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(Statement by the Minister\r\nfor Transport)
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\r\n \r\n \r\n The Minister for Transport (Mr Lui Tuck\r\nYew)\r\n : Mr Speaker, Sir, Members have raised concerns\r\nand queries regarding the two service disruptions on the North-South Line\r\n(NSL) that took place on 15 and 17 December 2011. I know that the\r\ntwo incidents were extremely disruptive and could have been better\r\nmanaged. I know it caused a significant amount of uncertainty, frustration\r\nand distress to commuters, and especially the passengers that were\r\nin the stalled trains because they were placed in the position of\r\ngreat duress. And I fully understand that for the disruption to\r\nhave happened on 15 December, to be followed in short order by another\r\ndisruption on 17 December, was clearly unacceptable to Singaporeans.\r\nLet me start by providing to this House a brief account of the facts\r\nof the case as we know them today, while we leave the Committee of\r\nInquiry (COI) to do its work in the coming months. I will also update\r\nthis House on some of the preliminary lessons learnt and the potential\r\nweaknesses that have been identified in our current framework as\r\nwe make every effort to put things right and to restore confidence\r\nin the MRT system.
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\r\n On the evening of 15 December,\r\nan estimated 127,000 commuters were affected by a major disruption\r\nto service along the North-South Line from Marina Bay station to Braddell\r\nstation. Four trains stalled, one between City Hall and Dhoby Ghaut\r\nstations, one between Somerset and Orchard stations, one at Braddell\r\nstation, and one just before Braddell station. The trains stalled\r\nbecause of misalignment between the trains' current collector shoes\r\nand the power rail that is commonly referred to as the \"third\" rail. The\r\ntrains draw locomotive power from the third rail through the train\r\ncurrent collector shoes. Due to the misalignment, the trains were\r\nunable to draw power and stalled.
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\r\n Two days later, a second\r\nservice disruption took place on the North-South Line on the morning\r\nof 17 December. Once again it caused distress and inconvenience,\r\nthis time to about 94,000 commuters. Five trains stalled, one each\r\nat City Hall, Dhoby Ghaut, Ang Mo Kio, and Bishan stations, and\r\none more along the stretch just before Somerset station. The cause\r\nfor this second disruption was apparently similar to the earlier\r\ndisruption: misalignment between the stalled trains' current collector\r\nshoes and the third rail.
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\r\n Following the second incident,\r\na complete check was conducted for the entire North-South-East West\r\nLine (NSEWL) and its operating fleet of trains. LTA and SMRT wanted to do everything possible\r\nto ensure that services would not be disrupted again. LTA and SMRT\r\nmobilised their technical and engineering staff to work through\r\nthe night of 17 December, and SMRT was able to fully resume service\r\naround noon on Sunday, 18 December.
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\r\n As a result of the checks,\r\nLTA and SMRT found 21 dislodged or missing claws. These claws secure\r\nthe third rail to the support brackets, and when a few consecutive\r\nclaws are dislodged, this may cause the third rail to sag. It becomes\r\nmisaligned with the collector shoes on the trains passing these\r\nsections and it will damage or break off the collector shoes. This\r\nwas likely the immediate cause of the incidents on both 15 and 17\r\nDecember. However, many questions remain unanswered: Why did the\r\nclaws dislodge? Why did it happen on such a scale and only along\r\ncertain stretches of our trains on those two days? And why, after\r\napparently fixing the problem on 15 December on the affected stretches, did\r\ntrain services run smoothly on 16 December, only to have the problem\r\nre-surface on 17 December in a different location? These are among\r\nthe questions that the COI has to look into.
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\r\n We suspected excessive vibrations\r\nfrom the running of the trains could be a factor for the claws to\r\nbe dislodged. Therefore, as a precautionary measure, LTA directed\r\nSMRT to impose a speed restriction of 40 kph, instead of the usual\r\n80 kph, on trains running along the floating slab tracks. The floating\r\nslab tracks, or what are known as FSTs, are large concrete structures\r\nthat are supported on bearings. They are designed to absorb vibrations\r\nfrom passing trains so that the surrounding buildings are not affected.\r\nMost of the damaged claws were found along the FST sections. SMRT\r\nalso further secured the claws with cable ties after consulting\r\nthe manufacturer.
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\r\n The staff of SMRT and LTA\r\nhave worked extremely hard to deal with the disruptions and to stabilise\r\nthe situation. They did so under significant time pressure and stress.\r\nAnd I know that Singaporeans would want to join me in expressing\r\nour sincere appreciation to them for their hard work. Let me also\r\nthank commuters who displayed tolerance and understanding, coping\r\nwith the slightly degraded service levels by starting their journeys\r\na little earlier and taking things in their stride. As of today,\r\nall but one of the damaged trains have re-entered service, and SMRT\r\nis running more trains than before the incidents, because some of\r\nthe 17 new trains that were recently delivered have entered service.\r\nThe speed restriction is still in place on the FST stretches of\r\nthe NSEWL and this has extended journeys by about two minutes. Since\r\nthe two incidents, SMRT has taken steps to secure all the claws\r\nalong the NSEWL, both underground and aboveground, with cable-ties,\r\nas an interim measure to prevent claws from being dislodged while\r\nthey work on a permanent solution. SMRT has also stepped up inspections,\r\nincluding daily checks on the third rail throughout the network, concentrating\r\nparticularly along the FST sections, to ensure that any signs of\r\nrecurrence are picked up early and rectified. The condition of the\r\ntrain collector shoes is also checked daily during operational hours\r\nfor any early sign of damage or abnormality, and also at the end\r\nof revenue service when the trains return to the depots to ensure\r\nthe integrity of the system.
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\r\n Since excessive vibration\r\nwas identified as a possible contributing factor, as an added precaution,\r\nSMRT went further to check other vulnerable structures in the tunnel that\r\ncould be affected by extensive vibrations. They therefore engaged\r\na Professional Engineer to inspect and confirm the infrastructure\r\nintegrity of the tunnel fixtures and mountings, and I understand\r\nthat no abnormalities were found after these inspections.
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\r\n The incidents of 15 and 17 December affected\r\nmore than 200,000 commuters. They suffered great frustration, inconvenience\r\nand distress. The execution of Emergency preparedness plans, especially\r\nfor the first incident, ought to be significantly improved. SMRT\r\ncould have better handled the evacuation of passengers in the stalled\r\ntrains to reduce the sense of distress, and could have provided\r\nclearer and timelier information and instructions to the public,\r\ninstead of leaving commuters confused and apprehensive in already\r\ndisordered circumstances. That the two incidents have the same proximate cause\r\nand happened two days apart raises concerns about possible systemic shortcomings.\r\nI assure this House that the Government takes a very serious view\r\nof the incidents and the potential safety risk that this could pose\r\nto commuters, to passengers, which is why I convened a Committee\r\nof Inquiry (COI) to investigate the incidents.
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\r\n The Committee comprises\r\nthree capable and experienced members, chosen for their legal, operational\r\nand technical expertise. Under its terms of reference, the COI will conduct\r\nan independent investigation into both technical and non-technical\r\naspects of the incidents on 15 and 17 December. The Committee will\r\ninvestigate the sequence of events leading to the disruptions as\r\nwell as establish the technical, systematic and other causes that\r\nmay have contributed to the disruptions. Based on these findings,\r\nit will make recommendations to minimise the recurrence of similar\r\nincidents as well as to improve the management of such incidents.\r\nA full report of the proceedings, findings and recommendations will\r\nbe submitted upon completion of the investigation, and it will be\r\nmade public. And I hope that this addresses Mr Cedric Foo's and\r\nMs Sylvia Lim's questions on the composition and the terms of reference\r\nfor the COI.
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\r\n Some have also asked if\r\nthe Committee should look into other service disruptions on other\r\nMRT lines. The extent and severity of the service disruptions on\r\n15 and 17 December, and the potential safety risks that they posed\r\nare what warrant an independent inquiry into the causes of these\r\ntwo disruptions. The COI should focus on investigating the core\r\nissues related to the 15 and 17 December incidents, report on its findings\r\nand make their recommendations accordingly. However, if there are\r\nany previous incidents or events which are relevant or have contributed\r\nto the incidents of 15 and 17 December, the COI has the latitude\r\nand indeed the obligation to consider them. The Chairman of the\r\nCOI, Mr Tan Siong Thye, has already stated that the Committee will\r\ntake a comprehensive and systems approach in its inquiry to thoroughly understand\r\nall the underlying causes, both technical and non-technical, that\r\ncould have contributed to the problem. Er Dr Lee Bee Wah has asked\r\nabout the reasons for the recent breakdowns. I urge Members to be\r\npatient and to give the COI time to conduct this investigation thoroughly\r\nbecause it is premature at this stage to draw definitive conclusions\r\non the underlying reasons for these two MRT breakdowns at this stage.\r\nWe should also avoid speculating on the reasons, as I think this\r\nwill undermine the focus of the COI in dispassionately and objectively\r\ngetting to the bottom of the issues.
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\r\n Ms Sylvia Lim has also asked\r\nhow the Committee will conduct its hearings. The hearings will be\r\nheld in public, and interested parties and witnesses have been invited to\r\ncontact the Committee's Secretary. The Committee will have its own\r\nindependent investigation team to enable it to carry out primary\r\nfact-finding. This will allow it to do a totally independent investigation,\r\nwithout relying on LTA and SMRT's ongoing investigations. The Committee\r\nwill also have the power to procure and receive evidence as it thinks necessary\r\nor desirable, and examine all such persons as witnesses in order to\r\nfulfil its terms of reference.
