1 Ms Denise Phua Lay Peng asked the Minister for Education (Schools) (a) how many appeals for exemption from Mother Tongue Language (MTL) have been received in each of the last three years; (b) what are the reasons for the appeals and what are the outcomes of these appeals; and (c) which department in the Ministry is responsible for assessing the appeals for an exemption from MTL and what is their basis for the approval of the appeals. \t
\tThe Senior Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministers for Education (Ms Low Yen Ling) (for the Minister for Education): Mr Speaker, Sir, bilingualism is a cornerstone of Singapore's education system. Under our bilingual policy, students are required to offer English and a Mother Tongue Language (MTL).
Students may only be granted MTL exemption under exceptional circumstances, such as, if they join our schools mid-stream without having learnt an official MTL or when they have certified Special Educational Needs (SEN) that severely affect their ability to cope with overall learning. Over the past three years, the proportion of Primary 6 students exempted from offering MTL due to SEN has remained fairly stable, at around 2.3% annually.
MTL exemption applications and appeals are evaluated by a Ministry of Education (MOE) panel. The panel comprises specialists with expertise in curriculum provisions and SEN. Depending on the complexity of the case, the panel may also consult clinicians in the healthcare sector in their evaluations of the applications.
Students with difficulties in reading and writing MTL can take up Foundation MTL in Primary 5 and Primary 6, and the MTL \"B\" curriculum at secondary and junior college levels. The Foundation MTL and MTL \"B\" curriculum focuses on the development of oral and listening skills, with a reduced demand on writing skills. This allows them to continue to have exposure to learning MTL.
Mr Speaker: Ms Denise Phua.
\tMs Denise Phua Lay Peng (Jalan Besar): I thank the Senior Parliamentary Secretary for the answer. I strongly support MOE's direction for bilingualism and for several reasons linked to our heritage, our roots and our culture. I have received quite a number of appeals and a lot of concerns as well from some families. So, I am wondering if MOE has used this tool of exemption very bluntly, so bluntly that the families are really struggling and even thinking of future plans whether they should remain in the local education system after the compulsory education years.
So, one, I would like to ask MOE if we can relook at the ways by which we make these decisions. Can we finetune these decisions and consider those cases with merit, especially if they are strongly supported by a very well-respected psychologist and psychiatrist in the field?
Also, finally, to ask if MOE can more creatively come up with more ideas so that people who go through this system of learning MTL do not end up hating it or disliking it so much and dropping it the minute they officially can.
\tMs Low Yen Ling: Mr Speaker, I want to thank Member Ms Denise Phua for her supplementary questions. I would like to assure her and Members of the House that MOE reviews and updates the criteria for MTL exemption regularly to ensure that the objectives of MTL exemption are met and also remain relevant. So, I want to assure her on that.
I also want to reiterate that MTL exemption is granted to students with SEN. Allow me to just share some of the considerations by the MOE panel. First and foremost, when we receive an application, we will look at the diagnosis by the psychologist that they had submitted. Two, we will also liaise with the student's school to understand how the student is managing his or her learning. Three, we will work with the school to better understand if the student is responding well to the teaching and instruction during the MTL lessons. All these are important inputs for the decision. The fourth consideration that we look at is how well the student is coping with the overall studies.
For students who submit MTL-exemption applications on grounds of SEN, these are the four key considerations. I mentioned earlier that we do review the criteria from time to time. I want to give Members the assurance. I also want to assure Members that MOE Headquarters takes every MTL-exemption application seriously. We look at it very thoroughly.
Mr Speaker: Mr Yee Chia Hsing.
\tMr Yee Chia Hsing (Chua Chu Kang): I have received feedback that some of the families have been working abroad for many years and their kids grew up overseas. In their case, when they come back, the children are supposed to enter secondary school and they have to suddenly study MTL when they do not even speak a single word of Mandarin. Is that also ground for exemption?
\tMs Low Yen Ling: Mr Speaker, I want to thank Mr Yee Chia Hsing for his supplementary question. Earlier on, in my answer, I did specify that there are two target segments of students that we will consider granting the MTL exemption. The first group will be students who are severely affected because of their SEN. The second group will be students who join our Singapore education system mid-stream, and they did not have the opportunity to learn MTL.
So, yes, we do consider the application for MTL exemption by the group that is highlighted by Mr Yee. I want to assure Mr Yee that for those applications, we would evaluate factors like the applicants' learning history, previous country of residence, admission level and also, the extent of home language environment.
Mr Speaker: Ms Denise Phua.
\tMs Denise Phua Lay Peng: As a follow-up to Mr Yee's question, I would like to ask the Senior Parliamentary Secretary if it is true that one of the factors of consideration is that the child or the applicant must fail every subject before they can be exempted from MTL?
Secondly, just to comment on Mr Yee's question, I do think that even if people or children come back from overseas, there is space for us to encourage them in the learning of MTL. I would like MOE to consider, in the spirit of lifelong learning, if there is any way by which it could convene a group so that we can continue with this learning of MTL or other languages that are useful or of interest, for the longer term, beyond the formal school years.
\tMs Low Yen Ling: I thank Ms Phua for her supplementary questions. The answer to the Member's first question about the marks, there is no arithmetic formula per se. I did share the four key factors that the MOE panel will consider. And one consideration is how well they are coping in their overall study, whether there is a need for us to make adjustment to the student's total academic load. That is one.
It is worthwhile for me to take a few seconds to reiterate that in MOE, we are committed to support and enable every student to learn MTL at a level that he or she is capable of, something that Ms Denise Phua earlier said that she was fully supportive of. This is why the MTL curriculum is differentiated to cater to the needs of students based on their varying abilities.
I can give an example. We do have students with SEN who have chosen to take Foundation MTL at Primary 5 and Primary 6. The focus of the Foundation MTL is to help them to develop a strong foundation in their oral and listening skills, with less demand on writing.
Let me be specific. The Member highlighted the marks. For example, if a Primary 5 student takes Foundation MTL, he or she, at this point in time, does not need to write a single character or word in MTL during exams. Why is that so? Because 55% of the marks are based on Oral Exam, 30% are based on Listening Comprehension and the other 15% are based on Comprehension with multiple choice answers. So, there are students who have chosen to take Foundation MTL so that they can build up their foundation in MTL as the parents know bilingualism is advantageous to the child.
As for the third question, yes, this is why we are working with SkillsFuture Singapore to bring MTL lessons into the heartlands to allow adult learners to continue to hone their proficiency in MTL.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Measures to Attract Legal Talent to Singapore Judiciary","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"OA","content":"2 Mr Christopher de Souza asked the Minister for Law (a) what are the measures the Government is taking to ensure that the Singapore Judiciary continues to be able to attract legal talent of the highest calibre; and (b) how does the situation in Singapore compare with that of the UK.
\tMr Christopher de Souza (Holland-Bukit Timah): The basis of my question took reference from a recent 18 March report published in the British newspaper, The Times. With Speaker's permission, may I ask the Clerks to distribute copies so that Members can refer to it?
Mr Speaker: Yes, please. [Copies of article distributed to hon Members.]
\tMr Christopher de Souza: I am grateful. I have also informed the Minister for Law so that the article can be addressed in the Minister's response. Question No 2, please.
\tThe Minister for Law (Mr K Shanmugam): Mr Speaker, Sir, I thank the Member for the question, and I thank him for alerting me to the report beforehand. The article which the Member has distributed speaks of a \"crisis in recruiting judges to the top levels of the bench\" in the United Kingdom (UK). It says that the UK courts are unable to attract high calibre legal talent to fill vacancies on the Bench.
There are likely to be several reasons. One reason is said to be because of \"a perception that [judges] are not valued\". The article also says that the judges went to the Employment Tribunal to argue their case on their own remuneration packages, specifically pension arrangements. And the government is appealing against the Tribunal's ruling.
So, here you have judges taking up their cases to the Employment Tribunal against the government; and now, the government is appealing against that decision. I think many of us would find this turn of events quite surprising.
The UK judiciary has always been perceived as being in an exalted position, highly valued, world-class and, really, beyond these sorts of squabbles. Our own legal system is derived from the British system, and we owe much to them. Many of us grew up as lawyers, knowing and believing that the British judiciary was, in fact, the gold standard.
It is, therefore, quite saddening to read this article. Some of the difficulties faced by judges in the UK have been quite public for some time. One of the reasons for this state of affairs, in my view, is that, for some time, the UK judiciary does not appear to have been given the resources it may have needed. And also, judges have been subjected to unfair public attacks.
These attacks have undermined the standing, prestige and morale of the judiciary. In 2015, the then-Lord Chief Justice of the UK said that “there has, overall, been a widespread feeling [amongst judges] of not being valued or appreciated for their work”. I referred Members to this when we discussed the Administration of Justice (Protection) Act (AOJP Act).
The results of a 2016 UK Judicial Attitude Survey published in February of last year showed that only 43% of judges feel valued by the public. That is down from 49% in 2014, which is, itself, low; only 2% feel valued by the UK government; and only 3% feel valued by the media. In fact, fully 42% of judges stated in the survey that they would leave the judiciary if it were a viable option.
This state of judicial morale in the UK owes somewhat to the attacks on judges by the British media. With your permission, Mr Speaker, I have asked for two newspaper cuttings to be distributed to Members in the House.
You can imagine that the standing of the judiciary in the eyes of the public does not get enhanced when these sorts of attacks are made by mass circulation media. In an earlier 2014 UK Judicial Attitude Survey, almost two-thirds or 62% of all judges said that members of the judiciary are respected by society less than they were 10 years ago.
Half of all judges – in fact, more than half – 56% of all judges saw media representation of judges and 59% saw public misunderstanding of the judiciary as factors which drove these changes. I also referred Members to this during the AOJP debate.
It is not difficult to see why when you have newspaper headlines labelling judges as \"Enemies of the people\" and \"You fools\" when the courts decide in ways that the media dislikes.
The Internet, social media in particular, seems to have worsened the problem. The current Lord Chief Justice, in a press conference in December last year, said that judges are facing \"an increasing torrent of personal abuse online\", some of which was designed to intimidate them. In the 2016 Judicial Attitude Survey I earlier cited, 15% of the respondents – the judges – said they had concerns about their own personal safety on social media.
What are the lessons for us? The situation we have in Singapore is slightly different. In a survey conducted by my Ministry in late 2015 on how Singaporeans viewed the Courts, 92% said they had trust and confidence in our legal system, and 96% agreed that Singapore was governed by rule of law. In fact, if you see these sorts of surveys across the system – I am particularly aware of the Police, the Courts and the legal system – they all have about 90% or above in terms of trust.
A State Courts user survey that same year found that 95% of users of our Courts had confidence in the fair and effective administration of justice by the State Courts. But this is not cast in stone, and what is happening in the UK could easily have happened in Singapore and can easily happen to us if we are not careful. The reason it has not happened is because we have chosen a different path from the UK in some ways.
First, there is a considerable difference between the UK and Singapore in our respective approaches to the remuneration of judges. I think the article says that a Senior Judge could get about £181,000, which equates to something slightly less than S$400,000 today. For us – the records are public – top practitioners do take a pay cut when they become Judges and, depending on where they were outside, it could be a significant pay cut. Some could take as much as a 70% to 80% pay cut. But many others might take a 10% to 20% pay cut. But in the UK, if you take a top silk earning ₤2 million or more, then you will see the difference on average. So, the cut that our judges take is there, but it is not as steep as in many other countries, including the UK.
We also seek to appoint the best people from the private and public sectors to the Bench and key Legal Service appointments. Our Chief Justice himself was a leading practitioner who was highly regarded both in Singapore and on the international stage. Before he went on to the Bench, he was Attorney-General and then he went on to head the Judiciary.
That is one aspect – remuneration. It is important, and we have to make sure that it remains such that, while there is a cut, it cannot come to a stage where judges feel that they are paid so little that they do not want to take it up, which is the situation seen in many places. Or you certainly do not want them going to Employment Tribunals, and appealing and arguing about their own remuneration.
Second, we have been clear about protecting our Judiciary from abuse and contempt. When we passed the AOJP Act in 2016, there were suggestions that we ought to, in fact, abolish the offence of scandalising the Judiciary, as the UK has done.
The UK Law Commission did recommend the abolition of the offence, but it noted that \"there [was] a great deal of extremely abusive online material concerning judges\". It also observed that the UK Judiciary had lost the deferential respect it used to enjoy and lamented that \"this change is one to be regretted\", and since the situation was so bad and all the judges were being attacked online, and because the UK judiciary no longer had the deferential respect, there was little point in keeping the offence because you cannot reverse it anyway.
The offence of scandalising the judiciary was, therefore, of limited value in the UK, because scandalising the courts was very common.
We did not abolish the offence. Even before the AOJP, we had always taken a strict view on scandalising the Courts, because if there is an erosion of trust and confidence in our Judiciary, that would fundamentally affect the standing of Singapore and the way Singapore functions. That is why I decided that we, in fact, had to further tighten the law on scandalising the Judiciary and lowered the test from \"real risk\" of undermining public confidence in the administration of justice, to one of “risk” that public confidence would be undermined. That was a specific, considered decision and it was the one change to the substance of the law that the AOJP made.
Questions were asked then, in the House as well as outside: \"Other countries are going in the opposite direction. Why do we not follow them?\" My answer is a simple one – we follow other countries if it makes sense, and we frequently look at the practice of other countries and more mature societies – what is good, what will work, we are happy to take. We are not shy about that. But when it makes sense, we must also be confident in charting our own paths. It is important that we are not colonised in our minds.
And the test – since the AOJP has become law, has freedom of speech suffered? Have legitimate, free discussions on Court cases been stifled? If we were to compromise on this, the effects will not be felt this year, next year or in the next two years. But some years later, we are likely to find ourselves in the same position that the British find themselves today – judges feeling under attack or judges being under attack; distrust generally pervading; and an inability to attract top legal minds to take up positions on the Bench.
When the quality of the Judiciary suffers, the rule of law suffers. When the rule of law suffers, the country suffers.
The Government regards a strong and trusted Judiciary as the bedrock of the rule of law. That is worth defending vigorously, and we will continue to do so through our laws and policies.
Mr Speaker: Mr Christopher de Souza.
\tMr Christopher de Souza: I thank the Minister for his reply, and I would like to say that I agree with every word in that response. My questions are: one, how do we keep the public's esteem for our Singapore Judiciary at a high and a continued high such that it is important to maintain our rule of law standing as a country?
Two, in line with the Public Service's move towards a clean wage, could the Minister clarify whether the judges are paid a pension or provided medical benefits, that is, do they have a clean wage?
\tMr K Shanmugam: We do have a clean wage. So, they do not get a pension or medical benefits. The same goes for many other parts of the Public Service, including political officeholders.
As regards the Member's first question as to how we keep the enhanced standing of our Judiciary intact, I would, in fact, go further. I think we have a unique window of opportunity to make sure that our Judiciary is not just respected within Singapore. If you look at the development of Asia today – the huge economic growth – and the fact that if you look around in Asia, which place really stands out as the one place that has outstanding rule of law, outstanding judges, lawyers and where you can get your legal business done properly?
I think there are only two places that will seek to claim that position. One is Hong Kong and the other is Singapore. These are the two competitors for that. I am not an unbiased party in this, but I believe that we are ahead. Not only that, but I believe that we are putting clear blue water between ourselves and Hong Kong, in that respect, for a variety of reasons. I think in Hong Kong as well, to some extent, public attacks on the judiciary are not uncommon. And the standing and position of Singapore, the fact that it is seen as a neutral place that you can come to, and the fact that we have been able to make significant changes like the Singapore International Commercial Court (SICC), which is a unique value proposition across the region and for many places in the world. You get world-class judges sitting there hearing cases, and it can be in any law, and it may have no connection to Singapore and Singapore is a forum that they trust.
So, we should not only maintain the standing of the Judiciary which, as I have said earlier, is not a given, but we have to work hard at it. I think that means continuing to get the best available legal talent, make sure that the standing of the judiciary is not subject to unfair attacks. Their judgments can be subjected to any sort of criticism you want as a matter of law. You can say they have gotten their law wrong. You can say that you disagree with them. But do not ascribe personal motives. And if you believe there are improper reasons, the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) will investigate. We have a clear system. No one, in that sense, is above the law. So, we need to make sure of that. And you need a Government that is strong enough to make sure that it protects the standing of the Judiciary.
Let me give Members an illustration. We had a verdict in the City Harvest case in the Court of Appeal in February. In terms of the actual sentences that were imposed, it is quite clear that the Government took the view that the sentences were not adequate. It is quite clear. We had said it even before the Court of Appeal ruled. We had said the sentence was not adequate, which was why the Public Prosecutor appealed. It was also clear that substantial public sentiment was very much not in favour of the judgment that was delivered.
So, politically, the easiest thing – and that happens in many places – would have been for the Government to come to Parliament if it wanted to make a point and also join in, in the criticism. I think it is most unlikely that you will get a situation where the Minister for Law will stand here and say, while we disagree with the final result, nevertheless, judges ought not to be attacked. They ought to be respected, supported and be given the freedom to decide. If we disagree, we criticise their judgments, but let us not criticise them personally.
That is very important. You need a Government – and I hope this is common to all Members here, and I believe it is common to all Members here, both Government and Opposition – that is very strong in protecting the standing of our Judiciary. Thankfully, we have not had debates in this House, nor among reasonable opinion outside, about the Judiciary along the lines that are taking place in many other countries.
Thankfully, we do not have that and, therefore, we are able to deal with the substantive issues. One can argue, agree or disagree on specific aspects of the AOJP, but I do not think there is disagreement on the fact that our Judiciary has to be protected.
In answer to Mr Christopher de Souza's question earlier on Judges' pensions, I am told by the Prime Minister that the Judges' pensions may have been taken into account in their overall remuneration. So, the answer I gave the Member is still strictly correct – in that they do not get pensions, nor medical benefits, but under the clean wage system, that factor may have been taken into account in their remuneration package. I checked it, but I will check that again. And if I have to correct it, I will come back and let the Member know.
Mr Speaker: Order. End of Question Time.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Public Order and Safety (Special Powers) Bill","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"BP","content":"[(proc text) Order for Second Reading read. (proc text)]
The Second Minister for Home Affairs (Mrs Josephine Teo): Mr Speaker, I beg to move, \"That the Bill be now read a Second time\".
In Singapore, it is difficult to imagine the circumstances under which the powers in this Bill would be required. We see news reports of gunmen attacks, hostage incidents. But they are happening elsewhere, not in Singapore. Not yet, fortunately.
The closest we came was when we uncovered the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) bombing plot. Our security agencies picked it up, acted swiftly and, as a result, we avoided a calamity. That happened in 2001, well over a decade ago. After the shock, memories have faded. But for those who do remember, the thought may still send a chill down their spine.
Last year, another chilling piece of news emerged. Syaikhah Izzah, a preschool assistant, became the first female Singaporean to be detained under the Internal Security Act. She became radicalised and made plans to travel to Syria to support the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), to be a martyr’s widow.
Since 2015, there have been 18 other Singaporeans like Syaikhah who had to be dealt with under the Internal Security Act (ISA). In all these cases, our security agencies managed to intervene in time. But we may not be so fortunate every time. Because a terror attack has not happened in Singapore yet, it is difficult to appreciate the severity of the threat and to imagine the grave consequences.
But Mr Speaker, the reality is that Singapore faces a clear and continuing threat. Foreign terrorists see Singapore as a prized target. We stand for many things in opposition to their ideology.
Singapore has been cited as a target in jihadist publications and videos, by both ISIS and other groups. There were two ISIS-linked plots against Singapore in 2016 alone, including the foiled plot by Batam-based terrorists to launch a rocket attack against Marina Bay Sands. We should, therefore, not be lulled into a false sense of security. We have to prepare.
In 2016, the Police introduced new capabilities to allow them to respond swiftly to an attack, and they continue to enhance these capabilities. In 2017, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) amended the Public Order Act (POA) to enhance the security for large-crowd events. The Infrastructure Protection Act was passed to enhance the security for critical buildings.
Now, MHA is introducing the Public Order and Safety (Special Powers) Bill (POSSPA) to ensure that the Police have the necessary powers to be able to deal effectively with serious incidents, such as a terrorist attack.
Members may ask, why is POSSPA needed? Do we not already have the Public Order (Preservation) Act (POPA) that gives special powers to deal with serious public order incidents? Did we not update POA just last year?
Mr Speaker, we have been studying terror attacks in other countries to ensure that our counter-terrorism strategies are robust. They provide many useful lessons which are relevant to this debate, and I would like to share them with Members. They will help illustrate the gaps we have in our present laws.
Mr Speaker, with your permission, I would like to show some pictures and videos during this segment.
Mr Speaker: Yes, please. [Some pictures and videos were shown to hon Members.]
Mrs Josephine Teo: First example, April 2013, Boston marathon. The bombings killed three and injured about 260. The Boston Police narrowed the suspects to a pair of brothers, Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev. The police ordered an extensive manhunt.
In the residential area of Watertown, the suspects got into a shootout with the police. Tamerlan was killed and 15 officers were injured. Dzhokhar escaped and the police had to mount a house-to-house search. During this time, the police issued a voluntary stay-in-place request within a 20-block area. Despite this request by the police, some residents still ventured outdoors.
Part of the reason could be because, as you can see in the photo on the right, there was no large-scale public disorder and the streets did not look dangerous. The fact that the fugitive Dzhokhar was armed, had shot and killed one police officer, was not obvious. Regular people who ventured outdoors, in spite of the police request, unknowingly affected police operations, which became much more difficult to manage. They also put their own lives at great risk.
Had the Watertown manhunt taken place in Singapore, POPA could not have been activated because there was no public disorder. We would not, like the Boston Police, have been able to enforce a curfew in the search area to facilitate the manhunt operation and keep people safe from danger.
Second example, January 2015, gunmen attacks in Paris. On 7 January, two armed attackers entered the headquarters of the French satirical newspaper, Charlie Hebdo. They killed 12, injured 11, and then fled. Several shootouts took place, as the police pursued them across north-eastern France. The two gunmen were killed two days later, after police stormed the building in which they were hiding.
On that same day, a third gunman walked into a Jewish supermarket, and took hostages. In total, 17 were killed and 11 injured. The French Police had to pursue the suspects over many areas quickly to prevent them from killing more.
The point is this: incidents can evolve very quickly; the theatre of operations also shifts quickly. Had the Charlie Hebdo incident taken place in Singapore, POPA would be inadequate, even if we expanded its scope to apply to a terrorist attack.
The Minister would have to make new proclamations to bring the powers to bear in every new incident area every time the operations shift to the new location. The Police response would be much less timely.
Another problem was the live news footages showing police officers ready to storm the supermarket to rescue hostages. Let me show another photo. In this photo, Members can see how the police were gathering outside the supermarket and they were getting ready to storm the place.
But the terrorist was able to open fire at the police officers as soon as they started moving in. He was waiting for the precise moment to strike, and he could. In a situation like this, the terrorist had every possibility of watching every move of the police’s operation, as it happened. This would compromise the tactical options that the police could take and risk the success of the operation. It also put the lives of the officers and hostages in greater danger.
The US Homeland Security Advisory Council studied this incident and published a White Paper in 2016. One of the lessons the Council pointed out was the need to reduce the risk of information about police tactics being leaked and compromising operations. We would be wise to learn this lesson for Singapore, too.
In several overseas incidents, police forces had appealed to the public not to transmit or broadcast videos of ongoing operations, to protect the safety of their officers and the public. But this is usually not effective. Cases of individuals and media knowingly transmitting and broadcasting are common, even when they are told that the information may lead to the loss of lives.
Mr Speaker, these overseas examples show why our laws need updating. They happened in developed and cosmopolitan cities like Singapore. New threats call for new measures to better protect Singaporeans and save lives when we come under attack.
Having explained today's threat and why we need POSSPA, let me outline the situations where POSSPA can be activated, what tools Police will be given in this Bill to respond effectively to a serious incident, how these tools will be activated, and safeguards against abuse.
POSSPA is an evolution of POPA. POPA was enacted in 1958, and there have been no major reviews of POPA since. It was designed to deal with large-scale communal riots, such as the serious racial clashes in Penang, during the Centenary Celebrations in Georgetown in January 1957, the year before.
Under POPA, Police have special powers to deal with serious threats to public order, for example, to impose curfews and disperse assemblies. As there is already a legal framework within POPA that contains the necessary special powers in one Act, MHA is updating this framework to ensure that we remain effective to tackle the evolving security threats. As I explained through the examples, the security threats and challenges have evolved.
In addition to large-scale public disorder, we also have to deal with violent extremism. MHA is, therefore, proposing to repeal POPA and replace it with POSSPA. POSSPA will expand the scope of POPA beyond public order, to enable the Police to also use it for serious incidents affecting public safety, such as a terrorist attack.
This is necessary because there may not always be public order problems in, say, a manhunt following a terror attack, such as in the Boston Marathon bombings. The term \"serious incident\" is clearly defined in clause 3. In addition to large-scale public disorder, \"serious incidents\" include terrorist acts and acts of serious violence affecting the public.
What are the additional powers provided under POSSPA that will enable the Police to protect public order and safety, in the event of a serious incident? I will, first, talk about the new tools introduced in POSSPA.
The first set of tools deals with modern technologies which can endanger the safety of the public and security forces. Sixty years ago, when POPA was enacted, there were only landline telephones. Today, we have smartphones, the Internet, 24/7 television news channels, and drones. Everyone with a smartphone can broadcast, and very many do, sometimes with wider viewership than regular media channels. Such modern technologies have been both a boon and a bane for the Police.
One clear example when they can hinder Police operations is during sensitive tactical operations, like hostage rescue. The Police need to have the element of surprise over the perpetrators, so that the latter will not start to harm the victims in anticipation of the Police's response or prepare themselves to defeat Police action.
The best-laid plans for the Police can be thwarted by a stray tweet or social media livestream, but the existing laws, such as the POA may not allow the Police to deal adequately with such risks.
During a serious incident, the Police will need every help they can get to be able to successfully execute their mission to save lives. POSSPA, therefore, contains special powers, to reduce the risk that their operations are compromised by unauthorised communications. Of these powers, the power to make a Communications Stop Order has garnered the most attention following the introduction of the Bill. I would, therefore, like to spend some time to explain this power carefully.
Clause 30 empowers the Commissioner of Police to issue a Communications Stop Order (CSO) which requires a person to stop making or communicating films or pictures of the target area, and to stop communicating text or audio messages about law enforcement operations in the target area. The CSO is not an information blackout throughout a terror incident, as some have portrayed it. It is location-specific. The CSO will only apply to coverage of the target area. It is limited in duration. After the security operations are over, the CSO will be lifted.
Even with a CSO, post-incident reporting is still necessary. Therefore, the Police will allow selected media access to incident locations, so that the events can still be recorded for subsequent use. We had conveyed this arrangement to senior editors and reporters of our local media at various engagements last month. We have also informed some of the foreign media here of our plans and how we will do our best to facilitate coverage.
I should add that the CSO is a discretionary power which can only be exercised by the Commissioner of Police under specific conditions. Clause 30 allows the Commissioner to make such an order only if he assesses that the communication of information about the target area or law enforcement operations compromises the operations or endangers the safety of people during the operations.
The Police will publicise the CSO and state clearly the time that it becomes effective, and the boundaries of the target area. A breach of the CSO is an offence which carries up to two years' imprisonment, or a fine of up to $20,000, or both.
Having said that, let me give this assurance. The CSO is not aimed at civilians who, for example, may be caught in a hostage situation, and are trying to get information about their predicament to security forces by any means possible. They are not the intended targets. Instead, we are trying to stop irresponsible communication of ongoing security operations which may endanger lives, such as those of the hostages.
Some have asked, \"What if someone was merely filming and not transmitting? That, surely, should not be a problem.\" The problem, I am afraid, is that in a situation that warrants a CSO, the Police will not have the luxury of time to confirm that everyone was merely filming to document the event and that no one was attempting to share valuable intelligence with the terrorists.
The more important question is this: when lives are at stake, should we hope for the best or must we assume the worst, that someone, somewhere, had malicious intent? Even if the Police were to order anyone they can see holding a camera to stop filming, as they can under the POA, what about people with small devices which Police did not notice amid the chaos?
Should the onus be on the Police to identify everyone who is filming and stop them, or should the onus be on individuals not to arouse suspicion of their intent? So, let us not be blindsided. We hope we will never have to issue a CSO. If ever there was a need, half measures will not cut it. Even with a CSO, we can only reduce but not fully eradicate the risk of unauthorised communications. That is something we need to bear in mind.
Mr Speaker, apart from the CSO, clause 28 empowers the Police to intercept unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and autonomous vehicles or vessels (AVs) in and around the target area. UAVs and AVs can be used for surveillance, and even as weapons. Under today's laws, the Police can take down UAVs and AVs only if they are clearly posing a threat to public safety and security. The additional powers in POSSPA will enable the Police to prevent compromising security operations, by taking down any UAVs and AVs in and around the target area.
Clause 32 updates the existing POPA section 9, which allows the Minister to issue a Direction to withdraw telecommunication services in a target area. This is also aimed at preventing the compromise of operations. Instead of issuing the Direction to the now-defunct Telecommunication Authority of Singapore, it empowers the Minister to issue the Direction to the Telecommunication Licensees (telcos) instead.
