to ensure that a sufficient number of foreign workers are recruited whilst ensuring a COVID-19-safe work environment.
Mrs Josephine Teo: The requested ratio is not a meaningful indicator of whether there is sufficient manpower in the Construction and Process sectors for committed projects in any given year. This is because MYEs are allocated for multiple years, and firms can also hire workers beyond their MYE allocation.
Nevertheless, we note that the number of foreign workers in the Construction and Process sectors has decreased by about 15% in the past year. At the same time, BCA and EDB expect demand to increase in 2021. That is why we had since December 2020 been taking steps to allow the entry of new workers, but in a safe way, minimising the risk of COVID-19 transmission into the community.
Foreign workers coming to Singapore must comply with border measures and safeguards which will continue to be adjusted as the operating environment changes. From 6 January 2021, all newly arrived foreign workers staying in dormitories have to go through an additional 7-day testing regime at a designated facility, after completing their 14-day Stay-Home Notice. In addition, from 18 January 2021, newly arrived Work Permit and S Pass holders from higher-risk countries or regions in the Construction, Marine Shipyard and Process sectors are required to take a Polymerase Chain Reaction test and Serology test upon arrival.
To ensure a safe working environment for our workers, employers are required to abide by the prevailing Safe Management Measures at the workplace. This includes measures like segregating teams into different zones in construction worksites. In dormitories, we have enhanced our contact tracing capabilities and test foreign workers regularly through Rostered Routine Testing. We have also been working with dormitory operators, foreign workers and employers to implement Safe Living Measures.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Proposed Alternative Work Schedule for a Day Off After Working Extra Hour Every Day for Nine Days","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WANA","content":"45 Assoc Prof Jamus Jerome Lim asked the Minister for Manpower whether the Government will consider instituting an Alternative Work Schedule (AWS) where employees that work an extra hour every day for a nine-day period will be able to claim the 10th day off.
Mrs Josephine Teo: The Employment Act already allows for alternative work hours and arrangements based on the requirements of businesses and the needs of workers. This includes work schedules such as the ones the Member has described.
Notwithstanding this, employers must ensure that their employees have adequate rest and break times, and safeguard their health and safety at all times.
46 Mr Leon Perera asked the Minister for National Development to what extent does the Ministry ensure that HDB Upgrading/Estate Renewal Programmes include considerations for heat-reduction through retrofits such as rooftop solar panels, green roofs and cool paints, with special attention paid to low-income blocks/precincts.
Mr Desmond Lee: HDB is continuously working on methods to reduce heat in our HDB estates. Under the Green Towns Programme for all existing HDB towns, HDB will be working with Town Councils to pilot the application of cool coatings on building facades and driveways. If this is assessed to be effective, the application of cool coatings can be extended island-wide.
Solar panels will also be installed at more HDB block rooftops as part of the Programme. In 2020, HDB announced a new solar target of 540 MWp to be installed on 70% of HDB blocks island-wide by 2030. This is more than double the previous target. These solar panels may shade the top of the roof from direct glare of the sun, hence potentially reducing heat experienced by residents.
In addition, urban farms, extensive greenery and community gardens will be gradually introduced to the top decks of Multi-Storey Car Parks (MSCPs) which can support these features. Besides offering visual and spatial relief, the greenery is expected to reduce the ambient temperature of our estates.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Progress of Plan to Plant 1 Million Trees","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WANA","content":"47 Mr Dennis Tan Lip Fong asked the Minister for National Development (a) what is the progress of the plan to plant 1 million new trees by 2030; (b) what is the expected carbon sequestration capacity of these new trees when the target is reached; and (c) whether there are plans to plant new trees to offset the clearing of forests in areas under active development.
Mr Desmond Lee: The OneMillionTrees movement was launched in April 2020 to involve the community in planting one million additional trees across Singapore between 2020 and 2030, and to foster greater stewardship of our greenery and nature in Singaporeans. These one million trees will sequester an estimated 78,000 tonnes of carbon dioxide. As the trees continue to mature, their carbon sequestration capacities will continue to increase.
Currently, almost 150,000 trees have been planted under the movement. These efforts have involved more than 1,000 participants from our Friends of the Parks communities, schools, nature groups, corporate partners and other organisations.
The OneMillionTrees movement also contributes towards our larger vision of transforming Singapore into a City in Nature, where we are extending and enhancing our green spaces, strengthening the connectivity between them, and integrating greenery into our built environment. This is on top of our existing greenery replacement measures to offset clearance due to development, such as replacement tree planting and increasing greenery and other natural elements in urban areas. Through our various greenery efforts, we will enhance liveability and climate resilience, strengthen biodiversity conservation and improve access to nature for all Singaporeans.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Impact on Jobs and Trades with Shift Away from Fossil Fuel and Traditional Automotive Industries","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WANA","content":"48 Ms He Ting Ru asked the Minister for Trade and Industry given the shift to low and zero emissions mobility (a) what is the estimated impact on jobs and trades in the fossil fuel and traditional automotive industries; and (b) what steps is the Ministry taking now to ensure that there will not be a shortage of skilled electrical engineers and workers when the economy transitions to such vehicles.
Mr Chan Chun Sing: We do not expect the shift to low emissions mobility to result in significant job losses in Singapore.
Our petrochemical companies will continue to stay relevant as petrochemical products are important inputs to the manufacturing of widely-used products, ranging from diapers, to rubber tyres and surgical masks, and even in the specialty chemicals sector, which continues to see significant growth in demand from Asia.
In the automotive industry, the shift would require our existing transport and maintenance workers to gradually work with hybrid or electrified platforms. Some of our transport workers would already be familiar with the new platforms. Currently, approximately two in five taxis are either hybrid or fully electric. We are also steadily ramping up the deployment of electric buses since April 2020. Our maintenance workers will need to upgrade their skills to maintain electric vehicle (EV) components and charging systems. In December 2020, the Government supported the setting up of the Singapore Motor Workshop Association (SMWA) training facility to equip our maintenance workers with such new skills. We will continue to support our workers in acquiring new competencies required in a hybrid and electrified mobility landscape.
We view low emissions mobility as the future of mobility in a carbon constrained world, and an opportunity for Singapore. We have been taking steps to grow the EV industry in Singapore by attracting investments across the mobility value chain, including from companies like Hyundai which will assemble EVs locally, and Borgwarner, Continental and Infineon which carry out R&D, design and manufacturing of EV components in Singapore. These investments will create exciting job opportunities in areas such as (i) advanced manufacturing, (ii) R&D and design of EVs and its components, and (iii) software engineering. Government agencies will continue to work with companies, training providers and the unions to prepare Singaporeans to take on these jobs. I am confident that our highly educated and skilled workforce will rise to the occasion.
49 Mr Dennis Tan Lip Fong asked the Minister for Transport (a) in 2020, what is the number of piracy incidents in the Straits of Singapore; (b) how does this compare with the frequency of piracy incidents over the past three years; and (c) what efforts are underway to ensure that there will be a reduction of such incidents this year.
Mr Ong Ye Kung: In 2020, there were 34 reported sea robbery incidents in the Strait of Singapore, which comprises the territorial waters of Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia. Out of the 34 incidents, 29 were petty theft involving unarmed perpetrators. Four incidents involved armed perpetrators, but no crew was physically harmed. There was one incident where the perpetrators were armed with knives and one crew member sustained a minor head injury. None of these 34 cases occurred within or originated from Singapore territorial waters.
Mr Tan asked about the frequency of incidents over the past three years. There were 31 sea robbery incidents in the Strait of Singapore in 2019, seven in 2018 and eight in 2017.
The Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore (MPA) works with the Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN) and the Police Coast Guard (PCG) to closely monitor vessels around and within Singapore’s territorial waters around the clock. Should any suspicious vessel enter our territorial waters, our maritime security agencies will respond swiftly and robustly to safeguard Singapore’s security. I have confidence in the capabilities of our security agencies and our frontline officers. The pirates must know this too, which was probably why they avoided coming into Singapore territorial waters.
Based on internationally established rules of engagement, our agencies do not generally intervene in piracy and sea robbery incidents that take place in other countries’ waters. We had previously explained in this House that the fight against piracy requires close collaboration among all regional partners, to share information and conduct coordinated patrols. Countries in the region have also taken enforcement action against pirates who are found within their boundaries. Singapore agencies have and will work closely with regional counterparts to combat piracy.
Vessel owners and crew also have a role to play in the fight against piracy. MPA has been advising vessels travelling through the Strait of Singapore to implement preventive measures to reduce the risk of piracy attacks, such as the installation of surveillance and detection systems, putting in place access control measures, and using radio and alarms to alert the authorities in the event of an incident. We also urge the shipping community to report incidents in a timely and accurate manner so that littoral states can take prompt remedial actions.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Trends for Disabilities in Instrumental Activities of Daily Living and Impact on Payouts for Long-term Care Insurance Schemes","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WANA","content":"50 Mr Yip Hon Weng asked the Minister for Health (a) what are the trends for disabilities in Instrumental Activities of Daily Living (IADLs); (b) how do IADL disabilities impact upon employment or financial independence among Singaporeans; and (c) whether the Ministry will consider including IADLs as part of the eligibility criteria for claim payouts in long-term care schemes like CareShield.
Mr Gan Kim Yong: There are broadly two categories of Activities of Daily Livings (ADLs). First, basic ADLs are activities necessary for independent living and basic self-care, such as washing and feeding oneself. Second, Instrumental ADLs (IADLs) are more complex activities that require higher cognitive functions and are related to the ability to live independently, such as communicating with others and managing one’s finances. These could impact individuals’ employability and financial independence. We currently do not have representative data on IADL trends in Singapore.
National long-term care schemes such as CareShield Life, currently use basic ADLs to assess an individual’s functional disability and provide payouts to support policyholders when they are severely disabled. This strikes a balance between providing adequate support to Singaporeans with severe disabilities while keeping CareShield Life premiums and costs affordable for all.
Notwithstanding this, the Ministry of Health recognises the impact of cognitive impairment on functional disability. Since 2020, we have improved the severe disability assessment framework to better consider the impact of cognitive impairment on functional ability. Cognitively impaired individuals with higher levels of functional impairment can now more consistently qualify for payouts under long-term care schemes like CareShield Life, MediSave Care, and ElderFund.