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\r\n Apart from the COI's investigation,\r\nthe LTA and SMRT have also started their own separate internal investigations.\r\nThis is to be expected. Both parties clearly have the duty and responsibility\r\nto find out what went wrong, especially for those areas that they are\r\naccountable for, and to do so as quickly as possible. The SMRT,\r\nas a public transport operator, must ensure that it is able to operate\r\na safe and reliable train service while LTA, as the regulator, is\r\nresponsible for identifying any shortcomings on the part of the operator\r\nthat may have led to the service disruption and will also have to\r\nsee if there are useful lessons from these incidents to strengthen\r\nits own regulatory role. The COI, on the other hand, is an independent\r\nparty appointed by MOT and will also look into the larger systems\r\nissues beyond that which SMRT and LTA will cover in their respective probes.
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\r\n I would like to give a quick\r\nupdate to this House on the ongoing investigation efforts. As vibrations\r\nwithin the train system appears to be a key issue contributing to\r\nthe incidents in question, SMRT engaged an overseas consultant to\r\nconduct a series of preliminary vibration testing on 22 December.\r\nThis was primarily a scoping exercise, to provide data on the dynamic\r\nproperties of the various track and train components. The results\r\nwill enable the experts to develop a proper proposal for the conduct\r\nof a series of more detailed tests that will be carried out in the\r\ncoming weeks. After that, the data will need to be analysed and\r\ninterpreted and they may have to carry out further tests if necessary.\r\nAs some of these activities must be carried out on the actual tracks\r\nand tunnels, the various investigating bodies will need to work\r\nthrough how best to do this while SMRT continues to operate the\r\nMRT services.
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\r\n There have been questions\r\nraised about whether our MRT system has been strained by the increase\r\nin ridership over the last few years with trains becoming more crowded. Because\r\nthe operators have injected an additional 2,000 weekly trips since\r\n2008 to cater to the higher ridership, some have speculated that\r\nthe higher intensity usage of our system may have resulted in the\r\nbreakdowns. I would like to assure the House of the following: First,\r\nthe additional trips added did not exceed the safe operating parameters of\r\nthe system. Second, LTA requires the operators to keep strictly\r\nto the maintenance regime prescribed by the manufacturers. I will\r\nsay a little more about this later.
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\r\n But, first, I want to respond\r\nto the question posed by Mr Gan Thiam Poh on whether the two-minute\r\nintervals are the minimum and safest margin for MRT trains to run during\r\npeak hours. The present signalling system on the NSEWL is designed\r\nto safely allow for minimum headways of 120 seconds. It is therefore\r\ntechnically feasible and safe for the operator to run trains at\r\ntwo-minute intervals during peak hours. The additional trips that\r\nSMRT has been putting on are only for the periods where the train\r\nintervals were longer than two minutes previously. Where trains were already\r\nrunning at two-minute intervals, no further trips were added. \r\n
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\r\n \r\n The signalling system is designed to disallow\r\ntrains from coming too close to the next train. And this is also\r\nthe reason why, as we come closer to running at the minimum two-minute\r\nheadways, that we see more occasions where trains have to stop mid-way between\r\nstations for a while before re-starting. This is because the train\r\nahead that has stopped\r\nat the station is sometimes delayed from moving off on time because\r\nsome commuters, for example, have tried to embark while the doors\r\nare closing.\r\n
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\r\n Members have raised concerns\r\nabout the adequacy of the current maintenance regime. Indeed, a\r\nstrong maintenance regime must be in place to ensure that the system is\r\nsafe and reliable. Under the SMRT's current maintenance regime,\r\nthe company has been performing maintenance works and inspections\r\nbased on the schedules recommended by the manufacturers. Notwithstanding\r\nthis, the quality and adequacy of the maintenance regime, be it\r\nfor preventive or corrective maintenance, are areas that will be\r\nclosely scrutinised by the COI as well as the internal investigation\r\nteams set up by both SMRT and LTA.
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\r\n Ms Foo Mee Har asked how\r\nthe SMRT is held accountable for the maintenance of the rail system.\r\nThe LTA, as a regulator, requires the operators to comply with their Operating\r\nPerformance Standards, or what is known as the OPS. The OPS mandates\r\nthe minimum service adequacy that the operators must fulfil. If\r\nfound in breach of the OPS, the operators can be penalised up to\r\n$1 million per incident, taking into account the severity of the\r\nincident. Besides the OPS, the operators are required to submit\r\ntheir two-year maintenance plans to LTA for review, and LTA may\r\nask the operators to adjust or to improve on the plans as necessary.\r\nBut I should also point out that, even in the absence of the OPS,\r\nit would still be in the operators' interest to maintain the RTS\r\nsystem well as this would extend the operational life of the assets.
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\r\n Mr Gerald Giam has asked\r\nif LTA has to date exercised its power to impose conditions relating\r\nto the appointment, re-appointment or removal of MRT operators' CEO,\r\nChairman or any of its Directors, and about the criteria that LTA\r\nuses to decide when to impose such conditions. Decisions relating\r\nto the changes of these key appointments in the company are initiated\r\nby the company or, in the case of the Chairman and Directors, by\r\nthe shareholders, and they cannot be unilaterally imposed by LTA.\r\nHowever, under LTA's current licences, operators must seek LTA's\r\napproval for the appointment, re-appointment or removal of any Director\r\nor the Chairman of its Board of Directors. While LTA has veto powers\r\nover the appointment of the operators' Board, these are generally\r\nintended to be used as a last resort against clearly unsuitable nominees\r\nand, to date, LTA has not found it necessary to exercise this veto\r\npower.
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\r\n One of the questions that\r\nneeds to be answered is whether the regulatory regime is sufficiently\r\nrobust. Together with the COI's more holistic findings, the Government\r\nwill thoroughly review the regulatory and penalty framework and\r\nits oversight over the operators' maintenance regimes to strengthen\r\nit where necessary.
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\r\n We move on to emergency\r\npreparedness. Several Members, including Ms Foo Mee Har, Mr Gan\r\nThiam Poh, Er Dr Lee Bee Wah, Mr Low Thia Khiang and Ms Irene Ng,\r\nhave asked about the readiness of our system to respond to an emergency.\r\nEr Dr Lee Bee Wah has also asked specifically about the role of\r\nthe SCDF in such incidents, and if the incidents have impacted the\r\nGovernment's planning for a terror attack on the train system. Let\r\nme say at the onset that these disruptions exposed gaps in emergency preparedness\r\nand crisis response, and we need to do much better.
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\r\n The current processes require\r\nthat the operators work with LTA to come up with plans that will\r\nbe activated based on various plausible scenarios. The operators\r\nare required to have\r\na Rail Incident Management Plan (RIMP) that is activated in the\r\nevent of a train service disruption. Under the RIMP, the operators\r\nare responsible to provide timely information and regular updates\r\nto the public and passengers, maintain train services where possible,\r\ncarry out recovery of service and provide alternative services to\r\nstations that may be affected by the service disruption, including\r\nthe timely activation of bus bridging services. The operators are\r\nalso expected to have clear procedures for handling passengers in\r\naffected trains, including the \"detrainment\" of commuters onto the\r\nMRT tracks and the relevant safety precautions that have to put\r\nin place in such instances, such as turning off the electric power\r\nto relevant sections of the third rail to ensure commuter safety,\r\nand so on.
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\r\n The LTA regularly reviews\r\nthe operators' RIMP, and works with them on improvements to service\r\nrecovery and incident management measures. Table-top exercises are\r\nconducted to check the crisis management procedures. And prior to\r\nthe opening of a new line or section of a line, LTA requires the\r\noperator to carry out a full-scale exercise involving first responders\r\nlike SCDF and SPF to ensure that coordination between the operator\r\nand first responders is smooth. The operator is required to validate\r\nthe SOPs during these exercises, so that adjustments can be made\r\nif necessary. Where possible, grassroots organisations and school\r\npupils are invited to participate in such exercises to improve the\r\nemergency readiness of residents.
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\r\n I would like to assure the\r\nHouse that a whole-of-Government approach is adopted with regard\r\nto commuter safety on our public transport system, and the Police\r\nand SCDF are activated during major service disruptions. During\r\nthe recent incidents, the Police officers were promptly deployed\r\nto assist SMRT on various fronts, and SCDF officers were also deployed\r\nto help those in distress for the incident on 15 December. Aside\r\nfrom LTA-led safety exercises, the PTOs also participate in security\r\nexercises that are led by MHA at the national level. So in 2006,\r\nExercise Northstar V was carried out with the public transport operators.\r\nThe exercise simulated multiple terror attacks in train stations\r\nand tested out contingency plans and coordination among various\r\nstakeholders from the public, private and people sectors. Shortcomings\r\nin areas like incident management, crowd control and casualty evacuation\r\nwere identified, and follow-up actions were taken to address these.\r\nMore recently in 2009, as part of Exercise Northstar VII, a swarm\r\nattack by gunmen was also simulated at Raffles Place MRT station.\r\nApart from conducting emergency preparedness exercises, the Public\r\nTransport Security Command, or what is known as TransCom, that was\r\nformed in August 2009 under the Singapore Police Force (SPF), provides\r\ndedicated resources to enhance the safety and security of the MRT\r\nand bus systems.
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\r\n There are, nevertheless,\r\nlimitations to such simulated exercises since these are often pre-planned\r\nand scripted with volunteers from grassroots organisations and schools\r\nas willing and psychologically prepared participants. The most realistic\r\nexercise would be an unannounced major simulated disruption that\r\ninvolves actual commuters during peak hours, but such exercises\r\nwould significantly inconvenience many commuters. But there is much\r\nmore that LTA and the operators can do to increase the realism and\r\nthe effectiveness of the exercises that they do and to extract greater\r\nvalue from these exercises to improve the SOPs and communications\r\nplans to the commuters and the public. Future exercises would therefore\r\nbe conducted using more challenging scenarios to test the readiness\r\nof the operators and improve the multi-agency coordination needed\r\nto enhance emergency preparedness and crisis response. And I believe\r\nthat this is something that the COI will be looking into as well.