We recognise the significant impact on the public if and when clause 32 is invoked. There is, therefore, a higher threshold in place. The Direction can only be issued by the Minister. This is unlike other special powers that, once unlocked by the Activation Order, can be authorised by the Commissioner of Police. Clearly, these powers will be exercised judiciously. Where the Communications Stop Order is sufficient and effective, there will be no need for a Direction to withdraw telecommunications services.
The telcos were consulted. They understood the need for the Direction. Their main concerns were how to operationalise the Direction, and how to communicate the disruption to clients. The Police will work closely with the Infocomm Media Development Authority (IMDA) and the telcos to develop plans and conduct exercises to ensure that a Direction can be implemented effectively.
Mr Speaker, today, the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) empowers the Police to conduct enquiries in relation to a crime. The second tool, in clauses 16 and 17 of the Bill, provides enhanced powers to stop and question individuals in a target area. The Police may need, for example, to ascertain the purpose for their presence in the area or to get information which might help the Police in their operations. Under POSSPA, refusal to provide the required information will be an offence. This is to empower the Police to get as much relevant information as possible in a timely way.
The third tool helps the Police to manage buildings in the area affected by the serious incident. Where it is necessary to close the premises or restrict entry, the Police will generally work closely with premises owners. It is not a problem if premises owners are cooperative. If, however, premises owners are uncooperative, clause 27 provides powers to the Police to direct premises owners to close the premises, restrict entry or provide information and documents relating to the premises.
As military premises are sensitive locations, the Police will work closely with the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) to manage any serious incidents affecting these premises, so that there will not be a need to use the clause 27 power in such circumstances.
Mr Speaker, the fourth set of tools are provisions which empower SAF servicemen, other law enforcement officers, and civilian assistants who are supporting the Police in dealing with the serious incident. During a serious incident, we may need to tap on additional resources to assist the Police. There are established plans for SAF to assist the Home Team in responding to serious security incidents. Under POPA, SAF servicemen were authorised with powers of search, arrest and to set up cordons.
This empowerment of SAF servicemen remains essential, and the Bill retains this, with an updated suite of powers needed by SAF servicemen. However, I will be introducing a Notice of Amendment later at the Committee stage to move these provisions for authorising SAF servicemen from POSSPA to the SAF Act.
This is to ensure a clearly defined command and control by the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) and SAF over all deployments of SAF servicemen in support of civilian authorities, including the POSSPA powers which SAF servicemen can exercise. The POSSPA powers can only be exercised by SAF servicemen if: (a) an Activation Order under POSSPA has been issued; and (b) the Police requests for assistance from SAF; and (c) after the Minister for Defence issues the relevant orders under the SAF Act. So, there are three parts to it.
It is clear however, that the Police will lead and coordinate the overall response, with the assistance of SAF servicemen.
Clause 15 similarly empowers other law enforcement officers and civilian assistants to support the Police operations. This is new. Law enforcement officers refer to officers from other Home Team agencies, such as the Immigration and Checkpoints Authority (ICA), the Central Narcotics Bureau (CNB) and the Singapore Civil Defence Force (SCDF).
The Police may also ask civilian assistants, such as the Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) volunteers and private security officers, to help, for example, to man an outer cordon, away from the incident location or hot zone, or prevent persons from entering the cordoned area. This allows Police resources to be diverted to more critical tasks.
I should highlight that nothing in POSSPA obliges civilians to assist the Police, and neither will the Police request for civilian assistance where there may be danger. The Police will only rely on civilians who are able and willing to assist. In other words, a civilian can refuse to assist, and no action will be taken against him.
As spelt out in subsection (4) of clause 15, civilian assistants can only exercise a limited set of powers. They are not allowed, for example, to use lethal force. Under clause 51, law enforcement officers, SAF servicemen and civilians who are assisting Police Officers are granted protection from legal liability. This is so long as they act in good faith and with reasonable care. This legal protection extends to members of the public who are complying with the Police's orders or directions.
POSSPA also retains and updates the existing provisions from POPA. These provide tools which are still relevant for Police operations. I will talk about some of the key provisions that have been updated.
First, the powers to impose cordons under clause 18. This was provided for under POPA, section 6. It has been updated to allow the Police to set up a cordon within a private place.
Secondly, the powers of requisition under clause 35. This was provided for under POPA, section 11. During a serious incident, the Police may require the use of equipment, electricity or space within a premises or land in the target area. We have retained the compensation framework in POPA. This is in clause 36.
Thirdly, the use of lethal weapons as a last resort. In every circumstance today, lethal weapons can only be used after all other available options have been exhausted, or when it is absolutely necessary, such as for time-critical situations, where the safety and security of the public are at risk. This remains the case under POSSPA. When a serious incident has occurred, or is about to occur, the Police will use all available force options to deal with the incident, including lethal weapons as a last resort.
There are two parts to the updated powers.
Part 1, the use of lethal weapons in certain circumstances, which was provided for under POPA. Under POPA, the Police can use up to lethal force, as reasonably necessary, to prevent persons from entering the cordoned area. Clause 18 will expand this to allow the Police to use lethal weapons as reasonably necessary to prevent persons, vehicles or vessels from entering the cordoned area or to remove them from the cordoned area.
Similarly, clauses 19 and 20 allow the use of lethal weapons as reasonably necessary to enforce road closures, and disperse processions and assemblies in the target area, for example, to end an armed skirmish between protestors.
Part 2, on the use of lethal weapons to effect arrest and prevent escape from the arrest. Clause 48 will expand the range of offences which allows the Police the use of lethal weapons as reasonably necessary to effect the arrest. The use of lethal weapons is not taken lightly, and the Police have been careful at all times to first exhaust other means. Its record speaks for itself. This high standard of care will be maintained even in a serious incident.
Let me reiterate, lethal weapons can only be used after all available options have been exhausted, or when it is absolutely necessary, such as for time-critical situations. The use of lethal weapons remains subject to internal procedures and rules of engagement.
Finally, Sir, we have also enhanced the penalty for failure to comply with the Police's directions or orders under the Bill. This will now carry a maximum imprisonment term of two years, or $20,000 fine, or both. This is to reflect the seriousness of the offences and is in line with similar provisions, such as the Infrastructure Protection Act.
Mr Speaker, I have explained in some detail the various tools which the Police will need to deal with a serious incident, and which are provided for under POSSPA. POSSPA pools together the necessary tools and places these in one coherent piece of legislation.
How will the Police gain access to these tools? When an incident has happened or is being threatened, the Police will deal with it using their baseline policing powers. However, if the incident is serious, and the Police assess that they need the special powers under POSSPA, they will recommend to the Minister to activate POSSPA.
After considering the Police's assessment, the Minister can issue an Activation Order under clause 8, if he is of the opinion that:
(a) There is a serious incident occurring, or one has occurred, or there is a threat of a serious incident occurring, in Singapore; and
(b) The exercise of any power in POSSPA is necessary to substantially assist in preventing the incident or reducing the impact of the incident, or to control, restore and maintain public order.
Both conditions have to be met before the Minister can issue an Activation Order.
The Activation Order unlocks a range of special powers, which I have explained earlier, which the Police will need to deal with during the serious incident. But it is important to note that these special powers will not automatically come into force upon the issuance of the Activation Order by the Minister. Each special power has to be specifically unlocked by the Commissioner of Police only as and when deemed necessary.
Under clause 11, the Commissioner of Police issues a Special Authorisation that can target a specific area, person, and/or vehicle. The Commissioner may declare more than one target area, target person or target vehicle, depending on the operational need.
The Minister for Home Affairs will publicise the Activation Order in accordance with clause 8 subsection (2), for example, through the media via press releases, and online and social media platforms.
The duration of each Activation Order is capped at one month, after which, the Minister must make a new Activation Order if he assesses that there is a need for a new Order.
We do not intend to use the POSSPA powers for longer than is absolutely necessary. After a serious incident has been resolved, we would want to work with the affected communities to return to normalcy as soon as possible.
Mr Speaker, I have explained the reasons for this Bill, the additional tools the Police will need in a serious incident and how these powers can be accessed.
By necessity, the provisions of the Bill are crafted broadly. This is because the threat situation continues to evolve and, quite frankly, the methods deployed by terrorists are increasingly hard to predict.
Through POSSPA, we will provide the Police the tools they need to respond effectively to a serious incident, and some degree of latitude in exercising the special powers when they are activated.
But are there any safeguards against abuse?
First, as I described earlier, there is a two-tier unlocking mechanism in POSSPA. Not all of the special powers will be used in every case. Even after the Minister has issued the Activation Order on the request of the Police, the Commissioner must apply his mind, and decide: (a) which of the special powers are needed to respond to the serious incident, (b) who may exercise these powers, and (c) which area, person or vehicle these powers may apply to.
Second, the law also sets out clear criteria which must be met by the Minister and the Commissioner of Police before they issue the Activation Order or Special Authorisation.
Third, even on the ground, the law sets out clear criteria and limits for Police officers to adhere to, in their exercise of these powers. For example, the basis for removing a vehicle, and how they may remove a vehicle from a target area, are set out quite clearly in clause 24 (1) and (2).
Police officers are also subject to internal guidelines and rules of engagement in their exercise of powers.
Members may ask why we have not carried over the provision in POPA section 3 subsection (5), which allows Parliament to annul the proclamation by the Minister by resolution as a safeguard. There is no sinister reason for this. Even without this provision, Members can question the Minister if they believe an Activation Order should not have been issued or should have been annulled.
Parliament has not been and is not prevented from holding Ministers to account for decisions or policies, just because there are no specific provisions in the law. In any case, judicial review of the Minister's decision to make an Activation Order remains an avenue to curb improper use by the Minister of his powers.
But let me return to why we have the Bill in the first place.
In a fast-evolving incident, such as a terrorist attack, time is of the essence. In the Paris attacks of November 2015, the first incident occurred outside a football stadium. Within minutes, there was shooting on the streets. Long before anyone could make sense of what was going on, hostages had been taken at a theatre.
To save lives, the Police will have to act fast. Should we build in additional layers of approval, for example, to require Parliament to confirm the Minister’s activation or the Commissioner's authorisations even while the situation is unfolding?
Or is a better approach to enable the Police to act swiftly, effectively and in good faith, and be held to account after the crisis is over?
Mr Speaker: Minister, if you can pause. Minister Lawrence Wong.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Time Limit for Minister's Speech","subTitle":"Suspension of Standing Orders","sectionType":"OS","content":"The Minister for National Development (Mr Lawrence Wong): Mr Speaker, may I seek your consent and the general assent of Members present to move, \"That the proceedings on the item under discussion be exempted from the provisions of Standing Order 48(8) to remove the time limit in respect of Minister Josephine Teo's speech.\"
Mr Speaker: I give my consent. Does the Minister have the general assent of hon Members present to so move?
[(proc text) Hon Members indicated assent. (proc text)]
[(proc text) With the consent of Mr Speaker and the general assent of Members present, (proc text)]
[(proc text) Question put, and agreed to. (proc text)]
[(proc text) Resolved, \"That the proceedings on the item under discussion be exempted from the provisions of Standing Order 48(8) to remove the time limit in respect of Minister Josephine Teo's speech.\" (proc text)]
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Public Order and Safety (Special Powers) Bill","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"BP","content":"[(proc text) Debate resumed. (proc text)]
Mr Speaker: Second Minister Josephine Teo.
Mrs Josephine Teo: Thank you, Mr Speaker.
In Singapore's case, I believe the latter is better able to serve our interests and I hope Members can support this view. Mr Speaker, with your permission, I would like to give my concluding remarks in Mandarin.
(In Mandarin): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] Singapore is an international hub and a multiracial and multi-religious society. We have a good reputation; the society is stable, and people generally feel safe.
Because of these attributes, we are a prized target for terrorists. Being able to successfully attack Singapore will give terrorists significant advantage in advancing their cause and reputation, and it will be a major victory for the terrorists.
In other cities, we have seen the impact of terrorist attacks on the public. We studied their security responses carefully. We concluded that our laws need to be strengthened.
POSSPA will give our security forces the necessary powers to respond effectively to serious incidents which threaten public safety, such as terrorist attacks, and protect our people.
(In English): Mr Speaker, we did not introduce this Bill in a vacuum. We did so only after studying the terrorist attacks that had taken place in other countries, and the limitations and problems they faced in dealing with the attacks. At the same time, in requesting for the special powers in the Bill, we have put in place safeguards.
But even as we debate the extent of the special powers, let us remember that we will never really know whether our preparations go far enough, until they are put to the test in an actual incident.
The bottom line is this. It is up to us to safeguard Singaporeans and Singapore if and when we come under a terror attack. In this, we must not fail. Mr Speaker, I beg to move.
[(proc text) Question proposed. (proc text)]
Mr Speaker: Mr Christopher de Souza.
Mr Christopher de Souza (Holland-Bukit Timah): Mr Speaker, Sir, I support this Bill because it provides our Police with the necessary powers to respond effectively to specific situations, in particular, terror attacks.
Terror attacks follow the same game play of division, terror, pandemonium. But terror attacks have ranged in form, such as lone wolf attacks, for example, knife attacks against a church in Yogyakarta, Indonesia; to coordinated firearm attacks, for example, the bombing in Paris in November 2015; or the tactic of long besiegement, for example, in Marawi, Philippines, or a quick single attack through commonplace items, for example, the vehicle rampage in Berlin's Christmas market; or highly symbolic, high impact attacks, for example, the collapse of the Twin Towers, or insidious attacks against innocent children, such as the bombing at the Ariana Grande concert.
As terrorists' methods change and vary widely, we, too, in Singapore, need to ensure that our laws keep abreast to deal with their widening and changing modus operandi.
The bases of the expanded powers are acts of serious violence affecting the public, acts causing large-scale public disorder, and terror attacks. These have been carefully defined under clauses 3 and 4. While such expanded powers are completely ill-suited for a neighbourhood theft incident, for example, the standard powers are also ill-suited for dealing with such large-scale public order and public safety events.
For example, under clause 19, read with clause 15(4)(a), the Police are able to rope in civilians to help to cordon off roads. This would be extremely useful, for example, where there is a large area to secure and when back-up is not there yet, and time is of the essence in preventing the perpetrator from escaping or other members of the public from entering.
Another example is the power to remove parked vehicles under clause 24 on the basis of endangering others, obstructing traffic flow and hindering the exercise of special powers. Imagine what would happen if a single vehicle held up the back-up Police forces, or if a vehicle was lying around as a getaway car, also doubling up as an obstruction to Police forces.
Another example is the power under clause 27 to direct premises owners to cooperate by providing information about the premises, closing the premises for a specific time, and ensuring the entrances and exits are secured. Take, for example, a situation where the perpetrator is still at large in the area. Surely, we do not want more people walking into the \"minefield\". And, surely, having access to floor plans is going to be extremely helpful for strategising where and how operations may be carried out.
Therefore, this Bill provides powers to deal with large-scale public disorder and serious violence incidents, which are largely different from normal day-to-day scenarios.
Additionally, this Bill is specifically targeted towards ensuring that the Police can effectively respond to the situation. This can be seen in how the applicability of the expanded powers in this Bill are triggered by the Police Commissioner, that the purpose of the power is meant to enhance Police effectiveness, is a recurrent theme throughout the Bill presented today in Parliament.
Therefore, although it is predicated on the Minister's issuance of an \"activation order\", which powers are to be exercised and by whom, are decisions for the Police Commissioner to make. This is done, not by the Minister, but by the Police Commissioner separately issuing temporary restraining orders, communication stop orders and requisition powers as well as the \"special authorisation\" under clause 11.
Importantly, the current Bill is not without safeguards, as alluded to by the good Minister. It is not a rough expansion of powers across the board, carte blanche. Rather, clause 15 carefully calibrates according to the person exercising the power. For instance, while the Police are able to enforce curfew orders, serviceman cannot.
Furthermore, other countermeasures in the Bill, such as curfews, communication stop orders, discontinuation of telecommunication service, requisition powers, do not apply across the board. They require yet another order by the Commissioner or Minister, on top of the more general conferring of broader powers. This calibrated approach makes sure that the measures are flexible enough to be effective in different situations, in different scenarios.
An activation order or a mere special authorisation is not a free pass to all the rest of the countermeasure powers. They require additional orders by the Minister or Commissioner, only arising when the situation calls for it and may apply for a shorter time period. We are not treating it as a one-size-fits-all authorisation, but we are ensuring that there are enough mechanisms to address serious incidents effectively.
Another important restriction that embeds accountability into the exercise of power is the explicit lists of acceptable purposes of the use of the power. Take, for example, the communications stop order in clause 30. In a \"serious incident\" like that in illustration (d) of a large sit-down demonstration impeding traffic and interfering with normal business activities, it seems a communication stop order is not to be issued to quell publicity.
Rather, it appears that it can only be issued if it is in the Police Commissioner's opinion that it would endanger safety of the public, prejudices ongoing law enforcement activity and other purposes set out in clause 30(2)(b).
Sir, zeroing into the communication stop order, I support the idea behind it. Too many hostage rescues and counter-terror attacks have been compromised through social media broadcasting, live media broadcasting. Perpetrators at the Taj and Oberoi hotels in Mumbai in 2008 were able to view and monitor actions of security forces through television (TV) coverage.
The power to take down drones in the target area should be considered. The bottom line is this. Once a theatre of threat has been established, we should remove all disadvantages to the Police. That will help to quell the threat and neutralise the danger.
This restriction on communication protects the people being rescued by increasing the chances of a successful rescue. It also protects the people who are trying to rescue them. After all, they, too, have families and friends waiting for their safe return.
Even as important as it is to control the physical situation, it is also important for the right foundations to be laid for social resilience. If there is a vacuum of information, there may be a lack of confidence that the situation is being managed. Because this may be for some time, perhaps one month, according to clause 10(2), inaccurate rumours may run amok through lack of accurate information. As the days pass, hope may dwindle. Therefore, would the Minister kindly clarify whether the communication stop order prevents a person from passing on official updates on an ongoing incident so as to quell anxiety amongst the families of those affected?
Another countermeasure that may be utilised is the power of requisition under clause 35. One can imagine that in a densely built-up urban area, such as Singapore, this power may be especially important for launching an effective surprise attack on the target person.
The Bill also provides for additional offences that seek to ensure that the situation in the target area does not escalate further. For instance, clause 37, relating to provoking breach of peace. These offences are predicated on the activation order. Therefore, I would like to seek an elaboration on what, I quote, \"all reasonable steps\" that must be taken by management or an officer of a company to absolve liability under clause 45(2)(b) are. Essentially, what are \"all reasonable steps\"?
While \"reasonable steps\" have been defined under clause 46(6) through the \"standard provision\" relating to corporate crimes as stated in the Explanatory Statement, what would it look like for a company to do all reasonable steps to promote a culture, something that is built over time, that does not encourage, tolerate or lead to noncompliance of the offences when the offences under this Bill only arise under the special circumstances of an activation order? What then? I hope the Minister will be able to clarify.
From a macro perspective, Mr Speaker, this Bill confers powers necessary to effectively deal with large-scale public order, public safety threats. It comes with an underlying tension, and I accept that. On the one hand, we do not want to face a situation where the Police is unable to neutralise the danger and quell the disorder because they lack the necessary powers. And, on the other hand, there may be sentiments that the Police should not be given disproportionate powers. In my view, the way I deal with this tension is that I do not think the Police are being given disproportionate powers here. In my view, this Bill equips the Police with a level of power necessary to quell danger and neutralise an escalating threat.
The foundation of my argument is that we have a good Police Force which largely enforce their powers professionally. And my core position is this: we do not want the Police to be unprepared, left inadequately protected because the Police officers are bereft of what they need to quell a threat. I support this Bill for it is needed to protect Singapore and Singaporeans.
Mr Speaker: Ms Sylvia Lim.
Ms Sylvia Lim (Aljunied): Mr Speaker, Sir, in its media release of 27 February 2018, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) stated categorically that the Special Powers under this Bill would not be available for routine operations. Two weeks later, on 15 March, MHA repeated that the Bill would not apply to day-to-day policing. This second statement was made in response to concerns from civil society groups about the wide wording of the Bill. Today, the Second Minister has just repeated the assurance in her Second Reading speech when she said she hoped that the Special Powers would never need to be used.
Sir, the understanding that the Bill should only be invoked in exceptional circumstances is a critical underlying assumption for the debate on this Bill. Parliament is being asked to approve very draconian powers to be given to law enforcement and supporting forces, but only in situations where there is an imminent and grave danger to the safety and security of the people in Singapore. As MHA has stated, the threshold for special powers to be activated in the Bill is \"high\". The powers under this Bill must never be misused for situations that can be adequately dealt with under other laws.
This Bill serves to repeal the POPA enacted in 1958, but its aims are wider. While the long title of POPA states that the Act relates to the maintenance and restoration of public order, this Bill states that its aim is to \"extend Police powers to better prevent and respond to any incident or likely incident involving serious violence or large-scale public disorder in Singapore\".
Thus, this Bill envisages prevention and response, not just to public disorder, but serious violence as well. To this end, the Bill provides some new powers not contained in POPA, such as the ability of the Police to direct owners of buildings within incident areas to take actions like closing the building for a specified time, and for the Police to question individuals within a target area when conducting a manhunt.
Sir, I accept that the nature of the threats that Singapore faces today, especially from terrorism, is different from the problems that POPA was supposed to address when it was enacted in 1958. The Government would need muscle as well as flexibility to respond quickly and effectively to those threats. I believe Singaporeans want this.
Under the Bill, the Minister can issue an Activation Order under clause 8 if he is of the opinion that a serious incident has occurred, is occurring or is threatened, and that the use of the Special Powers under the Bill would be necessary to achieve the objectives of preventing the occurrence, reducing its impact, or controlling and restoring public order. According to clause 9, the Minister's Activation Order must specify the nature of the serious incident, the duration of the Activation Order, and authorise the Commissioner of Police to exercise all or any of the Special Powers under the Bill.
It seems to me that the principle of proportionality should be a cardinal principle in exercising all the powers under the Bill. Not only must the Minister’s threshold for issuing an Activation Order be high, the decision of which Special Powers are really needed to deal with a particular scenario should be deliberately considered case by case. Earlier during the Second Minister's Second Reading speech, she confirmed that, for each incident, the Commissioner of Police would consider the need for each Special Power as commensurate with the nature of the incident.
What should also concern us today is whether any of the provisions in the Bill seem to be too wide or involve too much of a compromise on competing public interests, such as public accountability. In this regard, I have two concerns to raise.
First, the definition of \"serious incident\" under clause 3 of the Bill. Clause 3 defines \"serious incident\" to include not only terrorism-related offences and acts of serious violence, but also acts \"causing large-scale public disorder\". There are five factual illustrations for the scope of clause 3. The first three scenarios concern the use of explosives and firearms, and the forcible taking over of public transport, which, to most of us, warrant an exceptional response from the authorities. However, the last two illustrations which concern public disorder are more controversial. Illustration (d) covers a sit-down peaceful protest that grows in size such that there is impediment to paths, roads and normal business. Illustration (e) is about a group protesting in the street that grows in size and then starts to commit violent acts, which sounds to me like rioting, which is an arrestable offence under the Penal Code.
I would like the Minister to explain why the existing laws are not adequate to deal with such scenarios as in illustrations (d) and (e). In addition, it seems to me that in these scenarios, any law enforcement operation would not be tactically sensitive to warrant the use of Special Powers, such as the Communications Stop Order (CSO), a topic I shall deal with next.
Sir, notwithstanding what the Second Minister has said about the CSO, I am still most concerned about clauses 30 and 31. It is stated that the Commissioner of Police can issue a CSO to ban the making of relevant films or pictures, and to ban exhibiting or communicating any relevant film or picture, or a relevant text or audio message. The Commissioner can issue a CSO if he is of the view that exhibiting or communicating such relevant pictures, films, texts or audio messages would prejudice ongoing law enforcement operations relating to serious incidents or endanger the safety of the public or law enforcement officers during the law enforcement activity. The terms \"relevant picture or film\", and \"relevant text or audio message\", are defined in clause 2 broadly to mean those made while the Special Powers are activated and which are related to the target area or law enforcement activities in the target area.
Under clause 31, a Police Officer can direct persons to stop making, exhibiting or communicating such relevant films, pictures, texts or audio messages. The Police can also compel the deletion and the surrender of such material, and require persons to provide information on the recipients of any communications.
Sir, I appreciate fully that when a tactical security operation is ongoing, the details of a target area and the deployment of law enforcement require secrecy for maximum efficacy. Past incidents, such as the Mumbai attack in 2008, have shown that TV footage of ongoing operations had given perpetrators live information on the presence and tactics of law enforcement, enabling them to anticipate the actions of law enforcement forces.
However, on the other hand, it has also been proven in past incidents that footage or photographs taken at the scene of major incidents prevented fake news and enabled the truth to emerge, after the incidents were over. For instance, in 2009, a Group of Twenty (G20) summit meeting was held in London and a police operation codenamed \"Operation Glencoe\" was mounted to manage protestors. While the operation was on, a man named Ian Tomlinson suddenly fell and died while in the vicinity. Police initially denied that they had any altercation with him, until a video taken by an American there on business, showed Mr Tomlinson being pushed to the ground by police. This led to inquiries that uncovered the truth, which would not have happened had contemporaneous videos not been recorded.
Sir, while I can accept that the transmission of relevant films, pictures, texts and audio messages during a tactical operation may jeopardise the effectiveness of the operations, I do not accept that the making and the storing of such films and pictures for later viewing will undermine such operations.
Sir, as regards how such films and pictures can guard against Police abuse, MHA stated on 15 March that this was not required, as the Police would always look into any feedback or complaint about misconduct of its officers seriously. However, the reality is that in any investigation, evidence talks. If it is a case of \"he-says-she-says\", the burden will fall on the complainant to prove the complaint. A ban on making relevant films and pictures does not promote fact-finding and accountability.
I note what the Second Minister had said earlier in her Second Reading speech about the operational difficulties that the Police may face on the ground to distinguish between who is simply just making a film for record, or who is contemporaneously transmitting the films. As a former Police Officer, I understand that difficulty fully. Nevertheless, even if the offence of making films needs to be on the books in the Government's assessment, I would hope that the Government would be slow to prosecute if the film or picture adds value to post-review investigations.
So, Sir, in summary, I still have my concerns about the compromise we are making in the CSOs and I would ask the Government to adopt a more constructive approach towards unofficial recordings of major incidents.
Mr Speaker: Mr Kok Heng Leun.
Mr Kok Heng Leun (Nominated Member): Mr Speaker, today, we are discussing this proposed Bill, which will repeal the POPA, and this Bill increases the powers of the Police so that they can better deal with large-scale security threats that we may face in Singapore. These powers will include stop and search powers, requisitioning powers, powers to set up and enforce cordons and curfews.
While I recognise that in emergency situations, there is a need for the authorities to act swiftly and given some latitude in exercising their powers, we must nonetheless ensure that such security measures remain accountable and be accorded with due process and fairness so as to ensure that public confidence in the Government does not erode during crisis time.
Before I turn to discuss the substance of the Bill, I would like to understand if there was a public consultation for this Bill. I believe the public has a right to have their views heard on this Bill before its enactment, given that this Bill is a matter of public interest because it has wide-ranging implications and would intimately affect the public during emergency situations.
Mr Speaker, there are some measures in the Bill which, after my consultations with civil society, I would now want to discuss.
One of the concerns that I have was the definition of what constitutes a \"serious incident\". I would like to bring attention to illustration (d) under clause 3 which relates to a sit-down demonstration in the Central Business District (CBD) area which grows to a point, over a week, that it impedes the flow of vehicular and pedestrian traffic and interferes with business activities. So, what in this illustration would make it a \"serious\" enough incident such that it could be comparable to the other illustrations, such as illustrations (a) and (b), both depicting possible terrorist attacks? Illustration (d) is a peaceful protest involving neither violence against any person or property damage and presumably attracting a substantial level of support. While such events may require some Police intervention because of some degree of disorderliness, but they are not comparable to armed attacks or hostage situations in terms of severity.
To me, illustration (d) seems to stand in stark contrast to all the other illustrations provided, as the level of severity and the threat posed is significantly lower.
Can the Second Minister share with the House why she thinks that the powers under the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) or POA might be insufficient to cover an illustration (d) situation and, therefore, it is necessary to include this illustration as an example of the \"serious incident\" under clause 3?
Another area of concern that I have with the Bill is that it enlists the help of civilian assistants to discharge certain duties. Under clause 2 of the Bill, specific powers are given to civilian assistants to assist a Police Officer who is granted the special authorisation. Further, under clause 15(4)(a), a civilian assistant is authorised to exercise certain powers.
Mr Speaker, civilian assistants are not subject to the same training afforded to a serviceman, law enforcement officer or Police Officer. Therefore, in emergency situations that require instant decision-making under pressure, there is a possibility that civilian assistants might not possess the ability to respond quickly, decisively and even correctly as a trained personnel would. Additionally, civilian assistants may exacerbate the emergency situation or inadvertently cause harm to themselves or bystanders while discharging their duties.
As such, my concern is that enlisting of the assistance of civilian assistants might be more detrimental than beneficial during a crisis period and that the safety of these assistants might be compromised in the process of discharging their duties. I would, therefore, like to understand how the Ministry will ensure that the safety of these assistants is protected when they discharge their duties.