The Government is committed to helping Singaporeans who require financial assistance for their long-term care costs. Singaporeans with functional disabilities who do not qualify for severe disability schemes like CareShield Life can apply for support through other schemes like the Home Caregiving Grant and the Foreign Domestic Worker Levy Concession for Persons with Disabilities. Singaporeans who still require more financial assistance to fund their long-term care costs can rely on Government safety nets, such as MediFund or ComCare.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Detention and Treatment under Mental Health (Care and Treatment) Act","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WANA","content":"51 Mr Leon Perera asked the Minister for Health (a) in the past five years, how many persons have been detained and treated under the Mental Health (Care and Treatment) Act for (i) over 72 hours (ii) over one month and (iii) more than six months; (b) how many of such persons have been successfully rehabilitated; (c) whether police officers receive training on mental illness, particularly in identifying mental illness and interacting with a person with mental illness; (d) if so, what has been the effectiveness of such training; and (e) whether there are plans to review this Act in light of Singapore’s ratification of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
Mr Gan Kim Yong: The Mental Health (Care and Treatment) Act (MHCTA) provides for the State to detain persons with or suspected of having mental health conditions, and who may be a risk to self or pose a danger to others, in a designated psychiatric institution for psychiatric assessment and treatment. Depending on the person’s mental state, the person could be detained initially for up to 72 hours. Subsequently, and upon further review, the person may be detained for a further period, up to a maximum of 12 months, if assessed to be necessary. However, detention of patients is only exercised under the very strict circumstance that a patient with mental health conditions is at risk of harm to self or others. For the past five years from 2016 to 2020, the number of persons who have been detained and treated under the Act for more than 72 hours and up to one month averaged 1,460 a year. An annual average of 128 and 14 were detained between 1-6 months and more than six months respectively.
The Institute of Mental Health (IMH) treats all patients based on their mental health needs and does not specifically track the rehabilitation outcome of patients who have been detained in the hospital under the MHCTA.
Frontline police officers are trained to adapt to different scenarios, and intervene decisively to protect life and property. The Singapore Police Force (SPF) continually adjusts its training to ensure that they remain relevant, and effectively equip officers to carry out their duties in a dynamic operating environment.
As part of the Community Mental Health Masterplan, Police had worked with the Agency for Integrated Care (AIC) to increase officers’ awareness of mental health conditions and help them to identify and respond to persons observed with potential indications of mental health issues.
Apart from training, officers are also guided by a set of internal Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) when dealing with persons with possible mental health issues. The SOPs provide a general guide for officers in recognising possible signs of mental health issues, as well as recommendations on how to interact with such persons.
MOH currently has no plans to amend the MHCTA in light of Singapore’s ratification of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), as the legislation is already in compliance with the requirements of Article 14 of the CRPD.
Persons detained under MHCTA are treated with respect and accorded the same standard of care as other patients. Patients and family members can give feedback to IMH should they have any concern with regard to its IMH services.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Utilisation Rates at ICA's Physical Counters","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WANA","content":"52 Mr Muhamad Faisal Bin Abdul Manap asked the Minister for Home Affairs (a) how many visitors continue to use over-the-counter services at ICA in 2020; and (b) what is ICA doing to ensure that residents who require assistance to access ICA services can continue to do so.
Mr K Shanmugam: There were approximately 660,000 over-the-counter transactions made at the Immigration and Checkpoints Authority (ICA) in 2020. The majority of these over-the-counter transactions were for the collection of physical documents such as passports and National Registration Identity Cards (NRICs).
ICA has been transforming its services to provide an even more convenient and efficient experience for customers. Today, members of the public can perform a wide range of transactions with ICA through the MyICA online platform. Those who are using MyICA for the first time can learn about its features through an online tutorial, which includes step-by-step video guides in our four official languages for the online application of passports and ICs.
ICA is conscious that some customers may not have access to the Internet or are unfamiliar with transacting online. Therefore, ICA’s e-Services allow family members and friends of these customers to transact with ICA on their behalf, for key services such as passport application, re-registration of IC and change of IC particulars.
Those who do not have someone to assist them can visit the ICA Building, where ICA officers will guide them to submit the application online, or process the application over the counter.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Update on Remaining Number of HDB Blocks that Not Eligible for Lift Upgrading Programme","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WANA","content":"53 Mr Dennis Tan Lip Fong asked the Minister for National Development (a) whether he can provide an update on the remaining number of HDB blocks that are not eligible for the Lift Upgrading Programme; (b) whether HDB will inform residents that it has made its final decision on each of these blocks; and (c) for those who choose to take up the Lift Access Housing Grant, what assistance will HDB be providing to owners who have difficulties selling their existing flats.
Mr Desmond Lee: HDB has implemented the Lift Upgrading Programme (LUP) for over 5,000 blocks.
There are about 150 blocks where it is not feasible to implement LUP due to high cost, or existing technical or site constraints. For such blocks, HDB will continue to explore new technical methods to bring down LUP costs and to improve accessibility for residents living in flats without direct lift access. Hence, we need not make a \"final decision\" on LUP at this point.
In the meantime, residents living in these blocks who are in urgent need of direct lift access due to medical conditions or mobility reasons will be eligible for the Lift access Housing Grant (LHG) of up to $30,000 when they buy another flat with direct lift access. All flat owners who have taken possession of another flat are given a grace period of 6 months to dispose of their existing flat. This also applies to those who have purchased another flat with the LHG.
For flat owners who face difficulties selling their existing flat, HDB can grant an extension of time on a case-by-case basis. Flat owners who need further assistance can approach their HDB Branch for a discussion, and HDB will see how best to assist them.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Revising Eligibility Criteria and Housing Income Ceiling to Align with ComCare Assistance Schemes","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WANA","content":"54 Mr Don Wee asked the Minister for National Development whether HDB will consider revising the eligibility criteria for HDB rental flats and increase the household income ceiling from $1,500 to $1,900 to align with ComCare assistance schemes.
Mr Desmond Lee: HDB takes a needs-based approach in assessing requests for public rental flats, and the $1,500 income guideline is not a hard cap or ceiling. Individuals with income exceeding $1,500 can still apply for a public rental flat. HDB will evaluate each application holistically and consider factors such as whether the applicant has other housing options.
The income thresholds across social assistance schemes differ as the schemes meet different needs and have different target groups. For the Public Rental Scheme, we use $1,500 as a guideline because first-timer households with this income are generally able to buy a new flat with the help of our generous housing grants, and we want to encourage them to own their own homes.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Trend for Number of Complaints Made by Executive Condominium Buyers to HDB against Developers","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WANA","content":"55 Mr Darryl David asked the Minister for National Development (a) whether the number of complaints made by Executive Condominium (EC) buyers to HDB against their respective EC developers within the first 12 months of getting their keys has risen over the past five years; (b) how does HDB facilitate disputes between EC buyers and their developers; and (c) whether developers are blacklisted from bidding for future EC projects if they are found to have delivered poor quality in their previous developments.
Mr Desmond Lee: Executive Condominium (EC) buyers purchase their ECs directly from the private developers and enter into a Sale and Purchase (S&P) Agreement with the developers. Under the S&P Agreement, the EC developer is responsible for all defects within the development during the 12-month Defects Liability Period. The EC developer is also contractually obliged to attend to all feedback from buyers on the design, finishing, workmanship or other concerns pertaining to the development, and to respond to the buyers accordingly.
As EC buyers generally give feedback on defects directly to the EC developer, HDB does not have records of the number of feedback and complaints received. Nevertheless, when HDB receives any feedback from EC buyers, they will be conveyed to the EC developer for the necessary follow-up.
All EC developments are required to submit an application to be assessed under the Construction Quality Assessment System (CONQUAS). To safeguard the interest of home buyers, BCA has introduced an additional tier under CONQUAS in October 2019 to impose 100% checks on all locations within all units of the development if a developer has at least one private residential development in the past three years with a significant number of major defects.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Applications Made for Rare Disease Fund","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WANA","content":"56 Mr Leon Perera asked the Minister for Health (a) what is the number of applications under the Rare Disease Fund that the Ministry has received to date; (b) what are the specific eligibility criteria or conditions that applicants must meet to receive support from the Fund; (c) what are the specific eligibility criteria or conditions for selection of rare diseases to be covered under the Fund; and (d) whether the Ministry can provide an update on the timeline of more rare diseases to be covered under the Fund.
Mr Gan Kim Yong: Often diagnosed in childhood, most rare diseases are genetic in origin. Many rare diseases (defined as less than 1 in 2000 people) do not have available treatment and patients often have shorter lifespans as a result. For some rare diseases where effective treatments are available, medicines can substantially extend their life expectancies and improve their quality of life. The Rare Disease Fund (RDF) is a charity established in 2019 to support Singapore Citizens suffering from rare genetic diseases, where medication is often very costly and required for life. Through the RDF, society and the Government collectively support the financial needs of Singapore Citizens with rare diseases. All donations to the RDF are eligible for a 250% tax deduction, and the Government provides $3 in matching contributions for every dollar of public donations toward the RDF.
The RDF is operated largely on an endowment basis, where investment income generated is used to support patients, as a more sustainable means to support beneficiaries over their lifetime.
Singaporeans undergoing treatment at public healthcare institutions for rare disease conditions covered by RDF can apply for support through the medical social workers. Each RDF application is carefully assessed by an independent RDF Committee, comprising members with diverse backgrounds from the community sector, private corporations, and healthcare. The Committee takes into account various factors such as whether the patient is clinically eligible and likely to benefit from the treatment, their family’s ability to afford the treatment either in part or in whole, including any extenuating circumstances faced by the patient and family, and whether other financing support is available. The support is reviewed annually for each beneficiary, to factor in changes in their clinical condition and financial situation. The RDF Committee has approved six medicines for four conditions to be supported by the RDF, benefiting six patients.
The RDF represents an important plank of community support for Singaporeans with rare diseases who require substantial financial assistance. The RDF Committee will do their best to raise more funds and the Government remains committed to a 3:1 matching so that more can benefit from the RDF.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Long-term Solutions to Minimise Number of Potholes on Our Roads in All Weather Conditions","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WANA","content":"57 Mr Liang Eng Hwa asked the Minister for Transport whether LTA has investigated into the root causes of the recent high numbers of potholes on our public roads and whether LTA will be looking at a long-term solutions to minimise the number of potholes on our roads in all weather conditions.