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\r\n Members may also like to know that we have\r\ntaken some immediate measures to improve existing procedures. Even\r\nas the COI looks into these two incidents, I would like to assure\r\nthe House that improvement measures have been initiated so that\r\nwe are better prepared for a major train service disruption. I will\r\nspeak about three areas in particular, with regard to communication\r\nwith commuters, bus bridging and coordination between Government\r\nagencies and the operators in the event of a service disruption.
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\r\n First, measures have been\r\nput in place to improve communication to in-train commuters and\r\nthe general public in the event of a service breakdown. Changes\r\nhave been implemented to enable the SMRT Operations Control Centre\r\n(OCC) to broadcast directly to the passengers on a stalled train.\r\nThis will provide those most affected by any disruption with more\r\ntimely and accurate updates. The LTA is also working with the operators\r\non having emergency announcements made in other languages, besides English,\r\nin the event of a service disruption. The SMRT has also improved\r\nits detrainment procedures so that the decision to detrain can be\r\ntaken more quickly, and it will reduce the time that commuters are\r\ncooped up in a stalled train. After the first incident, SMRT has\r\nalso set up a Twitter account to provide more timely information\r\non service delays. And in addition to just using traditional media,\r\nLTA and the operators are also exploring the use of mass SMS broadcasts\r\nto alert commuters to service disruptions.
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\r\n The second area is on bus\r\nbridging. It has been observed that the activation of bus bridging\r\nservices sometimes took too long, and encountered various execution\r\nand logistical problems. Since the incidents, LTA has further reviewed\r\nSMRT and SBST's bus bridging plans to ensure that bus routing and\r\npassenger boarding and alighting points are updated, logical and\r\nsufficient to cater to the volume of passengers expected. On the ground,\r\nthis would include the improvement of signage for evacuation routes\r\nand bus bridging points. In addition, pre-prepared instructions\r\nto drivers have been reviewed to ensure that they are clear and\r\neasily understood. And as an added assurance, SMRT will deploy an\r\nofficer with every bus convoy whose drivers may be unfamiliar with\r\nthe route to guide them along.
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\r\n As the regulator, LTA is\r\nalso working with both SMRT and SBST to improve contingency plans\r\nfor train service disruptions, including a more integrated and holistic approach\r\nto incident management and service recovery. For example, instead\r\nof relying only on bridging shuttle bus services which could take\r\nsome time to activate, LTA is working with SMRT to allow for free\r\ntravel on its bus services that serve SMRT stations where train\r\nservices are disrupted, and they will explore extending this arrangement across\r\nboth operators, so that affected commuters can continue their journeys\r\non either operators' bus services for free regardless of which line\r\nis disrupted.
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\r\n Thirdly, coordination among\r\noperators and agencies has been further enhanced. We have streamlined\r\nthe communications protocol so that LTA, SPF and SCDF can be alerted\r\nmore quickly, especially if assistance is required by the operator.\r\nIn addition, SCDF, LTA and the Police are already reviewing and\r\nrefining response protocols and emergency procedures together with\r\nthe operators.
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\r\n Finally, let me assure this\r\nHouse again that the safety of commuters is paramount. The rail\r\nsystem is the backbone of our public transport system. It carries\r\nmillions of commuters\r\neach day, and its safety and reliability must be ensured. We have\r\ntaken a number of immediate measures after the two disruptions and\r\nwe will continue to improve the MRT system to regain the confidence\r\nand trust of commuters. While we know that the claws were dislodged,\r\nwe do not yet know why this happened. The COI will get to the bottom\r\nof this matter, we will get the problems fixed, we will improve\r\nthe overall resilience and robustness of our public transport system\r\nand we will enhance our incident management capabilities. I seek\r\nMembers' and the public's understanding and patience in the meantime.\r\nThank you.
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\r\n \r\n \r\n Mr Speaker: Order. I propose\r\nto take the break now. Members may seek their clarifications after\r\nthe break. I suspend the Sitting and will take the Chair again at\r\n3.55 pm.
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\r\n Sitting accordingly suspended
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\r\n at 3.35 pm until 3.55 pm.
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\r\n Sitting resumed at 3.55\r\npm.
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\r\n [Mr Speaker in the Chair]
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\r\n DISRUPTION OF MRT TRAIN\r\nSERVICES ON 15 AND 17 DECEMBER 2011
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\r\n Debate resumed
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\r\n \r\n \r\n Mr Cedric Foo Chee Keng (Pioneer)\r\n :\r\nSir, I want to thank the Minister for his very long and indeed comprehensive\r\nstatement regarding the questions that I and several of our Members\r\nhave raised. I have some supplementary questions and clarifications.
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\r\n First, whether the role\r\nof the regulator should be one of the terms of reference for the Committee\r\nof Inquiry (COI). Because if the COI is convened by the Minister\r\nfor Transport and LTA comes under his purview, where does the role\r\nof the regulator come into play when the COI examines it and how\r\nindependent would that assessment be? Secondly, how long will the\r\nCOI take by the Minister's estimation and what does he think is\r\na reasonable period for robust but timely inquiry results to be\r\npresented to this House?
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\r\n \r\n \r\n Mr Lui Tuck Yew\r\n : Sir, I thank\r\nMr Foo for his supplementary questions and clarifications. First\r\nof all, I believe that the COI, and I am confident that the COI,\r\nwould do a very thorough job of this to look into not only the causes\r\n– both technical and non-technical – that relate to the disruptions,\r\nbut also all other aspects that may allow us to do a much better\r\njob of maintaining the system as well as responding to such incidents. And\r\ncertainly, I would expect that they would take a look at the role\r\nof the regulator and, if they have opinions on the matter as to\r\nhow the regulator can do a better job, as I have mentioned in the\r\nStatement that I have given earlier, I would expect the COI to put\r\nthis forward in the recommendations.
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\r\n The COI is not dependent\r\non LTA or SMRT for the investigation. It has its own independent\r\ninvestigation arms, and that is why while it takes the reports from\r\nboth the internal investigations conducted by SMRT and LTA into\r\nconsideration, it can go well beyond this and, in fact, it is, I\r\nam sure, going to direct its own independent investigation to look\r\ndeeper into certain areas.
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\r\n Secondly, on how long the COI and what\r\nis the reasonable period: I would rather not speculate on that at\r\nthis point in time. But what we do expect, of course, is that at\r\nthe end of it all it will be a very, very thorough study with the\r\nappropriate recommendations into the issues and how to prevent it\r\nfrom happening again, and what are the improvements that we need\r\nto make. And we ought to give them the time that is needed in order\r\nfor them to do a very thorough job of this, which is why it is important\r\nthat the operators, together with the regulator, even at this point\r\nin time, put into place certain improvements where it can – where\r\nthey already know that there are certain weaknesses from observations\r\narising from how these two incidents were managed. If there are improvements\r\nthat ought to be made, well, we should not wait for the COI to finish\r\nits work. We ought to put them into practice, refine them if necessary\r\nand find other areas that we ought to further improve on.
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\r\n \r\n \r\n Ms Irene Ng Phek Hoong\r\n : Sir,\r\nthere is a concern that SMRT might have been focusing more on maximising\r\nits profits by growing its retail business rather than on improving\r\nits performance, maintenance and service standards of the rail system,\r\nand that this emphasis has contributed to the recent lapses.
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\r\n I have three supplementary\r\nquestions. First, what measures are the Minister introducing to\r\nensure that the public interest is always placed above that of commercial gain?\r\nSecond, the Minister mentioned about reviewing the penalty framework.\r\nCan the Minister tell us whether heavy fines will be meted out as\r\na punitive measure for the disruptions – large enough for the SMRT\r\nto feel the pinch – and the penalty framework reviewed so that the\r\nfines would be more effective as a deterrent? And my third point: can\r\nthe Minister assure us that the new CEO of SMRT will have the requisite qualifications\r\nand experience in transport management to deliver a public transport system\r\nthat Singaporeans can rely on and be confident of?
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\r\n \r\n \r\n Mr Lui Tuck Yew\r\n : Mr Speaker,\r\nSir, I thank Ms Ng for her very probing questions. I think it would\r\nprobably be remiss of me to affirm the Member's statement that they focus\r\nmore on commercial rather than on maintenance. I have no basis for\r\nsupporting such a hypothesis. What we do know is that they are required\r\nto maintain the trains and the systems in accordance with what the\r\nmanufacturer recommends. And based on their own experience operating\r\nthe trains and systems, to add on to what the manufacturer has recommended\r\nas well as to draw lessons from other regimes – best practices that other\r\noperators may be practising – in order to strengthen what they do\r\nhere in Singapore.
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\r\n On top of that, LTA exercises\r\noversight on this, so there is the Operating Performance Standards\r\n(OPS) that the LTA imposes on the operators of this system. This\r\nis the very minimum standard that they must meet, and it covers\r\na variety of different areas including service availability, on-time\r\nperformance, and so on and so forth. But there is also a part that\r\nis devoted to maintenance and safety, and the maintenance plans\r\nare put to LTA for their review and if LTA deems that there is more\r\nthat needs to be done, then LTA will work together with the operator\r\non these specific areas.
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\r\n On heavy fines, I would not like to speculate\r\nat this point of time what the fines should be for these two incidents\r\nbecause, obviously, it needs to be properly investigated and we\r\nneed to, first of all, understand the underlying causes and what\r\nare some of the contributory areas that may have resulted into the\r\ntwo severe incidents.