Sir, my third area of concern is with the broad discretion given to the Minister to grant an Activation Order. Under clause 8 of the Bill, if, in the opinion of the Minister, the granting of the Activation Order is necessary to prevent or reduce the impact of the serious incident or to control or maintain public order after the serious incident, my question is, what does the term \"necessary\" entail?
I would also note that the decision of the Minister does not require approval from another arm of the Government or an independent body. This is in contrast to section 3(5) of POPA which this Bill seeks to replace, where every proclamation of a dangerous area must be presented to Parliament for their concurrence.
Comparatively, under the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Act and the Internal Security Act (ISA), both of which are security-nature Acts, the decisions of the Minister are subject to the concurrence by the President on the advice of a special advisory committee. Just now, in the Second Minister's Second Reading speech, she has articulated the reason why she felt this should be removed. While I understand the time sensitivity of the Special Order, however, I also note the Second Minister has also said, this is such a special situation that she would even wish that it would not be ever activated. I think a mechanism of accountability should have been there. It can be done as soon as possible, without impeding the expediency of the Police when they are exercising this Order.
Further, under clause 8(3), an Activation Order must be published but a failure to publish does not invalidate the Order. Mr Speaker, I believe the two clauses are contradictory in nature. If it is a must to publish an Activation Order, logic dictates that the failure to publish the Order will invalidate it. I would like to understand the reasons behind this provision that the failure to publish does not invalidate the Order. Moreover, if there is an incident where an Order is not published and a Police Officer uses his special powers on an individual who does not know that this Order has been there, and subsequently refuses to obey the instructions of the Police Officer, is such an individual guilty of an offence under the Act?
Such a failure to publish means that the public may be uninformed. How can someone be held liable for a sudden change they have not been reasonably notified about? Additionally, if there is a situation when there is a failure to publish such a notice, should there not be a system of accountability of why the failure happened?
Now, I would like to discuss the next area of concern which pertains to clauses 30 and 31 which give the Commissioner the power to make CSOs against individuals.
In the MHA's Press Release on 27 February 2018, the Ministry explained that such a CSO is necessary to prevent leakage of such information to terrorist which could endanger the lives of security officers and members of the public who are caught in the act. The Ministry cited two examples: that of the Mumbai and Paris attacks whereby live television and media broadcast during those attacks resulted in leakage of information to the terrorists. In turn, such leakage of information made the police operation more difficult and placed the safety of the officers and hostages at greater risk.
In both incidents, it was not individual communications between persons or through the social media that impeded security operations, but rather through the live reporting of the said incidents by the media. Yet, there is an absence of guidelines or provision in this Bill that regulate or prevent the traditional media from leaking information through live broadcasts that may impede security operations, which appears to be the mischief that a CSO seeks to address.
There might also be issues arising from the issuance of CSOs against individuals. Under clause 30(1)(b), the exhibiting and communicating by any person of a relevant text may be banned during the period which the CSO is in force. If individuals near the vicinity are trying to inform their loved ones of their safety or to warn their loved ones to avoid the area of the serious incident, how are such individuals able to do so?
Also, what if an individual takes a photo or a video of an abuse of power by Police Officers, under clause 31(20(b), the Police Officer can order that individual to delete that video or photo. How is that individual then going to report to the Ministry when the only evidence to substantiate that claim has been deleted? Can the Minister please clarify what will be done in such a situation?
In the event of \"serious incidents\", like terrorist attacks, there will be a lot of confusion, and emotion will run high. In fact, the impact of any such security incidents is not just about fatalities and loss of properties, but it will cause fear and distress and then destabilise, paralyse and even divide the society. In the aftermath of such an event, it is important that there is enough information for us to piece things together, to verify facts, to dismiss accusations and restore justice if need be.
Hence, in these moments of high tension when people think that it is important to document certain happenings so that it could be useful in the aftermath of the event, to help the Police to understand the situations better, this CSO should not deter the individuals from doing that. In fact, documentation is important in the event of allegations of whether the Police or the public have stepped out of their line. It is a means to protect Police Officers and the public from false accusations and these documentations are witnesses and testimonies and, in the aftermath of the event, can help a lot in the healing of the community.
I have one more query pertaining to this. What if a Police Officer was accused of abuse of process by an individual who has documented the incident during the effect of the CSO could prove that the Police was innocent, would this individual who surrenders the documentation then be charged?
Another operational issue that I have is with the power of the Minister to give directions to telecommunication licensees to, amongst others, stop messages carried by a telecommunication service provided by the licensee under clause 32(3)(a) or prohibit the use of telecommunications by the licensee when an activation order is in effect. In the event that the telecommunication messaging and telecommunications services are discontinued, how would individuals caught in the vicinity where the serious incident occurred be able to send out messages of distress or call for help?
My final area of concern pertains to clause 38 of the Bill which criminalises, amongst others, the publication of materials prejudicial to public order.
Firstly, Mr Speaker, can the Minister clarify why the mere possession of a document is criminalised under clause 38? If, for instance, an individual types something on his phone, or writes something with no intention to publish it and merely for personal use, it seems disproportionate to say that such a person is liable of an offence, especially when no potential harm is caused by mere possession.
Secondly, what constitutes prejudicial material or documents appears to be too broadly defined such that a material that might not actually be prejudicial to public order and security may, nonetheless, be caught under clause 38. For instance, clause 38(1) (a) merely requires the said material to be \"likely to be prejudicial\", as opposed to being \"highly likely to be prejudicial\".
Thirdly, clause 38(2) seems to displace the element of intention for an offence relating to publishing material prejudicial to public order. It is a trite criminal law principle that an individual must have a guilty mind in addition to his or her action before one can be criminalised. Therefore, can the Minister provide reasons as to why clause 38(2) appears to deviate from this important principle?
Fourthly, Mr Speaker, I also note that in the interest of speed and efficiency, criminalising an individual under clause 38 may not necessarily be the most efficient measure to deal with materials that may be prejudicial to public order during an emergency situation. Would a takedown order that immediately forces an individual to stop distributing or take down any prejudicial matter be faster and more efficient in dealing with the publication of such material rather than criminalising the conduct?
Mr Speaker, permit me to reiterate that I do not oppose the intention of the Bill. National security is a priority in the current global climate. However, my view is that the Bill affords too much discretion on decision-makers. Therefore, more can be done in this respect to ensure greater transparency and accountability which are crucial during times of emergencies.
Mr Speaker: Mr Melvin Yong.
Mr Melvin Yong Yik Chye (Tanjong Pagar): Mr Speaker, I rise in support of the Bill, which seeks to extend Police powers to better prevent and respond to any incident involving serious violence or large-scale public disorder in Singapore.
As a former Police Officer myself, I can understand and appreciate fully the challenges faced by our Police Officers on the ground daily. Our Police Officers place their lives at risk constantly, and this risk increases immensely in the event of an attack. While others are running away from the threat, our officers must run towards, and seek to diffuse the threat. In my view, the powers proposed in this Bill are necessary and timely. It will help our Police and other Home Team officers better carry out their job to save lives.
Mr Speaker, MHA’s Singapore Terrorism Threat Assessment Report 2017 found that terrorism threat to Singapore remains the highest in recent years. Singapore continues to be a prized target of regional and global terrorist organisations. Over the years, our intelligence and law enforcement agencies have managed to act swiftly and discreetly to foil the attempts of foreign JI and ISIS militants in carrying out an attack in Singapore. But terrorism threats to our country are not confined to within our borders. In August 2016, the Indonesian authorities foiled a plot by a Batam-based terrorist group, which had intended to launch a rocket attack against the Marina Bay Sands, using Batam as a launch point.
In recent years, we have also seen a rise in the number of self-radicalised individuals influenced by extremist ideologies to target Singapore. Clearly, the threat to Singapore has increased tremendously, and our legislation needs to evolve in tandem to combat these threats.
Under the Bill, the Minister for Home Affairs is empowered to issue an Activation Order if a serious incident affecting public safety has occurred. Such an order must describe the general nature of the incident, specify the period or periods during which the activation order has effect, and authorise the Commissioner of Police to exercise the special powers under the provision of this Bill.
The Commissioner of Police is given the flexibility to then decide the targets of special powers, depending on the evolving operational needs. I agree that this is important and time-critical for the Police, especially in the event of multiple attacks, such as the November 2015 attacks in Paris, which saw a series of coordinated terrorist attacks in multiple locations. However, who makes the operational call that these multiple incidents are connected?
In the May 2017 Manchester concert bombing, there was a separate security incident which prompted an evacuation of a shopping mall in Manchester. Some thought that it was a coordinated attack, but investigations later revealed that it was unrelated to the concert bombing. My question then is whether the subsequent incidents must have a nexus to the original incident, or should the Minister be required to issue a new Activation Order if the subsequent incidents are seemingly unrelated to the first incident? Who then makes the call if incidents are related or not to the first incident?
Mr Speaker, the Bill also serves to empower the Police to issue a CSO to prevent sensitive information from being disseminated, to the detriment of operations secrecy, as well as the safety of the public and Police Officers. I am supportive of this.
Allow me to cite a few examples. In the manhunt for the Boston marathon bombers, \"live\" reports showing key police operations helped the suspects to evade capture for about four days. In the Manila bus hostage incident, the \"live\" broadcast of impending police operations to storm the bus further agitated the hostage-taker, who executed several hostages before he was eventually taken down. Having a CSO imposed in such scenarios would help protect operation secrecy, prevent critical information from leaking to the suspects via the media and, more crucially, prevent the loss of innocent lives.
However, it is a well-known fact that the initial 30 minutes after an incident occurs is a key period where every information collected is vital for the authorities to make sense of what is happening. This is also why our Police have been advocating the concept of Run, Hide and Tell. Where possible, tell the Police as soon as you can on where you are and what is happening. How can we, in the event of a terrorist incident, strike a balance between Run, Hide and Tell, with the imposition of a CSO?
Going back to the Boston Marathon bombing, the big breakthrough in identifying the suspects came from a photo taken by a spectator watching the race from across the street. We would need to make sure that any communications ban would not inadvertently end up harming Police investigations.
Mr Speaker, section 28 of the Bill empowers a Police Officer to direct persons operating unmanned aircrafts, or drones, and autonomous vehicles away from an area. However, to do so, the Police Officer is required to locate the person operating the drone or autonomous vehicle. Drone technology is advancing rapidly. Upcoming models will soon be able to operate beyond an operator's visual line of sight. How would our Police Officers be able to find the drone operator if the drone in question is far away from the operator?
Similarly, autonomous vehicle technology is advancing towards a level of autonomy where a human will not be required to be in the car. How would the Police Officer direct an autonomous vehicle away in such an instance? These are questions that MHA would need to think about carefully, as technology advances.
Mr Speaker, due to the heightened terrorist threat, the additional powers in this Bill are essential for the Police. The POSSPA Bill is an important part of the Government's ongoing counterterrorism efforts, coming after the POA Bill and the Infrastructure Protection Bill which were passed last year.
The powers to protect the integrity of tactical operations will enable the Police to carry out their mission by choosing the best tactical options available, without having to worry that the terrorists can watch their actions \"live\", anticipate their actions, and ambush them around the next corner. The proposed amendments serve to ensure that our Police will not be caught without the powers they require to safeguard lives and property, when an attack occurs.
Keeping us safe and secure every day is not an easy task and our Home Team has done and continues to do an incredible job. Mr Speaker, I support the Bill.
Mr Speaker: Ms Thanaletchimi.
Ms K Thanaletchimi (Nominated Member): Mr Speaker, Sir, I stand in support of this Bill. In view of the rising terrorism threats around the world, it is increasingly important to strengthen and tighten home security to ensure public order and safety. This is even more crucial for a small and multi-ethnic nation like Singapore.
Last year, MHA had reported that the terrorism threat to Singapore remained the highest in recent years. Security is, indeed, a joint responsibility among individuals, community and the Government. I, therefore, welcome the SGSecure national movement as Singapore's community response to the threat of terror.
In our workplaces, we have people of different races and nationalities working side by side. The news on ISIS and self-radicalised individuals may affect the cohesion of the various groups of people working and living amongst us.
When there is an such incident of terror, the Bill will allow the Commissioner of Police to make a CSO while security operations are ongoing, therefore, Police powers are proposed to be expanded to deal with terror attacks and serious incidents. It is, therefore, important that our officers are trained adequately to face potential challenges and different situations.
In addition, the measure of barring the public from taking images and banning text or audio messages from the affected area is essential to ensure that no public disorder might arise due to misinformation. The Bill is also essential to protect the secrecy of tactical operations and enable the Police to respond to serious incidents more effectively.
Sir, notwithstanding this, I have the following clarifications and suggestions to make.
First, what constitutes serious incident that provides the authorities with the special power to block all communication and filming and use of social media? Does this include non-violent passive protest or demonstration that has serious societal implication besides violent or terrorist incidents?
Second, when the Commissioner of Police authorises a CSO while security operations are ongoing, it will require all people in the vicinity from not taking pictures of the incident or sending them across to others. In today’s context, almost all Singaporeans use a mobile phone to inform their loved ones of their safety. Can such harmless communication be allowed if an individual is within the vicinity of the serious incident?
More often than not, public information via social media may provide useful leads for Police investigations. With this Bill, the public may be wary of producing such information to the Police even if they had acquired them. While we want to prevent frivolous dissemination of vital information, there should be means to acquire such useful information from the public. We should encourage civil society’s active participation in deterring terrorism and serious incidents with useful public information. Will the Bill discourage such responsive nature of public involvement to apprehend perpetrators?
Will such special powers result in public fear of abuse of power by the Police? How can one independently verify Police action when there is a communication blackout as the evidence presented is one-sided?
Lastly, I call on the Ministry to create awareness of the new Bill. The public must know the serious implications as it is now deemed an offence if one violates the order. While the public gets used to the new restriction, I hope that cases of genuine violation due to ignorance will be dealt minimally with discretionary powers. Sir, notwithstanding this, I support the Bill.
Mr Speaker: Mr Louis Ng.
Mr Louis Ng Kok Kwang (Nee Soon): Sir, like other Members in this House, I am in favour of providing the Police with enhanced powers to maintain public order and safety. We have to look to incidents around the world to learn about the evolving methods that terrorists use to inflict maximum damage and terror. Even if these incidents have not occurred in Singapore, there is no guarantee that it will not happen here. And when they do, we need to be prepared for it.
The POSSPA Bill is an important step to equip and empower our security agencies to mount an effective response, should we one day need it. While I support the Bill in its intentions, allow me to seek a few clarifications on its details.
In clause 3, \"serious incidents\" are defined to constitute terrorist acts, acts of serious violence, acts causing large-scale public disorder, and so on. Members of this House, past and present, have continuously debated about striking the right balance between maintaining public order and proportionate responses to achieving that order. We have constantly been recalibrating this balance, not just today, but in 2009 when we discussed the POA, and again in 2014 after the Little India Riots.
In that light, can the Minister clarify why \"acts causing large-scale public disorder\" under part (c) of clause 3 are defined as a \"serious incident\" on the same scale as violent acts of terrorism?
The Bill provides an example of such an act, describing \"a sit-down demonstration...(which) attracts a large group of sympathisers who voluntarily join the sit-in… Their presence starts to impede the flow of vehicular and pedestrian traffic\", which many other Members of this House have quoted as well.
The Bill proposes that the Police be given the same set of powers, whether it is dealing with acts of terrorism, or sit-down demonstrations which attract a large group of sympathisers. Why?
I do understand that there is a concern that these assemblies might lead to violence and injuries, but can the Minister clarify what exactly is the \"high threshold\" for the activation of the special powers spelt out in the Bill? What will trigger the activation?
I would also like to seek clarity on the size of an assembly that could qualify as a \"large-scale public disorder\". When would a crowd be large enough for these special powers to be activated?
For some members of the public, it may also seem excessive, in these cases, to allow the Police enhanced powers to stop and question individuals within the incident areas, and, if the individual does not comply, to issue a fine of up to $20,000, or two years' imprisonment, or in clauses 18, 19 and 20, to use force, including lethal weapons, to ensure compliance with orders.
Again, members of the public are clearly supportive of the use of lethal weapons to ensure compliance with orders when there is a terrorist attack but the concern of some members of the public is whether we need to use such lethal powers for a sit-down demonstration. Can the Minister address these concerns?
Next, I believe that the CSO in clause 30 is absolutely necessary in situations where \"live\" communications could give terrorists the upper hand. We do not want to see an embarrassing repeat of the Mumbai attacks in 2008 or the Manila hostage crisis in 2010.
Related to my previous point, I would like to ask the rationale again for requiring such a stop order, again, for \"acts causing large-scale public disorder\". Can the Minister provide some clarifications on why this is needed?
I understand that a member of the public would not be penalised if he/she was taking a photo and sending it to the authorities via SGSecure. In any given situation, there could be many people using their phones concurrently for different reasons, some violating the CSO and some not. How then would this be effectively policed?
Furthermore, I believe it would be beneficial to have more clarity on certain language used in the Bill. In clauses 18, 19, 20 and 48, the Police may \"use force as is reasonably necessary\", \"including the use of lethal weapons\". Can it be more clearly defined as to what constitutes \"reasonable force\"?
While empowering the Police with necessary powers to maintain public order, we also need to balance this with safeguards to prevent the misuse of this power.
The Bill now also grants some special powers to \"civilian assistants\", which Members of this House have raised as well, which I understand was not previously included in POPA. How can we ensure that these civilian assistants are sufficiently trained, particularly to know what \"reasonable force\" entails?
Some members of the public are also concerned that with the CSO, if any cases of potential Police brutality were to occur, we would not have independent documentation of the event. This may lead to some questions on whether there are sufficient safeguards to prevent a scenario of disproportionate power.
MHA has since clarified that if members of the public have any allegations of misconduct or abuse of powers by Police Officers, when POSSPA has been activated, they should lodge a Police report or report directly to the Ministry. But we will have to bear in mind that they may not be in possession of any evidence to support that Police report, due to the CSO. Can the Minister provide more clarity on this issue?
Sir, I do understand the need for and the importance of this Bill and I hope that the Minister can address the concerns I have raised. Sir, notwithstanding the above clarifications, I stand in support of this Bill.
Mr Speaker: Mr Ang Wei Neng.
Mr Ang Wei Neng (Jurong): Mr Speaker, Sir, recent serious terror attacks in Jakarta and Selangor have resulted in serious injuries and deaths. These underscore how the current Bill is timely, necessary and important, particularly since Singapore has been cited as a target in jihadist publications and videos, by both ISIS and other terrorist groups.
Many other countries have similarly stepped up their counter-terrorism responses, such as the EU countries which have been victims of horrific attacks. Britain, for instance, under its Investigative Powers Act, is empowered to conduct mass surveillance.
While we agree that the Police need to have sweeping powers under the extraordinary circumstance of a terrorist attack, we also need to have safeguards to provide a sense of balance. Thus, I will approach the Bill on two aspects. First, on the special authorisation and, next, on the CSO.
On the special authorisation by the Commissioner of Police under the Bill, I would like to clarify the following issues with the Minister.
“A law enforcement officer is defined in clause 2(1) to mean a Police Officer, an immigration officer, a narcotics officer, a prisons officer or a Civil Defence Service officer. The class may be expanded by the Minister”, as cited in the explanatory notes. How does the Minister envisage the class to be expanded?
The second group of people who can exercise the special powers specified in the special authorisation under subsection 1(c) refers to servicemen or SAF personnel and they \"do not act on the direction and in aid of the Police Officer given the authorisation\". What is the rationale for this? How would the Police and SAF coordinate the operations on the ground? Would it be coordinated by Ministers or by a Ministerial Committee or by the Cabinet?
The third group who can exercise the special powers is made of any civilian, cited as a civilian assistant. I note that Minister has clarified that they can include security guards. How are the security guards organised during peace time so that they can better assist the Police during a crisis?
Fourthly, a Police Officer can close a road under section 19 of the Bill or order a curfew under section 21, for up to 24 hours, but the Commissioner of Police can extend it. For how long can the Commissioner of Police extend it? Are there any safeguards?
Lastly, under the scope of the Bill, apart from obvious terrorist attacks where injuries and outright threats to public safety are apparent, it also listed an example of a sit-down demonstration where vehicles or pedestrians may be obstructed but public safety may not be threatened. Why would such incidents fall under this Bill, which has been enacted specifically for counter-terrorism purposes? Moreover, the Police already have the power to deal with a sit-down demonstration under the ambit of unlawful assembly, for example, as defined in the Penal Code.
Next, on CSO. The CSO's main objective is to deprive terrorists or criminals of information. It will also deny the terrorists the opportunity to broadcast their terrorist acts \"live\" through the media, like the case of the Mumbai attacks in 2008.
But the CSO is a very blunt instrument. Breaching a CSO carries a penalty of up to S$20,000 and/or two years’ imprisonment. In order to assure the public that the CSO would not be abused and that there are safeguards in place, I hope the Minister could address and respond to the following two points.
Firstly, print and broadcast journalists exist to provide independent documentation of key events. Singapore’s history is encapsulated in their reports. Hence, it appears harsh to ban the media professionals from doing their jobs. We note that the Police are the only party that would be allowed to make any recordings of the scene when the special powers are exercised. I hope the Minister can direct the Police to release the full footage after the event so that it would not lead to a gap in the documentation of Singapore’s history for future generations and this would also help to counter criticism of any abuse by the Police during the Police operations.
Secondly, to better balance between security and documentation, we could perhaps take a leaf from France, which adopted a Code of Conduct for Journalists covering terrorist incidents after the Hypercacher Supermarket siege incident in 2015. While not a legal instrument of force, its recommendations for journalists bear thinking about as a possible guide for journalists to be allowed to do their jobs responsibly during such incidents. These include responsible coverage of the event lest the perpetrators are watching and careful phrasing of events so as not to influence the public's perception. While I understand that not all media will cooperate and adhere to the code of conduct, but we should not give up trying and should only use the CSO as a last resort.
Mr Speaker, Sir, the special powers, including the CSO given to the Police under this Bill, are wide-ranging, potent and have great implications. Let me conclude my speech in Mandarin.
(In Mandarin): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] Mr Speaker, the special powers, including the CSO given to the Police under this Bill are wide-ranging. Could the Minister give us an idea whether there were previous incidents which would warrant such powers, especially the CSO, to be applied? Specifically, would the Little India riot in 2013 or the hijacking of SQ117 by four terrorists in 1991 require such special powers?
On the whole, the threat of terrorism is real. We have to be prepared for such an eventual attack. I would like to ask the Minister whether MHA intends to carry out exercises which will benefit the law enforcement officers, other Government agencies, the media and the public to better understand the implications of POSSPA and send a strong signal to all terrorists or would-be terrorists not to touch Singapore because you would not succeed easily. Mr Speaker, Sir, I support this Bill.
Mr Speaker: Mr Henry Kwek.
Mr Kwek Hian Chuan Henry (Nee Soon): Mr Speaker, I rise in support of the Bill. It is important to note that this is not the first time the law enforcement agencies have been given special powers to deal with security issues.
POPA was enacted in 1958 to provide the Police with the special powers to deal with large-scale communal riots which were the key threat to Singapore then.
However, much of the powers in the Act are no longer adequate to deal with today's threats. The threat of terrorism comes in multiple and complex ways, which require swift and decisive action from our law enforcement and security agencies. Therefore, it is necessary for our agencies to be equipped with the necessary powers to deal with the changing threats. As such, I support the Bill that is designed to protect our safety and security. I would like to speak on a few issues.
First, to justify the broad measures, I am glad the Minister has given several examples on recent terrorist attacks, highlighting why the current laws are inadequate to deal with these and that is why a broad-based measure like this is necessary.
My next point is that when the broad-based law is in place, sound and reasonable judgement by our law enforcement officers is needed. And this judgement, within any enforcement agency, is enforced through the guidelines.
I recognise that it may not serve our interest to publish internal guidelines which could be potentially exploited by terrorists. Nevertheless, I am heartened that the Government has articulated the broad principles that govern these internal guidelines, especially on the application of lethal force, the two-tier unlocking process of the powers in the law and the need by the Commissioner to unlock individual powers based on the needs.
The need to articulate these broad principles was originally a concern for me, and I wanted to flag them out in my speech today. I am glad that the Minister has provided a clear explanation of these broad principles.
Next, I would like to touch on the issue of limiting communications in the event of a terrorist incident. It makes sense not to have information posted online through public or open channels, be it social media or mainstream media.
And I appreciate the Second Minister for Home Affairs for clarifying that the victims of terrorist attacks are not prohibited on sending information to security agencies of their situation.
But I would like the Minister to clarify whether sharing with friends and families on closed networks is also forbidden, perhaps not video, but text messages indicating that there is an attack and please stay away.
During a crisis, we all want to make sure that our immediate loved ones are safe and stay out of any possible danger zones. So, a flurry of messages within closed networks can be expected. Some would also argue that if this information does not spill over to the public networks, or to the social media, the risk of the terrorist getting wind of getting useful information is also quite limited.
Lastly, I hope the Government can invest in more efforts to share this aspect of the law with our people. Perhaps, we can remind people at the onset of any serious terrorist incident that such a law is in place and the communication limitation is also in place. And this is because, while a limitation of communications is necessary, this provision goes against the initial instinct that many people have to share such information with their loved ones in times of crises. With that, I support the Bill.
Mr Speaker: Mr Desmond Choo.
Mr Desmond Choo (Tampines): Mr Speaker, Singapore has been extremely fortunate to remain safe and secure during a time when many cities experience terrorist attacks and serious incidents, such as hostage-taking, sit-down protests turning into violence protests. We must not stop anticipating in preparing to meet this threat. In doing so, the challenges faced by other security forces and jurisdictions are informative. Where practicable and instructive, we must learn and implement policies and procedures that can best protect our residents and officers.
This Bill is important in enhancing the powers of the Police to deal with serious incidents and security threats, including terrorist attacks. The special powers proposed in this Bill will help Police Officers to carry out these very difficult jobs to save lives and neutralise threats. In particular, the powers to protect the integrity of tactical operations are critical for operational success.
Some members of the public have raised concerns about the provision to allow the Commissioner of Police to issue a CSO. Their worry is that should this order be in effect, innocent bystanders who had unwittingly taken a photograph might be punished for a crime that they did not intend to commit. Others feel that this provision will affect the transparency of handling and managing security incidents.
These concerns are valid, and I seek the Minister's clarification and reassurance that the CSO will only be activated for exceptional situations where operational secrecy and integrity are critical to saving lives and protecting property, and that sufficient awareness and visibility will be in place to show that a CSO is in place.
In critical security situations, the safety of the public and officers is paramount. I have commanded a few operations during my 13 years with the Police Force. This included gunman operations, kidnapping, manhunt for suspects who committed capital offences. We realised that all operations are inherently risky, but those of this nature are especially dangerous to officers. I had gone into dangerous situations with my officers, knowing full well that the risk can only be managed but not totally eliminated. The responsibility was heavy. I wanted my officers to return safely. Tactical secrecy and integrity are critical to minimising risk. I constantly worried about the loss of the element of surprise and our suspects ready to inflict grievous harm on my raiding officers. I could not afford information leakages. I certainly could not allow prioritising any sharing of pictures involving the crime scene and the operations over the safety of officers and Singaporeans.
Back then, I did not have to contend with Facebook \"'live\", \"live\" Twitter feeds and the fast spread of news through apps like WhatsApp. I only had to manage and, very rarely, the odd photographer with telescopic lenses. There were no drones to contend with; information sharing was rather limited and much slower through multimedia messaging service (MMS) and short message service (SMS).
During the trial of Ajmal Kasab, the prime accused of the Mumbai terrorist attack on 26 November 2008, Justices Aftab Alam and CK Prasad called the \"live\" coverage of the security operations \"reckless\". According to the newspaper, The Hindu, they said, \"it is not possible to find out whether the security forces actually suffered any casualties or injuries on account of the way the operations were being displayed on the TV screen. But it is beyond doubt that the way their operations were fully shown made the task of the security forces not only exceedingly difficult but also dangerous and risky.\"
Our media personnel are responsible and will not seek to compromise operations. However, the operational terrain today is a lot more complex because of social media channels. Thus, the CSO is critical to protecting lives. So is the proposal to provide the Police with the power to take down autonomous vehicles in an attack, as these can compromise tactical secrecy.
With regard to the issue of lack of transparency, every Police Officer seeks to live up to the Police's oath to protect life and property. We can trust that they will discharge their duties professionally. There is no reason to believe that we need allowing people on Facebook \"live\" or any other social media channels to monitor their operations in order that they may execute their mission professionally.
While I support the proposals in this Bill, there must be greater public education on these matters. I would like to ask the Minister for his plans on public education and awareness for these measures. As we have done numerous simulated terrorist attacks to prepare our security agencies and other stakeholders, including the public, may I suggest that a mock CSO be included in future exercises as a way of promoting greater awareness on this matter? Mr Speaker, allow me to continue in Chinese.
(In Mandarin): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] Mr Speaker, Sir, all over the world, terrorist attacks and serious incidents occur constantly. Although there are no similar incidents happening in Singapore yet, we must always stay alert and be prepared for the contingencies. We not only need to strengthen our security measures but also increase our enforcement powers in case a serious incident happens.