Mr Ong Ye Kung: I thank the Member for his question. I have addressed them in my reply at the 1 February 2021 Parliament sitting.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Number of Website Portals Digitally Providing Government Services to the Public and Avenues for Singaporeans to Access Such Services","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WA","content":"1 Dr Tan Wu Meng asked the Prime Minister with regard to website portals digitally providing government services to the public including those operated by subcontractors (a) how many of such portals currently exist; (b) what proportion provide identical functionality when accessed by smartphones and mobile computing devices as compared to desktop computers; and (c) what avenues are provided for Singaporeans to access such services who are not in possession of a computing device.
Mr Teo Chee Hean (for the Prime Minister): There are about 600 website domains belonging to Government agencies. They provide informational and transactional services to the public, including those operated by subcontractors. For greater convenience, Government digital services are being grouped together for easier access through common access portals such as LifeSG and GoBusiness.
All Government websites are required to be designed for access from both desktops and mobile computing devices such as tablets or smartphones. However, there are functionalities and services that cannot be delivered on a smaller screen effectively, such as those requiring extensive input and documentation (e.g. filing of Form IR21 for tax clearance). These functionalities and services will be disabled for access via mobile devices, and users will be informed upfront that the service is not available on mobile devices and thus best accessed from desktop devices.
Eligible members of the public may apply to IMDA's Home Access (HA) scheme, which subsidises broadband connectivity and a computing device for low-income households; or the Mobile Access for Seniors scheme, which subsidises personal mobile phones and plans for lower-income seniors. Alternatively, members of the public may access Government digital services in-person at PA's Citizen Connect Centres located at selected Community Centres, and at Our Tampines Hub's Public Service Centre, where internet-accessible devices are available for public use. For members of the public who are unable to make use of online services, offline options remain available at physical counters.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Number of First-time Parents in Singapore in Past Five Years and Help Schemes Available","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WA","content":"2 Ms Hany Soh asked the Prime Minister (a) in the past five years, what is the number of first-time parents in Singapore; (b) how many of them became second-time parents thereafter; (c) what are the schemes available to help first-time parents; and (d) what is the take-up rate for such schemes.
Ms Indranee Rajah (for the Prime Minister): Between 2015 and 2019, annually an average of 15,234 and 11,548 mothers had their first and second child respectively. On average, married women have close to two children. This data is consistent with the findings of the National Population and Talent Division’s 2016 Marriage and Parenthood survey, in which 92% of married respondents indicated that they intend to have at least two children.
The Government is strongly committed to support Singaporeans who want to start or expand their families. The Marriage and Parenthood Package, which has been enhanced several times over the years, provides extensive support for families in areas such as:
(a) Support for child-raising expenses. First- and second-born children qualify for a Baby Bonus Cash Gift of $8,000, and up to $6,000 in Government contributions in the Child Development Account. To encourage parents to have more children, higher birth order children receive more benefits.
(b) Healthcare assistance. All newborns receive a $4,000 MediSave Grant, free childhood vaccinations (for vaccinations in the National Childhood Immunisation Schedule) and free developmental screenings at polyclinics and Community Health Assist Scheme (CHAS) General Practitioner clinics.
(c) Preschool subsidies. Working mothers receive basic childcare subsidies of $600 per month for infant care and $300 per month for full-day childcare. They also receive an additional means-tested subsidy of up to $710 for full-day infant care and $467 for full-day childcare, if their gross monthly household income is $12,000 and below. This helps to make quality preschool more affordable for parents
(d) Educational subsidies. The Government subsidises over 90% of the cost of education from Primary school to Junior College/ITE, about 85% for polytechnics, and about 75% for autonomous universities.
(e) Parental and Childcare Leave. Mothers and fathers of Singaporean children are entitled to 16 weeks of paid Maternity Leave and two weeks of paid Paternity Leave respectively. Each working parent can also tap on six days of paid Childcare Leave per year if their youngest child is below seven years, and two days of paid Extended Childcare Leave per year if their youngest child is aged between seven and 12 years. This is in addition to other leave benefits such as Unpaid Infant Care Leave.
(f) Work-life harmony support. The Tripartite Standards on Flexible Work Arrangements (FWAs) and on Unpaid Leave for Unexpected Care Needs contain the workplace practices that all employers should implement to support their employees in managing their family and work responsibilities.
More details on the Marriage and Parenthood Package may be found at go.gov.sg/mpbooklet.
The take-up rates for most of the support schemes have been high. As at 7 December 2020, about 99% of eligible children from the 2015 to 2019 birth cohorts have enrolled for the Baby Bonus Scheme. The majority of parents also use their Maternity Leave, Paternity Leave, and Childcare Leave.
We regularly review our support measures for parents in order to ensure a Singapore that is Made for Families.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Instituting Different Tiers of Childcare Leave to Cater for Families with More Children","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WA","content":"3 Assoc Prof Jamus Jerome Lim asked the Prime Minister whether the Government will consider instituting different tiers of childcare leave such that those with more children will be entitled to comparatively more days.
Ms Indranee Rajah (for the Prime Minister): We have enhanced childcare leave provisions progressively over the years. Following the increase in Government-Paid Childcare Leave scheme from two to six days per year in 20081 for parents with children aged below seven years old, we introduced two days of Extended Childcare Leave per year for parents with children aged 7 to 12 in 20132.
We have taken a practical approach to calibrating childcare leave provisions. Any enhancements to childcare leave, including according more leave to parents with more children, will need to balance the caregiving needs of parents with the manpower and operational needs of employers. We also have to consider whether the enhancements would affect the employability of parents. Nonetheless, we will continue to study this issue to better support parents in caring for their children.
Beyond legislated leave provisions, it is more important and sustainable for employers to provide a family-friendly work environment, to help parents manage both their work and caregiving responsibilities. The Tripartite Standards on Flexible Working Arrangements (FWAs) and on Unpaid Leave for Unexpected Care Needs, introduced in 2017 and 2018 respectively, recognise progressive companies that provide additional support for employees’ personal or caregiving responsibilities. Tripartite partners are also implementing the recommendations of the Citizens’ Panel on Work-Life Harmony that were submitted in 2019. These include efforts to grow a community of Work Life Ambassadors, and developing a guide to facilitate companies’ implementation of FWAs.
Today, the vast majority of employees are benefitting from FWAs. In 2019, about 85% of employers offered some form of FWAs. These numbers increased during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 as employers were required to implement work-from-home to reduce interactions in the workplace. As employers and workers become more accustomed to FWAs, the Tripartite Partners could look into ways to have FWAs become a norm at workplaces, to better support working parents in their caregiving needs. We will continue to work with Tripartite Partners on this front.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":["1 : Employers are responsible for the first three days of leave, while the Government reimburses employers for the fourth to sixth day of leave taken.","2 : The Government reimburses employers for all leave taken under the Extended Childcare Leave Scheme."],"footNoteQuestions":["3"],"questionNo":"3"},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Number of Stateless Residents Living in Singapore as of December 2020 and Measures to Assist Their Application for Singapore Citizenship and Permanent Residency","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WA","content":"4 Mr Christopher de Souza asked the Minister for Home Affairs (a) what is the number of stateless residents living in Singapore as of December 2020; and (b) whether more can be done to assist the stateless persons to apply for Singapore citizenship and permanent residency.
Mr K Shanmugam: As at 30 November 2020, there were 1,109 stateless persons living in Singapore. 76% of them are Singapore Permanent Residents (PRs), and enjoy various benefits accorded to PRs such as in healthcare, housing and education.
When such persons apply for PR or Singapore Citizenship (SC), the Immigration and Checkpoints Authority (ICA) evaluates every application, on a range of criteria including length of stay in Singapore, family profile, economic contributions, education qualifications, age, and family ties to Singaporeans.
The ICA also takes into consideration the applicant's circumstances, including the reasons behind the person's statelessness. For example, some may have chosen to give up their foreign citizenship, while others may have lost their citizenship not of their volition, for example, deprived by their country of birth for offences committed. Others were born in Singapore but were not eligible for SC at birth as their parents were not Singapore Citizens and did not obtain citizenship for their children from their home country.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Expanding Coverage of Yellow Ribbon Project to Include Ex-offenders of Non-violent Crimes","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WA","content":"5 Assoc Prof Jamus Jerome Lim asked the Minister for Home Affairs whether the Government will consider expanding the coverage of the Yellow Ribbon Project such that ex-offenders for non-violent crimes will, contingent on an extended period of good behaviour following successful reintegration in society, be eligible for the elimination of their criminal history from public records and hence not report this record for employment purposes.
Mr K Shanmugam: Can the Member clarify what he means by \"non-violent crime\"?
There are many offences which are serious but not violent in nature, such as sexual grooming, outrage of modesty, criminal breach of trust, and theft in dwelling. The Member may wish to note that his suggestion, prima facie, appears to be that records of such crimes should be expunged, which will in turn mean that ex-offenders could be employed in roles such as pre-school teachers or security officers, without their employers being aware of their history.
The Government operates a framework, to rehabilitate and find employment for most offenders, in a safe and transparent manner. And that framework is being constantly refined.
The Member can make a more detailed suggestion, if he wishes, and the Government will consider his suggestions.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Sharing Information on Structure and Workflow in Singapore's Public Healthcare Clusters with Integrated Shield Plan Insurers to Facilitate Disbursements of Claims by Patients for Care Received","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WA","content":"6 Dr Tan Wu Meng asked the Minister for Health whether Integrated Shield Plan insurers receive information and guidance on the structure and workflow of Singapore's public healthcare clusters so that patients at public hospitals do not encounter unnecessary administrative hurdles to receiving reimbursement for care across departments and institutions within the same public healthcare cluster.
Mr Gan Kim Yong: The inpatient claims process at our public healthcare institutions have been integrated and streamlined for both MediShield Life (MSHL) and Integrated Shield Plans (IPs). Claims are submitted directly by public healthcare institutions (PHIs) through the MediClaim system, without the need for the patient to file any claims.
In the outpatient settings, IPs may provide additional coverage beyond MSHL such as pre- and post-hospitalisation benefits, and the exact coverage may differ across insurers. These claims are filed directly by patients with their insurers and may require the submission of supporting documents such as referral letters.
Once the claims are filed, public healthcare institutions or patients are reimbursed directly by the Central Provident Fund Board (CPFB), or by IP insurers for patients with IP coverage.