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\r\n The last non security-related\r\nincident was in January 2008 where one of the locomotives stalled\r\non the tracks and it disrupted operations, I believe, for about\r\nseven hours. The fine, then, the largest in history so far, was\r\nabove $300,000. So we would take some of that into consideration\r\nas well – past performances and relative benchmarks, such as the\r\none that I have just mentioned, and depending on the findings of\r\nthe COI, we will then determine the penalty accordingly.
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\r\n I would also like to add\r\nthat this does not come out of commuters' fares because there is\r\nalways the concern that the greater the penalty you impose on the\r\noperator, the more of it is passed on to the commuters. The fare\r\nformula, as we are aware, does not quite operate that way. The fare\r\nformula really is a combination of the inflation as well as the CPI\r\nas well as the wage growth, the average of that with a productivity\r\ndividend of 1.5% that we extract from the operators. And that is\r\nthe basis for which the PTC would subsequently determine the fare\r\nformula for the following year. So penalties and fines and all that\r\nhave no bearing on the setting of fares for the years to come. I\r\nwant to assure Members of that as well.
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\r\n The final point on the new\r\nCEO. I think it is a matter that is best left to the Board to work\r\non. I know that they have one of the Directors with very strong\r\nengineering experience from Shell, Mr Tan Ek Kia, stepping in on\r\nan interim basis at this point in time while the search for a CEO\r\nis going on. We ought to give SMRT the time and space to do a proper\r\nsearch for the next CEO.
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\r\n 4.06 pm
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\r\n \r\n \r\n Er Dr Lee Bee Wah (Nee Soon)\r\n :\r\nSir, I would like to ask three supplementary questions to the Minister.\r\nI think this whole spate of breakdowns not only revealed the gaps\r\nin an emergency preparedness and crisis response, it also reveals\r\nthe seriousness in the lack of maintenance. I think a lot of people\r\nare thinking that our train system is breaking down part by part.\r\nI would like to ask the Minister: are you happy with the maintenance\r\nbudget that is set aside by the PTO in this case, SMRT? Question\r\ntwo: is LTA looking into any worst case possible? I was told that\r\nthe first batch of trains arrived in Singapore 24 years ago – 66\r\nof them – have already outlived their lifespan. And in those trains,\r\nthere are a lot of electronic parts which are all obsolete and it\r\ncould be a time bomb. I hope that LTA will look into this very seriously.\r\nAnd the third question is: it looks like we cannot just depend on\r\nthe train system. Is LTA looking into parallel bus systems?
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\r\n \r\n \r\n Mr Lui Tuck Yew\r\n : Sir, to\r\nanswer this set of questions, I should bring my file to share some\r\ndata with Members. Let me deal with the maintenance issues. You\r\nsee, we do not determine the maintenance budgets. We look at what\r\nis the outcome and if we are satisfied with the outcome. I asked\r\nfor some data on the number of incidents and I would just confine\r\nit to giving Members some data on the North-South-East-West line.\r\nI do not want to put it into the Statement because, as Mr Foo said,\r\nit is already long enough. So I thought I would just share it with\r\nyou here.
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\r\n You see, LTA tracks the number of breakdowns\r\nabove a 10-minute delay for peak hours; above 15 minutes for off-peak.\r\nThey also, of course, have data going down to five-minute and two-minute\r\ndisruptions. The data is for 2007 until November 2011. I do not have\r\nthe full year's data but, essentially, this is it. It is on incidents\r\nper 100,000 kilometres (km) because obviously, if you have a longer\r\nnetwork, you are running more trains, you have to expect that there\r\nwould be more breakdowns. Hence, over the years, we have indeed\r\nbeen running more trips. We have indeed been extending our networks\r\nso you would expect that there are also more disruptions. Hence,\r\nthe right thing to do and is indeed the norm for operators in other\r\nregimes to normalise this to 100,000 km.
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\r\n Broadly, what it shows is\r\nthat actually, in terms of the severe incidents above 30-minute\r\ndisruptions, that has come down in absolute number of disruptions\r\nfrom seven in 2007 to two in 2011. Obviously, this is prior to the\r\ntwo incidents. In terms of incidents per 100,000 km, that has come\r\ndown from 0.05 to 0.03. Part of the reason why it has come down\r\nis because we had, in the earlier years, a number of track intrusions.\r\nThe track intrusions actually disrupted the smooth running of the\r\ntrains quite a bit. We see a similar pattern of decreasing number\r\nof incidents reported and monitored by the LTA, the track intrusions.\r\nFor incidents that caused greater than 10-minute delay, there is\r\nalso a decrease from 30 in 2007, it went up to 37 in 2008 and thereafter,\r\nit came down – last year, it was 21 until November. And likewise,\r\nmeasured across per 100,000 km, it came down. Where there are slight\r\nincreases in the trend of disruptions are those that are of five-minute\r\ndelay – so five to 10 minutes – that has gone up. Absolute numbers\r\n– in 2007, it was 213 incidents; and 2011, for the eleven months,\r\nit was about 271 incidents. So we are really roughly talking about\r\nalmost an incident a day for that kind of disruption. And measured\r\nagainst per 100,000 km, it had also gone up from 1.65 to 1.8 – and\r\nthese are for more than five minutes.
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\r\n LTA is looking into this\r\ntogether the operators to try and understand whether there are some\r\nunderlying causes that affect the trains causing delays of more\r\nthan five minutes and to see whether we can improve the maintenance\r\nregime or whatever may be the cause of this.
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\r\n On old trains, I would like\r\nto correct that misimpression because what happens is that, I believe\r\nafter every 15 years, the trains undergo a service life extension programme.\r\nIt is not quite a mid-life upgrade because we know of other regimes\r\nwhere they have gone through two such extensions. So our trains\r\nhave gone through a service life extension programme where, basically,\r\nthey do what is necessary in order to continue to keep the trains\r\nrunning at a very performance level.
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\r\n The third thing is on parallel\r\nbuses versus trains. Today, we have two parallel bus services, one\r\noperated by SBST, the other operated by SMRT. I know there have\r\nbeen calls for more of these parallel bus services and indeed, we\r\nare thinking what more can be done, particularly when we are able\r\nto bring in more buses into the system. But I would say that actually,\r\nif you look at the use of these two services, it has been disappointing\r\nbecause people tend to gravitate towards the trains rather than\r\nto the buses for a variety of reasons. It is just that it is less\r\nconsistent and less reliable in terms of the kind of timings that\r\nyou would expect. The most telling was on Sunday morning. Remember\r\nwe had that disruption on Saturday. At the end of the operating\r\nhours on Saturday, we shut down the system for an extended maintenance\r\nand checks. We only fully\r\nresumed service on Sunday, 18 December by about noon. The bus bridging\r\nservice dragged on to about two o'clock. It was free. So there was\r\nfree bus bridging parallel to the MRT lines on a Sunday mid-day\r\nversus paid train services. As soon as the trains were running,\r\neverybody shifted to the trains. So we continued running the buses\r\nbut you could see the behaviourial patterns.
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\r\n I would say that, while\r\nwe want to look into how we can provide more parallel services particularly\r\nduring the peak hours, I am mindful that based on the two services that\r\nwe run today, it really has pretty low ridership. They have not\r\nbeen successful and the experience on Sunday showing demand between\r\npaid MRT services and free bus bridging services was also quite\r\ntelling.
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\r\n 4.12 pm
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\r\n \r\n \r\n Mr Low Thia Khiang (Aljunied)\r\n :\r\nSir, I noted the Minister's admission that there is a gap in emergency\r\nresponse and would look into it. I am happy to note that. There\r\nare some clarifications I would like to seek. First of all, what\r\nis the role of Government in an emergency situation involving public\r\nservice such as SMRT which is essentially a private company? Secondly,\r\nwho should assess and determine whether a particular situation like\r\nservice disruption on 15 December is indeed an emergency situation\r\nwhereby the SOP involving such a situation is activated? Thirdly,\r\nwhether the operator, in this case, SMRT, by creating a situation\r\ndue to whatever situation that they have inside, has caused the\r\nGovernment agencies to provide the service which cost Government expenditure?\r\nAnd whether this company which is a private company, answerable\r\nto shareholders, should be made to pay for the services provided\r\nby the Government?
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\r\n Sir, in the Minister's Statement,\r\nhe mentioned that 17 new trains have been put into service. I would\r\nlike to know where these train cars come from. Who are the manufacturers\r\nand whether or not these new train cars may indeed cause excessive vibrations\r\nwhich are probably causing the problems that we face today?
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\r\n \r\n \r\n Mr Lui Tuck Yew\r\n : Mr Speaker,\r\nSir, let me thank the Member for some very good questions. On the\r\nway of the Government in emergency situations, let us stick to transport-related\r\nincidents. If they are security-related, for example, if it is a\r\nterrorist incident and so on, then it comes under the charge of\r\nthe Police Force. For disruptions of the nature that we encountered\r\non 15 and 17 December, it comes under the responsibility of the\r\noperator who is the domain owner of the situation. But it does not mean\r\nthat they handle these themselves because there is, as I have said,\r\na Rail Incident Management Plan (RIMP) where they are required to\r\nassess, decide on \"detrainment\" procedures, communications and so\r\non, and also assess whether there is a necessity to call for additional\r\nhelp. So, in this case, the Police as well as the SCDF were activated. Upon\r\nactivation, if I can recall correctly, the Police arrived at Somerset\r\nStation within about 20 minutes or so. The SCDF arrived at Somerset\r\nStation – because that was where the call came from, where it all\r\nstarted – within about 12 minutes. And thereafter, the Government\r\nagencies actually put in more resources, including activating their personnel\r\nfor crowd control as the crowd that needed bus bridging services\r\ngrew greater.