The CSO and the power given to the Police to restrict the use of drones are of great importance. In order to successfully execute a high-risk operation, tactical secrecy is critical. When I was a Police Officer, I took part in many enforcement operations. Every operation was risky. Manhunt for suspects and raids are especially dangerous. When leading an operation, I was always concerned about external disturbances, for example, intrusion by innocent passers-by. If it was not handled properly, the lives of the Police Officers, victims and the public could be endangered. With this new clause in place, the Police will be able to focus on the operations to arrest the terrorists and criminals.
The second important clause in this Bill is that the Police are given the power to ask operators to assist in the operation. When an incident occurs, the Police will be able to order the operators at the site to assist Police operation and investigation. Under Police request, they must suspend their operation for the time being. When a serious crime occurs, time is critical for enforcement and investigation. Although operators are mostly willing to cooperate, however, there may be exceptions. I hope MHA can explain to the operators MHA’s requirement and their duty under this clause.
This Bill is an important link in our anti-terrorism and crime-fighting framework. I support this Bill.
Mr Speaker: Mr Gan Thiam Poh.
Mr Gan Thiam Poh (Ang Mo Kio): Mr Speaker, Sir, as we look at terror incidents around the world, the methods used by terrorists have been evolving in order to inflict maximum damage and strike fear into the hearts of target communities. Even though there have been no attacks in Singapore so far, there is no guarantee that such incidents will not happen here. We must be prepared and equipped, both at the national level where our security agencies have oversight and at the individual level. We must cooperate and work together to protect our homeland.
In this respect, refraining from communicating at the sites of terror attacks is one of the ways individuals can cooperate with and assist our security forces. Their actions, or rather, the lack of, could potentially save the lives of the unfortunate ones caught in the event and those of the men and women who risk their own to rescue them.
However, there are some concerns over the ban on the transmission of photos, videos, text and audio messages. I think it is worth our time to examine more thoroughly the implications of this ban.
Part of the anxiety expressed so far stems from the novelty of the proposal, which is probably unprecedented. I understand that Singapore is among the first in the world to introduce such legislation. I agree with the intent as it aims to protect everyone and it will empower our security agencies to mount an effective response, should we ever need it one day.
We should draw lessons from the 1972 Munich Olympic incident, the 2008 Mumbai terror attack and the 2015 Paris terrorist attack. The efforts of the security forces in all three incidents were severely compromised by television broadcasts.
Today, rescuers have more than TV crews to worry about. With a smartphone in hand, anyone can be a broadcaster, streaming real-time updates, which can potentially provide valuable information to perpetrators and give them a strategic advantage. This is what the Bill clearly seeks to prevent.
What the Ministry could have communicated better and much more strongly is that the Bill does not seek to prevent hostages or witnesses at the sites from communicating with the authorities, especially information about the attackers and their operations.
As part of our SGSecure campaign, our Home Team has been educating Singaporeans about what to do in the event of an attack – \"Run, Hide, Tell\". We tell Singaporeans to move away from danger, stay out of sight, switch their phones to silent mode and provide information to the Police by calling, SMSing or using the SGSecure App. This advisory has not changed. However, I hope the Ministry will consider allowing communications via other additional platforms in the event that these official channels become overloaded or malfunction.
On the other hand, in case the terrorists or their sympathisers manage to transmit images or text in the midst of the mayhem, I hope we are equipped with the technology and know-how to jam the signals and prevent their broadcasts. Fines and jail-time are not going to be deterrents for them.
Lastly, regarding the concerns by civil society groups over the definition of a \"serious incident\", I would like to caution that we should not assume that nothing would happen, even at seemingly small gatherings or peaceful protests. The risk of escalation is always there. It is the duty of the Police to protect everyone, regardless of language, race, religion, political convictions and beliefs.
Hence, to address the possibility of abuse whilst the communication ban is imposed, I would like to suggest we tap on the use of technology, such as equipping every policeman with a body video recorder. The record could be reviewed by an independent committee and the composition of the members can be discussed to ensure independence. Mr Speaker, Sir, in Mandarin.
(In Mandarin): [Please refer to Vernacular Speech.] As the saying goes, \"Don’t fear what is, fear what if\". Every Singaporean must stay vigilant and must not think that terrorist attacks will never happen to them. We must prepare for the rainy days. We do not have to be overly panicky, However, it is better to remain cautious. If we stay united, we will succeed.
Mr Speaker: Second Minister Josephine Teo.
Mrs Josephine Teo: Mr Speaker, I thank the Members for speaking in support of the Bill. They raised many useful points which I shall try to address.
Several Members asked about the definition of \"serious incident\", specifically the inclusion of \"acts causing large-scale public disorder\" and the illustration (d) in clause 3 which describes such an incident. Ms K Thanaletchimi asked whether non-violent, passive protests are covered under the Bill. Ms Sylvia Lim, Mr Kok Heng Leun, Mr Ang Wei Neng and Mr Louis Ng asked why the same powers to deal with terrorism are also available for large-scale public disorder.
Outside of the House, there were even assertions that POSSPA will be applied to \"peaceful demonstrations\". The narrative goes something like this: first, the law allows POSSPA to be unlocked by the Minister for \"peaceful protests\". Such protests can attract crowds of all sizes. There is no definition of what \"large-scale public disorder\" means, so the law could be applied to peaceful protests involving a small group of protestors. Therefore, the law potentially allows the oppression of protesters and will have a chilling effect on society. We have come across such assertions outside the House.
These assertions misrepresent what POSSPA is about. Let me explain why.
There are three limbs under the meaning of \"serious incident\": a terrorist act; serious violence affecting the public; or large-scale public disorder.
The third limb, large-scale public disorder, is the subject of focus. It is not new, by the way. POPA already provided for it since 1958. In any case, peaceful protests are not the target of POSSPA. Let me say that again – peaceful protests are not the target of POSSPA.
We will only invoke POSSPA if the situation deteriorates, and the threat of large-scale public disorder or violence becomes imminent. If a protest is really peaceful, there should be no concern whatsoever about falling within the third limb of \"large-scale public disorder\". Illustration (d) in clause 3 makes it clear what we mean by \"large-scale public disorder\".
I should just quote to Members what it actually says. It goes like this: \"a sit-down demonstration for a cause attracts a large group of sympathisers who voluntarily join the sit-in. For over a week, the group grows and the demonstrators start to occupy the publicly accessible paths and other open spaces in the central business district. Their presence starts to impede the flow of vehicular and pedestrian traffic and interfere with normal trade or business activities in the area\".
There are several parts to this. The protest was protracted; over a week. It involved a large and growing group. They occupied public places in the CBD. The last sentence is worth repeating. The demonstration \"starts to impede the flow of…traffic and interfere with normal trade or business activities in the area\".
The illustration shows quite clearly that not every protest will meet the high threshold to be considered a serious incident. What is required? There must be significant disruption to ordinary Singaporeans trying to go about their daily business. People – motorists, commuters, passers-by, shopkeepers, workers – are agitated. The tension is rising. If it is not diffused, things could quickly turn chaotic.
Some observers think such a situation is not intolerable, well within acceptable threshold. Mr Kok Heng Leun suggests that that situation should not be treated as a \"serious incident\". Is that the view of most Singaporeans? I do not think so. In fact, in such a situation, it is more likely that the Police will be asked: \"Why are you allowing this chaos to unfold?\", \"Are you not worried something worse will happen?\", \"Can't you do something to prevent an escalation?\"
The Police will have to make a judgement call. If they stick with existing policing powers, can they bring the situation under control? What if the chaos spins out of control and there is loss of lives? If they assess the need to seek powers under POSSPA, do they have enough justification? What if they invoked POSSPA, and were, in fact, able to restore order but were then accused of having over-reacted? That they misjudged? That there was no need to have used POSSPA?
There are no easy answers. The Police will have to judge, the Minister will have to judge and decide. This alone is not a low threshold to cross.
Since Independence, POPA has only been used once. This was after the Little India riot and, even then, it was tightly scoped to control the consumption of alcohol, to calm the situation and prevent further violence. The Police did not use any other power in POPA, even though they could.
Ms Sylvia Lim, Mr Henry Kwek and Mr Kok Heng Leun asked why existing powers in other laws are not enough to deal with the large-scale public disorder scenarios described in illustrations (d) and (e).
Let us take illustration (d), although most of it applies to illustration (e) as well. This is a large and protracted demonstration that is causing significant disruption to Singaporeans. The demonstration keeps growing and things could get chaotic. The Police may assess that they need to take measures to reduce the risk of property damage or prevent the crowd from further building up. To do this, the Police may need to order nearby premises to close, impose a cordon, and direct people to stay out of the area. The POSSPA powers are necessary to do this. No other laws have such provisions for such a situation.
Another example which occurred in Singapore: in the aftermath of the Little India riot, we activated POPA and used the POPA power to regulate conduct to stop the consumption of alcohol in public places in Little India. Given the large crowds on weekends and public holidays, alcohol was assessed to be a significant risk factor for public disorder. The Police did not have the power to do this outside of POPA until this Parliament passed new legislation under the Liquor Control Act to regulate the consumption of liquor in public places.
Mr Louis Ng, Ms Sylvia Lim and Ms K Thanaletchimi asked, how about the CSO? Will it be used for the scenario set out in illustration (d)?
Let me be clear. The CSO is not meant for peaceful assemblies. Ms Sylvia Lim said that law enforcement operations in large-scale public disorder would not tactically be sensitive to warrant CSO. I agree. I have explained in my earlier speech that strict conditions must be met before the Commissioner of Police can issue a CSO. It must be to protect the safety of the public or law enforcement operations. This confirms Mr Christopher de Souza's understanding also.
I have also explained in my earlier speech that not all the powers become automatically available once the Minister issues the Activation Order. The Commissioner of Police must assess which of the powers are necessary to deal with the situation. So, it is not the case that when there is large-scale public disorder, all the special powers of POSSPA will be used to deal with the incident.
Mr Louis Ng asked if we could put a number to what is considered \"large-scale\". His question is understandable, but there is also no easy answer.
The size of the protest is one of many factors. It depends also where the protest is conducted, how it is conducted and its consequences on Singapore, whether intended by its organisers or not. As Mr Gan Thiam Poh has pointed out, a \"peaceful demonstration\" can quickly degenerate into violence and threaten public safety.
An example is the London Riots in 2011. It started off as a peaceful demonstration against a court ruling. But degenerated into rioting, looting, setting buildings and vehicles on fire. It spread to several cities over the course of the summer, including Birmingham, Leicester and Manchester. In its trail, there were five dead and 205 injured, of which 189 were police officers. Property damage was estimated at £200 million, and the impact on the economy was significant.
Another example is the Charlottesville rally in 2017. This took place against the backdrop of the controversial removal of Confederate monuments in parts of the United States (US), in response to the Charleston church shooting in 2015. It started with a protest against the removal of a Confederate monument from a public park. Protestors chanted racist slogans while carrying rifles and banners. The protestors clashed violently with counter-protestors.
The Virginia governor declared a state of emergency in order to have additional powers to safeguard public safety. One of the protestors rammed a car into a group of counter-protestors, killing one and injuring 19. By the time the violence was over, there were three dead and at least 38 injured.
The point is this: peaceful intent does not guarantee peaceful outcomes.
Having explained what \"large scale public disorder\" means, I will explain what it is not. Where possible, we will, indeed, use existing laws to deal with such situations. For example, in Singapore, public assemblies are allowed in accordance with the law. This comes under the framework of the POA. The Police regularly grant permits for public assemblies: last year alone, over 900.
We have also set up the Speakers’ Corner for Singaporeans to organise events and demonstrations without having to apply for a permit, as long as certain conditions are met. Many events take place at the Speakers’ Corner. POSSPA cannot be used against demonstrations if these demonstrations do not cross the threshold of threatening \"large-scale public disorder\", or \"serious violence\".
For example, the recent student demonstrations at Dublin Scioto High School in Columbus, Ohio. About 200 students sat outside the school in silence to protest gun violence in the wake of the Florida school shooting in February 2018.
There was no violence or large-scale public disorder in this example. If such an event happens in Singapore, it can be dealt with using baseline policing powers. The POA will be sufficient. In fact, this is what we have done in the past.
An example is the 2013 illegal protests at Merlion Park. Around 100 foreigners gathered to protest the 2013 Malaysian elections on two different days. They held up signs and chanted slogans. We issued a total of 74 conditional warnings under the POA. POPA was not invoked then. So, our record is clear and consistent – we have never used POPA against political dissent.
Mr Speaker, to reiterate: POSSPA is not targeted at peaceful demonstrations or protests. It is targeted at terrorist acts, serious violence affecting the public and large-scale public disorder. As Mr Christopher de Souza reminded us right at the beginning, \"we do not want the Police to be unprepared, left inadequately protected because they are bereft of what they need to quell a threat\". In a serious incident, Singaporeans expect the Police to be able to act fast and to act decisively. That is what POSSPA seeks to do.
I will next address Members' queries on the specific clauses. Mr Melvin Yong asked how the Police would deal with UAVs and AVs, if they are unable to find the operator.
Clauses 28(2)(b)(ii) and 28(3)(b)(ii) empower Police Officers to act against UAVs and AVs directly, even if the operator cannot be located. The priority is to stop the UAV or AV. AVs and UAVs are a relatively new area, which SAF and the Home Team are both working on. SAF is developing a \"drone catcher\". The Home Team is also working on technology to target drones.
Mr Christopher de Souza asked what would constitute \"reasonable steps\" under the law for companies or their officers to absolve themselves from liability for obligations under POSSPA. It will be a question of fact in each case whether a corporation's officer can be shown to have taken all reasonable steps to prevent or stop the commission of an offence by the corporation.
To illustrate, clause 27 allows the Police to direct premises owners to take certain actions, like closing the premises. If the owner or if the officer of a corporation can show that he actually gave instructions for the premises to be closed, but those instructions were inadvertently not followed, then he will not be liable.
Mr Louis Ng has asked why enhanced powers to stop and question individuals are needed under POSSPA, and whether these were excessive.
In a serious incident where POSSPA is activated, the Police need to be able to obtain information quickly in order to deal with the incident. These enhanced powers make it clear that individuals have an onus to comply. For example, when the Police are searching for an unknown terrorist suspect, to stop and question individuals to ask for information, they must be able to get the information quickly in order to trace the suspect. Otherwise, the Police will waste precious time.
Mr Louis Ng asked for clarity on what constitutes \"reasonable force\". In a serious incident, Police Officers and the public are faced with considerable danger, and the Police will need to be legally empowered to use lethal weapons, if indeed necessary.
POSSPA allows the use of such force, as is \"reasonably necessary\" to effect arrests and enforce certain powers. This means that the officer can use such force, as is reasonable in the circumstances, and no more.
Operationally, and as a matter of policy, the Police will use lethal weapons only if they have no other choice. The Police do not want to use lethal weapons unless all other options have been exhausted. There are clear internal Police procedures and rules to ensure that Police Officers act as such. Therefore, Police Officers are typically equipped with a range of force options, including unarmed tactics, and non-lethal options, like batons and Tasers. Police Officers are trained to apply the appropriate force options in accordance with the situation.
The Police’s record speaks for itself. The Police have very rarely used lethal weapons. Take the Little India riot again. In fact, the Police came under criticism from some quarters, which suggested they should have used their firearms to deal with the rioters. In that situation, the Police assessed the use of lethal weapons was not necessary and exercised restraint from using firearms.
On the other hand, there are times when the use of lethal weapons is necessary and justified. Take the car that sped through concrete blocks at a Police checkpoint at the Shangri-la Dialogue in 2015. This was a high-profile event, with many foreign dignitaries in attendance. The risk that the car could be committing an act of terrorism was high. How would we know what was in the car? The Police had to use reasonable force, in this case, lethal weapons, to deal with the threat.
Mr Ang Wei Neng has also asked how SAF and the Police would coordinate operations on the ground. The Police have worked closely with SAF to develop joint plans for terror attacks. Both forces have also exercised closely together on many counter-terrorism exercises. In October 2016, the Police and SAF conducted a major joint Home Team-SAF counter-terrorism exercise. This was followed by Exercise Northstar in October 2017, a multi-agency counter-terrorism coordination exercise involving private stakeholders.
Mr Ang Wei Neng, Mr Kok Heng Leun and Mr Louis Ng have also asked for clarifications on civilians assisting the Police under POSSPA. For example, whether they will be sufficiently trained, and how we can ensure their safety.
As I have mentioned in my earlier speech, civilian assistants can only exercise selected powers, under Police Officers' directions. There are no powers to compel civilians to aid the Police; they can only do so voluntarily. Before requesting civilians to aid the Police, the Police will consider the suitability of the task at hand, and the risks to civilians. As Mr Kok Heng Leun correctly points out, in some cases, it may be detrimental to deploy the civilians. The Mandarin saying is: 成 事 不 足, 败 事 有 余. That can happen. We agree.
The volunteers will, therefore, not be assigned to tasks that will put them in harm’s way or which they are quite incapable of performing. The Police conducted an exercise in October 2016. The scenario involved multiple gunmen attacks at a shopping mall. In this exercise, mall security officers assisted the Police by evacuating the public to safety, and no more than that. It is an example of the kind of roles civilian assistants may be tasked with.
Mr Ang Wei Neng has also asked about the class of public officers who may be prescribed as \"law enforcement officers\". As the threats continue to evolve over time, our operational needs will change. This provision simply allows the Minister to prescribe specific groups of public officers with specialised skills to assist the Police in responding to the serious incidents, for example, cybersecurity specialists or whoever else.
Mr Speaker, there have been a number of queries raised by Members on the CSO. I would, first, like to acknowledge the support that Mr Melvin Yong and Mr Desmond Choo have voiced for the Bill, in particular for the CSO. As former Police Officers, they understand the challenges and risks that Police Officers face, and the need for the special powers in this Bill to deal with serious incidents.
Mr Desmond Choo asked whether the CSO will only be activated for exceptional situations where operational secrecy and integrity are critical for saving lives and protecting property. Mr Ang Wei Neng suggested adopting a Code of Conduct for journalists and using the CSO as a last resort. Mr Desmond Choo and Mr Henry Kwek asked whether the public will be notified when the CSO is place.
The short answer to Mr Desmond Choo's question is yes, as I have explained earlier in my speech. Mr Ang Wei Neng's suggestion on the media Code of Conduct is a useful one which we will consider. But the fact is this: in a serious incident, we cannot rely solely on a Code of Conduct. The objective of the CSO is to send a clear signal to the public to stop making and communicating films or pictures, stop communicating messages on law enforcement activities in the target area. The Police will publicise the CSO through all its public communications platforms.
Other Members raised some concerns on the CSO which can be grouped into four categories: one, whether the CSO will stop people from sending information to the Police, or sending updates on their situation to their loved ones; two, whether the CSO would lead to less accountability for the actions of the Police; three, why should mere making of films be banned; and four, how the CSO will be enforced in practice.
Firstly, whether the CSO is intended to stop members of the public caught up in the incident from sending updates to their loved ones. This was raised by Mr Henry Kwek and Mr Louis Ng. I have said in my earlier speech that the CSO is not aimed at civilians who may be caught in a hostage situation and are trying to get information to their loved ones. The CSO is intended to stop irresponsible communication of ongoing security operations which may endanger lives, such as those of hostages.
Therefore, when the Police look into reports lodged on breaches of the CSO, it will consider the circumstances of the sender and if the breach could reasonably have been avoided or should have been avoided, if the actions posed safety risk to the public or to the law enforcement officers, or if the leaked film exposed sensitive tactical information of the law enforcement activity.
Some Members, like Mr Melvin Yong, Ms Thanaletchimi, and Mr Gan Thiam Poh, asked whether the CSO would stop people from communicating information to the Police or discourage them from doing so.
Mr Speaker, the public plays an important role in providing information to assist the Police. The Police are more aware than anyone else of this. The objective of the CSO is to protect the integrity of specific security operations at a particular location and for a limited time. Outside of the scope of the CSO, there is no restriction on communications in general. This will be made clear.
The public will be encouraged to submit information to the Police via the \"999\" hotline or through the iWitness and SGSecure platforms. If members of the public who are acting in good faith to provide information to the authorities, but inadvertently breached the CSO, we do not intend to take action against such persons. I hope this assurance addresses Ms Sylvia Lim's concerns.
Secondly, Members like Ms Thanaletchimi have also asked whether the CSO would lead to less accountability for the actions of the Police and a lack of independent documentation. Ms Sylvia Lim said that without film or photo, the burden would fall on the complainant to prove the complaint. She also cited the example of Mr Tomlinson at the G20 Summit in 2009. In the first instance, it is unlikely that the CSO would have been issued in a public order incident like the one she described. It was not the kind of scenario in which we had envisioned CSO to be issued.
But with or without footage, any person with a complaint of misconduct by Police Officers can lodge a Police report, and they regularly do. Without footage, Ms Sylvia Lim is right that it may be harder for the Police to verify the complaint. However, the Police's investigations do not start and end with photo or video evidence. They can interview the parties involved and gather other evidence to establish the validity of the claim.
The Police have always taken a serious view of all complaints made against our officers and will thoroughly investigate these complaints. If the complaint is substantiated, the Police will not hesitate to take action against any errant officer.
Mr Kok Heng Leun also asked whether the Police will use the powers under the CSO to delete videos and photos of abuse of powers by the Police. It is a criminal offence to dispose of evidence and Police officers cannot do that.
Mr Gan Thiam Poh suggested equipping every Police Officer with a body-worn camera to mitigate the risk of unfair allegations when a CSO is in place. This is a helpful suggestion, and we will look into it.
In fact, the Police have equipped a number of their frontline officers with body-worn cameras to facilitate investigations and the gathering of evidence. The footage from these cameras is also helpful for any allegations of wrongdoing. This is on top of the in-vehicle cameras that Police have. These cameras will continue to operate when a CSO is in place.
This leaves me with the third and fourth group of issues under the CSO, which I will address together. Besides issues of accountability, Ms Sylvia Lim expressed discomfort with extending the CSO to the making of relevant pictures and films. Ms Sylvia Lim's view is that mere making of the film does not cause harm and should be allowed.
Mr Ang Wei Neng and Mr Louis Ng also asked how the CSO will be enforced by officers on the ground. For example, there could be many people using their phones at the same time for different reasons.
As I explained earlier, during a serious incident, the Police will not have the bandwidth to investigate every person who is recording a film or picture to ascertain its true intent. Ms Sylvia Lim also acknowledged from her experience as a former Police Officer that this is a challenge. The Police will exercise discretion and take into consideration the circumstances which the recorder was in and if the breach could not have been reasonably avoided.
This Bill puts the onus on the individuals to not arouse suspicion of malicious intent not because the Police want to make things difficult, but because of exigency. By doing so, the Police have a straightforward enforcement aim to make sure no one is recording. If it were not spelt out this clearly, then you could have a situation of confusion: what exactly are the Police trying to enforce against?
Mr Kok Heng Leun asked a similar point: why is the possession of materials likely to prejudice public order a criminal offence? The same consideration applies here. In a serious incident, the Police will not have the bandwidth to sort out those who have malicious intent and those who do not. And, if I may add, this particular provision has been around since 1958 and the Police have never enforced it.
Mr Speaker, there have been many questions on the CSO. This is why MHA earlier spoke to the local media to hear their concerns and discuss how we can work closely to ensure that the CSO does not disrupt their ability to report the news for documentation purposes. The local media also raised concerns similar to Members and the general public. For example, how to ensure that those caught in the incident can report to the Police? We have taken this into account and, in my earlier speech, I also talked about the importance of post-incident reporting and how we will allow the media to record incidents for subsequent reporting.
Mr Kok Heng Leun asked if there was a public consultation for this Bill. We studied international incidents, spoke to our law enforcement counterparts and gleaned learning points on how to deal with these incidents. Then we consulted key stakeholders who would be directly affected by the exercise of specific powers. This was the same approach for the POA amendment Bill, as well as the Infrastructure Protection Bill just last year. So, there is no change.
I will now move on to the issue of safeguards for POSSPA powers. Mr Henry Kwek has asked whether there will be any limits to the duration the provisions will stay in effect.
Under POSSPA, the duration of each Activation Order is capped at one month, after which the Minister must make a new Activation Order if he assesses that there is a basis for the new order. We do not intend to use the POSSPA powers for longer than is absolutely necessary. After a serious incident has been resolved, one of our key priorities is to work with the affected communities to return to normalcy as soon as possible. Having an Activation Order longer than necessary does not help.
Mr Kok Heng Leun asked why the failure to publish would not invalidate an order. Again, there is nothing sinister. All that clause 8(3) does is to ensure that the mere failure to publish the Activation Order does not invalidate the need for the Commissioner of Police to issue a special authorisation and deploy the Police Officers. This does not diminish accountability of the Minister. It can happen that the Commissioner of Police may need to act quickly and issue the special authorisations. He should not be prevented from doing so just because of a delay in publishing the Minister's Activation Order, which is a technicality. This is what the provision seeks to protect, nothing more.
Mr Melvin Yong asked whether a new Activation Order would be needed if subsequent incidents are unrelated to the first incident for which the Activation Order was made. The Commissioner of Police will only be able to issue special authorisations for incidents that have a nexus to the incident that led to the Activation Order.
If there is a subsequent serious incident that does not have a nexus to the initial incident, the Minister must issue a fresh Activation Order for POSSPA powers to be used. For example, if a large-scale public disorder occurs that is unrelated to a terrorist act for which an Activation Order has been issued, the Minister would need to issue a new Activation Order to be able to exercise POSSPA powers for the new incident.
However, Mr Melvin Yong makes a more important point about whose judgement it will be in deciding whether the two incident areas are related. It will have to be a professional assessment made by the Police based on the information at hand. The Commissioner will have to decide before he issues a special authorisation.
Mr Kok Heng Leun raised a similar line of query in many parts of his speech. I listened carefully and I must say, for me, it contrasted very much with Ms Sylvia Lim's speech, which I believe to be well-informed by her professional experience as a Police Officer and her legal training. I reflected on Mr Kok Heng Leun's point, and I think his main discomfort has to do with the discretion given to the Minister and the Commissioner of Police; whether we should trust them to act honourably at all times or whether we should curtail their discretion and not leave it to chance. Therefore, he asked whether we can impose conditions under which the powers are used and whether these conditions can be written into the Bill.
In my view, it is not unreasonable to consider such risks. Not unreasonable. In fact, Mr Kok Heng Leun cited the ISA in which we subject the decisions of the Minister to the concurrence by the President on the advice of a Special Advisory Committee. This shows clearly that the Government − this Government − is not averse to introducing such checks if there are good justifications to do so. And on a day-to-day basis, Ministers and the Commissioner of Police do not have as much latitude in their exercise of powers.
However, the POSSPA Bill is designed for serious incidents as per clause 3 where we envision the Police to be in a race against time. Hypothetically, suppose terrorists have taken some Singaporeans hostage, can we afford to put the rescue operations on hold while Parliament debates whether the Minister's Activation Order or the Commissioner's CSO are justified?
And in a terror situation, things can change by the minute. Supposing in the meantime, the terrorists start to harm the hostages and we decide we can no longer wait. The Police mount a rescue operation but, predictably, there was live coverage of the Police operations online. The result: casualties. Would it not weigh on our conscience that we have not given the hostages or the security personnel the best chance of survival because the CSO was not authorised in time?
Ultimately, it boils down to this: there is a risk of too much discretion, but there is also a risk of too much delay. Members will have to weigh which is the bigger risk in a serious incident, which has the graver consequence. This tension was also highlighted by Mr Christopher de Souza, who concluded that \"this Bill equips the Police with the level of power necessary to quell danger and neutralise an escalating target\". I am still quoting Mr de Souza, \"The foundation of my argument is that we have a good Police Force.\"
Perhaps not everywhere in the world, but, in Singapore, we can and should trust that the Police will discharge their duties professionally. Mr Desmond Choo echoed this point.
I hope Members can be persuaded that the threshold, which must be met before the POSSPA powers can be activated, is high. This means that the special powers will not be used for day-to-day policing. It can only be used in exceptional circumstances with many conditions attached already, as some Members have pointed out.
Once the threshold of a serious incident is crossed, we must give the Police sufficient latitude to act decisively and respond to whatever the threat may be. Ms Sylvia Lim used two terms. She said \"muscle\" and \"flexibility\". And I think that sums it up aptly. You need the muscle; you need the flexibility in a serious incident. You need both. After the incident has been dealt with, and the danger has passed, we can have a debate, including here in Parliament, about whether the Minister and the Police did the right thing, and hold them to account. We did that for the Little India riot. We had an inquiry. The inquiry was fairly extended, and the inquiry certainly did point out areas that the members of the panel thought the Government had fallen short on. But you do that after the incident has been dealt with.
We, therefore, agree that it is important for the public to be aware of the obligations under the new Bill when an Activation Order is in place. Ms Thanaletchimi, Mr Ang Wei Neng and Mr Desmond Choo have all asked how we intend to do so.
Mr Speaker, when an Activation Order is issued by the Minister, it will be publicised via press releases and online and social media platforms. The areas which the Commissioner of Police will authorise Police Officers to exercise special powers in will also be publicised via all platforms, where appropriate.
MHA will also continue to inform the public on the key points of POSSPA, like what to do when a CSO is in place. We will do so via our Home Team outreach channels, such as SGSecure.