MOH and the CPFB work closely with the insurers and public healthcare institutions in resolving any claims filing and reimbursement issues, especially for appeals or complex cases. We also ensure that insurers are informed about any changes to claim processes. We will continue to partner all stakeholders to explore opportunities to further streamline the claim processes, especially where there are referrals across institutions as part of clinical protocol and routine treatment requirements.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Number and Sufficiency of Patient Navigators Employed across Restructured Hospitals and Specialty Centres","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WA","content":"7 Dr Tan Wu Meng asked the Minister for Health (a) how many patient navigators are currently employed across the restructured hospitals and specialty centres; (b) what is the ratio of patient navigators to patients on active follow-up and patients with complex medical conditions respectively; and (c) whether the Ministry will consider provisioning for additional patient navigator manpower and support given the ageing population and patients facing more complex co-morbidities.
Mr Gan Kim Yong: Patient navigators are staff who help patients steer through the healthcare system or find appropriate care options. Depending on the institution, they may also be referred to as care coordinators, case managers, service associates, or programme coordinators. In some instances, such work may also be undertaken directly by trained nurses. As at end 2020, there were around 360 staff with patient navigation roles, including trained nurses, across public acute hospitals and specialty centres on a full-time equivalent (FTE) basis.
Care coordination is one of the key domains under the Skills Framework for Healthcare (SFH) for nurses. This equips nurses with patient navigation skills to help coordinate healthcare staff to work collaboratively to deliver quality care to our patients. For example, the Community Nursing Pilot project led by our Regional Health Systems has developed the competencies and capacity of community nurses to support the healthcare needs of seniors in the community. As of end 2020, there were 124 community nurses under this pilot project.
As patient navigation can be performed by a combination of healthcare staff trained in care coordination, the ratios of staff to patients are determined by the respective institutions based on their workload and patients’ needs. Based on data from public acute hospitals and specialty centres, the number of staff with patient navigation roles has increased by three percent annually over the past three years (2018 to 2020).
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Median Waiting Time for Appointment for Non-emergency Dental Services at Polyclinics in Last Three Years","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WA","content":"8 Mr Gerald Giam Yean Song asked the Minister for Health (a) in the last three years, what is the median waiting time to get an appointment for non-emergency dental services such as scaling and polishing at polyclinics; and (b) whether the capacity of non-emergency dental services at polyclinics will be increased in light of relaxed safe distancing measures in Phase 3 to meet growing demand from the general population.
Mr Gan Kim Yong: The median waiting time for new dental appointments for non-emergency dental services (such as scaling and polishing) at our polyclinics in 2018 and 2019 was around four months. This increased to 5.3 months in 2020, arising from the need for additional safe management measures. Emergency dental cases (such as pain, swelling) at the polyclinics will be seen on the same day. Emergency dental cases which cannot be managed at the polyclinics will be referred to the National Dental Specialty Centres [National Dental Centre, Singapore (NDCS) and National University Centre for Oral Health (NUCOHS)] where they will also be seen on the same day.
As Singapore re-opens following the Circuit Breaker, dental capacity at the polyclinics is gradually returning closer to normal, but there are safe management measures that still need to be in place. In Phase 3, dental clinics are still required to maintain safe management measures including seeing patients by appointment basis, instituting crowd management measures, and putting in place infection prevention and control measures to reduce the risk of cross infection. Some of the earlier measures, such as having a 15 to 45-minute resting interval between patients, have been relaxed. The polyclinics will continue to prioritise urgent/emergency and time-sensitive cases, including patients whose dental care were deferred in 2020. MOH would like to seek patients’ understanding during this exceptional period.
Pioneer Generation (PG), Merdeka Generation (MG), as well as Community Health Assist Scheme (CHAS) Blue and Orange card holders now enjoy subsidies for dental services for selected non-emergency procedures at private CHAS dental clinics. MOH regularly monitors and reviews primary care dental capacity provided by private CHAS dental clinics and public polyclinics, both of which provide subsidised non-emergency dental services. There are currently over 800 CHAS dental clinics. Residents can also look forward to dental services in the upcoming Polyclinics such as Eunos Polyclinic that is scheduled to open in 2021.
We will continue to monitor and meet the dental care needs of Singaporeans at the appropriate settings.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Expanding Clinical Training and Supervision Programmes for Students of Clinical Psychology to Increase Future Headcount in Public Healthcare System","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WA","content":"9 Mr Leon Perera asked the Minister for Health whether the Ministry will consider (i) expanding clinical training and supervision programmes for incoming, existing and graduating students of Clinical Psychology with the goal of increasing future headcount particularly in the public healthcare system and (ii) facilitating access to tertiary education for current and potential psychologists and counsellors through financial support along similar lines to the various tuition grant agreements available to medical and dental students at some local universities.
Mr Gan Kim Yong: Locally, the National University of Singapore (NUS) and James Cook University (JCU) Singapore offers Master’s programmes in Clinical Psychology. In the past three years (2018 to 2020), both schools took in a combined average of 27 students per year. There are also overseas programmes recognised by employers.
As of September 2020, there were 504 psychologists registered with the Singapore Psychology Society1. Within the public healthcare sector, the total number of psychologists and clinical psychologists increased by four percent annually, from about 160 in 2016 to about 190 in 2020, as a result of ongoing efforts to expand psychiatric and counselling services. The Government, in consultation with relevant stakeholders, is also reviewing the national supply plans for psychologists.
There are various schemes available that provide financial support for students pursuing local and overseas studies in clinical psychology. MOH Holdings offers the Healthcare Graduate Studies Award (HGSA) which covers tuition and other compulsory fees, monthly allowances and approved developmental courses. The National Council of Social Service (NCSS) also offers scholarships and awards for psychologists joining the social service sector. Students in the NUS Master of Psychology (Clinical) Programmes could tap on their Post-Secondary Education Account (PSEA) to pay for the programme fees. They can also apply for the NUS-Mental Health Counsellor Scholarship, which was newly introduced in 2020.
In addition, in-service psychologists working in the public healthcare sector can apply for MOH In-service Scholarship (ISS) to take up a Master’s programme in Clinical Psychology. Similarly, NCSS also offers support for in-service professionals to acquire recognised post-graduate psychology qualifications though the VWOs-Charities Capability Fund (VCF).
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":["1 : Source: Singapore Register of Psychologists, maintained by the Singapore Psychological Society. As registration for practice is not compulsory for psychologists, actual numbers may be higher."],"footNoteQuestions":["9"],"questionNo":"9"},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Number of Films, Videos, Plays and Others Requiring Content Changes Before Approval for General Dissemination in Past Five Years","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WA","content":"10 Mr Leon Perera asked the Minister for Communications and Information in each of the past five years, what is the number of films, videos, plays and other forms of content where the Government has required changes to content to be made before approval for general dissemination was granted.
Mr S Iswaran: Over the last five years, the Infocomm Media Development Authority (IMDA) has received 24,196 application for classification for films and 5,001 for Arts Entertainment (AE). In the same period, 137 films (0.57%) were edited so that the material could fall within the classification guidelines. For AE, 18 productions (0.36%) were edited over the last five years so that the material could fall within the classification guidelines. The majority of these edits were made for offensive religious content or explicit sexual depictions. A small minority were assessed to promote terrorism or individuals who espoused violence.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Piloting Separate Recycling Bins for Biodegradable Plastics","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WA","content":"11 Mr Christopher de Souza asked the Minister for Sustainability and the Environment whether the Ministry will consider piloting separate recycling bins for biodegradable plastics.
Ms Grace Fu Hai Yien: There are no plans to pilot separate recycling bins for biodegradable plastics as the environmental benefits of segregating such plastics do not apply in Singapore’s context. Unlike in countries where waste is buried directly in landfills, plastic waste generated in Singapore is either recycled or incinerated in waste-to-energy plants. As such, biodegradable plastics are treated in the same manner as non-biodegradable ones in Singapore. Any litter that enters our waterways is also removed using litter traps and flotsam removal craft before it reaches the sea. Therefore, this prevents plastic waste from entering and polluting the ocean.
We will continue our efforts to reduce and recycle all types of plastic waste, especially single-use plastics.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Study on Presence of Microplastic in Seafood from Kelongs in Singapore Waters","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WA","content":"12 Mr Louis Ng Kok Kwang asked the Minister for Sustainability and the Environment (a) whether the Ministry has done a study on the presence of microplastic in seafood from kelongs in Singapore waters; (b) if so, what are the results of the study; and (c) if not, why not and whether it intends to do so.
Ms Grace Fu Hai Yien: Microplastics is an emerging global issue for food security and human health. There have been scientific reports of the ubiquity of microplastics across different mediums like the environment, freshwater, plants and animals. For example, microplastics can potentially enter the human food chain if they enter the marine environment and are ingested by marine animals.
Based on currently available evidence, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation and the European Commission have assessed that the overall human health risks posed by microplastics at present is low.
Since 2020, the Singapore Food Agency (SFA) has been developing the testing methodology for microplastics in food and water as there is currently no international method available. There are also surveys in progress on selected food products to collect baseline data for insights on microplastics levels in food available in the market. The findings from these surveys will be ready in about two years’ time.
SFA will continue to monitor and keep abreast of international scientific developments on the issue of microplastics, before deciding on the need to conduct specific studies in seafood from local waters. MSE takes the issue of marine pollution seriously and will continue to work with all stakeholders to prevent and reduce marine plastic debris through the management of pollution from land-based sources, and the management of water pollution and quality in inland water bodies and coastal areas.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Ensuring Surveillance Cameras Used to Detect High-rise Littering Do Not Intrude into People's Privacy","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WA","content":"13 Mr Louis Ng Kok Kwang asked the Minister for Sustainability and the Environment how does the Ministry ensure that the surveillance cameras used to detect high-rise littering do not intrude into people's privacy.
Ms Grace Fu Hai Yien: In the National Environment Agency’s (NEA) deployment of optical surveillance cameras for high-rise littering enforcement, safeguards have been put in place to mitigate residents’ privacy concerns. The nature of the offence allows NEA to focus the cameras on the external facade of buildings where surveillance is being carried out, often at an angle either above or below the unit of interest, rather than looking directly into individual units.