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\r\n Whether they should pay\r\nfor services by the Government: I think this is a completely different\r\nissue altogether and I think it is not appropriate for me to say\r\nthat as a result of this incident, we establish a new precedent\r\nwhere any private company that draws on Government services in an emergency must\r\nbe required to pay for it. I think where private entities, commercial\r\nbodies draw on Government resources, for example, if they were to\r\nrequire us to help them to do a study as they expand overseas or\r\nwhatever, they pay. They pay the full cost plus a little bit more.\r\nThat is already a given.
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\r\n But where it is emergency\r\nservices where you activate the ambulance, the Police or the fire\r\nbrigade, I am not so sure that that ought to be the principle that\r\nwe adopt.
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\r\n On the 17 new trains, these\r\nare Kawasaki trains that were assembled in China and delivered to\r\nus. The first five of the 22 actually came in May, and 17 were delivered,\r\nI believe, from October/November onwards. We have been accepting\r\nthem into service. Hence, that was also the reason why despite the\r\nloss of that one train – which we were not yet able to complete\r\nthe repairs – SMRT was actually able to introduce more trains to\r\nrun the system.
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\r\n Did they cause excessive\r\nvibrations? We do not know. It is something that we would need to\r\nget to the root of it. There are four classes of trains now in the\r\nsystem. We bought them at different times. The latest two generations\r\nwere from Kawasaki. These trains are about five tonnes heavier than\r\nthe other trains; and each train is about 220-plus tonnes, so the\r\nnew ones are five tonnes heavier each. If you say that you run it\r\nat full load, I do not know, maybe 1,400 or 1,500 passengers at\r\nabout 65 kg each, that would be about another 100 tonnes. So, the\r\ndifference is about five tonnes over, maybe, 320 tonnes. Did they\r\ncontribute, and to what degree did they contribute, to the excessive vibrations?\r\nWe do not know yet. We have asked this question. The academics have\r\ntold us that vibration is, as they always say, quite complicated.\r\nIt is speed, it is mass. It is whether there are floating slab tracks\r\nor concrete tracks. Is it round the curves or straight? So there\r\nis a variety of different possible factors that they need to input\r\ninto the so-called \"equation\", which is why SMRT brought an expert\r\nin to do a scoping exercise, to come up with a detailed plan to\r\nmeasure the different trains, different speeds, different places.\r\nWe will, then, analyse the results, and we will know better thereafter.
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\r\n 4.16 pm
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\r\n \r\n \r\n Mr Gerald Giam Yean Song\r\n :\r\nI thank the Minister for his statement. I have one supplementary\r\nquestion. Why is the COI that he appointed only going to cover the disruptions\r\non 15 and 17 December? As the Minister has said earlier, there were\r\nactually 269 other disruptions or instances lasting more than five\r\nminutes that happened last year. By limiting the inquiry to just\r\nthe incidents on 15 and 17 December, is the Government omitting\r\nthe major problems – whether systematic or otherwise – that may have\r\nbeen the cause of the other incidents?
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\r\n I understand that LTA would\r\nbe investigating the other incidents, as the Minister mentioned\r\njust now. But is it not necessary to have an independent panel or\r\ncommittee to be investigating these as well?
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\r\n \r\n \r\n Mr Lui Tuck Yew\r\n : Convening\r\nthe COI is a serious matter. The last time the transport arena had\r\nto convene a COI was back in April 2004 during the Nicoll Highway\r\nincident. You know that when you bring the COI together, it is really\r\nto take a very, very careful detailed look at very serious disruptions.
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\r\n The \"ordinary\" disruptions − if I can call\r\nthem that, that is, the 5-minute, 10-minute or 30-minute disruptions\r\n– I think you would leave it to both the operator as well as LTA\r\nto investigate thoroughly and to draw lessons as to whether there\r\nare systemic causes, what are the issues involved as well as to\r\nmake the improvements needed. I did also say in the Statement that\r\nthe COI could and should look at other factors that may have contributed\r\nto what happened on 15 and 17 December.
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\r\n My personal belief is that\r\nbefore any significant incident happens, there is possibly a series\r\nof little incidents that if we had been monitoring these carefully\r\nover time, taking the lessons learned, doing the necessary improvements\r\nand changes, may have prevented them. I speak from experience because,\r\nhaving served 20 years in the Navy, I know that that is so when\r\nwe track it back. So while the COI focuses on what happened on 15\r\nand 17 December, both from the technical and non-technical aspects,\r\nand if it deems it necessary, for example, it would look at the\r\nissue of the claws – how many claws were dislodged in the past,\r\nwhat did you do with regard to such claws, and so on and so forth.\r\nIt need not be constrained as to what actually happened and the approximate\r\ncauses for the 15 and 17 December. If it deems it necessary, it\r\ncan go beyond that to look at the events as well as the other factors.\r\nIt is actually quite a broad scope. But I would also add that I\r\nthink it is not possible nor is it necessary for us to convene a\r\nCOI for every five-minute disruption to the train system.
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\r\n 4.19 pm
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\r\n \r\n \r\n Ms Tin Pei Ling (Marine Parade)\r\n :\r\nI thank the Minister for the very comprehensive Statement. I also\r\nfind it very assuring that the Government is looking very seriously\r\ninto the possibilities of terror attacks and therefore planning\r\nfor such emergencies. But, frankly, I am also a little disappointed\r\nthat the SMRT, since this is under its purview, has not been able\r\nto anticipate or prepare for emergency scenarios like those that\r\nhad happened in December, since those would have been the more likely\r\nscenarios, especially in terms of train operations, and we see it\r\neverywhere in other countries as well.
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\r\n I felt that in the Minister's\r\nStatement, the emphasis on having a robust maintenance could not\r\nhave been more important and more emphasised, and therefore it brings\r\nme to ask this question: whether the Ministry will consider requiring\r\nservice and technical audits on a regular or half-yearly basis?\r\nIf so, would the Ministry consider publishing such results so that\r\npublic confidence could be restored? This would be a suggestion that\r\nI hope the Ministry could perhaps consider, in addition to the investigation\r\nand reports that the COI would be putting together. I think, in\r\none night, if 61 rail defects and 13 faulty trains were uncovered,\r\nthis could not have happened overnight. If we could put in such\r\nmeasures on a more regular basis, perhaps such disruptions could\r\nbe better mitigated.
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\r\n \r\n \r\n Mr Lui Tuck Yew\r\n : Thank you\r\nfor the suggestion. I really do not want to speculate at this point\r\nas to what were the underlying causes. We know that the claws dislodged.\r\nThe question we need to ask is: Could it have been picked up? Could\r\nsomething have been done about it before the two incidents happened?\r\nWould a more stringent regulatory and audit regime have helped?\r\nThese are areas that we do not quite know at this point in time,\r\nand I dare say that I would not want to add to the speculation,\r\nbut I would allow the COI to do its job. If the COI deems that we\r\nreally need to strengthen the regulatory and audit regime, and for LTA to pay more\r\nattention to these areas, we would certainly want to take that on\r\nboard.
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\r\n 4.22 pm
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\r\n \r\n \r\n Mr Yaw Shin Leong\r\n : Sir, I\r\nthank the Minister for the statement. I just have one clarification.\r\nWhy do the MRT train windows not have emergency ventilation panels built\r\nin, so that commuters can manually open them in the event of an\r\nemergency like this one, or, say, if there is a chemical attack\r\non the trains? The Hong Kong MTR has such panels in every train\r\nwindow which can be pulled open easily in the event of an emergency.\r\nShould this not have been part of the design specification of the\r\ntrains? Is LTA intending to make this feature a requirement in all\r\nfuture train deliveries, including the 17 Kawasaki trains? And will\r\nit modify existing trains to implement this feature?
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\r\n \r\n \r\n Mr Lui Tuck Yew\r\n : I thank\r\nMr Yaw for that question. What we have today is emergency power\r\nsupply on board that will allow the emergency systems not the full system,\r\nbut emergency lighting, ventilation and so on – for up to 45 minutes.\r\nThese are tested regularly − I have checked with them − and they\r\nshould last for up to 45 minutes. His point about whether we should\r\nhave windows that can be opened in the event of a chemical attack\r\nand so on, I hesitate to say \"yes\" because sometimes that can actually be\r\nmore dangerous than it would otherwise be if you have them closed.\r\nBecause in a chemical attack, the chemical agents are actually outside\r\nin the tunnels or whatever it is. You would want to try and keep\r\nthe train cars sealed for as long as possible.
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\r\n I am not an expert in this\r\nmatter as to whether you would want to have the windows open where\r\npeople under all circumstances would be prepared to just pull open\r\nthe windows, when sometimes it may be actually a greater danger\r\nto them. So, where necessary, I would want to take a much more careful\r\nlook at this. But whether the emergency power supply of 45 minutes\r\nis doing what it is supposed to do, and whether it is sufficient,\r\nI would want to take a more careful look into that.
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\r\n 4.24 pm
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\r\n \r\n \r\n Dr Janil Puthucheary (Pasir Ris-Punggol)\r\n :\r\nMr Speaker, Sir, I would like to ask the Minister two questions.\r\nGiven that our rail network is probably increasing in length and almost\r\ncertainly in complexity, the absolute number of disruptions may\r\nincrease even as the relative number reduces. Does LTA audit variance\r\nfrom the various emergency plans that the operators put up, such\r\nas the RIMP that he described? If not, why not? If so, would they\r\nconsider using variance from the proposed plans as part of a performance\r\nindicator? So, between the regulator and the operator, if they come\r\nup with an emergency preparedness plan, does LTA investigate whether\r\nthe plan that was proposed and was approved, is actually the plan\r\nthat was carried out in an emergency situation? And if not, why\r\nwas that not measured? If it is measured, could that variance from\r\nthe plan be used as the performance indicator to incentivise the\r\noperator to put up realistic plans and carry out those plans properly?