To increase awareness, Mr Desmond Choo and Mr Ang Wei Neng have suggested conducting exercises for the public on how the powers will be used, especially for the CSO. This is a very helpful suggestion and is something that the Police will consider.
Mr Speaker, I hope I have addressed Members' concerns. The special powers under POSSPA are needed to deal with serious incidents, like terrorist attacks. The special powers, which come with safeguards, will be used judiciously.
As the threats have changed and technologies have changed, we must ensure that the Police are empowered to respond to these new threats. Sir, I beg to move.
Mr Speaker: Mr Kok Heng Leun.
Mr Kok Heng Leun: I thank the Second Minister for her reply. I was listening very intently to her argument. There are two points which I still feel a bit uncomfortable. One is the definition of the \"illustration\" in question, which was illustration (d). Just by the mere words of it, to be honest, I do not sense that kind of seriousness as the Second Minister has described and her subsequent elaboration of what the situation could be.
So, I would like to ask maybe, in this Bill itself, there should be some change of wording in that part of the illustration whereby it is not just about a disruption to daily businesses, but a protracted disruption. That would make it sound in terms of the severity, in comparison to what the Second Minister has said. At the same time, when things are still quite peaceful at that moment, any kind of Police intervention may, under this Bill, actually cause even more problems subsequently. That is the first clarification.
The second one is about asking for accountability from the Minister and the Commissioner. I think just because this Bill is so severe in terms of the action that comes with it, I am asking if that is really not because there is a mistrust, I guess a kind of accountability. That is why, in my speech, I did say that as much as time can permit without affecting the expediency of the Police action, I think even an official report on the decision of the Minister or the Commissioner would be very important to be submitted to Parliament in that process.
I think that is what we really need in terms of accountability. And by putting such a procedure in place, it actually places all of us, or even the Parliamentarians here, plus the Commissioner and the Minister, to a kind of accountability that is open and transparent.
Mrs Josephine Teo: Mr Speaker, I thank Mr Kok Heng Leun for his two questions. I hear what the Member says about illustration (d) and I think the purpose of a debate on legislation is very often to illuminate on what is in the Bill so that Parliament has a record of the intent of the movers of the Bill. And the explanations that go into the Hansard constitute part of the interpretation of the Bill. So, whilst I understand the nature of Mr Kok Heng Leun's request, I hope he appreciates that what has been said in this House, in the course of this debate, forms a substantial basis for us to have a proper interpretation of the Bill. That is to the first question that the Member asked.
To the second question on accountability, Mr Kok Heng Leun is looking at it from the point of view of whether or not you trust the individuals. How do you hold them to account? I would put to Mr Kok to look at it from the point of view of the person who has to exercise these powers. What is the weight of the office that he will feel? His immediate thought is, “This is serious stuff. I have to make the call. I can be asked a question in Parliament and probably not just one. Can I justify this action?”
Is this not accountability? Does this not already encapsulate what Mr Kok says? As I have said, it is not a low threshold at all. If it were such a low threshold, if it was so easy for the Minister to be able to activate POSSPA, or the powers, then I do not think, in 60 years, the number of times in which you can attribute POSSPA powers to have been invoked, to be countable on one hand. That would not be the case.
Mr Speaker: Mr Kok Heng Leun.
Mr Kok Heng Leun: Thank you, Second Minister, for the reply. With regard to the second reply, I think we are sort of in the same place and, in a way, I do agree that it is a heavy and difficult decision. That is why I think that the more difficult and heavier it is, the procedure of accountability becomes even more important. That is why I am not suggesting that we have to call Parliament up to have a deliberation on that immediately. But, in certain circumstances, if Parliament needs to sit to deliberate on something really important, I think Parliament has that moral responsibility to do that.
In this particular case, I am talking about a report after the activation would really be very important to actually lay out how the decision was being made, the threshold we need, without asking for Committees of Inquiry (COIs) and things like that. So, it is just about a certain procedure so that we could also respect the kind of heavy responsibility that these people are making, and they are affecting every individual, at least within that vicinity, of course, also the whole of Singapore.
Mrs Josephine Teo: Mr Speaker, I would like to ask Mr Kok Heng Leun what would prevent him from filing a Parliamentary Question (PQ) to ask the Minister to account for his actions. He does not need a procedure for that. He can already do so.
Mr Kok Heng Leun: Of course, we can always file a PQ in Parliament, but I am just seeking a kind of procedure rather than each time relying on the PQs. And we only meet once a month for that. So, in that moment, as soon as it can, if possible, I do not find that it is a problem to submit a report.
Mrs Josephine Teo: Mr Speaker, if a serious incident as envisioned in clause 3 has happened, does the Member not think that the public would demand an explanation? Does he not think that the public would already expect a report to be tabled? And that even without a PQ, any self-respecting Minister knows that he has to respond. I do not think you need to write it into a Bill. The Minister will have to stand for election. We do not know what timeframe, but he will have to, at some point. And if he has not thought about accountability, something must be seriously wrong. So, I am quite baffled by Mr Kok's insistence on this point. It is a concern that I am not quite sure I understand fully because there is already nothing that prevents Parliament from debating incidents. Far smaller-scale incidents have been discussed at length in Parliament. And when a serious incident happens, I cannot imagine that it will not be brought to Parliament for discussion.
[(proc text) Question put, and agreed to. (proc text)]
[(proc text) Bill accordingly read a Second time and committed to a Committee of the whole House. (proc text)]
[(proc text) The House immediately resolved itself into a Committee on the Bill. – [Mrs Josephine Teo.] (proc text)]
[(proc text) Bill considered in Committee. (proc text)]
[Mr Speaker in the Chair]
[(proc text) Clause 1 ordered to stand part of the Bill. (proc text)]
[(proc text) Clause 2 – (proc text)]
The Chairman: Clause 2, there are seven amendments. Second Minister for Home Affairs.
Mrs Josephine Teo: Mr Chairman, in respect of amendments 1 to 4 as indicated in the Order Paper Supplement, may I seek your permission to move them together as the amendments are related?
The Chairman: Please proceed.
Mrs Josephine Teo: Mr Chairman, I beg to move the amendments* 1 to 4 standing in the name of the Minister for Home Affairs, as indicated in the Order Paper Supplement.
The amendments proposed to various definitions in clause 2 are aimed at supporting the key change in this Notice, which is to make clear that MINDEF and the SAF have command and control over all deployments of SAF servicemen in support of civilian authorities during a serious incident under POSSPA.
Amendments 1 to 4 update the definition of \"law enforcement activity\" to include activities carried out by SAF servicemen using powers under section 201C(9) of the SAF Act.
Today, SAF servicemen may already be deployed under section 201C of the SAF Act to assist civilian authorities like the Police. The amendments made clear such activities can be considered law enforcement activities under POSSPA.
[(proc text) *The amendments read as follows: (proc text)]
[(proc text) (1) \"In page 9, lines 1 and 2: to leave out 'or servicemen'. (proc text)]
[(proc text) (2) In page 9, line 4: to leave out 'or'. (proc text)]
[(proc text) (3) In page 9, line 8: after '(b);', to insert 'or'. (proc text)]
[(proc text) (4) In page 9: after line 8 to insert – (proc text)]
[(proc text) '(d) the exercise of any power under section 201C(9) of the Singapore Armed Forces Act (Cap 295) by a serviceman, or the carrying out by a serviceman of any activity in preparation for or directly in support of the exercise of that power;'\". (proc text)]
[(proc text) [(proc text) Amendments agreed to. (proc text)] (proc text)]
The Chairman: Amendments 5 to 7, Second Minister.
Mrs Josephine Teo: Chairman, in respect to amendments 5 to 7 as indicated in the Order Paper Supplement, may I seek your permission to move them together as the amendments are related?
The Chairman: Please proceed.
Mrs Josephine Teo: Mr Chairman, I beg to move amendments* 5 to 7, standing in the Minister's name, as indicated in the Order Paper Supplement.
Amendments 5 to 7 change the definition of \"serviceman\" to refer to a serviceman who is deployed for duty under section 201C of the SAF Act by MINDEF and is authorised under section 201E of the SAF Act to exercise powers provided for under section 201C(9) of the same Act.
It is through section 201E of the SAF Act that the Minister for Defence exercises control over which powers SAF servicemen are authorised to exercise when assisting civilian authorities.
[(proc text) *The amendments read as follows: (proc text)]
[(proc text) (5) \"In page 11, line 22: to leave out 'deployed for duty in accordance with any order made', and insert 'authorised'. (proc text)]
[(proc text) (6) In page 11, line 23, to leave out '201C', and insert '201E'. (proc text)]
[(proc text) (7) In page 11, line 23: after 'Act', to insert 'to exercise powers under section 201C(9) of that Act in connection with an activation order'\". (proc text)]
[(proc text) Amendments agreed to. (proc text)]
[(proc text) Clause 2, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. (proc text)]
[(proc text) Clauses 3 to 10 inclusive ordered to stand part of the Bill. (proc text)]
[(proc text) Clause 11 – (proc text)]
The Chairman: Clause 11, there are two amendments. Second Minister.
Mrs Josephine Teo: Mr Chairman, may I seek your permission to move the two amendments together as they are related?
The Chairman: Please proceed.
Mrs Josephine Teo: Mr Chairman, I beg to move amendments* 1 and 2 standing in the Minister's name, as indicated in the Order Paper Supplement.
Amendments 1 and 2 are needed to make clear that the Commissioner of Police does not authorise SAF servicemen to exercise powers under POSSPA. Instead, when an activation order by the Minister for Home Affairs is in place, the Commissioner of Police will make a request for SAF servicemen to support the Police with selected POSSPA powers as are necessary.
Under these circumstances, MINDEF will authorise the powers that SAF servicemen may exercise under the SAF Act. I explained during the Second Reading this is to ensure a clearly defined command and control over all deployments of SAF servicemen in support of civilian authorities, including for serious incidents under POSSPA.
[(proc text) *The amendments read as follows: (proc text)]
[(proc text) (1) \"In page 18, line 21: to leave out 'or a serviceman, or both,'. (proc text)]
[(proc text) (2) In page 18, line 22: to leave out 'or servicemen (as the case may be).'\" (proc text)]
[(proc text) Amendments agreed to. (proc text)]
[(proc text) Clause 11, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. (proc text)]
[(proc text) Clause 12 – (proc text)]
The Chairman: Clause 12, there are two amendments. Second Minister.
Mrs Josephine Teo: Mr Chairman, may I seek your permission to move the two amendments together as they are related?
The Chairman: Please proceed.
Mrs Josephine Teo: Mr Chairman, I beg to move amendments* 1 and 2 standing in the Minister's name, as indicated in the Order Paper Supplement.
These amendments are needed for the similar reason as for clause 11. SAF servicemen will no longer be given a special authorisation by the Commissioner of Police under POSSPA.
[(proc text) *The amendments read as follows: (proc text)]
[(proc text) (1) \"In page 19, line 18: to leave out 'and (6)'. (proc text)]
[(proc text) (2) In page 19, lines 29, 30 and 31: to leave out 'or serviceman'\". (proc text)]
[(proc text) Amendments agreed to. (proc text)]
[(proc text) Clause 12, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. (proc text)]
[(proc text) Clause 13 – (proc text)]
The Chairman: Clause 13, Second Minister.
Mrs Josephine Teo: Mr Chairman, I beg to move the amendment* standing in the Minister's name, as indicated in the Order Paper Supplement.
Clause 13 is amended for the same reason given for changes to clauses 11 and 12. Our intent for powers exercisable by SAF servicemen to be authorised under the SAF Act and not by the Commissioner of Police under POSSPA.
[(proc text) *The amendment read as follows: (proc text)]
[(proc text) \"In page 20, line 7: to leave out 'and serviceman'\". (proc text)]
[(proc text) Amendment agreed to. (proc text)]
[(proc text) Clause 13, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. (proc text)]
[(proc text) Clause 14 ordered to stand part of the Bill. (proc text)]
[(proc text) Clause 15 – (proc text)]
The Chairman: Clause 15, there are four amendments. Second Minister.
Mrs Josephine Teo: Mr Chairman, may I seek your permission to move the four amendments together as they are related?
The Chairman: Please proceed.
Mrs Josephine Teo: Mr Chairman, I beg to move amendments* 1 to 4 standing in the Minister's name, as indicated in the Order Paper Supplement.
Clause 15 currently describes what POSSPA powers SAF servicemen can exercise and how they can exercise them. The amendments delete SAF servicemen from this clause.
A key change I will be proposing is to confer on SAF servicemen POSSPA powers through the SAF Act, so that the servicemen remain subject to the control of MINDEF and under the SAF Act.
[(proc text) *The amendments read as follows: (proc text)]
[(proc text) (1) \"In page 22, line 1: to leave out 'who', and insert '(who'. (proc text)]
[(proc text) (2) In page 22, line 1: to leave out 'servicemen', and insert 'serviceman)'. (proc text)]
[(proc text) (3) In page 22: to leave out lines 14 to 32. (proc text)]
[(proc text) (4) In page 23: to leave out lines 1 to 8\". (proc text)]
[(proc text) Amendments agreed to. (proc text)]
[(proc text) Clause 15, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. (proc text)]
[(proc text) Clauses 16 to 31 inclusive ordered to stand part of the Bill. (proc text)]
[(proc text) Clause 32 – (proc text)]
The Chairman: Clause 32, Second Minister.
Mrs Josephine Teo: Mr Chairman, I beg to move the amendment* standing in the Minister's name, as indicated in the Order Paper Supplement.
The amendment will ensure that the Minister for Home Affairs can also give directions to discontinue telecommunications services so as to avoid endangering the safety of SAF servicemen during an ongoing law enforcement activity.
[(proc text) *The amendment reads as follows: (proc text)]
[(proc text) \"In page 43, line 14: after 'officer', insert 'or serviceman'. (proc text)]
[(proc text) Amendment agreed to. (proc text)]
[(proc text) Clause 32, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. (proc text)]
[(proc text) Clauses 33 to 49 inclusive ordered to stand part of the Bill. (proc text)]
[(proc text) Clause 50 – (proc text)]
The Chairman: Clause 50, there are three amendments. Second Minister.
Mrs Josephine Teo: Mr Chairman, may I seek your permission to move the three amendments together as they are related?
The Chairman: Please proceed.
Mrs Josephine Teo: Mr Chairman, I beg to move amendments* 1 to 3 standing in the Minister's name, as indicated in the Order Paper Supplement.
The amendments to clause 50 are to make it clear that POSSPA does not affect an SAF serviceman's powers under Part VII and VIIA of the SAF Act which relate to emergency powers of SAF servicemen and the powers SAF servicemen can exercise in aid of civilian authorities. The exercise of powers under the SAF Act will be subject to the safeguards that exist within the SAF Act.
[(proc text) *The amendments read as follows: (proc text)]
[(proc text) (1) \"In page 62, line 26: after 'Part', insert 'XII or'. (proc text)]
[(proc text) (2) In page 63, lines 27 and 28: to leave out 'when an activation order is not in effect'. (proc text)]
[(proc text) (3) In page 63: to leave out line 5\". (proc text)]
[(proc text) Clause 50, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. (proc text)]
[(proc text) Clauses 51 to 60 inclusive ordered to stand part of the Bill. (proc text)]
[(proc text) New clause (A) (proc text)]
The Chairman: New clause (A), Second Minister.
Mrs Josephine Teo: Mr Chairman, I beg to introduce a new clause entitled \"Amendment of the Singapore Armed Forces Act\".
Order for the amendment of the Singapore Armed Forces Act read.
Mrs Josephine Teo: Mr Chairman, I beg to move, \"That the new clause be read a Second time.\"
I propose a new clause introducing amendments to the Singapore Armed Forces Act which is to be numbered as clause 60. This new clause amends section 201C(9) of the SAF Act to include the selected POSSPA powers for SAF servicemen to use when called upon during an activation order period. I refer Members to clause 60(e).
A new section 201C(9)(f) will be added which incorporates the types of POSSPA powers that SAF servicemen authorised by the Minister for Defence to support civilian authorities can exercise. These are no more than what is in clause 15(6) of the Bill if we did not amend that earlier. The limit on powers are as follows.
Firstly, the powers can only be accessed when an Activation Order by the Minister for Home Affairs under POSSPA is in effect. If there is no Activation Order, the SAF servicemen cannot be authorised with these enhanced powers.
Secondly, the SAF servicemen can only exercise powers that the Commissioner of Police requests SAF servicemen to exercise in order to assist Police during a serious incident. If the Commissioner of Police does not request for the military's assistance on certain duties, the SAF servicemen will not be able to exercise those powers.
Finally, the activation of the SAF servicemen and the exercise of powers are subject to the approval of the Minister for Defence, who remains the authority on whether or not to authorise SAF servicemen to be deployed and whether they should exercise POSSPA powers that the Commissioner of Police has requested that SAF servicemen in aid of the Police Officers deployed during the period of an Activation Order.
I next refer Members to the new clause 60(a) to (d) and (f).
The amendments to section 201C(9)(b), (c), (d) and (e) have the effect of suspending these powers whenever similar powers under section 201C(9)(f) are exercised by the SAF servicemen activated to support the civilian authority using POSSPA powers.
The amendments made clear that the overlapping SAF Act powers are suspended when SAF servicemen are authorised with similar POSSPA powers under section 201C(9)(f). The definition of similar powers is described in new clause 60(f) which inserts a new subsection (11) in section 201C of the SAF Act. However, the powers in 201C(9)(b), (c), (d) and (e) remain available to servicemen outside of a target area even during an activation period.
I refer Members to new clause 60(g) and (h). They amend section 201F of the SAF Act to level the thresholds for use of legal weapons with that in POSSPA, only for the POSSPA powers that are exercisable by SAF servicemen under section 201C(9)(f).
Finally, I refer Members to new clause 60(i). The penalties in the SAF Act 201H will be brought in line with penalties in the POSSPA of a maximum of two years' imprisonment, or $20,000 fine, or both. This will ensure that penalties for public safety and security offences are aligned across the two legislation.
[(proc text) Question for the new clause to be read a Second time put, and agreed to. (proc text)]
[(proc text) New clause considered in Committee. (proc text)]
The Chairman: New clause. The Question is, \"That the new clause* be added to the Bill.\"
[(proc text) The new clause read as follows: (proc text)]
[(proc text) \"In page 69, after line 26 to insert – (proc text)]
[(proc text) 'Amendment of Singapore Armed Forces Act (proc text)]
[(proc text) 60. The Singapore Armed Forces Act (Cap 295, 2000 Ed) is amended – (proc text)]
[(proc text) (a) by inserting, immediately after the words 'public place' in section 201C(9)(b), the words ', where and to the extent that similar powers are not exercisable under paragraph (f) by a serviceman'; (proc text)]
[(proc text) (b) by inserting, immediately after the words 'such barrier' in section 201C(9)(c), the words ', where and to the extent that similar powers are not exercisable under paragraph (f) by a serviceman'; (proc text)]
[(proc text) (c) by inserting, immediately after the words 'paragraph (c)' in section 201C(9)(d), the words ', where and to the extent that similar powers are not exercisable under paragraph (f) by a serviceman'; (proc text)]
[(proc text) (d) by inserting, immediately before the words 'stop and search' in section 201C(9)(e), the words 'where and to the extent that similar powers are not exercisable under paragraph (f) by a serviceman,'; (proc text)]
[(proc text) (e) by deleting the full-stop at the end of paragraph (e) of section 201C(9) and substituting a semi-colon, and by inserting immediately thereafter the following paragraph: (proc text)]
[(proc text) '(f) exercise any of the powers conferred on a police officer under any provision in Part 4 (except sections 17 and 24), or section 31 or 48, of the Public Order and Safety (Special Powers Act) 2018 as if references in that provision to a police officer were references to a serviceman, but only – (proc text)]
[(proc text) (i) when an activation order is made and in effect under that Act in respect of a relevant event: (proc text)]
[(proc text) (ii) to the extent as requested by the Commissioner of Police; (proc text)]
[(proc text) (iii) after a police officer gives an order or a direction under section 19(1) or 21(1) of that Act, if the power under that provision is so requested; and (proc text)]
[(proc text) (iv) within a target area within the meaning given by that Act unless it is a power in section 28 or 31 of that Act.'; (proc text)]
[(proc text) (f) by inserting, immediately after subsection (10) of section 201C, the following subsection: (proc text)]
[(proc text) '(11) A reference in subsection (9) to similar powers exercisable under paragraph (f) is a reference to the following powers described in the Public Order and Safety (Special Powers) Act 2018: (proc text)]
[(proc text) (a) the powers conferred on a police officer under sections 16, 18, 19 and 20 of that Act, where subsection (9)(b), (c) or (d), as the case may be, is concerned; (proc text)]
[(proc text) (b) the powers conferred on a police officer under sections 16, 22, 23, 25 and 26 of that Act, where subsection (9)(e) is concerned.'; (proc text)]
[(proc text) (g) by deleting the word 'or' at the end of section 201F(1)(a)(ii); (proc text)]
[(proc text) (h) by inserting immediately after paragraph (a) of section 201F(1), the following paragraph: (proc text)]
[(proc text) '(aa) do anything likely to cause the death of, or grievous hurt to, the person in exercising any power under section 201C(9)(f) unless the serviceman would have been authorised by the Public Order and Safety (Special Powers) Act 2018 to do so if he were a police officer acting in accordance with that Act; or'; and (proc text)]
[(proc text) (i) by deleting the words '$2,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 years' in section 201H and substituting the words '$20,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years'\". (proc text)]
The Chairman: The new clause will be inserted immediately after clause 59. The consequential amendments* to be made will be made.
[(proc text) *The amendments read as follows: (proc text)]
[(proc text) (1) \"In page 23, line 9: to renumber sub-clause (8) as sub-clause (5). (proc text)]
[(proc text) (2) In page 63, line 6: to renumber sub-paragraph (vii) as sub-paragraph (vi). (proc text)]
[(proc text) (3) In page 63, line 7: to renumber sub-paragraph (viii) as sub-paragraph (vii). (proc text)]
[(proc text) (4) In page 69, line 28: to renumber clause 60 as clause 61\". (proc text)]
[(proc text) Bill reported with amendments; read a Third time and passed. (proc text)]
Mr Speaker: Order. I propose to take a break now. I suspend the Sitting and will take the Chair at 4.05 pm.
Sitting accordingly suspended
at 3.45 pm until 4.05 pm.
Sitting resumed at 4.05 pm
[Deputy Speaker (Mr Lim Biow Chuan) in the Chair]
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Films (Amendment) Bill","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"BP","content":"[(proc text) Order for Second Reading read. (proc text)]
The Minister for Communications and Information (Assoc Prof Dr Yaacob Ibrahim): Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, I beg to move, \"That the Bill be now read a Second time\".
The Films Act (FA) sets out the regulatory framework for the distribution, exhibition and possession of films in Singapore. Under the Act, distributors and exhibitors are required to obtain a licence from the Info-communications Media Development Authority of Singapore (IMDA). All films also need to be submitted to IMDA for classification. The FA, therefore, ensures consumers can make informed choices about films and video games, protects the young from mature content and ensures that films do not undermine national harmony or security, or the public interest. It was enacted nearly four decades ago in 1981 to replace the Cinematograph Films Act inherited from the British, and to deal with the advent of video tapes and discs. Since 1998, changes have also been made, for instance, to address the introduction of video compact discs (VCDs) and the spread of obscene films.
Sir, films play an important role not only in entertaining the public but also in informing and educating Singaporeans and shaping our social development. The FA must, therefore, be updated to remain relevant for the films industry and consumers, but also to continue to safeguard the public interest.
The world today has changed significantly since 1998, 20 years ago. The films industry, the broader media landscape and the needs and demands of Singapore consumers have evolved. There are three key trends that underpin our proposed amendments.
First, our films industry has grown more vibrant. Today, Singapore moviegoers clock more than 20 million visits annually, achieving one of the highest per-capita cinema attendance rates in the world.
Second, technological developments continue to spur changes in film distribution and consumption. Film exhibitors no longer need physical or digital copies of a film to screen it. Instead, the film can be stored remotely, locally or overseas, and streamed over the Internet to a public screening in Singapore. Digital cinema, as this is known, is already a reality in the United States (US). Video games are also becoming more visually realistic, increasingly featuring mature themes, such as violence, gore and sex.
The broader media environment has also shifted as a result of digital advances. We live in an era of media pervasiveness. This gives Singaporeans greater viewing and entertainment choices, but we also have to remain vigilant against content that could weaken our security, stability or unity. Around the world, we have seen a sharp rise in content that spreads discord, extremism and hatred, as well as information campaigns that seek to interfere in elections or the affairs of other countries. While such activities can take the form of tweets and posts, they can also take the form of films. We cannot let them take root here.
Third, our society has become more educated and mature, even as the film and media landscape has grown more dynamic and complex. Coupled with the subjective nature of how films can impact viewers and society, this means that what constitutes appropriate or inappropriate content today could be different tomorrow. IMDA should, therefore, have the means to reconsider and update classification-related decisions, especially those that were made many years ago.
Mr Deputy Speaker, the Ministry of Communications and Information (MCI) and IMDA conducted a four-week public consultation last year to gather feedback on the amendments. MCI and IMDA have also engaged the films industry and community since late 2016. We have received much useful feedback and have modified some of our proposals. Our goal is to make the films regulatory regime more business- and consumer-friendly, while ensuring that it remains relevant and effective going forward.
Sir, allow me to now go through the key amendments proposed.
The first set of amendments seeks to formalise the co-classification scheme, which we have piloted since 2011 for video distribution, and 2015 for film exhibition. The scheme involves allowing external film content assessors (CAs) trained by IMDA to classify films and videos up to Parents Strongly Cautioned (PG13). Sections 19 to 20C of the Bill will formalise this scheme by setting out the registration requirements for film CAs, the types of films they can classify, the duties of the film CAs, and the regulatory steps that may be taken against misclassification.
The co-classification scheme will nurture a pool of CAs familiar with the film classification guidelines and enable films and videos to be brought to the market more quickly, thereby benefiting both film exhibitors and distributors, as well as consumers. IMDA will put in place safeguards to ensure that our content standards are upheld. I would also clarify that the scheme is optional. Industry players will get an additional option for film classification, but those who prefer to submit films to IMDA for classification can continue to do so.
The second set of amendments seeks to clarify the FA's regulatory scope in four areas.
The current FA requires all films to be classified. Anyone who wishes to import, make, distribute or exhibit a film will also need to be licensed by IMDA, unless exempted. Going forward, the type of activities to be regulated will be reduced.
First, the Act will be amended to reflect IMDA's focus on the distribution and public exhibition of films. Clauses 7 and 11, therefore, clarify that licensing and classification will only apply to the distribution and public exhibition of films henceforth. Section 6 is amended to remove the making and private exhibition of films from the FA’s licensing scope. Section 21 is similarly amended so that films meant for private consumption no longer need to be classified.
However, IMDA will still be able to require a film to be submitted for classification. For instance, IMDA may receive feedback that a film contains content that could undermine public interest and would thus require the film for review. This provides a balance between protecting the public and reducing regulatory reach.
Second, section 6 will also clarify that a licence is required for the distribution or the public exhibition of films in the course of any business, regardless of whether the core business involves film distribution or exhibition. Such activities need not necessarily be carried out by cinemas or video retailers; one can easily purchase a DVD at a bookstore. Our intent is to regulate the distribution and public exhibition of films consistently, regardless of the nature of the business. Our concern, Sir, is with the film activity and content, rather than the entity or person. To focus IMDA's regulatory efforts further, we also intend to grant exemptions. For instance, there is currently no need to obtain a licence for the public exhibition of films that are classified up to PG13, and we are considering further exemptions for distribution and classification.
Third, with technological advances, an exhibitor in Singapore no longer requires the physical reel to screen a film. A cinema operator can have the film digitally streamed from overseas for public exhibition. Clause 3 updates the definitions in section 2 to allow IMDA to regulate the public exhibition of films consistently, whether they are screened from a copy or via a transmission. Since online streaming has made film exhibition possible without a physical or digital copy, we also propose to amend section 35 to clarify that exhibiting prohibited films is also an offence, besides the possession and distribution of such films.
Fourth, section 10A is introduced to allow IMDA to create a system of class licences for film activities where a lighter regulatory approach is appropriate. Clause 3 introduces a new definition for video games, to clarify that only physical video games will be regulated under the amended Act. These changes will enable IMDA to enhance the protection of minors by establishing an automatic class licence for retailers of video games. IMDA will be able to impose licence conditions, such as specifying that retailers do not sell Mature 18 (M18) video games to underage patrons. Since the class licence is automatic, video game retailers need not register, nor will there be licence fees or performance bonds. It would be largely business as usual for these retailers.
Sir, the third set of amendments in clauses 11 and 15 seeks to enhance the classification and appeals process in five areas, so as to keep up with changing times and evolving societal norms.
First, a new section 15 will empower IMDA to reclassify films. Films are classified based on the film classification guidelines, which are updated from time to time to reflect our evolving norms and values. A film classified in the past may thus qualify for a different classification rating today. This amendment will enable IMDA to respond to new information or changes in the film classification guidelines by reviewing past classification decisions to keep them up to date. A film may be reclassified to a higher or lower rating. Should stakeholders be aggrieved by the reclassification, they may appeal to the Films Appeal Committee (FAC).