In the first instance, NEA will always look for vantage points at the ground level for camera deployments. Only if such a site cannot be found, would NEA source for vantage points in adjacent blocks, and if a site can be found, deploy our camera there. As a result, the majority of our camera deployments for surveillance of high-rise littering acts are conducted at the ground level. This SOP further minimises the instances of a surveillance camera looking directly into housing units.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Average Monthly Number of Surveillance Cameras with Video Analytics Currently Deployed to Deter and Detect High-rise Littering and Bird Feeding","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WA","content":"14 Mr Chua Kheng Wee Louis asked the Minister for Sustainability and the Environment (a) what is the average monthly number of surveillance cameras with video analytics that are currently deployed; (b) what is the length of time for each deployment; and (c) whether the Ministry will consider increasing the number of such surveillance cameras to detect and deter high-rise littering and bird feeding.
Ms Grace Fu Hai Yien: The National Environment Agency (NEA) currently deploys an average of 220 surveillance cameras with video analytics each month, with the length of deployment lasting between 5 to 14 days. NEA has increased its high-rise littering camera deployments by over 50% in 2020 as compared to 2019, including deployments to detect high-rise bird feeding.
Even as NEA steps up enforcement against high-rise littering through the use of surveillance cameras with video analytics, we must continue to cultivate social graciousness, good habits, and a sense of collective responsibility to keep Singapore clean and safe. For this reason, NEA adopts complementary strategies such as strengthening community partnerships to raise awareness on the negative impacts of high-rise littering.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Monthly Increase in Plastic and Other Recyclable Waste During and After Circuit Breaker Period and Initiatives to Address Issue","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WA","content":"15 Assoc Prof Jamus Jerome Lim asked the Minister for Sustainability and the Environment (a) whether there has been any increase in plastic and other recyclable waste during and after the circuit breaker period respectively, with a breakdown by percentage per month; and (b) whether additional initiatives will be considered to address the rapid increase in plastic waste.
Ms Grace Fu Hai Yien: The National Environment Agency (NEA) publishes Singapore’s annual waste and recycling statistics, which includes a breakdown by waste streams. The 2020 statistics will be released later this year. We do not have a breakdown by waste stream on a monthly basis.
The monthly average amount of waste disposed during the Circuit Breaker (CB) period (i.e. April to May 2020) was 19% lower than pre-CB in March 2020. The decrease is largely attributable to the fall in the amount of non-domestic waste disposed, with the amount of domestic waste remaining largely unchanged.
Post-CB in June 2020, while the amount of waste disposed of increased relative to the CB period, it was still 16% lower than pre-CB. This was again largely attributable to the fall in the amount of non-domestic waste disposed.
Addressing packaging waste, which includes plastics, remains a priority for my Ministry. We take a multi-pronged approach, from encouraging upstream reduction in excessive consumption to ensuring proper end-of-life waste management.
To raise awareness on the impact of excessive consumption of disposables including single-use plastics, NEA launched the second run of the nation-wide \"Say YES to Waste Less\" campaign in September 2020. Operators of more than 2,100 premises have partnered NEA to encourage consumers to bring reusables and decline disposables such as single-use bags or takeaway containers and cups. NEA also started a Citizens’ Workgroup to address the excessive consumption of disposables, which submitted its recommendations in January 2021. My Ministry and NEA will study the recommendations and share our response in February 2021.
We introduced the Resource Sustainability Act in October 2019 to drive upstream waste reduction and recycling of packaging, including plastics. From this year, producers of packaged products and retailers with an annual turnover of more than $10 million are required to start collecting packaging data and develop plans to reduce, reuse or recycle packaging for submission to NEA. The reporting framework will lay the foundation for an Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) framework to manage packaging and plastic waste, which will be put in place no later than 2025.
Collectively, these efforts will help to reduce plastic waste disposed and improve its recycling rate.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Efforts to Diversify Food Supplies to Ensure Price Stability of Goods over Chinese New Year Period Due to Disruptions from Movement Control Order and Floods in Malaysia","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WA","content":"16 Mr Dennis Tan Lip Fong asked the Minister for Trade and Industry what are the Government's efforts to diversify food supplies to ensure price stability of goods over the Chinese New Year period due to the disruptions caused by the Movement Control Order 2.0 and floods in Malaysia.
Mr Chan Chun Sing: Malaysia's Movement Control Order 2.0 does not affect essential economic sectors, but we are closely monitoring the impact on the logistics chains. The monsoon floods have however resulted in poor crop output, causing price fluctuations in Malaysian vegetables.
We have adopted a multi-pronged strategy to manage the risk of disruption of essential supplies. Our major retailers and supermarkets have planned ahead for Chinese New Year, to ensure that a good range of produce remains available, including alternatives from other source countries.
We continue to diversify our supply sources. We now import food from more than 170 countries, including eggs from Ukraine, frozen shrimp from Saudi Arabia, and vegetables from China. Diversification remains an important strategy to mitigate any source disruption.
While we will continue to do our best to protect our supply of essential food commodities and keep prices stable, these are extraordinary times with many countries still grappling with the impact of COVID-19. We seek the understanding of Singaporeans if they experience minor disruptions or some price volatility during this time.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Percentage of Singapore's Electricity Consumption in 2020 Used for Data Centres","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WA","content":"17 Ms He Ting Ru asked the Minister for Trade and Industry what is the percentage of Singapore's electricity consumption in 2020 that is used for data centres.
Mr Chan Chun Sing: The electricity consumed by data centres was around 7% of Singapore’s total electricity consumption in 2020.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Defaults by Borrowers on Enterprise Singapore-supported Loans Introduced in 2020","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WA","content":"18 Ms He Ting Ru asked the Minister for Trade and Industry whether any borrowers have defaulted on Enterprise Singapore-supported loans that have been introduced in 2020 and, if so, how many cases have there been.
Mr Chan Chun Sing: As of 31 December 2020, 26 loans have been reported by Participating Financial Institutions to be in default. These represent 0.1% of the over 29,000 loans supported under the new or enhanced financing schemes introduced by ESG in 2020.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Plans to Systematically Compile Preferred Gender Pronouns for Students","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WA","content":"19 Assoc Prof Jamus Jerome Lim asked the Minister for Education whether there are any plans by the Ministry to systematically compile preferred gender pronouns for students, subject to the consent of parents, and to ensure that teachers respect such pronoun usage in class.
Mr Lawrence Wong: Every student diagnosed with gender dysphoria is different, and their treatments are individualised. Instead of compiling preferred gender pronouns for all students, MOE will support each student diagnosed with gender dysphoria on a case-by-case basis, working with the parents concerned, as well as medical professionals.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Steps Taken to Build a Better Understanding of Persons with Disabilities amongst School Children","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WA","content":"20 Mr Gerald Giam Yean Song asked the Minister for Education what steps are being taken to build a better understanding of persons with disabilities amongst school children in Singapore.
Mr Lawrence Wong: MOE builds students’ understanding and empathy for peers with special educational needs (SEN) or persons with disabilities (PWDs) in the following ways.
First, all teachers are equipped to use inclusive practices in their classrooms and CCAs to grow their students’ understanding of SEN and their ability to play, learn and work with peers with SEN. This is done through pre-service and in-service training as well as mentoring by experienced colleagues.
Second, Character and Citizenship Education (CCE) lessons emphasise care and respect for all. Students learn not to stereotype and instead, to appreciate each other’s strengths and needs. Older students develop Values in Action (VIA) initiatives under their teachers’ guidance. An example of a VIA at Anglo-Chinese School (Independent) saw students creating activities for MINDS Training and Development Centre (Clementi) and interacting with the trainees one afternoon a week over a six-week period.
Third, as part of CCE, by 2022, all schools will have peer support structures to promote a culture where students are sensitive to the needs of others including their peers with SEN. For students who need more structured help, Allied Educators in Learning and Behavioural Support will form groups of peers to provide circles of friendship and emotional support.
Finally, through Satellite Partnership, a long-term sustained relationship between a mainstream and Special Education (SPED) school, we enable all students to develop mutual understanding and respect. For example, students from Cerebral Palsy Alliance Singapore School not only taught students at Tampines-Meridian Junior College how to play Boccia but also joined them in community outreach projects.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Reason for Difference in Amounts Disbursed in ComCare Fund Annual Report FY2019 and Financial Statement in Annual Report","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WA","content":"21 Ms Hazel Poa asked the Minister for Social and Family Development (a) what is the reason for the difference between the disbursed amount of $151.42 million found on page 12 of the ComCare Fund Annual Report FY2019 and that of $68.8 million listed in the Financial Statement found on page 13 of the Annual Report; and (b) whether the Financial Statement is for FYE March 2020 instead of 2019.
Mr Masagos Zulkifli B M M: The Community Care Endowment Fund (ComCare Fund) was launched by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong in 2005 as a sustainable source of funds to provide social assistance to low-income Singaporeans. The interest income generated from the ComCare Fund is used to fund ComCare programmes. The Ministry of Social and Family Development (MSF) publishes annual reports to provide an account of the utilisation of the ComCare Fund in the preceding financial year (FY).
The Financial Statement in the ComCare Fund Annual Report for FY2019 presents the state of affairs of the Fund as at 31 March 2020. During FY2019 (i.e. 1 April 2019 to 31 March 2020), $151.4 million was disbursed under the various ComCare programmes. Out of this, around $68.8 million was funded by the ComCare Fund’s interest income. The remaining $82.6 million was covered by MSF’s budget.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"MUIS's Injection of $1 Million Training Credits to Cover Non-Islamic Courses","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WA","content":"22 Dr Wan Rizal asked the Minister for Social and Family Development and Minister-in-charge for Muslim Affairs whether the $1 million injection in training credits by MUIS will cover non-Islamic courses such as mental health, coding and programming, financial management and media literacy.
Mr Masagos Zulkifli B M M: MUIS’ Asatizah Training Credits (ATC) scheme aims to help asatizah develop the relevant skills to operate confidently amidst the COVID-19 pandemic. This complements the national SkillsFuture efforts to encourage Singaporeans to upskill and reskill.
Asatizah can use the ATC scheme’s credits to take up to six foundational courses in the following competency areas:
(a) Digital Literacy;
(b) Personal Development and Lifelong Learning;
(c) Grit and Resilience; and
(d) Tech-Enabled Learning and Delivery.