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\r\n \r\n \r\n Mr Lui Tuck Yew\r\n : Mr Speaker,\r\nlet me thank Dr Janil for a very good question. Yes, indeed, we\r\ndo audit the variance. So, whether it is in terms of timings for\r\nthe activation of the different protocols – activation, indeed,\r\nof the RIMP itself – whether the bus-bridging service is activated in a sufficiently\r\ntimely manner, the number of buses and so on, it is certainly so.\r\nIt is the outcomes and whether the operators are able to meet the outcomes\r\nexpected of them.
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\r\n 4.26 pm
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\r\n \r\n \r\n Dr Lim Wee Kiak (Nee Soon)\r\n :\r\nSir, I would like to ask the Minister about benchmarking ourselves\r\nagainst other countries' MRT system, like Hong Kong MTR, as well\r\nas the Tokyo system versus New York and London systems. What are\r\ntheir breakdown rates like compared to ours?
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\r\n The second question I would\r\nlike to ask is this: during the PTC reviews, whenever the public\r\ntransport operator requests for a fare increase, are these breakdown\r\nrates computed into the formula? This means that if there are more\r\nbreakdowns, why do we let them have a chance to have a fare increase?\r\nCommuters have been complaining that while fares go up, the quality\r\nof service may not measure up.
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\r\n \r\n \r\n Mr Lui Tuck Yew\r\n : I thank\r\nthe Member for that question. I actually do not have the detailed\r\ndata for some of these other regimes. I know that in terms of availability\r\nas well as service standards, we are generally comparable if not\r\nbetter than many of them. We have a little bit more data on fares,\r\nbut since that is not question that the Member raised, I would not\r\nwant to share that data right now. But indeed we do try and get\r\nas much information as possible, as well as the problems they are\r\nencountering and sharing the problems that we encounter to try,\r\noverall, for everyone to have a more robust operating regime.
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\r\n On fare formula: the fare\r\nformula is due for review in 2012 for implementation in 2013. I\r\ndo not want to speculate at this point in time whether and how the\r\nfare formula for the coming years may change. You know what the\r\nfare formula entails today. When we assemble the team to let them\r\ntake a review of the fare formula, they will have sufficient room\r\nto consider then all the necessary factors that may have to go into\r\nthe new fare formula.
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\r\n 4.28 pm
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\r\n \r\n \r\n Er Dr Lee Bee Wah\r\n : Thank\r\nyou, Mr Speaker, Sir. The Minister mentioned earlier about the first\r\nbatch of train being sent for service life extension. May I ask\r\nMinister what is that? What is being done to the train and is this\r\na common practice? How long is the extension of the life span of\r\nthe train? Why is it that it is not replaced by new trains? And if\r\nit is replaced by a new train, how much will it cost SMRT? Does\r\nSMRT have sufficient funds to replace new trains?
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\r\n \r\n \r\n Mr Lui Tuck Yew\r\n : Well, I\r\ndo not have all the details as to exactly what they do. I do know\r\nthat, for example in London, I was told that trains have gone into\r\nthe third cycle of extension. So, roughly about average 15 years\r\nafter you take over the trains, you do a major improvement to them\r\nand then the trains come out. Through the course of the 15 years,\r\nyou continue to improve on the trains. These are smaller maintenance\r\nregimes. Every 15 years you take the trains in for an extended period\r\nof time and we do what is necessary.
\r\n
\r\n Why not replace them with new trains? We\r\nhave added 22 new trains just over the course of this year. There\r\nis another lot of new trains coming in, in 2014. I cannot recall the\r\nnumber but together, what we are getting this year plus the new\r\ntrains in 2014, would be about 25% of the total capacity for the\r\nCompass lines.
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\r\n My philosophy, and I think\r\nit is a philosophy that we all share, is we need to be prudent in\r\nthe use of funds, because at the end of the day, who will ultimately\r\nbear the costs, even if it is paid for by the Government? Ultimately,\r\nit goes back to the taxpayers. Whether they pay for it through taxes,\r\nwhether it is done through fares, we want to be as fiscally prudent\r\nas we possibly can. We build what needs to be built. Certainly,\r\n$60 billion over 10 years, is already a lot of money to build the\r\nnew lines, the Downtown Lines, the Thomson Line and so on. New trains\r\nare being added to the North-East line, to the Circle Line as well\r\nas – where Mr Liang Eng Hwa's constituency is – Bukit Panjang LRT.
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\r\n So, there is significant\r\nexpenditure. It is important for us even while we spend billions of\r\ndollars to also be counting the millions of dollars that each new\r\ntrain would cost. If we can continue to prolong the life of each\r\ntrain without making it unsafe or degrading its performance, then\r\nI think it is important for us to do so.
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\r\n 4.31 pm
\r\n
\r\n \r\n \r\n Assoc Prof Fatimah Lateef\r\n :\r\nTwo issues, Sir. One, can I ask the Minister for his definition\r\nof train intrusions because I am not very clear on what that term\r\nactually means? Secondly, it is pertaining to the gaps in the emergency\r\npreparedness. I know that we conduct exercises every year, almost.\r\nOne example is the North-Star exercise where multi-agencies are\r\ninvolved. The basic fundamental that we practise during these exercises\r\nare crowd-control, evacuations and how to handle emergencies, including emergency\r\ncommunications. So, to say that there are lapses in such fundamental\r\nissues gives me certain concerns. I wonder whether we should tailor\r\nfuture exercises accordingly; both in simulated, as well as the\r\nMinister mentioned, unsimulated situations. Also, perhaps, as he\r\nmentioned, we should use volunteers, NSmen, school students and\r\ngrassroots leaders as \"casualties\" in such exercises. Perhaps we\r\ncould consider opening these up to Singaporeans to volunteer so\r\nthat they actually get the real feel and they know exactly what\r\nto do in emergency situations.
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\r\n \r\n \r\n Mr Lui Tuck Yew\r\n : On intrusions:\r\nthey are not \"train intrusions\", they are \"track intrusions\". \"Train\r\nintrusions\", I think, would refer to the graffiti and all. I was\r\ntalking about track intrusions and they would disrupt services for\r\nperhaps more than 30 minutes while we carry out the evacuation.\r\nThere are the voluntary and the involuntary track intrusions, which\r\nis why we build the half-height platform doors along the main lines.
\r\n
\r\n On training exercises, I\r\nfully appreciate the point that Member Dr Fatimah has raised and\r\nI share the disappointment that, despite table-top exercises and\r\nfull troop exercises, the execution of the emergency plans leaves\r\nmuch to be desired. My take is this: there is a difference when\r\nyou do pre-planned and scripted exercises, where the participants are\r\npsychologically prepared and they know what is going to come next.\r\nAnd you assemble, often is the case, the most prepared team to take\r\npart in the exercise. Yes, it helps\r\nwhen the officers step through the procedures and sometimes you\r\nfind shortcomings in the procedures. But in terms of the realism,\r\nit is not there. In terms of actually testing whoever ought to be\r\ntested, you may not be testing the right people. Therefore, the\r\nmost realistic exercises ought to be the unannounced, unscripted\r\nones, where you allow a certain degree of free play, which means\r\nthat if you really want that degree of realism, you ought to be\r\nconducting exercises on one or a few of your trains during, say,\r\na Friday evening peak hour. But the inconvenience to commuters would\r\nbe unimaginable. It would be on a scale or close to the scale of\r\nthe disruptions that we saw on 15 and 17 December. I do not suggest\r\nthat we go in that direction. I merely said that we ought to improve\r\non the way we conduct our exercises today to inject a greater degree\r\nof realism so that people are, to some extent, caught off guard.\r\nSo, you are able to really assess how prepared they are and how\r\nquickly they can respond to it. We will have to think through how\r\nthis is best done, but I do not think it is possible to spring such surprises\r\non Singaporeans without any proper announcement.
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\r\n With regard to opening up\r\nspots for such exercises to all Singaporeans, it is certainly something\r\nthat we will consider so that it is not only the grassroots nor\r\nonly school students that would be involved, but whoever who would\r\nlike to participate and get a sense of what is required and be more\r\nprepared to respond to an emergency, is something that we can consider.
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\r\n 4.35 pm
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\r\n \r\n \r\n Mr Pritam Singh (Aljunied)\r\n :\r\nI would like to thank the Minister for his reply. Incidents do happen\r\nand I am glad the Minister has proceeded to give a lengthy response\r\nto this House. I am concerned about the public's cynicism about\r\nexercises like the North-Star series. To renew public's confidence,\r\ncan I request the Minister to consider getting the regulator, in\r\nthis case LTA, to underwrite and approve all safety and communication-related\r\nSOPs implemented by the operator in future, as it does appear to\r\nbe the case that this was where the SMRT's response was indeed very\r\nwoeful? This is also short of springing surprises on Singaporeans\r\nwith unannounced exercises which I do not think is realistic.
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\r\n \r\n \r\n Mr Lui Tuck Yew\r\n : Sir, I thank\r\nthe Member for understanding that it is not quite possible to do\r\nexercises in that manner. Today, the role of the regulator with\r\nregard to the operator's plans, for example, their Rail Incident\r\nManagement Plan (RIMP), is that the operator submits this plan to\r\nthe LTA for review. It is not a formal approval but they sit together,\r\nthey run through the plans, they make sure that actually the parameters\r\nare set up quite clearly and then, as Dr Janil had asked earlier,\r\nwe would hold them to it so that when there is a need to operationalise\r\nor to execute such plans, we are able to assess the variants and\r\nwhether they have conformed to the plans. This takes place not only\r\nfor incidents but also for their safety and maintenance plans as\r\nwell.