Second, a new section 28 will set out a new right of appeal to the Minister against IMDA's decision in areas other than classification, like refusing licensing, suspending or revoking licences or refusing to register a person as a film CA. This will bring the FA in line with other media laws which have such provisions and ensure that the industry has avenues of recourse for both classification and non-classification related decisions.
Third, section 24, which deals with appeals against IMDA's classification decisions, will be amended to allow a broader group of appellants, so long as these persons have a nexus to the film. This includes the person who applied for classification, the person who intends to distribute or publicly exhibit the film, the maker of the film, and the film CA whose classification rating has been overruled by IMDA.
Fourth, section 24 will also be amended for appeals against IMDA's decision to refuse classification for films that are against national security. These appeals will henceforth be heard and decided by the Minister instead of FAC. We have proposed this amendment as ensuring national security is one of the Government's core responsibilities. It is neither ideal nor fair for a citizen panel, such as FAC, to assess threats to national security, as members may not be privy to the full extent of security concerns due to the sensitivity of the information. Notwithstanding this, section 24A requires the Minister to first consult with FAC before coming to a final decision, to preserve citizen representation in the deliberation of such appeals.
I would add that films are rarely disallowed on grounds of national security, but we need to be vigilant. The amendment also takes into account the increasing pervasiveness of media and how different media, including film, can be used to disseminate content that could undermine our security.
Lastly, section 25 is amended to allow the Minister to appoint between 15 and 21 members to FAC instead of 15 members currently, to change the quorum from five members to at least one-third of members, and to determine the term of FAC members for up to three years. Sir, this will allow for greater representation within FAC and address situations, such as appointing new members to fill unexpected vacancies mid-term.
The fourth set of amendments seeks to extend IMDA's enforcement and investigation powers for better administration of the Act. I will elaborate on the need for these amendments as they received the most feedback during our public consultation.
Besides protecting the young, films are also regulated to ensure that the content does not undermine the social fabric of our society, racial and religious harmony or national security. This is particularly critical, given our diverse, multiracial and multi-religious society. As one of the smallest and most open countries, we are also highly susceptible to foreign influences and information campaigns that can undermine our social values and sow discord among our communities. Advances in technology mean that such undesirable content can easily be disseminated locally, through the rapid and mass reproduction of films in thumbdrives, digital video disc (DVDs) or secure digital (SD) cards, or streamed from overseas for screening in Singapore. Issues like race and religion have torn many societies apart, but, in Singapore, we live together harmoniously. This did not occur by chance, and we need to continue to work hard to preserve it.
Under the current FA, IMDA, as the licensing and classification authority, already has powers to enter premises and seize items that constitute evidence, without warrant, for serious offences, such as those involving obscene and unclassified films. These powers are vital to the protection of public interest so that IMDA is able to secure the necessary evidence for prosecution. Without-warrant powers and the use of reasonable force to gain entry are crucial, given the ease of flight and the ease of removing evidence. For example, an ad hoc public exhibition of an unclassified film can be over in two hours or less, while thumbdrives and SD cards can be quickly and easily disposed of.
However, Sir, there are two gaps today. First, IMDA's existing enforcement powers do not cover several serious offences, such as those involving films prohibited by the Minister on public interest grounds and unlicensed public exhibition. Second, IMDA has no powers to require information or record statements from persons who have knowledge of the offence. Today, even if IMDA seizes obscene or unclassified films under existing powers, the matter has to be passed over to the Police for investigations, despite IMDA having the requisite expertise.
Sections 23, 34 and 34A in clauses 11 and 20 will address these gaps. These new sections empower IMDA to: first, request information and documents that are necessary to ensure compliance with the amended FA and gain access to places where films are publicly exhibited or distributed for inspection purposes; second, require the attendance of persons for the purpose of investigating breaches and offences under the amended FA; and third, enter with the occupier's consent or a Court warrant, search and seize evidence with a Court warrant for FA offences. However, for serious offences in the Act, such as those involving obscene and unclassified films, an IMDA enforcement officer can enter, search and seize evidence without warrant.
We have also made several adjustments to address public feedback. We have confined these powers to the more serious offences, extending them only to those involving prohibited films and the unlicensed public exhibition of films. These offences are specified in section 34A.
The power to enter and search without warrant will only be exercised when the enforcement officer suspects on reasonable grounds that the specified offences have been committed or are being committed, or that evidence of the commission of the specified offences can be found in the relevant premises and it is necessary to secure the evidence to prevent it from being concealed, lost or destroyed.
In addition, all enforcement powers will only be exercised by IMDA's enforcement officers who are and will continue to be trained by the Home Team.
We have also provided an avenue so that owners can challenge seizures of their items in Court within 48 hours of the seizure.
The new sections 23, 34 and 34A will enable IMDA to enforce the FA effectively and efficiently whenever necessary. They will also allow the Police to focus their resources on other threats to security and law and order. Sir, I would like to assure the House that IMDA will calibrate its enforcement actions and only use the most intrusive powers when it is absolutely necessary to safeguard public interest.
We will also enhance the range of IMDA's regulatory actions so that it can better tailor regulatory responses to the severity of breaches. Section 11 is amended to widen the range of regulatory actions that can be taken against licensees for non-compliance with FA. For instance, IMDA will be able to act against a single outlet of a distributor for a breach, instead of penalising every outlet under the distributor.
Sir, I will now touch briefly on the fifth and final set of key amendments in the Bill.
Clause 2 amends the Act's long title to reflect the shift from censorship towards classification.
Sections 3 and 4 are amended to dissolve and transfer the functions of the Board of Film Censors (BFC) to IMDA. This simply regularises the existing practice where the Minister has appointed IMDA officers to BFC since 2003. Thus, there is no need to maintain a BFC structure that is distinct from IMDA. There will be no knock-on changes to the classification processes.
Several sections are amended to remove the minimum fines for various FA offences. This will align FA with modern legislative practice which gives the Courts discretion to impose an appropriate sentence, unconstrained by minimum fines.
Section 16 is introduced to clarify situations in which a film will be refused classification, after being reviewed by IMDA or FAC. It entails no change in content standards for films.
Sections 22 and 22A empower IMDA to approve or refuse approval of advertisements for films and set out the offences involving such advertisements.
Section 27 is amended to confine the Minister's powers to order FAC to only review films that IMDA has classified. This clarifies the FAC's role as an appellate body for classification decisions.
Section 38 introduces standard provisions so that corporations and unincorporated associations or partnerships are also liable for offences under the FA and not just individuals. Section 38B provides for the composition of less serious offences.
Consequential amendments are also made to the Cinematograph Film Hire Duty Act due to the transfer of functions from BFC to IMDA, and the Public Entertainments Act as it has cross-referenced the FA's definition of \"film\".
Sir, the amendments proposed are a practical set of changes that will allow MCI and IMDA to respond to changes in the film and media landscape, while ensuring that the FA remains relevant to both industry and our society. But the media environment remains highly dynamic. MCI and IMDA will continue to review both local and international developments and consider future changes to the Act when the time is right. Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, I beg to move.
[(proc text) Question proposed. (proc text)]
Mr Deputy Speaker: Mr Zaqy Mohamad.
Mr Zaqy Mohamad (Chua Chu Kang): Thank you, Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, for allowing me to speak on a matter that will help grow the media industry here and that has been refined to address national security.
The FA sets out the framework for regulating the distribution, exhibition and possession of films in Singapore. MCI's amendments to the Act, following a wide review, aims to help develop our media industry in Singapore, without undermining our religious and racial harmony, public interest and matters of security. MCI and IMDA's content regulatory approach reflects the community standards while providing more choices for consumers and protecting the young.
I will touch upon four main areas of the Bill, Mr Deputy Speaker: (a) formalisation of the Co-Classification Scheme; (b) appeals against IMDA’s decisions; (c) clarification on films classification; and (d) enhancements to IMDA’s investigation and enforcement powers.
Starting with the new Films Bill which will formalise the Co-Classification Scheme, IMDA has piloted co-classification by film CAs for PG13 and below, and CAs can only co-classify prescribed categories of films for PG13 and below. I applaud this move, as it is pro-business and in the interests of the consumer.
Moreover, this move also helps strengthen capabilities within the media industry to better understand classification guidelines and processes, while consumers can get access to films more quickly. I wanted to ask, since this scheme is optional, as films can still be sent to IMDA for classification, how has the response been from the industry in adopting this?
However, from the IMDA point of view, I would like to understand why it is, in a way, \"outsourcing\" its classification responsibilities. The intent of the Films Bill is to safeguard content standards. What are the safeguards in place to prevent the newly-formalised co-classification scheme from being abused? What happens in cases of misclassification? Have there been examples of such cases since it was piloted?
Further, there is already an existing appeals process for film classification. Why does IMDA need film reclassification powers? Are there safeguards in place to prevent the abuse of these powers by IMDA? For instance, could IMDA be lobbied by interest groups or could be put under pressure, to reclassify controversial films to give them either higher or lower ratings? How do we ensure that this does not happen?
On FAC, currently, the FAC comprises a mix of individuals representing the community, creative, legal and education sectors, as well as academia. How can we make the composition more representative of the community? Will MCI or IMDA take suggestions from the industry for suitable nominations to FAC?
I spoke to members of the film community, and they would like to suggest increasing the transparency and accountability of the FAC's decisions and not just receive an opaque reply. Would MCI or IMDA be open to being more engaging with the industry on the FAC's decisions?
On appeals involving films with national security concerns, I am satisfied that the amendments in the Bill took into consideration that national security is one of the Government's core responsibilities, as the FAC may not be privy to the full extent of concerns from security agencies due to the sensitivity of information.
Some of the community had asked whether FAC should be maintained as the appeal authority for films with national security concerns. There are concerns that if the Minister is to decide on such appeals, they may not be able to represent themselves and explain the context of their work. So, is it possible that the appellants be allowed to make in-person representations to the Minister, or the FAC is part of the Minister's consultation process? Will FAC be consulted before the Minister decides on the appeals involving national security and whether their inputs will be given weightage in this process?
Replacement of Not Allowed for all Ratings (NAR) with \"Refused classification\": a very small number of films that exceed acceptable community norms or are against public interest are not allowed for distribution or public exhibition. Such films are currently determined to be NAR. Under the new FA, such films would be refused classification by IMDA. Why is there such a change in terminology? Is this change really necessary under the legal construct of the amended Act?
As I understand it, the NAR is just a simple change in terminology. Can the Ministry confirm that there is no change to its meaning or application with the new \"Refused Classification\" terminology? I understand that there have only been two such films that have been classified as NAR or prohibited in the past. What are the thresholds and how are the norms and boundaries of public interests defined?
Through my interactions with the local film industry, they are concerned that the new term \"Refused Classification\" could also be misunderstood by the wider international film community and affect the reputation of our filmmakers and films. They are also concerned that the term implies that the film is not viewed by IMDA prior to classification. The Minister probably has to watch many of these films to decide. Can the industry be assured that all films will be viewed prior to being branded “Refused Classification”?
If the Minister decides on appeals of films that are “Refused Classification” for undermining national security, how will the appeals process for such films change from current procedures, where appeals are submitted to FAC under the existing FA?
Under the new Act, IMDA will undertake the enforcement authority from the Police. These include powers to request information, such as documents, as well as interview persons and take statements for a suspected breach of FA or licence conditions. As such, the IMDA enforcement officers will be granted powers to enter, search and seize evidential materials, such as film-making equipment, to enforce against FA offences.
How has IMDA been enforcing against FA offences thus far, given the gaps in enforcement and investigation powers? Have MCI or IMDA considered the merit of continuing with the existing enforcement framework where IMDA relies on the Police where it does not possess the requisite enforcement and investigation powers and what were the compelling reasons to make this change?
Has IMDA or the Police had to use without-warrant powers in the past? If not, why are these powers, including the use of reasonable force in obtaining entry, necessary? Can the Ministry clarify under what types of offences does the power of searching without warrant and to enter, search and seize evidence come into force?
In the case where the offence is the illegal distribution of film, will items, such as film-making equipment – because by nature, filming is not an offence under the FA, only distribution is – or non-relevant items like handphones, computers, which are not related to the distribution and storage of evidence, be seized, too? What is the recourse for those affected in view of privacy concerns that personal and private content may be searched through by the authorities?
What kind of processes does IMDA put in place to ensure proper checks and balances when enforcement officers carry out enforcement activities, especially for entry and seizure without warrant? In particular, for new enforcement officers who may have very little or any relevant experience, what are the safeguards in place when they carry out the above activities?
We have to assure the public that the processes are in place to prevent abuse of authority. For, one, we need to ensure the accountability of the enforcement officers’ actions and that the enforcement powers are exercised judiciously. For instance, all entry and search will be authorised by senior IMDA officers holding the title of Director or equivalent.
What are the training and internal processes in place to ensure that the IMDA enforcement officers exercise the without-warrant powers and forced entry appropriately? With that, Mr Deputy Speaker, I support the Bill.
Mr Deputy Speaker: Mr Kok Heng Leun.
Mr Kok Heng Leun (Nominated Member): Mr Deputy Speaker, thank you for the opportunity to speak on this Bill.
IMDA sought consultation last year with the film community. I thank IMDA for going all out in that concerted effort even before the amendment was being put out, extending the consultation deadline, and that was very helpful. With that, during the consultation, the film community has put out a position paper whereby 48 filmmakers, and half of them well-known filmmakers, have raised their concerns.
So, in my speech, I would address some of these concerns that were put up by the filmmakers which were also addressed by my colleague, Mr Zaqy Mohamad, just now. Some will seem repetitive, so do bear with me.
I will highlight three main areas of concerns. The first area of concern pertains to whether several amendments may restrict the creativity boundaries and artistic space for the filmmakers. The second area is about the sweeping powers given to IMDA enforcement officers. The third area would pertain to the need to ensure due process and fairness in relation to the appeals process under FA.
Let us look at the first area of concern.
There are several amendments to this Bill that I feel might potentially stifle the space for creativity and the artistic work by filmmakers. Under the proposed section 16, a film that is, among others, \"against national security\" or that \"contains any material prescribed\", will be refused classification. I note that there is no specification of what is the definition of \"material prescribed\" nor is there a definition of what is \"against national security\".
Having spoken to some filmmakers, they have expressed concerns that the lack of clarity of the above terms may have the unintended effect of restricting and impeding how to produce their films, since they do not know whether the content of their films may have crossed the boundaries such that it becomes against national security and, therefore, refused a classification. In turn, this may cause the film industry to self-censor on the kind of films that they may produce.
I, therefore, hope the Minister can provide some clarification or guidelines as to what constitutes a film that contains \"material prescribed\", or one that is \"against national security\". On the definition of \"national security\", I note that it is not impossible to provide some clarity on its contours. Take, for example, the Public Order and Special Powers Bill that we debated just now. The Bill has specifically set out several situations that constitute \"serious incident\" that may affect public order and security.
Further, under the proposed section 15(5), the provision sets out several guidelines as to what will be taken into consideration in classifying a film. Although section 15(5) does not strictly relate to issues of \"national security\" or \"prescribed materials\", it does show that it is possible, at the very least, to provide examples of what would be taken into account in reaching a particular classification decision.
Even if it is not possible to give a clear definition of what constitutes \"prescribed materials\" or what is “against national security”, at the very least, the Minister can set out what it will take into consideration in determining whether a film is against national security or contains those prescribed materials.
Such clarity is important to ensure a creative environment in which the film industry will not be inhibited by unknown legal perimeters and to cultivate an environment that encourages diverse narratives and perspectives to be explored through the films. I agree with the Minister that, actually, films talk about what we are and who we are and are important cultural tenets of this society.
On a related note, as regards the proposed section 16 which permits the Minister to refuse classification, I would like to clarify whether this means that the Minister would refuse classification of a film that falls under the proposed section 16, or does it mean that such a film will be given a \"Refused Classification\" rating? Again, I think the way we put the terminology becomes very important so that it would not cause confusion.
Mr Deputy Speaker, I am also concerned about the introduction of a co-classification scheme. This convenience has been welcomed by the businesses, mostly by the distributors, as it shortens the processing time when they can classify their own Parental Guidance Suggested (PG) or PG13 films, instead of waiting on the IMDA classification division. However, the film community is not just made up of these distributors. In fact, the scheme may not benefit filmmakers or consumers.
As it is now in Singapore, some production companies are also distributors. One of them has just bought over even a cinema chain. So, a three-in-one production company, distributor and exhibitor. With so many interests at stake, it could be a case whereby interventions can happen even at the creative process, as early as scripting stage, editing stage, to cut out more, in order to fit lower age-restriction ratings and, in this equal system, the filmmakers may find themselves in a disadvantageous position with lesser bargaining power and have to compromise their artistic vision.
Creators should be allowed to make works that can best express their stories and engage consumers and leave the regulatory and censorship monitoring to the authorities and be allowed to appeal if they think an age-restriction rating is too strict.
But, as we can see in several cases, the consumers are not well-served by this amendment, and can, in fact, be shortchanged by this. This is because distributors are incentivised to cut out shots to achieve a lower age-restriction rating and, hence, reach possibly larger audiences. But consumers may not be fully informed on what they are missing, even when they are still paying for full-price admission.
The fact that the film has been censored is usually not advertised on the promotional collaterals put out by the distributors and cinema operators. So, a rating that is displayed at the box office where consumers buy their tickets would usually be stated simply just as PG13 but, in fact, certain scenes may have been taken away. Instead, maybe it should be accurately reflected as \"PG13 [Edited]\".
At the same time, external CAs will be penalised if they classify it wrongly, hence, it will inadvertently lead to them being more conservative in the way they classify.
I want to now turn to the proposed sections 34 and 34A of the Bill which confers IMDA enforcement officers with intrusive and excessive powers. Under the proposed section 34 that is read with section 34A, enforcement officers are given overarching powers, such as being permitted to enter a place \"using such force as is reasonably necessary to obtain entry\", or to seize any film, advertisement or equipment that may be evidential material without warrant if the enforcement officers \"reasonably suspect\" that certain offences have been committed.
Fundamentally, I believe that such sweeping and intrusive powers should only be granted to the Police who are the custodians of law and order. Moreover, I am concerned whether we are giving too much power to enforcement officers who, as compared to our Police, might not have the operational experience and expertise to effectively discharge such powers.
I further note that under the proposed section 34(11), an enforcement officer may be assisted by other individuals in exercising enforcement powers under this Act. It is not clear from this section who such \"other individuals\" refer to, nor are such \"other individuals\" defined under the Bill. Can the Minister clarify who these \"other individuals\" refer to?
Do such \"other individuals\" refer to IMDA licensing officers and/or classification officers or are they non-IMDA officers? What are the situations which the Minister would envisage the assistance of such other individuals, and can the Minister clarify what are the powers which such individuals can exercise while assisting enforcement officers in discharging their duties under the Act? Apart from the fact that the enforcement and Police Officers are exercising sweeping powers, I am concerned that such powers may be exercised without a warrant under section 34A(2) if such officers suspect that certain offences under the Act are committed.
I note that under the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC), the Police may exercise its powers of search and seizure only when an arrestable offence is committed. Some examples of an arrestable offence under our Penal Code include rioting and voluntarily causing grievous hurt. I note that the offences under the FA are nowhere as severe or violent as the examples of arrestable offences which I have just cited. Moreover, there is nothing in the FA nor in the amendments to this Bill which provides that the offences under the Act are arrestable.
I would like, therefore, to understand why, despite the fact that the offences under the Act are non-arrestable, and, despite the fact that these offences are not as severe as arrestable offences, then why enforcement officers and the Police are permitted to search and seize without warrant.
Moreover, what I feel is particularly egregious is the fact that an enforcement officer may exercise such intrusive powers without warrant, powers that are traditionally within the purview of the Police. In addition, I would like to understand what prompted the Government to provide for such a devolution of powers from the Police to enforcement officers and to potentially other undefined individuals?
In this Bill, the expanding search and seize powers allow for IMDA enforcement officers to break into any venue to collect any \"evidential materials\" as well as \"not evidential materials\" that they happen to take. We must be reminded that what they can seize are not just DVDs or film reels, but now also include personal digital devices, including mobile phones, personal tablets, laptops, computers and any type of storage devices, including thumbdrives, which will now be materials that can be seized for prosecution. How do we ensure that the enforcement officers will not be over-zealous in their search for evidence such that the privacy of individuals is not infringed?
I turn now to the next area of concern, which is to ensure due process and fairness in the appeals process. I am rather concerned that neither the FA nor the amendment provides that the appellant appealing a decision is guaranteed the right to be heard by either the Committee of Appeal or the Minister.
With regard to appealing a decision which is to be heard by a Minister, the proposed 24A(3)(b) merely states that the Minister may consult any person before making his decision regarding the appeal. With regard to the appeal to be heard by the Committee of Appeal under the proposed section 24, the said section did not provide that the applicant has the right to be heard by the Committee.
Mr Deputy Speaker, as a matter of ensuring due process and fairness, it is important that such an applicant has the right to be heard by the relevant appellant body, so that such an applicant has the opportunity to make his or her case personally, if any.
As I understand it, the current practice is that FAC does give an aggrieved individual who is appealing a decision of IMDA the right to be heard. However, unless the right to be heard is legislated under the FA, there is simply no guarantee such a practice will continue.
Another concern that I have with the appeals process is with the composition of FAC. Clause 12 of the Bill, which provides for the constitution of the Committee of Appeal, only provides that the number of members is of, at least 15, but not more than 21 members.
Mr Deputy Speaker, in a submission made by a group of filmmakers during the public consultation, they have recommended that the Committee of Appeal be made up of more individuals from the film industry to be appointed to the committee. Presently, only one out of the 15 members of the committee is from the film industry. I also note that the present committee comprises a few civil servants, school principals, professors as well as lawyers.
However, given that the Committee of Appeal will be dealing with appeal matters concerning appeals from filmmakers, I feel that having more members from the film industry will be beneficial to the committee, in terms of the relevant experience and expertise that members of the film industry can contribute.
To quote from one of the filmmakers in one of the discussions I had with her: \"We, in the film community, do have valuable professional perspectives to contribute, as well as feedback rooted in civic and consumer rights\".
I understand that the appointment of the present Committee will end by June 2019. I hope to understand from the Minister whether he would take into consideration to have a more diverse selection of members of the committee, including those from the film industry, when appointing the next Committee.
I have one more clarification that I hope the Minister can address. I note that the proposed section 24 and 24A of the Bill is silent as to whether the applicant making the appeal will be provided the grounds of decision made by either the Committee of Appeal or the Minister. As a matter of ensuring due process and in fairness to the applicant, he or she should be aware of the basis on which his or her appeal is either upheld or dismissed. Further, providing the grounds of decision also ensures that the decision-maker is held accountable.
Finally, Mr Deputy Speaker, I will turn to the last area of concern pertaining to the continued criminalisation of the making and reproduction of party political films under section 33 of the Films Act. I know that this has not been put up for amendment in this particular Bill.
However, it is stated clearly in the Explanatory Statement that one of the purposes of this present amendment to the FA is for \"excluding private exhibition, and the making and the reproduction of films\". In paragraph 2.15 of the IMDA's public consultation paper, it is stated that, I quote, \"MCI/IMDA would like to clarify that the primary regulatory focus of the Films Act remains on the distribution and public exhibition of the films, as these activities have wider and more direct impact on consumers\" – which was reiterated by the Minister earlier.
Moreover, under the proposed section 2(6), it is expressly stated that the private viewing alone of a film by an individual does not constitute exhibiting the film by the individual. It is clear from the above that private viewing of a film is not sought to be criminalised. However, if a person makes a party political film for the sole purpose of viewing it by him or herself without any intention of publishing or distributing such a film, would such a person be criminally liable?
To put it in context, take, for example, an individual who video-records a political rally. The person then edits the video with a video-editing app by adding in some music and politically motivated slogans for his own personal viewing, or just to share this edited video privately with some of his friends. If I am not mistaken, such a video may fall under the definition of a film provided under the proposed section 3 of the Bill and may constitute a party political film under the present section 2 of the FA. It seems disproportionate that such an individual may be criminally liable for the making of such a video under section 33(b) of the present FA.
I, therefore, hope that the Minister can consider also amending section 33 (b) of the present FA to address the disparity in the standards, where the making and reproduction of party political films are criminalised, but the making and reproduction of non-party political films are not criminalised under the new amendments.
That said, I again would like to thank the Ministry for being very responsive throughout the public consultation period, and for taking seriously consideration of the feedback it received and also have to reconsider and amend certain parts of the amendment Bill in light of the feedback it received.
Now, with regard to my own fundamental position on one of the important amendments to this Bill – which is about co-classification – in 2014, IMDA actually wanted to propose a similar scheme for the arts sector. The Term Licensing Scheme was proposed for arts groups to be able to have their own CAs to help co-classify productions. This was rejected by the Arts community, myself being one of them.
One of the fundamental issues I have with this co-classification scheme is this: that the censorship and regulation guidelines are set up by the authority. Hence, it should be the job of the authority to man the gates but for artists to submit it so that the authority can decide whether they want it, and whether they will classify it or not classify it. Why should I, the maker of the artistic work, be the one doing regulatory monitoring and censorship for IMDA?
Mr Deputy Speaker: Mr Kok, you have one-and-a-half more minute.
Mr Kok Heng Leun: So, in light of those concerns, I am, at the moment, not really sure if I can support this particular Bill because there is a difference between classification and censorship. And in this case, I would not say that there is no censorship. There is classification, but censorship do prevail and that is something that I, as an art maker, fundamentally feel is a problem.
Mr Deputy Speaker: Assoc Prof Daniel Goh.
Assoc Prof Daniel Goh Pei Siong (Non-Constituency Member): Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, the review of the FA that started in September 2016 and ending with these proposed amendments was much needed. Market, societal and technological developments have changed videography and the consumption of films since the FA was last amended in 2009.
Several of the moves contained in these amendments should be welcomed for liberalising the media field and, in effect, encouraging the development of a vibrant media industry. Dissolving the BFC and formalising the Co-Classification Scheme would help further shift the paradigm from knee-jerk censorship to age-appropriate classification.
Amending the licensing framework to exclude private exhibition and the making and reproduction of films recognises the maturity of our society and the media industry. It recognises that our citizens are more than able to make value judgements on what they watch and are not simpletons prone to being brainwashed and losing their moral compass.
I would like to bring up three issues with the review and the Bill. These are: (a) keeping up to date with technology and social norms; (b) the question of public interest; and (c) the regulatory risk of raids and seizures.
Let me begin with the first issue, keeping up to date with technology and social norms. The amendments contained in this Bill seek to update definitions and regulations so that they match the current common uses of media technology. Even the word, \"film\", has a new definition to keep up with the watching of films on mobile devices and through online streaming.
The problem is that the Bill is still very focused on the term \"exhibit\" as the main activity that it seeks to heavily regulate. The expanded definition of \"exhibit\" in the Bill means \"to display, screen or project the contents contained in the film in order that another individual may see it (regardless of the manner of the film’s reception)\". The definition of \"film\" is very broad, referring not just to a cinematograph film, but any video recording or any form of recording with a moving visual image, including computer-generated image.
This covers a whole range of activities that do not fit the common sense of the word, \"exhibit\". In the Explanatory Statement of the Bill, \"exhibit\" is said to include \"showing to any other individual content comprising, wholly or in part, moving images received on a computer monitor, television screen, mobile device or similar medium equipment appropriate for receiving that content, and where the delivery of the content is by a broadcasting service, telecommunications or other electronic transmission\". It is also said, \"But an individual will not be regarded as exhibiting a film if the individual is watching a film alone and in private\".
Given that a lot of people consume and share video recordings of one kind or another on their mobile devices on a daily basis, it would be good for the Minister to clarify the limits of \"exhibit\". Would someone watching a film on his or her laptop or mobile device in a public place, where it is inevitable others standing or sitting close by would also watch the film, be exhibiting a film? Would someone who shares a video recording with friends through Whatsapp or Facebook be exhibiting a film?
This is important because such a wide definition can have a chilling effect on public discourse. In the Closing Note to the public consultation on the Bill, MCI/IMDA said that three things are sensitive subject matters: race, religion or politics. I strongly believe it is important to safeguard our racial and religious harmony and national security. However, to mark race, religion and politics as sensitive subject matters in themselves is to send mixed signals. Social norms have been evolving and Singaporeans seem prepared to discuss race, religion and politics more openly now in a civil manner.
For many decades, Singaporeans have been told that we should avoid discussions of issues related to race and religion because these are sensitive and explosive. Representations of race and religion in Singapore films tend to fall back on safe caricatures and common stereotypes. This does not help in encouraging mutual understanding and respect and may even reinforce racial and religious prejudices. In fact, it is for this very reason that the Ministry of Culture, Community and Youth (MCCY) supported BRIDGE, partnering community groups in providing safe spaces to frankly discuss topics related to race and religion to strengthen our social fabric.
At the launch in March 2017 of BRIDGE, a documentary film titled \"Jihad Selfie\" was shown to over 120 religious and community leaders, who then discussed the complexities of extremist self-radicalisation. This demonstrates that films and the exhibition of films have an important role to play in building and shoring up our multiracialism and multiculturalism. Difficult topics on race and religion should not be avoided by content producers, filmmakers and civil society and community groups. It would be to our benefit that safe spaces, such as those supported by BRIDGE, could multiply through our society and without having to always depend on the Government’s oversight.