There are also existing courses under MUIS’ Asatizah Recognition Scheme Continuing Professional Education on mental health and psychological resilience. More advanced and specialised skills such as coding, programming and media literacy are not currently offered under the ATC scheme but asatizah can use their SkillsFuture credits to attend relevant courses to acquire these skills.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Prosecution of Individuals Found Practising and Spreading Deviant Teachings under Muslim Law Act","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WA","content":"23 Dr Wan Rizal asked the Minister for Social and Family Development and Minister-in-charge for Muslim Affairs what are the deciding factors in prosecuting individuals who are found to be practising and spreading deviant teachings under Section 139 of the Administration of Muslim Law Act.
Mr Masagos Zulkifli B M M: Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura (MUIS) takes a very serious view on the propagation of false doctrine, especially if it threatens our socio-religious peace and harmony, and our way of life in Singapore. At the Sitting on 4 January 2021, I addressed the matter of how MUIS adopts a multi-pronged approach to counter individuals spreading deviant teachings in the name of Islam. [Please refer to \"Outcome of Cases Reported in Last 10 Years to MUIS for Contravention of Section 139 of Administration of Muslim Law Act\", Official Report, 04 January 2021, Vol 95, Issue 14, Written Answers to Questions section.]
To recap, section 139 of the Administration of Muslim Law Act (AMLA) imposes criminal sanctions on those who propagate false doctrines. Any attempt to apply legislation to religious matters is carefully considered. As this is a religious matter, the Office of the Mufti and the Fatwa Committee are first consulted in dealing with such matters. Thus far, the religious authorities have advised that other approaches be adopted first, such as beginning with counselling, depending on the severity of the situation. If the perpetrators responsible for sharing false doctrines are registered under Asatizah Recognition Scheme (ARS), the Asatizah Recognition Board may cancel their ARS recognition. All ARS asatizah are also required to regularly upgrade and update their religious knowledge, and their suitability for accreditation is periodically reviewed. If they are unfit to be asatizah, such as if they breach the Code of Ethics, their ARS status will be suspended or cancelled. Therefore, Muslims should seek religious guidance only from ARS-recognised asatizah; the list of which can also be found on the MUIS website (https://www.muis.gov.sg/ARS-and-IECP/ARS/ARS-certified-Teachers).
The Office of the Mufti will also continually remind Muslims in Singapore against erroneous teachings and misinformation through Friday sermons as well as coverage in mainstream news (both print, broadcast and digital). MUIS also publishes fatwas on the MUIS’ website (https://www.muis.gov.sg/officeofthemufti/Fatwa).
In the last 10 years, MUIS has received five complaints about individuals allegedly promulgating false doctrines. Any purported evidence of deviant teaching received by MUIS is presented to the Fatwa Committee to assess whether the allegations of false doctrine are true. MUIS and the Fatwa Committee investigated and addressed all of the complaints through the combination of issuing fatwas, counselling and public education. Should there be a case where the propagation of false doctrine is egregious, for example, if the person spreading the false doctrine is recalcitrant even after counselling, then MUIS may file a police report under section 139 of AMLA. If a police report is lodged, Police will investigate the case accordingly based on the facts of the case and consult MUIS on the religious matters entailed.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Number of Bus Service Lines Implemented or Reviewed under Bus Service Enhancement Programme","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WA","content":"24 Ms Hany Soh asked the Minister for Transport (a) how many bus service lines have been newly implemented or reviewed under the Bus Service Enhancement Programme; (b) how many have benefited residents residing at Marsiling-Yew Tee GRC's Woodgrove division to enable residents to get to town centres, polyclinics and community centres efficiently.
Mr Ong Ye Kung: 80 new bus services were progressively introduced as part of the five-year Bus Service Enhancement Programme (BSEP), which was fully implemented in 2017. Two of them serve Woodgrove, and complement the other 27 services in the constituency. They connect residents to amenities such as the town centre, the polyclinic and community clubs, as well as to the city and other towns.
Although not part of BSEP, there have also been new services introduced in Woodgrove in recent years, such as Service 913M, which was introduced in March 2019 to link residents to the new Marsiling Mall and other amenities along Woodlands Avenue 1. Express variant Service 960e was introduced in November 2018 to provide Woodgrove residents with a faster connection to the city.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Accidents and Incidents Involving Vehicles Catching Fire due to Mechanical Failure and Poor Maintenance of Vehicles","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WA","content":"25 Mr Murali Pillai asked the Minister for Transport (a) in the past five years, how many vehicular accidents and incidents involving vehicles catching fire have arisen due to mechanical failure and poor maintenance of vehicles; and (b) what steps have been taken against vehicle owners or other persons who are responsible for the maintenance of the vehicles involved.
Mr Ong Ye Kung: In the past five years, there have been about 200 cases of vehicle fires per year. Majority of them are due to overheating or faults in electrical components. Given that vehicular parts are badly damaged in most cases of vehicular fire, the SCDF is not usually able to pinpoint the cause of the fire to mechanical failure or lack of maintenance.
To ensure that vehicles are roadworthy, vehicle owners must send their vehicles to LTA-Authorised Inspection Centres (AICs) for mandatory periodic inspections. Older vehicles, as well as commercial and point-to-point passenger transport vehicles are subjected to more frequent inspections. Vehicles that fail the inspection will not have their road tax renewed, and cannot be used on our roads.
LTA also checks for illegal modifications to vehicles, as these could compromise vehicle safety. These checks are conducted as part of the mandatory periodic inspections, and during LTA’s regular enforcement efforts on our roads. Under the Road Traffic Act, any person who is convicted of an illegal modification to the vehicle can be fined up to $5000, imprisoned up to three months, or both. The penalties will be doubled for repeat offenders.
LTA and SCDF have developed joint advisories on how to prevent and handle vehicle fires, for example, through regular servicing and checks for fluid leakages that could lead to engine overheating. These advisories can be found on social media, or at motorist touchpoints such as petrol kiosks, LTA-AICs and customer service centres.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Redevelopment Plans for Bukit Batok Bus Interchange","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WA","content":"26 Mr Murali Pillai asked the Minister for Transport whether there is any plan to redevelop the Bukit Batok Bus Interchange that was built in 1987 and, if so, what are the details of the plan.
Mr Ong Ye Kung: In 2016 and 2020, LTA completed major upgrades of commuter and staff facilities at Bukit Batok Bus Interchange, including the extension of shelters at the berths. With the recent upgrades, there are no immediate plans to redevelop Bukit Batok Bus Interchange.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Regulations Protecting Rights of People with Disabilities at Workplace","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WA","content":"27 Mr Gerald Giam Yean Song asked the Minister for Manpower (a) whether there are any regulations specifically protecting the rights of people with disabilities at the workplace; (b) if so, how many complaints have been filed with the Ministry pertaining to violations of these regulations in the past five years; and (c) whether the Ministry has plans to strengthen regulations to better protect the rights of persons with disabilities at the workplace.
Mrs Josephine Teo: People with disabilities enjoy the same protections, right and obligations under our employment legislation, as any other individual. This includes an expectation that employers abide by fair and merit-based employment practices as outlined in the Tripartite Guidelines on Fair Employment Practices, protection from workplace discrimination and from unfair dismissal. Employers who have breached these obligations face firm enforcement action by MOM and will have their work pass privileges curtailed.
MOM and TAFEP investigate all such complaints impartially, without prejudging either party to the complaint. From 2015 to 2019, the Tripartite Alliance for Fair and Progressive Employment Practices (TAFEP) received four complaint cases on workplace discrimination relating to persons with disabilities. After investigation, TAFEP found that these cases involved poor communication and a lack of sensitivity by the employer, when interacting with the complainant. However, there was no practice or policy of discrimination on the part of the employer. TAFEP provided advice to the respective employers on how they could improve their employment practices. All four employers were receptive to the advice, and there have been no further complaints against these employers involving persons with disabilities. There were also no substantiated cases of discriminatory dismissal due to disability in the past five years.
TAFEP has also observed that employers, their managers and society generally, need to cultivate the correct mindset with respect to disability. Some employers misunderstand the needs of persons with disabilities, or wrongly conclude they are unable to perform certain tasks. Our public education efforts include advisory articles on TAFEP’s website, advertisements on mainstream media platforms, and social media posts, to create a more inclusive workplace for persons with disabilities. The Government also provides wage offsets to employers who hire Singaporeans with disabilities earning below $4,000 a month. Under the Enabling Employment Credit scheme, employers will receive up to 20% wage offset, and those hiring Singaporeans with disabilities who had not been working for the past six months prior to being hired will receive an additional wage offset of up to 10% for a period of six months. SGEnable also administers the Open Door Programme which provides support for employers to hire, train and integrate persons with disabilities into the workplace.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Breakdown of Gig Workers by Industries and Average Salaries","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WA","content":"28 Ms Hazel Poa asked the Minister for Manpower (a) how many gig workers are there currently in the workforce; (b) what industries are these individuals working in; (c) what are the average salaries of these individuals by industry; and (d) how many of these gig workers are classified as self-employed.
Mrs Josephine Teo: There is no internationally accepted definition of \"gig workers\". In general, the term refers to own account workers or self-employed persons (SEPs) who operate their own business without hiring any employees1, and who source for a significant part of their work through online matching platforms.
In 2020, 190,900 residents were engaged primarily as SEPs for their livelihood. Over the past decade, such SEPs’ share of the workforce has remained stable at 8% to 10%. Among the 190,900, there were 73,500 who utilised online matching platforms, mostly working in the transportation of goods and passengers. Table 1 shows the breakdown of the top three occupations, namely private-hire car drivers, taxi drivers, and car and light goods vehicle drivers, and Table 2 reflects the corresponding median incomes.
In 2019, the median income for these three occupations was between $1,500 to $2,500. In 2020, SEPs’ income from work2 was impacted by COVID-19 pandemic to varying degrees. Many were eligible for support of up to $9,000 from the SEP Income Relief Scheme (SIRS), Workfare Special Payments of up to $3,000, as well as regular Workfare payouts amounting up to $2,667 in 20203, as well as the Point-To-Point Support Package, which comprises two components for taxi and PHC drivers:
(a) Special Relief Fund (SRF), to help full-time drivers defray business cost, and
(b) Government and NTUC Driver Care Fund for drivers who may not qualify for the SRF but still require financial assistance.