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\r\n 4.37 pm
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\r\n \r\n \r\n Mr Gan Thiam Poh (Pasir Ris-Punggol)\r\n :\r\nSir, for any incident or accident, we should be more concerned about\r\nhuman safety. Can Minister assure the House that the operator will\r\nensure that the accident that happened in China, where there was\r\na collision, will never happen in our train system, even if our\r\nsignalling system has failed?
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\r\n \r\n \r\n Mr\r\nLui Tuck Yew\r\n : Sir, I think the Member will appreciate\r\nand understand that it is never possible to give an iron-clad guarantee\r\non such matters, but let me assure him that we looked very carefully\r\nat what happened in China. We wanted to do everything possible to\r\nmake sure that the signalling equipment in Singapore will, as best\r\nas we can do so, not be subject to what happened there.
\r\n
\r\n On signalling: indeed sometimes\r\nwe hear of signalling faults being announced during a distruption.\r\nThere are two types of signalling faults. One is on board the train and\r\nthe other one is track-side. When you have an on board the train\r\nsignalling fault, the train cannot carry on its operations. It has\r\nto be either pushed or hauled to the depot or to a siding. When\r\nyou have a track side signalling fault, the trains can continue\r\nto operate but in manual mode. And in manual mode, the driver takes\r\nover control of the trains, and of course, we reduce the speed of\r\nthe train and the speed instead of at 80km/hour, you will run it\r\nto as slow as 15km/hour and you would extend the headways between\r\nthe trains. So, it is a degraded service. So, for track side signalling\r\nfaults, you can continue with some degraded mode of operation, but\r\nif it is a train signalling fault, you would have to pull that train\r\nout before you can resume service. Or you can put the train to the side\r\nbefore you can resume service.
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\r\n The point about commuter\r\nsafety is one that we take absolutely seriously. And so, in the\r\nOperating Performance Standards (OPS), we allow certain disruptions,\r\ncertain breakdowns and all, but no fires on board, no fatalities.\r\nThose are very, very stringently spelt out. And I assure you, I\r\nassure the House and the public, that out of all this investigations,\r\nout of the work that the COI is going to do and the recommendations\r\nthat they would put forward that we would take on board. We will\r\ncontinue to improve on what we have – just as we have made some\r\nimmediate improvements. We will continue on them and help the public\r\nrestore and regain confidence in the MRT system.
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\r\n 4.40 pm
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\r\n \r\n \r\n Mr Muhamad Faisal Bin Abdul Manap (Aljunied)\r\n :\r\nSir, I would like to ask the Minister, regarding the driverless\r\ntrains on the Circle Line, what is the Standard Operating Procedure\r\nfor responding to train emergencies? A least now, for the NEL, there\r\nis still a staff member on each train so he or she could take control\r\nof the emergency situation. But for the City Line, they do not have\r\nany, I believe, operator so what should the SOP be?
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\r\n \r\n \r\n Mr Lui Tuck Yew\r\n : Mr Speaker,\r\nlet me thank the Member for a very good question. The driverless\r\ntrains are designed so that in the event of an emergency, as much\r\nas possible, they would be able to coast to the next station. So\r\nthat is how the parameters are designed and that is how the emergency\r\npower is designed. We have people at every station and so, in the\r\nevent that there is a need to, they would have people from the stations\r\ncome to provide support to the trains.
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\r\n 4.41 pm
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\r\n \r\n \r\n Mrs Lina Chiam\r\n : Thank you,\r\nSir. At the time of the disruption of the MRT trains, passengers\r\nleft the trains and walked through tunnels along the railway tracks\r\nto reach their destinations.\r\nMay I clarify with the Minister whether the railway tracks were electrified?\r\nAnd if they were electrified, did they pose a danger to these commuters? Secondly,\r\nwill the Committee assure that the next CEO that will be appointed\r\nwill not be holding numerous portfolios as this will deter the work\r\nefficiency? Can the Minister clarify?
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\r\n \r\n \r\n Mr Lui Tuck Yew\r\n : On detrainment\r\nbetween stations, this is not the first choice. The first choice\r\nis actually to bring a stalled train into a station. So you either\r\nhave another train to pull it or push it so that the passengers\r\ncan actually disembark from the train at the station. That is always\r\nthe preferred mode of evacuating passengers. Hence, when you take\r\na decision to detrain them and have them walk along the tracks,\r\nit will take a certain amount of time before that decision is made\r\nbecause you would want to avoid exposing passengers to such conditions.
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\r\n Secondly, there is a very\r\nstrict safety protocol that you have to follow before such passengers\r\nare allowed onto the tracks. One of the steps is to make sure that\r\nthe electricity supply is shut off, the third rail is de-energised\r\n– just to mention some considerations – before the passengers are\r\nallowed to detrain and walk on the tracks.
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\r\n I am not so sure I follow\r\nthe Member's point about CEOs holding numerous portfolios, but that\r\nis something that is best determined by the Boards who are responsible\r\nfor appointing such CEOs as well as for their overall performance.
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\r\n 4.43 pm
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\r\n \r\n \r\n Ms Denise Phua Lay Peng\r\n :\r\nThank you, Sir. I also thank the Minister for a very comprehensive\r\nstatement. I would like to ask the Minister for the background leading\r\nto the resignation of SMRT's CEO, Ms Saw. May I find out if the\r\nresignation should happen after the completion of the investigation\r\nby the COI, or at least until the next CEO is identified and there\r\nis a proper handover? Or is this just a populist decision to placate the\r\npublic by whomever who makes the decision? And whether the resignation\r\nof the CEO right now is truly a better solution for the operator?
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\r\n \r\n \r\n Mr Lui Tuck Yew\r\n : Let me again\r\nthank the Member for the supplementary question. It is a good question\r\nto ask, except that I do not have the answer because this is not something\r\nthat is determined by MOT or even LTA. As I have mentioned in my\r\nreply just now, the operator runs its appointments of Chairman,\r\nDirectors and so on past the LTA, but we have never vetoed any such\r\nappointments. Certainly, the performance of the CEO is something\r\nthat the Board decides on. Whether she resigns now or why she has to\r\nresign and so on, that is an internal SMRT matter.
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\r\n I know as much as what I\r\nhave read in the press, which is that she was already contemplating\r\nand there was some discussion about her leaving the company because she\r\nhas already done nine years. 2012 would have been her tenth year\r\nand that is a pretty long time in one particular organisation. So\r\neven prior to the incidents, there was already some ongoing discussion.\r\nWhat I do know is that while having no executive role in the organisation,\r\nshe will stay on until the investigations are completed so that\r\nshe is able to provide her perspectives and inputs to the investigations\r\nboth within the SMRT as well as by the COI.
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\r\n 4.46 pm
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\r\n \r\n \r\n Mr\r\nCedric Foo Chee Keng\r\n : Sir, it was good to hear the\r\nMinister reiterating that commuter safety is of paramount importance\r\nfor the COI to look into. I would also like to ask the Minister\r\nif he agrees that the independence of the COI is also equally important\r\nso that the public's confidence in the findings of the COI, when\r\nthey are presented to the House, is not undermined. Would the Minister\r\nshare with us his thinking behind the choice of the Chairman in\r\nthe Chief District Judge? He is a learned judge. Is he very senior?\r\nWhy did the Minister agree with that selection and the selection of\r\nthe members within his Committee?
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\r\n \r\n \r\n Mr Lui Tuck Yew\r\n : I want to\r\nthank the Member for that supplementary question. I have absolutely\r\nno doubt that the COI is an independent one. It is set up that way.\r\nThey will have an independent investigation body. MHA has agreed\r\nthat the CID will be their investigation arm, not because we consider\r\nthat there is a criminal liability or such like. It is just that\r\nthe CID has very good investigative skills. They are totally separate\r\nfrom the parties that are involved in the incidents, and they will\r\nbe the primary investigation arm for the COI.
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\r\n Why these three gentlemen?\r\nMr Tan Siong Thye is the Chief District Judge of the Subordinate\r\nCourts, the No. 1, the best man. The Inquiries Act stated that one\r\nmember must be legally trained. I consulted and took views from\r\ndifferent people. He was at the top of the list – absolutely no\r\nquestion whatsoever about his capabilities, integrity, etc. The\r\nfact that he is a public transport commuter and has been so regularly\r\nover the last 10 years was a real bonus. It was not a key consideration.\r\nTo me, it was a bonus. Having interacted with him, I have absolute\r\ntrust in his ability to get to the bottom of the issues.
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\r\n Professor Lim Mong King,\r\nvery learned. Expertise, of course, he is an engineer. He was Dean\r\nof the Engineering School, Deputy President of NTU, so he is a very\r\nrespected, learned gentleman. He has got expertise in vibration.\r\nHe has done work on this, and this is an area that we are, of course,\r\nvery much interested in. He has also had the benefit of sitting\r\non a couple of COIs in the past dealing with shipyard fires. We\r\nthought that that was going to be useful because he would understand\r\nwhat really needs to be done to get to the bottom of it.
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\r\n Mr Soh Wai Wah, now Director\r\nof Prisons, was for many years in the Police Force as their Operations\r\nHead, the G3 of the Police Force. He was involved in planning many\r\nbig events, including crisis management, dealing with incidents,\r\netc. Prior to that, he was also involved in incidents like the Hotel\r\nNew World collapse, etc.