It is important that the Government continue to safeguard racial and religious harmony, so there must be a balance. Would the Minister clarify how IMDA intends to achieve this balance in the new licensing and classification regime?
Let me move on now to the second issue on the question of public interest that is to be safeguarded by the Government. In MCI’s Closing Note, it is stated that the Ministry seeks \"to encourage the development of a vibrant media industry, while ensuring that the content does not undermine Singapore's racial and religious harmony, national security or the public interest\".
It is clear that it is crucial for racial and religious harmony and national security to be safeguarded by the Government. But \"public interest\" is a vague term, much like \"exhibit\", which, when unlimited in meaning, would give IMDA draconian powers to ban any film or video recording it deems as against \"public interest\". If the term refers to social norms concerning sexuality and sexual identities, then it should be clearly stated as such. Would the Minister clarify what does \"public interest\" mainly refer to? Is it politics?
I am asking this because MCI/IMDA said in the Closing Note that politics is a sensitive subject matter on par with race and religion. I think this is a terribly outdated view, especially when the Government has been trying to encourage a more engaged citizenry and greater public understanding of our political system and sense of history.
The SG50 commemorations and the passing of Mr Lee Kuan Yew appear to be watershed events in this regard, with a more politically conscious public interested in how the country could and should be run in the context of global trends and world events.
MCI/IMDA also said in the Closing Note that \"social norms could evolve such that lower ratings become more appropriate\". I think our social norms regarding political discussion and expression have evolved. The definition of Party Political Film (PPF) was amended to allow for greater responsible and reasonable discussion of politics in 2009 after the PPF was first regulated in 1998.
Almost 10 years now, from 2009, the absence of an update is conspicuous. I would like to ask the Minister: did MCI/IMDA look into whether social norms regarding politics in films have further evolved since 2009? Because if they had, then the amendments in this Bill should reflect it.
Other than politics, there have been a greater interest in different interpretations of Singapore's history in recent years. It would be good for the country if we could depoliticise history and open the history to multiple but fair interpretations of it. There is no doubt that the events in the 1950s and 1960s are very important for understanding how we have become who we are. It is because they are very important that they should be divorced from the politics of today. The politics in the past should not be conflated with the politics of today. It was a different context with different actors then.
For our sense of history to be credible and our national identity to be deep and authentic, there is a need for society to discuss, debate and understand the different aspects and perspectives of this history. Only then can we truly appreciate why different actors did the things they did without excusing or glorifying them. A balanced view of history results not from monotonous stories reflecting some kind of officially sanctioned history, but from many fair and honest stories told from multiple perspectives.
I come now to the third and last issue of IMDA having powers to do raids and seizures. When the amendment Bill was first put out for public consultation last December, it raised concerns from the public that IMDA officers would have too much power and that the exercise of these powers would erode public confidence in the regulation regime for films. It is good that MCI/IMDA responded to the public uproar by extending the public consultation period and refining the amendments to clarify the powers of entry and search without warrant.
The powers of IMDA officers to enter, search and seize without warrant are now made an exception in the new section 34A. Officers can only exercise the exceptional powers to conduct search and seizure without warrant in two situations: the first situation is that they suspect, on reasonable grounds, that one of the more serious offences has been or is being committed; and the second situation is that they have a reasonable cause to believe that evidence of the offence can be found in the place and it is necessary to secure the evidence immediately.
Though now circumscribed, these powers are still very expansive and, if used in a heavy-handed manner and liberally, would erode public confidence in the regulation regime for films and thus negatively affect the development of the media industry. I would like to ask the Minister three questions in this regard.
First, would the Minister clarify that these powers would, indeed, be used in the spirit of exception, as a \"nuclear option\" of last resort when speed is of the essence in securing evidence of the offence committed?
Second, would the Minister clarify if the reasonable grounds of suspicion of the commission of offence and the reasonable cause of belief that evidence can be found and need to be secured, would be set out to the person or persons affected by the search and seizure so that they could challenge the seizure in Court within 48 hours if they deem the seizure unreasonable?
Third, would the Minister clarify that all care would be taken to ensure that private data in the seized equipment and devices would be protected, secured and returned to the affected persons?
Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, several of the moves contained in these amendments should be welcomed for liberalising the media field and encouraging the development of the media industry. The Government must, however, ensure that the enhanced regulation regime does not cause a chilling effect on the media field or erode public confidence in the regulation process. Clarifications are needed in this respect with regard to the definition of \"exhibit\" and the approach to regulating films containing the subject matters of race, religion and politics. There is also a need to exercise the powers to search and seize without warrant with extreme care, as these pose a major regulatory risk – one wrong move could backfire on the development of a vibrant media industry.
In closing, I would like to leave behind one word. The word is \"gingerly\", as I hope the Government would regulate films \"gingerly\". Today, \"gingerly\" means \"extremely cautiously\", but I also like the old meanings of \"delicately and elegantly\" that are not altogether lost in the word. I hope IMDA would regulate films, especially films produced by our budding local directors, extremely cautiously and also delicately and elegantly.
Mr Deputy Speaker: Mr Louis Ng.
Mr Louis Ng Kok Kwang (Nee Soon): Sir, my parents and my sister played the most important role in developing my values and instilling in me a sense of compassion, honesty and integrity. And it was my late Daddy who always taught me to speak up, to question, to always focus on solutions and to try my best, no matter what.
But films probably played the second most important role in shaping my life, shaping the person I am today. At 14, I watched a documentary, or film called \"Gorillas in the Mist\" that told the true life story of Dian Fossey, an American lady who gave up her good life in America to go to Africa to study and save gorillas.
That movie singlehandedly changed my life and probably my Mommy's, too. I watched that movie with her and, halfway through, I turned to her and said, \"Mommy, I want to be just like Dian once I grow up\". Mommy freaked out at the end of the movie because Dian was murdered by the poachers, and she thought this was probably what her son wanted to do.
And I did. I spent the last 17 years of my life protecting animals. Like Dian, I, too, studied primates, but gibbons and not gorillas, and, thankfully, unlike Dian, I have not been killed. Yet.
Films, continue to shape my life – from the food I eat, to the places I visit and to the father I am today. Films continue to play that important role.
And so, the amendments we are proposing today will not only have an impact on just the films industry, but on all of us, on our society because, ultimately, we are not just what we eat but what we watch.
Sir, in drafting my speech for this Bill, I met up with filmmakers and they have some concerns about the effect of the proposed amendments. I do believe I met up the same filmmakers that Member Kok Heng Leun met as well because some of the clarifications that I will say will be similar to his. They have emphasised to me the need to have checks and balances in the regulatory and enforcement framework.
Films, with their transformative powers, are a crucial part of our nation's arts and culture. It is important to protect the ability of filmmakers to tell their stories openly, honestly and with integrity, and to preserve the right of audiences to enjoy those stories. But at the same time, there is also a need to have regulations in place.
Before raising my questions for clarifications, I would, first, like to commend IMDA for engaging with the filmmakers and the public in their review of the FA, which started in May last year and involved several meetings.
The filmmakers that I met highlighted to me several changes in the final Bill that resulted from IMDA's consultation process on the Bill. This is a good example of how the public can be constructively engaged in the law-making process.
Sir, allow me to now seek some clarifications. The new sections 24 to 27 set out the appeals process for classification decisions, for which there are two appellate authorities – a Committee of Appeal and the Minister.
I understand that, presently, filmmakers are given the opportunity to present their case before the FAC.
Filmmakers I have spoken with have indicated that this current practice satisfies them that the decision was made in accordance with due process even if the appeal does not succeed. Will this positive practice be maintained, and will filmmakers continue to have the opportunity to present their case before the Committee of Appeal and/or the Minister in an appeal against a classification decision?
While there is no guarantee of such a right to audience even under the current FA, the opportunity to be heard is an important procedural safeguard. Further, would the minutes of the Committee of Appeal's deliberations on a classification and grounds for decision on the appeal be published?
Similarly, while a decision of a Minister on a matter of national security is deemed to be final, will the Minister be providing reasons for his decision?
Next, I do welcome the new section 25, which will increase the number of members sitting on the Committee of Appeal, which may provide for greater diversity of views. Can I check with the Minister if we will be including more members of the film community and civil society who can provide professional perspectives and feedback reflecting civic and consumer concerns?
Next, under section 16, IMDA may refuse to classify films in five stated categories. Can the Minister clarify how the proposed category of \"Refused Classification\" differs from the current rating of \"Not Allowed for All Ratings\" (NAR)? Filmmakers also wanted clarifications that the BFC will watch and assess the films that are subsequently deemed to be \"Refused Classification\" notwithstanding the language, which may be understood as suggesting that the film will not be reviewed at all?
I would also like to seek further clarification on the scope of those categories. Can the Minister clarify what would constitute a \"prohibited film\" and \"a film against national security\" respectively?
Can the Minister also shed some light on the type of films that might be refused classification under the catch-all provision \"contains any material prescribed\" that is not currently already covered by the first four categories?
Further, what is the rationale behind providing for such powers to deal with matters of national security under the FA when there are other pieces of legislation, such as the Penal Code, the Internal Security Act (ISA) and the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act that deal with matters that might threaten national security?
Can I also find out if we will be publishing the reasons and bases for the classification decisions by IMDA and registered film CAs? Clearly communicating the grounds for decisions ensures accountability and transparency.
The Bill also introduces a new co-classification scheme, which has been welcomed by distributors as it shortens the processing time for classifications. However, one concern raised by filmmakers is that an external film CA hired by the distributors may be incentivised to cut out shots to achieve lower age-restriction ratings.
Film reviewers would have reviewed and recommended the uncut version, while audiences only see the cut version and may not be aware of what they have missed out, since the full advisory is only available on the IMDA online classification database.
Will the Minister consider requiring all films with cuts to be expressly listed and visibly advertised as such so that consumers are not shortchanged? This could be done, as suggested earlier, on the classification label that IMDA must issue under section 18(1)(b). For example, a PG13 film could be advertised as PG13 (Edited).
Next, sections 34 and 34A extend certain enforcement powers of an enforcement officer. They are granted special enforcement powers that may be exercised without warrant. Can the Minister clarify who will be classified as enforcement officers? Given that these officers will have powers to conduct search and seizure, what kind of training will the officer be required to undergo to ensure that they are able to exercise these extensive powers responsibly? I note the Minister has said they will be trained by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA). Will guidelines be issued for the exercise of their enforcement powers, and will they be publicly available so that members of the public are aware of their rights and available recourse should their personal devices be seized?
Under sections 34 and 34A, enforcement officers will have the power to seize anything which the officer reasonably suspects is evidential material. Can the Minister provide examples of what can and cannot be seized under this provision, given that films do not clearly take the form of just film reels or DVDs as they did in the past, and can now be stored on all kinds of storage devices? This would seem to cover mobile phones, personal tablets, laptops, computers and thumbdrives. The amendments would implicate everyone who owns a camera and storage devices, not just filmmakers. What safeguards are there to ensure that personal materials on the devices seized will not be accessed?
I note that the special enforcement powers of enforcement officers allow them to enter a place \"using such force as is reasonably necessary to obtain entry\". I understand from speaking with individuals within the film industry that this provision is intended for use against errant distributors. Can the Minister confirm that this is the intention behind this provision? Have there been instances where forced entries have been required in dealing with distributors?
Finally, what is the intent behind regulating the public exhibition of films via digital transmission? Will the amendments bring the streaming of films under the ambit of the FA?
Sir, I can see how powerful films are, how much they have impacted me and how we need regulations in place. I can see how much they have impacted my daughter Ella as well. While she has only watched four films so far, Paddington, Madagascar, The Lion King and Ant Bully, but I am pretty sure that, one day, Ella, too, will freak me out while we are watching a film, like how my Mommy was freaked out by me. That, I am not looking forward to.
Sir, I do stand in support of this Bill, and I hope that the Minister can provide the above clarifications and assurances, which will go a long way in addressing the concerns from members of the public and the films industry.
Mr Deputy Speaker: Mr Ganesh Rajaram.
Mr Ganesh Rajaram (Nominated Member): Mr Deputy Speaker, firstly, let me declare my interest. I run the Asian business of a multinational media company, Fremantlemedia International.
Sir, I would like to start by commending the Ministry for this review and the proposed amendment of the FA. The last major review was in 1998 and, in the last 20 years, there have been significant technological and industry developments that warrant amendments to keep the Act relevant. In particular, the amendments will help cater to the advancements brought about by the digital revolution, strengthen the protection of minors and, generally, make it easier for businesses to function.
Mr Deputy Speaker, let me now look at some of the key amendments more closely. The first is the class licensing requirement for video games retailers to enhance the protection of minors. As video games have become more sophisticated and include mature content on sex, violence and drugs, retailers should be taken to task if licensing conditions are breached. This amendment will ensure that all retailers will have to comply with licensing conditions like labelling and age checks.
However, Mr Deputy Speaker, this amendment only applies to physical copies of video games. Increasingly, I have discovered as a parent of a teenager, children buy their games online. What this means is that platforms like gaming consoles and apps are the most common transaction platforms for upgrades and purchases of new games. Parents' Paypal or credit card accounts are required for such purchases. These payment details are usually stored after the initial purchase, with authorisation necessary for subsequent purchases.
The onus, therefore, must be on parents to scrutinise the games that their children purchase online and to make sure that the games are suitable for their kids. I know of many parents who, because of their hectic schedules, are happy to approve these purchases without due assessment. I urge parents to monitor their children’s online purchases until such time when laws governing such online purchases are amended to adequately protect minors.
Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, another amendment that is most welcome is the formalisation of the Co-Classification Scheme for Films. Co-classification of content is not a new phenomenon and has been tested in several countries and adopted successfully. IMDA, or the Media Development Authority (MDA) as it was known then, also successfully piloted a test co-classification scheme in 2011 and classified some 2,300 titles rated PG13 and below.
The scheme, Sir, is a pro-business and consumer move. It is pro-business and driven by the commercial market. Some quarters have commented that co-classification could lead to self-censorship, so that distributors and exhibitors could show the films to a bigger audience. This is not necessarily true as I think we need to give our audiences a little bit more credit. These are commercial decisions, and the market tends to regulate itself.
One example is the 2007 film, \"Lust, Caution\". The distributor originally wanted to release the film as an edited No Children below 16 (NC16) version but, after public feedback, released the original film under the Restricted to Those over 21 (R21) rating. The distributor decided to show several versions of the film to attract a bigger audience. And in other cases, distributors will tend to have just the one edited version because of cost considerations. Mr Speaker, Sir, this very obviously serves to show that these are decisions best left to the market to decide based on commercial factors.
The co-classification scheme also allows for PG13 and below titles to hit the market more quickly. This is pro-consumer, as Singaporean audiences can be the first to watch these films. It has also the desired effect of shortening the window for piracy. This move allows for producers of films and exhibitors to engage in more robust debate about classifications, and this inevitably will build stronger industry capability and better understanding of classification guidelines and processes. Most importantly, Mr Deputy Speaker, this scheme is optional as films can still be sent to IMDA for classification if the distributors want to.
Another important amendment to the Act is the granting of relevant enforcement and investigation powers to IMDA. There has been understandably a bit of a furore over this proposed amendment. However, Mr Deputy Speaker, I think that when it comes to films that could undermine our social fabric, disrupt our racial and religious harmony as well as national security, these investigative and enforcement powers, carried out with discretion and attention to detail, will be a very small price to pay.
What is of most concern for some quarters is the granting of powers to IMDA officers to enter and search premises without warrant and seize equipment, in particular equipment used to procure a livelihood, such as professional cameras used for filmmaking and also personal equipment, such as laptops and phones. The issue here is the possible abuse of power and the privacy of the individuals being searched. There is much concern that the proposed powers of search and entry without warrant could be open to abuse.
Mr Deputy Speaker, while I acknowledge the deep concerns in this area, there is also the argument that the majority of law-abiding Singaporeans, legitimate filmmakers and family home movie enthusiasts alike, would have little to fear. However, I would like to ask the Minister for more clarity on the following as many of my Parliamentary colleagues have done just now.
Firstly, how senior are the IMDA officers who will be entrusted with these powers? While I understand that these officers will undergo training with the Home Team, what is the nature and duration of this training?
Secondly, when is an offence considered serious enough for these officers to enter premises and to seize equipment? Is there a process for a senior authority in the Ministry to assess the facts of the case and to authorise the raid?
Thirdly, what is the recourse for people who have been the victim of these raids who may have been wrongly implicated? I hope that the Minister can share these details as they will allay some public fears.
Mr Deputy Speaker, the final amendment I would like to focus on is the strengthening of the classification and appeals process. One suggestion from interest groups is that the FAC be made up of nominees from all its stakeholder groups. This, in my view, could make the regulatory process an arduous one with different interest groups lobbying their representatives to influence the Committee’s decisions. Perhaps a more practical approach would be for the Ministry to consider options that would ensure that the Committee reflects a broad representation of the average Singaporean film audience. This would ensure that any allegations or concerns about the dominance of particular lobby groups or a vocal minority can be addressed. And once these appointments are made, the Ministry should make public the names and the bios of all Committee members.
Another issue that has prompted feedback is the amendment to make the Minister the final authority to hear appeals for films with national security concerns. I am in complete support of this amendment. Given the uniqueness of our social fabric, which is dependent on racial harmony, national security could be undermined by films that promote or reflect values and tenets contrary to this. And with the digital disruption upon us, foreign influencers can also target the creative community through funding and other more sophisticated means. I believe that the Minister would be best placed to decide on appeals concerning such films as he will have the entire machinery of the Government’s security agencies to examine the sensitivity of the issues involved. I believe that the Minister will also consult FAC before making his decision, and this should allay the concerns of the filmmaking community.
Mr Deputy Speaker, the FA amendment Bill is important and timely in this era of convergence. I support the Bill.
Mr Deputy Speaker: Mr Darryl David.
Mr Darryl David (Ang Mo Kio): Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, digital technology and the Internet have radically changed the film and media industry by democratising how media is produced, distributed and exhibited and have also altered the way we consume media content.
Take, for example, Netflix, which was once regarded primarily as an online-streaming platform that provided traditional film production companies another alternative channel for exhibition. With funding and rapid development and growth, Netflix now produces its own films and dramas, which it shows on its own platform, thus completely circumventing traditional distribution and exhibition channels.
In light of such disruptive evolution to the film and media industry, in light of changing social norms, it is timely that the Government review the FA to ensure that it remains relevant in the age of digital media. I would like to focus on three main areas in my speech.
The first area is the co-classification of films. Section 19 of the Bill provides for individuals to be registered as film CAs to administer the classification of films. This provision is, in principle, a positive one, as it signifies a more collaborative and consultative approach towards film classification.
This should benefit distributors and audiences in the long run because of the wider range of views incorporated as part of the classification process and the increased number of film industry professionals who now have been trained to classify films. However, I do have some clarifications that I hope that the Minister can help me with.
First, while the Bill describes the procedures to apply to be a CA, it does not specify the type of qualifications one needs to have before application and who will approve these applications. I hope that any required qualifications will not be too narrowly defined and the approval process not too tightly regulated.
Second, I understand that the CA scheme might not be applied to all categories of films. Could the Minister please explain why that would be so, and if we could work towards eventually allowing CAs to classify films up to a higher classification level, similar to those currently classified by the authorities?
I would also like to ask under what circumstances the authorities would override or reclassify a film already classified by a CA. This topic of reclassification was raised by my colleague, the hon Member Mr Zaqy Mohamad. My concern is that if the authorities were to do this too often, this could result in the public perception that the authorities only prefer CAs to “rubber-stamp” ratings in accordance with the authorities' pre-approved guidelines and standards.
The second area, Sir, is the appeals process. Any appeals for reclassification are currently being decided by FAC. Clause 12 in the Bill amends section 25 to modify the composition of this committee. It is encouraging to note that the committee size is no longer fixed at 15 but is now stipulated to comprise between a minimum of 15 members and a maximum of 21, with an appointment period not exceeding a three-year term.
I am supportive of this change as it ensures that FAC can incorporate more diversity and FAC gets refreshed on a regular basis. I would like to suggest, however, that the authorities strike a balance between refreshing the FAC too frequently and in ensuring that FAC retains some level of institutional knowledge about the appeals process.
While such structured refreshment of the FAC ensures that new perspectives are being constantly brought in, I feel that the authorities can consider emulating the practices on corporate boards by renewing the tenure of some members beyond three years, provided that it can justify why the tenure of these members should be extended.
This ensures that there is a good mix and overlap of new members and experienced ones, which will be useful should there be a need to rely on experience and historical knowledge when deciding on appeals.
On this note, could the Minister also shed more light on the composition of the FAC and the process as to how members are selected, and does the Government plan to engage the industry and films community to solicit nominees for the committee? I believe that in drawing some of the FAC members from the industry, this will be critical in ensuring that the committee has the endorsement and support from the community and also helps strengthen the buy-in for decisions that the FAC would ultimately have to make.
The third area, Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, is that of films and national security. We heard this debated in quite a few speeches before mine. Clause 11 introduces a new section 24 to deal with appeals to the Minister against a decision refusing to classify or reclassify a film on the grounds of national security.
Mr Deputy Speaker, I spend more than 20 years in the media and communications industry, and I was also a media educator for almost 10 years. As such, I think it is fair to say that I understand the concept of creative freedom in the media and why it is important for us to get the balance right, between allowing space and licence for artistic creativity to grow and blossom but not allowing carte blanche such that anyone can come up with a media product in the name of art or creative freedom that could have a damaging effect on society or on the community.
In my opinion, the Government has been progressive in its attitude and policies towards media over time since I began my career as a media professional in the early 1990s. I believe that things will continue to change both for those who produce media and those who consume it to reflect changing societal norms, consumer tastes and preferences and technological advancements and developments. But these changes need to be calibrated and measured and there are boundaries that should never be crossed.
In a small, multi-ethnic, multireligious country like Singapore, national security is paramount. While most films do not openly preach violence against the community, we cannot ignore that certain plotlines could contain innuendos that may injure the feelings of some communities, or some films could have thinly veiled messages that are disparaging to a particular religion or could be viewed as legitimising certain extremist views.
As such, I echo the comments that my colleague, the hon Member Mr Ganesh Rajaram, made and I am supportive of the Minister having the authority to decide all appeals regarding films with national security concerns. I was also heartened to hear the Minister say earlier that he will seek the views and consult the FAC before arriving at a decision. However, I hope that the Minister will be willing to go even one step further and share with the FAC or even the public, the reasons as to why he would have made a particular decision regarding a film that might be deemed as a threat to national security. Such transparency would not only be illuminating; it would also be educational.
While I am supportive of the authority that the Bill gives to the Minister, I would like more clarity on the authority that the amendments in section 34A of the Bill provides IMDA-appointed enforcement officers.
What training and processes have been put in place to ensure that these officers are equipped with the relevant knowledge to exercise their authority appropriately? And furthermore, how can we integrate this portion of the Bill with other national security initiatives or measures that MHA or the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) might already have with regard to similar threats to national security from film and media sources?
Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, this review of the FA is timely in understanding the changing landscape of the film industry and also helps to better cater to the aspirations and needs of filmmakers, producers, distributors, exhibitors, audiences and the wider community and, indeed, my clarifications, notwithstanding, I believe that the changes are largely positive.
Nevertheless, I am aware of the sentiments held by certain members of the film and media industry that the amendments to the FA may stifle artistic freedom and creative expression and lead to self-censorship. I believe this was also raised by the hon Member Kok Heng Leun in his speech earlier.
I would like to conclude by presenting the view that it actually takes more creativity and artistic innovation to create works of art that exist within certain parameters and boundaries. In fact, one could make the point that having those boundaries might present certain challenges that would inspire and motivate the artist to achievements that might not have been possible had those boundaries not been there in the first place.
Indeed, legendary award-winning producer and writer Lorne Michaels was quoted as saying: \"To me there's no creativity without boundaries. If you're gonna write a sonnet, it's 14 lines, so it's solving the problem within the container\". So, in the spirit of creativity within the container, I end my speech in support of the Bill.
Mr Deputy Speaker: Senior Minister of State Chee Hong Tat, you wanted to make a clarification?
The Senior Minister of State for Communications and Information (Mr Chee Hong Tat): Mr Deputy Speaker, may I have your permission to join the debate by seeking some clarifications and responding to some of the points made by Assoc Prof Daniel Goh?
Mr Deputy Speaker: Yes.
Mr Chee Hong Tat: Thank you, Sir. Sir, Assoc Prof Daniel Goh asked how MCI intends to achieve a balance between freedom of speech, freedom to discuss issues of race, religion, politics, and safeguarding important values, such as racial and religious harmony. He cited a closing note to our public consultation where race, religion, politics were mentioned as sensitive subject matters.
Sir, that section of the note was about co-classification. First, I want to confirm with Assoc Prof Daniel Goh if my understanding is correct, that the section that he was referring to refers to co-classification?
[(proc text) The hon Member Assoc Prof Daniel Goh indicated agreement. (proc text)]
Thank you, Assoc Prof Daniel Goh. So, for that section, Sir, we laid out what we want to do to work in partnership with industry and with film CAs to co-classify films. Minister Yaacob had explained this earlier in his opening speech. We are starting with films up to PG13 to reduce the impact of any misclassification. IMDA is also excluding films with content on race, religion or politics from co-classification. Such content could be sensitive, depending on how they are presented. We are, hence, starting the scheme with other categories of films.
I think it is important, and I would like to clarify, we should not quote that specific line out of context. It is referring to co-classification.
Sir, if I may continue to respond to some of the comments from Assoc Prof Daniel Goh. IMDA has and will continue to classify films and provide age-appropriate ratings and consumer advisories so that Singaporeans, both young and old, can make informed viewing choices.
There is no lack of avenues to raise issues and to debate in real life or online in Singapore. This includes the films industry making, viewing and disseminating films with political content under IMDA's classification system.
Our safeguards are intended to protect public interest against egregious content. This is how we have found a balance between freedom of speech, creative expression and safeguarding our collective greater good. There is significant space in between. It is not one or the other, neither \"free for all\" nor \"nothing at all\".
Sir, Assoc Prof Daniel Goh mentioned about Party Political Films (PPF) under section 33. Section 33 is intended for PPFs which seek to sensationalise or distort serious issues to evoke emotional, rather than logical debate based on facts. They thereby have the risk of harming our political discourse.
But not all films with political content are PPFs. There are, in fact, many films that deal with political content and serious issues in ways that inform Singaporeans, that both enrich our media space and our political space. We should not compare PPFs to other films. They are a different category of films, given the impact that they could have on the integrity of our elections as well as the broader political discourse in Singapore.
The issue of PPFs is a basic judgement, whether it is better to debate political issues with words and logic, or with images and emotions. Given the harm that PPFs can cause to rational political discourse, we believe there is strong reason, and it is prudent, to maintain the current provisions against the making of PPFs. And let me assure the House that IMDA will continue to be judicious in administering the provisions.
Sir, Assoc Prof Daniel Goh also mentioned events in the 1950s and 1960s and how they are important for understanding how we have become who we are. I agree with him that is important to know our history. But we also need safeguards to prevent distortion and misrepresentation of facts.
There will be different accounts of the formative events of our nationhood, but there are also basic facts which are not matters of opinion, and which successors and sympathisers of the protagonists at the time are still trying to deny. Not all narratives are equally truthful and valid.
I believe Assoc Prof Daniel Goh may be referring to the two prohibited films under section 35: Zahari's 17 Years and Dr Lim Hock Siew. The two films are prohibited as they gave distorted and misleading portrayals of Dr Lim and Said Zahari's arrest and detention under the ISA in 1963. The two men were involved in communist activities and had posed a threat to the interests and security of Singapore. The films made baseless accusations against the authorities and undermine public confidence in the Government.
This has nothing to do with the politics today. The fight with the communists is over. But the stance we take with regard to these actions by certain individuals in the past, to distort the facts and to use false portrayals to exculpate their guilt, can have an impact on what others may do in the future which could then affect our national security and public safety.
Sir, looking at how far our films and media sectors have come, I believe we can continue to strike the right balance between freedom of speech and protecting the interest of Singapore and Singaporeans.
Mr Deputy Speaker: Minister Yaacob Ibrahim.
Assoc Prof Dr Yaacob Ibrahim: Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, first, let me thank all the hon Members who have spoken. I will try and respond with creativity within the container.
The majority of them, Sir, have expressed support for the amendments, and raised interesting views and questions. I will address their views in five broad areas.
First, Members spoke about the co-classification scheme.
I thank Mr Zaqy Mohamad, Mr Darryl David and Mr Ganesh Rajaram for their support for the scheme. IMDA has been engaging the industry closely, and distributors and exhibitors have expressed support for the scheme. This is because the classification process is faster and cheaper for participating companies which will only pay a flat fee per film or video title rather than a fee based on the title's duration.
Mr Zaqy Mohamad also asked why IMDA was outsourcing its classification duties. Sir, I wish to clarify that IMDA is not outsourcing its classification duties. Instead, as I have just explained, the co-classification scheme aims to help our films industry to distribute film and video titles more quickly and to save costs. This is one of the ways in which we will develop and grow our films industry.
Mr Zaqy Mohamad and Mr Darryl David also asked about the potential challenges in implementing the co-classification scheme, and the safeguards in place to address misclassification risks. IMDA, Sir, has considered this carefully.