29 Ms Raeesah Khan asked the Minister for Manpower what steps is the Ministry taking (i) to encourage victims to file a workplace sexual harassment report either with their employer or other authorities when such incidents happen and (ii) to ensure that personnel are trained to handle such complaints.
Mrs Josephine Teo: MOM appreciates the seriousness of workplace harassment and the challenges victims may face. To raise awareness and to ensure that employees do not hesitate to report such cases, Tripartite Alliance for Fair and Progressive Employment Practices (TAFEP) together with MOM and other partner organisations have stepped up efforts via digital and social media platforms to educate the public on what constitutes workplace harassment and the available avenues for recourse, including when to file a report with TAFEP or the Police.
In addition, TAFEP works closely with tripartite partners to conduct regular courses to train key personnel such as HR, line managers and supervisors to adopt policies to prevent and manage workplace harassment. More than 950 company representatives have been trained over the last five years.
Affected employees who do not feel comfortable reporting through their company channel are encouraged to approach TAFEP for assistance. Such cases are handled sensitively. When a case of harassment is filed, TAFEP will require the employer to provide a report of their investigations of the complaint including disciplinary actions to be taken against the harasser if the complaint was found to be true. TAFEP will also assess if the case inquiry and the company’s grievance handling process were in accordance with the Tripartite Advisory on Managing Workplace Harassment. TAFEP will treat all information provided as confidential and work with the employer to prevent future occurrences. TAFEP also refers affected individuals to organisations like the Family Service Centres, Health Promotion Board and SOS Singapore which have the expertise to help them get closure and the necessary support.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Distributing Home Renovation Work Information Digitally and Protocols for Seeking Help Against Noisy Renovation Unit and Managing Recalcitrant Cases","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WA","content":"30 Mr Yip Hon Weng asked the Minister for National Development (a) whether information on home renovation works can be distributed in advance through digital means or letters to ensure more residents get the information with ample time to prepare; (b) whether there is a recommended protocol for residents to seek help against a noisy renovation unit; and (c) whether there is a protocol to manage recalcitrant cases when there are recurring or similar complaints against the same unit.
Mr Desmond Lee: Certain renovation works that may affect the structural integrity of the HDB block, such as the demolition of walls and hacking of flooring, require a renovation permit from HDB. Currently, renovation contractors who have applied for a HDB renovation permit for such works on behalf of flat owners have to put up the notice of renovation outside the flat during the renovation period. The contractor is also required to serve a notice at least three days in advance to the surrounding flats within a 2-unit radius from the unit undergoing renovation. To improve outreach to residents, HDB is exploring digital options such as the use of the OneService app to keep the residents of the block informed of the units undergoing renovation.
In a high-density living environment, some amount of noise is inevitable. It is important that residents do their part by showing consideration for their neighbours, such as by keeping the noise level down. In light of the COVID-19 situation and with more households working from home, we understand that some residents may be affected by renovation noise. However, there is a need to balance the needs of the owners who wish to complete their renovations early, and those of residents affected by the works. Mutual understanding and tolerance will facilitate the completion of works and allow new owners to move in as soon as possible.
While HDB will investigate and take necessary actions against contractors who are found to have infringed the rules, in most instances, residents and contractors cooperate when alerted to feedback about noise, and will take measures to minimise the inconvenience to their neighbours. Under the Community Dispute Management Framework, disputing parties can also seek mediation at the Community Mediation Centre, or in more intractable cases, refer the matter to the Community Disputes Resolution Tribunal. We should not resort to excessive enforcement, as doing so is not only intrusive, but also destroys the social fabric.
HDB residents with feedback on renovation works may contact HDB’s branch service line at 1800-225-5432 or the Essential Maintenance Service Unit after office hours. Residents in strata-titled developments may approach the management corporation or managing agent for assistance.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Number of Bird Feeding Cases Reported and Number of Enforcement and Composition Notices Issued over the Last Year","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WA","content":"31 Mr Chua Kheng Wee Louis asked the Minister for National Development (a) over the last year, what is the number of cases of bird feeding that has been reported on a monthly basis and cumulatively; and (b) what is the number of enforcement notices and composition notices that have been issued for the feeding of birds during the same time period.
Mr Desmond Lee: In 2020, NParks received more than 8,100 cases of feedback on bird feeding, or an average of about 675 cases per month. 16 composition notices and 40 warning letters were issued for the feeding of birds during this period.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Increase Frequency of Council Estate Agencies' Real Estate Salespersons Examination and Conducting Online Examination","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WA","content":"32 Mr Chua Kheng Wee Louis asked the Minister for National Development (a) whether the frequency of the Council for Estate Agencies' Real Estate Salespersons Examination can be increased given the backlog from 2020 and current capacity limits; and (b) whether the Ministry will encourage the Council for Estate Agencies to conduct the examination via online channels.
Mr Desmond Lee: The Council for Estate Agencies (CEA) generally conducts the Real Estate Salesperson (RES) examination three times a year. In 2021, the RES examination will be held in February, June and October, which are the usual months for the examination. The conduct of each RES examination requires the careful setting of examination questions so as to ensure that candidates who join the real estate agency industry meet the required standards.
In view of the COVID-19 situation, CEA has restarted the conduct of the RES examination on a smaller scale so as to ensure the safety of examination candidates and the personnel conducting the examination.
Recognising the demand for the RES examination, CEA will increase the capacity for the examination for future runs this year, subject to the prevailing COVID-19 situation. CEA is also exploring other modes of conducting the RES examination, such as conducting computer-based examinations at designated location(s), while ensuring that the integrity of the examinations is maintained.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Land Cost in FY2019/2020 and Breakdown of Payment to SLA, Government Organisations and Private Entities.","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WA","content":"33 Ms Hazel Poa asked the Minister for National Development (a) how much did HDB pay for land cost in FY2019/2020; and (b) what is the breakdown of that payment amount to (i) SLA (ii) other Government organisations and (iii) private entities.
Mr Desmond Lee: Currently, HDB only buys Land from the Singapore Land Authority (SLA), the custodian of State Land in Singapore, for HDB’s public housing developments.
In FY 2019/2020, HDB paid SLA about $3.2 billion for the purchase of State Land. This information can be found in HDB’s annual financial statements report, which is published on HDB’s website.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Environmental Baseline Study for Evaluating Different Development Options for Clementi Forest","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WA","content":"34 Mr Dennis Tan Lip Fong asked the Minister for National Development (a) whether an Environmental Baseline Study can be considered for evaluating the different development options for Clementi Forest, namely (i) a nature park as Nature Society Singapore has proposed (ii) leaving it untouched as a secondary forest or (iii) a residential development similar to the upcoming Tengah Forest Town; and (b) if so, whether the results of the Study can be made available to the public given the active public interest in the area.
Mr Desmond Lee: Members have asked about development plans for green spaces in Singapore, including specific sites at Clementi and Ulu Pandan. I will first address our overall approach to land use planning and nature conservation, and then talk about specific sites.
Let me start with our approach to land use. We are a city, 728 square kilometres of land area in all. But we are also a city-state. Our land use considerations are therefore quite different from most other cities. This is because, unlike most other cities which have large hinterlands, we have to cater for everything that a country needs within the limits of our city, instead of far beyond its limits in the cases of other cities. These include uses such as airports and seaports, airbases and military training ground, reservoirs, incineration and power plants, agriculture, and so much more.
Our approach to conservation as a city-state is also quite different. For example, in other cities, you travel out, sometimes for many hours on the motor-way, to enjoy natural greenery and nature. But in Singapore, our wild spaces are right in our midst. With our gem, the Central Catchment and Bukit Timah Nature Reserves, nestled in the green heart of our city.
We have always taken a long-term view towards land use planning, with stewardship and sustainability as core, long-held principles. Given our small size, we have been, and have to be, judicious in stewarding our scarce land resources to support Singapore’s development as well as in our aspiration to be a City in Nature. We have to constantly balance demands and trade-offs across a wide variety of needs, including housing, green spaces, infrastructure, community facilities, workplaces, amongst others. These tensions are inherent in land use planning everywhere, but felt much more acutely in a small city-state like Singapore.
Sustainable development for Singapore over the long term also means that we need to recycle and reuse our limited land, while incorporating flexibility into our plans, to meet the changing needs and aspirations of each new generation. We must continue to plan ahead to support our collective vision for Singapore, not just for ourselves, but for our children and theirs.
Our land use needs today are quite different from those of yesteryear, and will continue to evolve. Let me use Public Housing as an example. Today, we continue to see a high demand for new HDB flats. In 2020, the overall application rate for BTO flats was 5.8 times. This means that for each BTO flat, we broadly get between 5 and 6 Singaporean applicants. This is driven partly by marriage and family formation. Between 2015 and 2019, the annual average number of citizen marriages registered was 23,600, higher than the annual average of 22,400 registered between 2010 and 2014. In the near term, we expect more demand from the larger “Echo” Baby Boomers cohorts (born in late 1980s to 1990s) as they enter into the marriageable age. For comparison, we built an average of 16,200 new HDB flats each year over the same period, to cater to BTO demand by all buyer groups, and not just newly-weds. For completeness, other housing options, of course, including HDB resale flats, ECs, private property, open market rental flats or living with family members, remain. We therefore need to continue building to meet the demand and aspirations of young families.
On top of that, our public housing demand is also partly driven by changing social structures. For example, there is a growing trend of smaller households as more young couples, singles and their parents choose to have their own flats instead of staying with their extended families as it was so in the past. Indeed, Members of this House have championed some of these needs and more. The average household size in HDB dwellings was 3.07 in 2019, compared to 4.24 in 1990.
Or take a more recent development like COVID-19, which continues to affect our lives in many ways, and has thrown up new land use challenges. Apart from the fact that working from home became the norm for many of us, the pandemic also reminded us that supply disruptions are a very real concern. For example, given the supply tightness that the world experienced for certain food and medical items, our agencies are looking to strengthen local resilience of some of our resource systems, such as for food. This may mean increasing local production and storage capacity for such resources, where feasible. The pandemic has also demonstrated the importance of having buffer sites for emergency uses, which we were able to activate quickly for quarantine and recovery facilities, and temporary housing of our migrant workers. Meanwhile, trends such as tele-commuting and e-commerce have accelerated, raising questions about how much office and retail space we might really need in the long term. Our economic imperatives may also shift and evolve after the pandemic, as technology changes and advances, so we will need to take a good, hard look at land use needs for the future. While it remains to be seen if some of these shifts will persist in the “new normal” beyond COVID-19, we are actively monitoring these trends and adjusting our land use strategies to satisfy both the needs of today, and the possibilities and challenges of tomorrow.