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\r\n So my feel is that we were\r\nlooking for different expertise: legal, engineering and technical,\r\nas well as operational expertise. We wanted people who really have\r\na great deal of experience and have much to contribute to the COI,\r\nable to work well as a team. After we have decided on Chairman Tan\r\nSiong Thye, I discussed with him the other two members to make sure\r\nthat he was comfortable working together as a team because they\r\nwill all have to support one another and cover the areas together.\r\nThat was how it was assembled. Why did we choose those people that\r\nwe did? There were, of course, a number of other prominent names\r\nthat we considered. Some of them whom we looked at are already doing\r\nwork with SMRT, LTA, MOT, and so we had to not allow some of these\r\nvery capable individuals to be part of the COI. Professor Lim Mong\r\nKing, equally capable,\r\nfortunately was not doing work for us at this point in time. Hence,\r\nthe independence of the individuals of the team was considered as\r\nwell.
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\r\n 4.51 pm
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\r\n \r\n \r\n Ms Irene Ng Phek Hoong\r\n : Sir,\r\nI am surprised that the Minister does not have details of the rate\r\nof disruptions of the train systems in other developed cities. This\r\nquestion is actually also in my PQ in the Order Paper. Without this\r\ndata, how can the Minister and MOT, as regulator, determine what\r\nis the acceptable level of disruptions in Singapore?
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\r\n Can I also ask the Minister\r\nwhat would he consider as an acceptable level of train disruptions\r\nin Singapore? Related to this is the question of managing the expectations of\r\ncommuters. As other Members have mentioned, incidents do happen,\r\nand for some of us who have travelled abroad – for instance, I have\r\ntravelled in the Tube in London – train disruptions are not irregular.\r\nThey are pretty common, but the commuters take it in their stride\r\nperhaps because they are quite used to such disruptions, or perhaps\r\ntheir alternative arrangements are adequate, or perhaps because\r\nof their culture. But in Singapore, can I ask the Minister how he\r\nassesses the response of the commuters in such emergencies, and\r\nwhether he could set a certain benchmark that is tagged to the train\r\nsystems of developed cities on what is the acceptable rate of train\r\ndisruptions?
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\r\n \r\n \r\n Mr Lui Tuck Yew\r\n : Sir, I should,\r\nof course, get back to the Member on the details of the numbers\r\nin terms of disruptions. What we measure is service availability,\r\nthat is, the ability of the operator to meet what he sets out to\r\ndo in the schedule. The standard that we set for ourselves is 98%.\r\nThe standard that is achieved by the operators is 99.9%-plus. When\r\nwe look at this indicator, it is comparable and is actually slightly\r\nbetter than what we see in other regimes, including Hong Kong and\r\nso on.
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\r\n As for the UK system, I\r\ndo not think it is fair for me to comment on their rate of disruptions.\r\nIt is more anecdotal. I do not have the figures at hand. The UK\r\nsystem is somewhat different from ours. Transport for London is\r\npublicly owned. Their fare system again is different from ours.\r\nIt is more expensive. How they set it is sort of CPI plus 2%, which\r\nis the fare increase that they allowed for the last few years and\r\ngoing forward. The advantage of the London system, if you ask me,\r\nis that while I do not know of them providing bus bridging services\r\nin the event of a disruption, what happens is that the network is\r\nvery dense because they have had more than a hundred years to build\r\nthis up. Hence, if you have the Circle Line or the Jubilee Line\r\nbeing disrupted, the commuters would just move on and walk 500-700\r\nmetres to the next station, do a bypass and find an alternative\r\nway to get to their destination.
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\r\n The fact that disruptions,\r\nas the Member puts it in her own words, \"happen so often\", and whether\r\nthis has conditioned their commuters, I would rather that this not\r\nbe the case in Singapore. I would rather it be that disruptions\r\nare somewhat rare and that commuters express a certain amount of\r\nunhappiness even as they do understand that it would not be possible\r\nfor it to run at 100% all the time, every day, across the entire\r\nyear because no amount of expenditure or redundancy is going to\r\ngive you 100%. I think commuters in Singapore understand this. What\r\nthey need is for more timely and accurate information to be given\r\nto them so that they can say, \"All right, let me try and do something\r\nelse. Let me not go to the station, let me take a bus or walk somewhere else\r\nand take the Circle Line instead of the Compass lines.\" We need\r\nto make that available to our commuters.
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\r\n I would rather ours be a situation where\r\nthe disruptions, particularly the major disruptions that will require\r\nus to close stretches of the line, are so rare that when it happens\r\nit causes a great amount of unhappiness. And we ought to take these\r\nmatters seriously, get to the root of it and minimise it as much\r\nas possible so that we continue to keep our standards high.
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\r\n 4.56 pm
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\r\n \r\n \r\n Dr Intan Azura Mokhtar (Ang Mo Kio)\r\n :\r\nI thank the Minister for taking the time to patiently answer all\r\nthe questions. Are there external operators or contractors who carry out\r\nmaintenance works on trains and tracks other than SMRT personnel,\r\nin order to provide that additional layer of checks and balances?\r\nWould the Ministry consider getting other private train operators\r\nto manage our train system in the light of numerous train disruptions\r\nunder the SMRT?
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\r\n \r\n \r\n Mr Lui Tuck Yew\r\n : Sir, I thank\r\nthe Member for the two supplementary questions. Certainly, there\r\nare external personnel because I have seen them myself. I was down there\r\non Boxing Day at about 3.30 in the morning, just to get a feel of\r\nwhat it is that they do and to talk to their people. Certainly,\r\nthey bring in people from outside of SMRT to help them in some of\r\nthe work, especially the heavy lifting. But they assured me that\r\nthe man in charge of the entire team is from the SMRT and he is\r\nresponsible for making sure that the track is ready for works to\r\ntake place, that the works are done according to what is required,\r\nthat they clear up and prepare the tracks for operations when they\r\nresume. So, yes, certainly so, but they are under the charge of\r\nSMRT personnel.
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\r\n Today, we are moving to\r\na new rail financing framework. The Downtown Line that we put up\r\nfor tender last year was the first of these lines under this framework\r\nand it was a competitive bid between SMRT and SBST – just the two\r\nof them. This is the first time that is happening. At another occasion,\r\nI will speak more on it and reiterate the rationale as well as the\r\nbenefits of why we are doing this. In time to come, gradually, all\r\nthe new lines and even the existing lines will come under this competitive\r\nbidding framework by the operators. I do not preclude the possibility\r\nthat one day, when we are a lot more familiar and comfortable with\r\nthis new framework that we will open it up to other operators who\r\nare suitably qualified and experienced to participate in such tenders.
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\r\n \r\n \r\n Mr Speaker\r\n : One last question\r\nby Mr Desmond Lee.
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\r\n \r\n \r\n Mr Desmond Lee\r\n : Thank you,\r\nMr Speaker. As I spoke to community leaders, grassroots leaders\r\nand residents about the SMRT incident to get their views of what happened,\r\nthey compared SMRT's and the public's response to this incident\r\nwith the response they see in other countries. When the earthquakes\r\nstruck Japan, every child knows where to duck, where to hide. When\r\na gas attack threatens countries in the Middle East, they know when\r\nthey don their gas masks and they take it very seriously. The concern\r\nthey raised was whether the public service operators' responsiveness\r\nor lack thereof in this incident might be perhaps symptomatic of\r\nthe seriousness with which we in Singapore take rehearsals and drills\r\nto prepare for emergencies. Take, for example, fire drills that\r\nwe undertake in buildings, how often do we go for coffee breaks,\r\njust before the alarm is raised –
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\r\n \r\n \r\n Mr\r\nSpeaker\r\n : Mr Lee, can you please ask your question?
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\r\n \r\n \r\n Mr Desmond Lee\r\n : Can I ask\r\nthe Minister what wider lessons we can draw from this incident so\r\nthat, in future, we are not just better prepared for public transport\r\ndisruptions but better prepared for all emergencies that we may\r\nface?
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\r\n \r\n \r\n Mr Lui Tuck Yew\r\n : Mr Speaker,\r\nthat is a very difficult last question to deal with, but I think\r\nit is a very pertinent one. I am not so sure that I have all the\r\nanswers to what the Member has just raised because he has raised\r\nvery important points about how we can be better prepared, especially\r\npsychologically, as a people. In total defence, psychological defence\r\nis one of the key pillars. We are of a different mindset if we know that\r\nwe are always exposed to such natural disasters or man-made incidents.\r\nPerhaps, because it is something unusual, something that we are\r\nnot accustomed to, sometimes, our responses may not be as instinctive\r\nand as appropriate as it might otherwise be.
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\r\n Hence, because it is not\r\ninstinctive, all the more reason we need to have as realistic exercises\r\nas possible, involve as many people as we can and try and then use\r\nthem as multipliers to reach out to as many others as we possibly\r\ncan. So that they understand that in an emergency, it actually takes\r\na certain amount of preparedness – physical, psychological and emotional\r\n– in order to best respond to it and be able to preserve life and\r\nlimb.
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\r\n It is not easy to deal with\r\nit because, as the Member has pointed out himself, for fire drills,\r\nhow seriously do we take it? I think the military in particular\r\ntries to inculcate this because if you do not respond properly,\r\nit could be your life. And so they do a good job of it. I certainly\r\nknow that happens within the two years of National Service, and thereafter,\r\nyou try to make sure that when your NSmen come back, they get a\r\ndose of it. Hopefully, this carries them through over time. But\r\nthere is also a need to look at it not only from the individual\r\nresponse but from the collective response because, sometimes, if\r\nyou have one person breaking out in panic, it just stymies everybody\r\ninto a stampede. So you need to have leaders, you need to have people\r\nwho are able to remain calm themselves and who are, in that sense,\r\ncatalyst for calmness in chaotic situations. And then, to be able\r\nto identify these people, give them some amount of training, even recognition\r\nand, hopefully, they are in the right place, at the right time,\r\nto be able to influence crowd behaviour. I think that is also another\r\nfactor that we may well have to consider going forward.
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