First, the prospective film CAs will be required to attend formal training and pass mandatory tests before qualifying for registration. Film CAs must also fulfil an annual retraining requirement and, when in doubt, they can consult IMDA on a film's appropriate rating. No other strict academic requirements are necessary.
Second, film CAs can only co-classify films up to the PG13 rating. IMDA will continue to classify films that exceed the PG13 rating. IMDA will also classify certain categories of films regardless of rating, such as films intended for film festivals and those that deal with matters of race or religion.
Third, IMDA will conduct regular checks on co-classified film titles and reclassify those that are misclassified. The relevant company will have to replace the classification labels with the right rating and bear the associated costs.
Sir, after the FA is amended, regulatory action can also be taken against the errant film CA. IMDA will carefully consider the facts and circumstances of any case before determining the appropriate step, including whether there is intentional misclassification, the severity of the misclassification, and the film CA's track record. Possible regulatory action includes warnings and financial penalties. The companies involved will also be penalised if they are found to have had a role in the misclassification. However, Sir, all regulatory steps will be administrative, rather than criminal in nature.
As Mr Darryl David said, co-classification is, indeed, a collaborative effort with the industry, to ensure that films and videos meant for distribution and public exhibition are rated in line with the film classification guidelines. Since the co-classification pilots were launched with video distributors in 2011 and film exhibitors in 2015, IMDA has trained and certified 81 film CAs, and almost all co-classified titles are in line with IMDA's own ratings. Sir, we, therefore, believe that the industry is ready for the scheme to be formally introduced.
Sir, I would like to reassure Mr Kok Heng Leun that the scheme will also remain optional, so that those who prefer to do so can continue to submit films to IMDA for classification. It is an additional option. Film CAs have to classify the films with reference to the film classification guidelines, which is no different from what IMDA does today. The safeguards in place will help to minimise misclassification risks. We do not believe it will stifle the creative space for the industry.
Mr Darryl David also asked why co-classification would only apply to films up to PG13. Sir, I would like to reiterate that we are beginning with co-classification for ratings PG13 and below to reduce the potential impact of any misclassification. We will consider whether to allow co-classification beyond PG13 in time, as the industry grows more familiar with the classification guidelines.
Both Mr Louis Ng and Mr Kok Heng Leun spoke about the prospect of consumers missing the uncut film should film CAs edit films to qualify them for lower ratings and asked if we could require all edited films to be expressly listed.
Sir, I wish to clarify that this is not a classification issue; it is a commercial one. Decisions on whether to edit a film and what film versions to screen are purely commercial ones made by film distributors or exhibitors. Some do release different versions for different audiences. I thank Mr Ganesh Rajaram for raising the example of the film \"Lust, Caution\". Another example is the film \"Attack on Titan\", where two versions were screened in 2015, one rated M18 and the other edited for NC16. In these two cases, the distributor decided to screen different versions, so that the films were viewed more widely. Sir, I think this is the right approach, as the distributors and exhibitors know their customers best and can decide which version of the film is the most commercially viable.
Second, Members also spoke about the changes in IMDA's regulatory scope.
I thank Mr Ganesh Rajaram for his views on the video games class licensing scheme. While it is true that online video games purchases are rising, as Mr Ganesh Rajaram noted, these often require credit card or other online payment methods that might mitigate the risk of underage consumers buying games with mature content without their parents’ consent. However, in contrast with online games, anyone can walk into physical stores and buy age-restricted games today without proving their age. Going forward, the class licence conditions will make clear that retailers must also play their part to protect our minors by ensuring that M18 video games are not sold to underage consumers.
Mr Louis Ng asked what the intent was in regulating the public exhibition of films that are digitally transmitted, and if this amendment would bring the streaming of films under the FA's ambit. Sir, I would like to reassure the Member that the amendments will not affect those who view films in the privacy of their homes. The amendments are to ensure that the public exhibition of films is regulated under the FA, whether they are screened from a recording or from a digital transmission. The focus, Sir, is on public exhibition.
Assoc Prof Daniel Goh asked if several scenarios would be considered public exhibition or otherwise. Sir, I believe where such cases arise, IMDA will look at them holistically and consider the facts and circumstances involved. For instance, if you are watching a movie on a mobile device in a Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) station and someone peers over your shoulder to watch the same movie, that, Sir, is not considered public exhibition. That is called being \"kay poh\".
Mr Zaqy Mohamad and Mr Louis Ng asked about the new terminology, \"Refused Classification\", and whether the film would be viewed by IMDA before making such a decision. The short answer is that this is simply a change in terminology. Today, a film is \"Not Allowed for all Ratings\" (NAR) when it exceeds the film classification guidelines and is not suitable for distribution and public exhibition. However, it is often not clear to people if NAR is a rating or not. The new term “Refused Classification” will be more accurate in describing IMDA's decision to disallow the film for distribution and public exhibition.
So, Sir, there is no change to IMDA's classification process. IMDA will continue to review the film and provide reasons for its rating or its decision to refuse classification. This would be the same for film CAs. In fact, section 15 of the Bill requires IMDA to view a film before it decides to refuse classification. IMDA must also give reasons for deciding as such.
Mr Louis Ng and Mr Kok Heng Leun also asked what the films that might be refused classification under section 16 are, where IMDA will refuse to classify any film that \"contains any material prescribed\". This refers to existing film content elements that exceed the R21 rating in the film classification guidelines, for instance, gratuitous depictions of extreme cruelty or content that glorifies substance abuse. Going forward, these elements would be prescribed in regulations, and the provision cited enables it. This will be transparent, as they will need to be published in the Gazette.
Third, Members also commented on the amendments to strengthen the classification and appeals process.
Mr Zaqy Mohamad and Mr Darryl David asked why IMDA needed film reclassification powers, since there is already an existing appeals process for film classification. Sir, with the formalisation of the co-classification scheme, IMDA may need to reclassify films in certain situations, such as where a film CA has misclassified a film. IMDA may also reclassify older films when there are relevant changes to the film classification guidelines, so that their ratings are up to date.
Mr Zaqy Mohamad also asked if there are safeguards in place. Sir, IMDA treats public feedback on film ratings seriously and will give due consideration to the diverse views of our society. IMDA will have to weigh such feedback against the film classification guidelines, which help to ensure consistency in standards applied to all film content. For contentious films, IMDA will also seek the views of the Films Consultative Panel (FCP), which comprises a cross-section of Singaporeans. Sir, IMDA is keenly aware that frequent changes in classification decisions could create uncertainty for the industry and consumers. I would like to reassure Mr Zaqy Mohamad and Mr Darryl David that IMDA will, therefore, reclassify films only after careful consideration. Such decisions by IMDA are also appealable to the FAC.
Sir, on films with national security concerns, let me first thank Mr Ganesh Rajaram, Mr Zaqy Mohamad and Mr Darryl David for their support for this amendment for the Minister to hear appeals involving these films. Mr Zaqy Mohamad and Mr Darryl David as well as Mr Louis Ng and Mr Kok Heng Leun also asked several questions, including what would constitute a film against national security and how the new appeals process for such films would be like.
As I have mentioned earlier, national security is one of the Government’s core responsibilities. We cannot outsource or delegate our responsibility to safeguard the security of Singapore and Singaporeans. Considerations of national security include what would be detrimental to the continued existence of the country, its ability to exercise its sovereign rights, and the safety and security of its citizens and their way of life. In determining whether a film is against national security, IMDA will also consult the relevant security agencies. However, these agencies may face constraints to share the full extent of their security concerns and sensitive information with the FAC, as its members come from non-Government sectors and do not have the necessary security clearances. It will be better for the Minister to decide on such appeals as he will be able to consider the appellant’s view, together with IMDA’s considerations and the detailed assessment from security agencies. The Minister will also consult the FAC for its views before making his decision on the appeal.
We do not disagree with Mr Kok Heng Leun that it would be useful to set out some considerations broadly, which I have done here. But, Sir, given the complex nature of national security matters, the prudent approach would be to avoid binding this in legislation. In refusing classification, let me assure Members again that IMDA has been and will continue to provide grounds for its decisions. Should there be appeals for films with national security concerns, I envisage that we will adopt an appeals process similar to existing Ministerial appeals, where the appellant and IMDA would be given due opportunity to make their respective cases to the Minister via written submissions. Where possible, the Minister will also provide the appellant with the grounds of his decision.
Mr Louis Ng and Mr Darryl David further asked about the rationale for the provisions that deal with films that are against national security, given existing laws, such as the ISA. Sir, these existing laws serve different purposes. The FA governs the regulation of films, regardless of the content theme or concern. It provides the films industry and the public with a single point of reference and clarity on the regulation of films in Singapore. This is a practical approach, given that any one film can contain multiple content themes or concerns. The FA also allows for a calibrated approach, depending on the nature and gravity of any undesirable content. For instance, films that are refused classification for exceeding classification guidelines are not allowed for distribution and public exhibition, but private viewing is allowed. However, it will also be an offence to possess films that are prohibited under section 35.
Sir, on the FAC’s composition, Mr Zaqy Mohamad asked how we could make the FAC more representative, while Mr Kok Heng Leun, Mr Louis Ng and Mr Darryl David asked about appointments and if more could be done to appoint members from the films sector or civil society.
Sir, the FAC already comprises individuals from diverse backgrounds, representing our various communities, the creative, legal and education sectors, as well as academia. We agree with Mr Darryl David that experience is important, too. There is thus also a mix of newer and more experienced members, so that the FAC brings in new perspectives while maintaining an understanding of past decisions. The appointment process also considers nominations from various community groups, such as the Council for the Development of the Singapore Malay/Muslim Community (MENDAKI) and the Singapore Indian Development Association (SINDA).
Sir, we are open to considering individuals from the creative and films sectors, but they should be appointed by the Minister in their own capacity and not as industry nominees. The FAC's role is to hear appeals involving film classification, which takes reference from our community norms and values. The FAC, therefore, has to reflect the range of perspectives that make up our society.
Mr Louis Ng and Mr Kok Heng Leun asked several questions about the FAC. Sir, I am not able to respond on the FAC's behalf but I understand that the FAC generally allows appellants to present in person and will also share its grounds for decisions with appellants. So, this is already the case. I also understand that the FAC would consider allowing appellants to present in person, too, before forming its views when it is consulted by the Minister on appeals regarding films with national security concerns.
Sir, Mr Louis Ng and Assoc Prof Daniel Goh also asked what would constitute a prohibited film. Films are prohibited under section 35 of the FA. It is intended for films with the most egregious content, where even possession of the films would be contrary to public interest. Examples of such content include films that advocate violence or films that threaten racial or religious harmony, the broader fabric of our society or public confidence in our institutions. The Minister will have to exercise his judgement on whether it is necessary to invoke this section, and I think we have been very judicious, as pointed out by the Senior Minister of State. We only have two films so far that have been prohibited. This section ensures that we have some safeguards against the most egregious content, to protect larger societal interests, even as we have moved away from censorship towards classification.
Fourth, Sir, I thank all hon Members who spoke about the extension of IMDA's enforcement and investigation powers. Mr Zaqy Mohamad asked how IMDA has been enforcing against FA offences, given the current gaps in enforcement and investigation powers. Currently, Sir, IMDA seeks the assistance of the Police, for instance, to investigate offences involving unclassified films when they are discovered and seized.
Mr Zaqy Mohamad and Mr Louis Ng asked if IMDA has used without-warrant powers in the past, including the use of reasonable force to obtain entry, and if extending these powers are really necessary. Mr Kok Heng Leun also asked about the rationale for these powers.
First, I would clarify that without-warrant powers are not new. IMDA already has these powers for some offences, such as those involving unclassified films. IMDA has also been circumspect in invoking these powers. They are meant for serious offences and for situations where IMDA has to act quickly in order to secure evidence. IMDA enforcement officers have entered business premises to seize unclassified films intended for distribution or exhibition. However, people have generally cooperated and allowed access, after IMDA enforcement officers identified themselves. So, IMDA has not had to use forced entry. But these powers are still necessary, as we cannot expect compliance in every instance. IMDA has to be able to respond to a broad range of enforcement scenarios to be able to protect the public interest, but it has been and will continue to be circumspect in invoking these powers.
Mr Zaqy Mohamad, Mr Kok Heng Leun, Assoc Prof Daniel Goh, Mr Louis Ng, Mr Ganesh Rajaram and Mr Darryl David – in fact, everyone who spoke – also asked about IMDA's enforcement officers – their training, the extent and limit of their powers, and how IMDA would ensure that they exercise their powers responsibly.
Sir, let me begin by thanking those who contributed their views during the public consultation of the Bill. Their feedback, in fact, has been very useful. On enforcement, it has helped us to gain better appreciation of the concerns about without-warrant powers for entry, search and seizure. We have made several adjustments.
First, we have limited the extension of powers to serious offences, such as those involving prohibited films and the unlicensed public exhibition of films. I have explained the egregious nature of prohibited films earlier. For unlicensed public exhibition, the risk and the ease of flight are high as an exhibition typically lasts two hours or less. But for less serious offences, a Court warrant or permission from the owner will be needed for IMDA to exercise these powers.
Second, we have also limited the exercise of these powers to IMDA's enforcement officers. These officers currently already have to and will continue to attend and pass the Home Team Investigation Courses where they receive both classroom and practical training alongside Home Team officers in areas, such as (a) powers of entry, search and seizure, (b) collation of evidence, (c) recording of statements, and (d) preparation of investigation reports. There are three phases of training with the Home Team: three weeks of basic training, one week of intermediate training and one week of advanced training, with annual refresher courses for all officers. The enforcement officers are also security-vetted and the majority have prior experience in law enforcement agencies. To Mr Kok Heng Leun’s question of which \"other individuals\" may assist IMDA officers in exercising the enforcement powers under the Act, this refers to Auxiliary Police Officers and information technology (IT) forensic engineers. It does not refer to other IMDA officers.
Third, Sir, we have specified in the Bill that without-warrant powers will only be used when the enforcement officer has reasonable grounds to suspect that the specified serious offences have been or are being committed, or that evidence of the commission of these offences can be found in the premises and it is necessary to secure it from being concealed, lost or destroyed.
So, I would like to reassure Mr Zaqy Mohamad, Mr Louis Ng, Mr Kok Heng Leun and Assoc Prof. Daniel Goh that only items used in the commission of the offences would be seized. What is seized, of course, will depend on the specific offence. For instance, for unlicensed public exhibition, IMDA officers are likely to seize the storage medium where the film is kept but not the projector or the exhibitor’s mobile phone. For distribution of unclassified films, the officers will only seize the copies of films being displayed or intended for distribution, but not personal items, such as the distributor’s mobile phone. During the investigation of seized items, only materials that are relevant to the offence will be flagged as evidence, while the rest will be protected and will not be disclosed. This is similar to conducting a physical search where enforcement officers will have to go through the storage space before extracting what is relevant. IMDA's interest would only be on materials that serve as evidence. We have also provided an avenue for owners to challenge seizures of their items in Court. Generally, IMDA will return seized items after investigations conclude.
Sir, these limits and safeguards will be set out clearly in the amended FA, which will be publicly available.
Mr Zaqy Mohamad and Mr Kok Heng Leun also asked whether we could continue with this current arrangement of relying on the Police in areas where IMDA does not possess the necessary powers.
Sir, IMDA, as our info-communications media authority, is best-placed to enforce and administer the FA. It has the necessary domain expertise, and its officers also understand and appreciate the work of the media and films industry. Extending IMDA's powers to close the enforcement and investigative gaps will enable IMDA to administer the Act effectively. It will also allow the Police to focus on the other threats to security and law and order. I believe this approach is in the best interest of both the films industry and Singaporeans.
Mr Zaqy Mohamad, Mr Ganesh Rajaram and Mr Louis Ng also asked how IMDA will ensure that these powers are exercised responsibly. I would like to assure the Members and Singaporeans that IMDA has put in place robust internal processes.
First, all enforcement activities have to be authorised by suitable senior IMDA officers holding the office of a Director or its equivalent. Verification is done to assess and ascertain the veracity of information received on potential offences committed and/or the identity of the potential offender. Enforcement action will only be authorised if a prima facie case is established. The senior IMDA enforcement officer will also be apprised of the operational plan and the rules of engagement, before any action is taken. I would also like to reassure Mr Rajaram that any person who deliberately gives false information to mislead IMDA to initiate enforcement actions would be committing an offence.
Second, enforcement actions are undertaken by a team of enforcement officers, led by an experienced team leader. New or less experienced officers do not carry out enforcement actions on their own. Team leaders leading enforcement activities have at least five years of enforcement experience.
Third, to safeguard against abuse, each enforcement officer is issued with an authorisation card that is distinct from the general IMDA staff passes. It is spelt out in the Bill that enforcement officers must identify themselves if asked, failing which, entry can be refused.
Fourth, an established whistleblowing policy is also in place where members of the public can lodge complaints of abuse. Investigations will be conducted by IMDA's Internal Audit Unit, which is independent of IMDA's regulatory and enforcement divisions. IMDA takes the abuse of enforcement powers very seriously. Depending on the severity of the accusation and the evidence given, IMDA may deploy the accused officer to an administrative post during the investigation. If the allegations are true, internal disciplinary procedures will apply, including the prospect of dismissal.
Finally, Sir, I will address questions raised on issues beyond the scope of the Bill.
Mr Kok Heng Leun asked why the making and reproduction of Party Political Films (PPFs) would remain an offence under the FA or, more broadly, why there is no amendment to the PPF provisions. Assoc Prof Daniel Goh also asked about norms regarding politics in films.
Sir, the PPF provisions were introduced in 1998 to keep our political discourse sober and rational. And, Sir, by a quirk of history, I was on the other side of the House debating the same Bill on 27 February 1998. The FA was then amended in 2009 to exempt and allow political films that are factual and objective and do not dramatise or present a distorted picture.
Sir, we have reviewed the provisions and are of the view that they remain relevant. As Mr Louis Ng shared, films can be emotive and powerful and shape one's worldview for a long time. It is one thing for \"Gorillas in the Mist\" to inspire someone to devote his life to animal welfare, but another thing for distorted or sensationalised films to undermine a democracy and alter the course of a country forever.
Film, Sir, is not an ideal medium for political debate. Serious political issues could be sensationalised or distorted to evoke emotional rather than rational reactions. Films do not allow for effective rebuttals and there is a risk that political debates on serious matters could be reduced to a contest where parties and candidates promote themselves, attack others, or mislead voters through slick commercials and slanted presentations. We should thus not compare PPFs to other films. They are a different category of films, given the impact they could have on the integrity of our elections, as well as the broader political discourse.
It is, therefore, prudent to retain the provisions, so that we can continue to ensure that political debates in Singapore remain grounded in fact, for the greater and longer-term good of Singapore and Singaporeans.
Nevertheless, Sir, I would like to reassure Mr Kok Heng Leun that IMDA will continue to be judicious in administering these provisions. Should cases like the one Mr Kok Heng Leun described arise, IMDA will look at them holistically and consider the facts and circumstances, including the larger intent behind the PPF provisions, to keep our political debates and broader political discourse sober and rational.
Sir, in conclusion, let me reiterate that this set of amendments will help to update the FA and bring it in line with technological developments and shifts in our film and media environment. Many of the changes in the environment are for the better but there are changes that also pose very real risks for us. We are still a city-state with different races and religious groups living closely together on a small, dense island. We believe that the amendments are a right step towards finding a course in an increasingly connected and complex media landscape. Sir, I beg to move.
Mr Deputy Speaker: Mr Kok Heng Leun.
Mr Kok Heng Leun: Mr Deputy Speaker, I am actually responding to my hon colleague Mr Darryl David talking just now about artistic freedom and artists at work. I just want to clarify that most artists do not make work in order to express artistic freedom. I think artists make work because they pick up on things that they think are of great concern to them. That is why when they bring up something of concern, sometimes it may not fall within the comfort of certain particular groups of the society. And that is where the dialogue happens.
Secondly, it is about the creativity within the container. A lot of the artistic work, while it starts from within the container, the intention is then to redraw the container or even get out of the container. Kuo Pao Kun would always say, and I paraphrase, \"Know the frame where you are in, so that you can break away from the frame to create new possibilities\".
The last thing that I would like to address to the Minister is that I really hope that the Minister, whenever there is an appeal, especially for those unclassifiable, that the Minister see the filmmaker face-to-face. I think that will make the appeal process much more genuine and the conversations and dialogues much more in-depth.
Mr Deputy Speaker: I will take it that you are seeking the Minister's clarification on your last point.
Assoc Prof Dr Yaacob Ibrahim: Sir, on the first point about creativity in a container, I just want to clarify one point. I think in his speech, Mr Kok Heng Leun gave the impression that with co-classification, it will stifle creativity.
Actually, that is not the intent. It is really to allow some distributors to co-classify. But it means that you can also make a film for any of the classification ratings that are available out there. The example that I gave and the example that Mr Ganesh Rajaram gave are good examples to demonstrate that filmmakers can actually make a film from R21 all the way downwards to General (G), if they want to do so. It is, basically, their choice.
So, I do not think this co-classification scheme that we will introduce after the Act is amended will stifle the creativity of filmmakers. If anything, from the distributors' point of view, it is a lot more efficient for them to bring their films to the market. But I agree with the hon Member that creativity is important because we want to continue to build our films industry to be dynamic.
On the Member's second point, as mentioned in my reply, the process that we will adopt will follow all other Ministerial appeal processes. Most of the processes, if not all, we will basically deal with the agencies and for the agencies who are involved to give us their submissions. So, I think we will retain that for the moment and we allow it to work out and see how it works and then we will evolve from there and learn from the experience.
Mr Deputy Speaker: Assoc Prof Daniel Goh.
Assoc Prof Daniel Goh Pei Siong: Deputy Speaker, two clarifications for the Senior Minister of State. I thank the Senior Minister of State for his clarifications.
So, when the Senior Minister of State said the phrase about race, religion and politics being taken, you know, that they are not sensitive subject matters because you are taking it out of context from it being put in the closing note on co-classification. So, would the Senior Minister of State, therefore, agree with me that these subject matters are therefore not sensitive in themselves and Singaporeans therefore should be more open to discussing them in a civil matter, of course, in safe spaces? And a filmmaker should be encouraged actually to produce content so that they can spark off discussions amongst Singaporeans about these subject matters. So, they are not sensitive in themselves. That is the first clarification.
The second clarification is on prohibited films. I did not mention those two prohibited films because I have not watched them because they are prohibited. And that is precisely the problem, I think, because I would have wanted to watch them to make the judgement myself that, you know, these films are not good because they promote violence and so on and so forth, to overthrow the Government, and so on. But the problem is precisely that censorship has alerted me to these films. And that is how I knew about these two films. The publicity that surrounds the prohibition, the censorship and the banning of these films actually attracted me to these films. That is what some of the practitioners would call the Streisand effect.
So, has IMDA looked into this Streisand effect and see whether the banning of these two films actually helped to encourage and attract more people to go and look for these films and to watch them and, therefore, we have the unintended consequences of actually promoting these films more than prohibiting them?
Mr Deputy Speaker: Senior Minister of State Chee Hong Tat.
Mr Chee Hong Tat: Mr Deputy Speaker, I thank Assoc Prof Daniel Goh for his clarifications. The first point, I do not think I said that race, religion and politics are not sensitive issues. I think what I clarified earlier was that I asked Assoc Prof Goh whether he was referring to the closing note in which he quoted the remarks from IMDA and MCI, and whether that remark that he was referring to actually came from the section in the closing note touching on co-classification. That was my clarification to Assoc Prof Goh and he has confirmed that that was where he saw that phrase. So, I wanted to just put it in context that when we say that race, religion, politics were mentioned as sensitive subject matters, it was in the context of co-classification. We are not opening up this co-classification arrangement to films with content touching on race, religion and politics for a start. That was the basis of my clarification earlier.
The point that Assoc Prof Goh made about then was should we have films that touch on race, religion and politics to raise awareness, to generate discussion? I think that was the point that he asked. Certainly, I think we do have many of such films. In fact, not too long ago, our Parliamentary colleague, Dr Janil Puthucheary, was involved in two films with Channel NewsAsia touching on race and religion. And there are many other films by filmmakers. Both the filmmakers who are working on films with political content, films touching on race, on religion, I think we can find plenty of examples. What I mentioned earlier was that these films are allowed but they will go through IMDA's classification system. Some may be given, depending on the content. So, it is case by case.
The second clarification on prohibited films, I think this is why IMDA and MCI, we take a very judicious and careful approach to exercising the powers under section 35 on prohibited films. Every decision that is taken under section 35, something that we have to go through very careful consideration, and it should be used really as a last resort because there are many other ways – through classification, for example – to be able to deal with some of the risks and concerns. But we want to keep section 35 provisions to deal with films with egregious content. So, I want to assure Assoc Prof Goh and the House that these powers will be exercised in a careful and judicious manner.
[(proc text) Question put, and agreed to. (proc text)]
[(proc text) Bill accordingly read a Second time. (proc text)]
Assoc Prof Dr Yaacob Ibrahim: Sir, before I respond to that, could I just add a small paragraph to my speech?
Mr Deputy Speaker: Yes.
Assoc Prof Dr Yaacob Ibrahim: Sir, I just want to say that our amendments will give greater clarity to the films industry and society and, where there are greater risks involved, IMDA will be empowered to do the necessary.
Certain regulations have not been amended because the fundamental nature of our multiracial and multi-religious society has not changed. And, indeed, this is something that we want to preserve and protect.
My Ministry and IMDA are confident that these amendments will be a positive move to help film regulations in Singapore evolve with the times, protect our young, provide choices for adults and constructively shape our social development as a nation.
So, I thank all hon Members for their views and their support. As I have mentioned earlier, we will always evolve and we always look for future amendments if we have to do so. But this is always something which is a work-in-progress.
On that note, Sir, I beg to move, \"That Parliament immediately resolve itself into a Committee on the Bill\".
[(proc text) Question put, and agreed to. (proc text)]
[(proc text) Bill committed to a Committee of the whole House. (proc text)]
[(proc text) The House immediately resolved itself into a Committee on the Bill. – [Assoc Prof Dr Yaacob Ibrahim.] (proc text)]
[(proc text) Bill considered in Committee; reported without amendment; read a Third time and passed. (proc text)]
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Adjournment","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"OS","content":"[(proc text) Resolved, \"That Parliament do now adjourn to a date to be fixed.\" – [Ms Grace Fu Hai Yien.] (proc text)]
Adjourned accordingly at \t6.18 pm.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null},{"startPgNo":0,"endPgNo":0,"title":"Smoking and Alcohol Consumption by Spectators and Players in the Vicinity of Sports Stadiums","subTitle":null,"sectionType":"WA","content":"1 Assoc Prof Randolph Tan asked the Minister for Culture, Community and Youth (a) how often do smoking and consumption of alcohol by spectators and players occur in the vicinity of sports stadiums in the aftermath of sports matches, including on the running tracks; and (b) whether there has been feedback from other stadium users about the impact that the gathering of such groups of drinkers on running tracks has on other sporting activities.
Ms Grace Fu Hai Yien: Smoking is prohibited at all sporting facilities. This is in line with the Smoking (Prohibition in Certain Places) Act administered by the National Environment Agency, where smoking is prohibited in stadiums, swimming pools, indoor sports arenas, gymnasiums, fitness centres and so on.
The consumption of alcohol at sporting facilities is generally disallowed. However, alcohol can be sold to spectators and consumed at certain events, subject to the approval of venue operators and licensing authorities.
To date, Sport Singapore has received few complaints related to smoking and alcohol consumption within and in the vicinity of sporting facilities.
","clarificationText":null,"clarificationTitle":null,"clarificationSubTitle":null,"reportType":null,"questionCount":null,"footNotes":null,"footNoteQuestions":null,"questionNo":null}],"writtenAnswersVOList":[],"writtenAnsNAVOList":[],"annexureList":[],"vernacularList":[{"vernacularID":81,"sittingDate":null,"vernacularTitle":"Vernacular Speech by Mrs Josephine Teo","filePath":"d:/apps/reports/solr_files/20180321/vernacular-Public Order and Safety (Special Powers) Bill Josephine Teo.pdf","fileName":"Public Order and Safety (Special Powers) Bill Josephine Teo.pdf"},{"vernacularID":82,"sittingDate":null,"vernacularTitle":"Vernacular Speech by Mr Ang Wei Neng","filePath":"d:/apps/reports/solr_files/20180321/vernacular-Public Order and Safety (Special Powers) Bill Ang Wei Neng.pdf","fileName":"Public Order and Safety (Special Powers) Bill Ang Wei Neng.pdf"},{"vernacularID":83,"sittingDate":null,"vernacularTitle":"Vernacular Speech by Mr Desmond Choo","filePath":"d:/apps/reports/solr_files/20180321/vernacular-Public Order and Safety (Special Powers) Bill Desmond Choo.pdf","fileName":"Public Order and Safety (Special Powers) Bill Desmond Choo.pdf"},{"vernacularID":84,"sittingDate":null,"vernacularTitle":"Vernacular Speech by Mr Gan Thiam Poh","filePath":"d:/apps/reports/solr_files/20180321/vernacular-Public Order and Safety (Special Powers) Bill Gan Thiam Poh.pdf","fileName":"Public Order and Safety (Special Powers) Bill Gan Thiam Poh.pdf"}],"onlinePDFFileName":""}