To meet our growing and changing needs, we have been, and will continue to adopt a range of development options. This includes increasing the density of developments – building higher, and building more densely, while ensuring liveability. So there is a limit. We are also co-locating suitable uses. For example, the upcoming Punggol Town Hub will feature a public library, community centre, hawker centre, and health services. All co-located for one-stop, convenient access for our residents. We are also co-locating a Water Reclamation Plant and an Integrated Waste Management Facility at Tuas Nexus, and a 4-in-1 rail and bus depot in the East Coast. Such projects save us hectares of land.
We are also redeveloping brownfield sites such as golf courses, old school sites, or industrial areas, as leases expire. For example, last year, we launched the former First Toa Payoh Secondary School site for public housing, after the school was merged. Many Members might also remember that Bishan used to be a cemetery. Going forward, when the lease for the Keppel Club Golf Course expires, we will use the land to develop public and private housing. Land taken back from Jurong Country Club, Raffles Country Club, Marina Bay Golf Course from 2024 and Orchid Country Club from 2030, will also be used to meet other needs. By 2030, we would have taken back more than 400 hectares of golf course land for redevelopment.
We will continue to carry out land reclamation where appropriate, and see how we can make use of underground spaces and deep cavern spaces for infrastructure, though the costs are high.
We also undertake major long-term redevelopment moves when the opportunity arises, to re-imagine Singapore to advance our children’s interests, and those of their children. For example, the height restrictions over a large part of eastern and north-eastern Singapore will be lifted after the air base moves out of Paya Lebar, allowing us to intensify land use both in and around the site. We will also progressively redevelop the Greater Southern Waterfront after the port moves to Tuas, freeing up prime waterfront land for public and private housing, and other purposes. But many of these moves take time and require complex planning and careful coordination, because they affect people, homes, livelihoods, and industries. So we cannot redevelop these spaces overnight. There are also different trade-offs to weigh, including the compatibility of a new development with surrounding land uses, and the availability and capacity of supporting infrastructure, among many other considerations.
Now let me move on to explain our approach when it comes to greenfield sites. Because of our commitment to land stewardship and sustainable development, we adopt a science-based approach to identify core biodiversity areas and surrounding buffers that we want to retain for future generations. Broadly, the considerations include ecological significance and connectivity of habitats. The 4-pronged Nature Conservation Masterplan sets out the strategies to safeguard these green spaces. In fact, the Masterplan goes further than that, and in terms of our City in Nature ambitions, it includes the mindsets of our people, and their ability to be conscious and scientific in their understanding of nature, and to understand the stresses and tensions that we deal with as we seek to protect the biodiversity on our city-island.
As a result of this approach, we have retained a number of ecologically important sites as green spaces, although they had initially been designated for other, human uses. For instance, the Mandai Mangrove and Mudflat had initially been planned for factory use. Yet, after careful study through biodiversity surveys and ecological modelling, we decided to keep it as a Nature Park given its ecological value. Similarly, while other green spaces such as Dairy Farm Nature Park and Rifle Range Nature Park could have been developed for housing, they have been retained as green buffers to our Nature Reserves instead. We have done this in many other areas too over time – Sungei Buloh, Pulau Ubin and Chek Jawa, Kranji Marshes, Chestnut, Thomson, Khatib Bongsu, and Bukit Batok Hillside Nature Parks, and the Rail Corridor, to name a few. We are looking out for other areas, to enhance ecological connectivity and biodiversity.
Today, we have safeguarded approximately 7,800 hectares of our land for Nature Reserves, Nature Areas, Nature Parks and other green spaces, such as parks and park connectors. These comprise key representative ecosystems and habitats for Singapore’s native biodiversity. We need to remember that not all of these areas were untouched habitats. For example, Sungei Buloh Wetland Reserve and the upcoming Khatib Bongsu Nature Park were once prawn farming areas. These areas were abandoned, acquired by the Government for future redevelopment, and have over time become green spaces inhabited by indigenous flora and fauna.
We will not only protect and enhance existing green spaces but will also extend our network with an additional 1,000 hectares of green spaces over the next 10 to 15 years, and weave greenery more intensively into our urban areas. In tandem, we will implement species recovery plans for 130 animal and plant species by 2030, to strengthen the conservation of our endangered and rare species. These efforts will restore existing ecological habitats for our wildlife, and provide Singaporeans with greater access and a more immersive experience in nature.
Let me assure Members that we are committed to stewarding and protecting our green spaces. But given our physical constraints and scarce land area, there will be some greenfield sites that we might have to develop to meet our land use needs. Any decision to proceed is made only after detailed study of the trade-offs and alternatives. And where development cannot be avoided, we proceed with care.
Developments near to sites with significant biodiversity undergo an in-depth consultation with Technical Agencies and may be subject to an environmental study to assess the possible environmental impact of development plans, including ecological connectivity. We also engage stakeholders, such as those from the nature community, to take in feedback and strengthen the rigour of the studies. Unless there are security considerations, the studies will be made publicly available, so that anyone can provide feedback on the findings and recommendations. The studies, as well as feedback received, guide the planning of the site, including mitigating measures to reduce the impact on the environment. We also seek to preserve and integrate natural elements within the development where possible, to facilitate ecological connectivity. We thank the nature groups for their close partnership in working with the relevant agencies to achieve these outcomes.
Now, let me talk about the specific sites in Clementi and Ulu Pandan mentioned by Members. The site at Clementi was an abandoned rubber plantation, which has since been overgrown with Albizia trees which are not native to Singapore. In January this year, I explained to Parliament that the land had been zoned “Residential (Subject to Detailed Planning)” 23 years ago, since the Master Plan 1998. While there is no immediate need to develop the site for housing, we will retain the zoning of the site for now. This will give our future generations the option of deciding whether to use it for housing or to review its land use if the need arises.
As for the site at Ulu Pandan, it used to be a rubber plantation, fruit orchard and kampongs. It is similarly overgrown with non-native trees after the settlement and agriculture were abandoned. Since the Master Plan 2003, the land had been zoned “Residential (Subject to Detailed Planning)”. HDB engaged an external consultant to conduct an environmental baseline study (EBS) for Ulu Pandan, to guide HDB’s development plans and identify the native flora and fauna and their habitats. HDB then consulted nature groups to refine their plans for Ulu Pandan, incorporating the findings from the EBS. Subsequently, the EBS report was published online for public feedback.
HDB has since received and continues to receive feedback and suggestions from nearby residents and members of the public. There has been a very wide range of views, and we thank everyone who has contributed so far. Some have called to retain the site fully for greenery and recreation, and to designate it as a Nature Park. Some have gone further to say that we should not build any more HDB flats, and halt all development. We can understand this sentiment too. Others have urged the Government to redevelop other sites instead, including older housing blocks, or existing school fields and running tracks in the area. Several have suggested that new housing and nature should co-exist on the site, for example, develop the eastern end where vegetation is less dense, while integrating mature trees into the new estate and preserving some of the streams. While there are diverse views, many who have written in appreciate the tension between the need for development, and nature conservation.
We are studying the feedback in detail and welcome more Singaporeans to give their views and inputs, as we consider our plans for the Ulu Pandan site. Accordingly, HDB will extend the public consultation period for another four weeks, so please write in. We will carefully consider all the feedback received, and share our plans when ready.
We are encouraged by the keen interest generated in our plans for Singapore and nature conservation. Indeed, mainstreaming of nature consciousness among Singaporeans is a key part of our strategy to become a City in Nature. This is a good time as concerns about sustainability are now at the top of our agenda. As the same time, as part of such conversations, it is good for all of us to better understand the opportunities and constraints facing Singapore when it comes to balancing our land use needs. And if we recalibrate the balance between conservation and development, we also need to discuss what this would mean, in practical terms. For instance, in a TODAY commentary which I read over the weekend, a 24-year old SUSS student Mr Yeo Wei Jiang summed it up aptly. He said that preserving the natural environment should be Singapore’s “top priority” and that “I am willing to commit to it even if it means waiting longer for a BTO, living in a more inconvenient area, or paying a higher price”. Now some may resonate, others may not agree, but that’s part of the conversation. Singaporeans’ aspirations and views are evolving: on housing and property, on material pursuits, on family and society, on nature, and on the nature and form of work. At the same time, the world, the global economy around us, and technology are changing, and changing rapidly. And so too must our strategies and approaches, so that we can emerge a stronger nation, after this most difficult of tests. URA will engage Singaporeans later this year, as we do regularly every few years, to discuss our aspirations as a people, and gather ideas, inputs and partnerships, to formulate our long-term plans for a liveable and sustainable future. We invite everyone to join these conversations and to partner us in action.
The Government will continue to regularly review our plans in partnership with the community, to support the aspirations and changing needs of our people, as consensus on the balance between environmental conservation and development evolves. Our goal is to steward a home and City in Nature that all Singaporeans, in this generation and future ones, love and cherish.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"One-room Rental Flats Accommodating More Than Three Occupants and Measure to Minimise Spread of Diseases in Overcrowded Flats","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WA","content":"35 Mr Don Wee asked the Minister for National Development (a) how many one-room rental flats under HDB's Public Rental Scheme accommodate three or more occupants including the listed tenants and occupiers; and (b) what measures are in place to minimise the spread of diseases in overcrowded flats.
Mr Desmond Lee: About 2,300 or 9% of households living in 1-room public rental flats have a household size of three or more. Most public rental households who have three or more members live in 2-room flats. Households who have grown in size since they entered public rental can request to move to a 2-room flat. Those that form two nuclei, such as grandparents living with parents and children, can apply for two rental flats and request for the flats to be in the same block, subject to vacancies. On a case-by-case basis, we will also be prepared to offer larger families a 3-room rental flat.
HDB carries out regular tenancy inspections to ensure that only approved occupants live in the rental flats, and that the flats are well maintained and in good condition. When HDB encounters households who may need additional assistance, HDB will link them up with MSF Social Service Offices, grassroots organisations, and/or social service agencies.
During the Circuit Breaker period, HDB conducted additional checks on rental blocks to ensure the general cleanliness of common areas and that safe distancing measures were adhered to.
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